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Abstract 
This thesis examines the evolution and development of science, technology and 
innovation (STI) policies in Colombia as a particular case study of a developing 
country within the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Region. The initial stage of 
the research analysed attempts by Colombian policy-makers from the 1960s onwards 
to build a National System of Innovation (NSI), following recommendations from 
transnational organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development and the Organisation of American States. This investigation found little 
evidence of systemic relationships between public, industrial and academic 
organisations to generate, exchange and apply knowledge. Central to these 
innovation strategies was a focus upon funding research with public resources to 
strengthen knowledge generation as the main mechanism for promoting innovation. 
This suggested that, although the STI policy was formally defined as following a 
‘systemic’ approach, the policy mix reflected a linear reading of innovation (Tait & 
Williams, 1999) and generated an unhelpful (mis)perception of an uptake lag 
(Brown, Gregson, & Mason, 2015). The study was therefore refocused to develop a 
bottom-up understanding of innovation in selected industrial settings. A detailed 
analysis was undertaken of the innovation arrangements in three key Colombian 
agricultural industries - coffee, flower and sugarcane - within the national economy 
and global supply chains. This is an exploratory qualitative research based upon 
semi-structured interviews and specialised focus groups with key academic, public 
and private actors related with the evolution, design and application of innovation 
policies and strategies at the national and sectoral levels, supported by analysis of 
published and unpublished literature.  
Moving beyond narrow Innovation Systems (IS) perspectives, this thesis brought 
together aspects of STI policy design with an analysis of formal and informal social, 
economic and political institutions. A detailed focus on specificities of the three ISs 
under study highlighted important differences in terms of the generation and 
exploitation of knowledge linked to differences in inter-organisational relationships 
within the sub-sectors and their governance and governability. This in turn pointed to 
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the importance of cultural factors shaping innovation dynamics and the co-evolution 
of sectoral actors with technical, organisational and market changes. These findings 
suggest a top-down and bottom-up approach to understanding how national 
innovation strategy can be embedded in firms and industries.  
This thesis makes three contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it contributes to theories 
of sectoral innovation systems - showing that even at the sub-sectoral level, there are 
very different innovation pathways depending upon ownership, trading relations, 
scale, political insertion, longevity, sources and cumulativeness of knowledge. This 
reinforces the need for NSI to be grounded in broader historical and sociological 
understanding. Secondly, the operation of (de facto) innovation systems needs to be 
understood through a broad analysis of the embedded institutions and the power 
dynamics between the actors involved in the system. We suggest that the NSI 
approach might usefully be reconnected with earlier Latin American intellectual 
approaches that took into account the particularities of local/national industrial and 
knowledge institutions and the insertion of the LAC economies into global trading 
systems. Finally, it provides a critical appraisal of how the NSI approach can be read 
and understood by political actors to justify and shape particular policy mixes that 
encourage a narrow focus on the promotion and exploitation of public sector research 
based upon linear models of innovation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I started this doctoral journey considering the role that science and technology might 
play in developing economies. It was my intent to enquire about the nature of 
innovation, to understand the factors behind different innovation pathways and to 
analyse science, technology and innovation (STI) policy directed towards improving 
competitiveness in national strategic sectors. It seemed that ideas of progress and 
development were heavily based on a linear thinking of science as a main driver for 
innovation, but that there were some ‘black boxes’ in the process of developing basic 
research, its evolution to applied research, and the setting-up of spin-off companies 
and technology-based Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with strong links 
between academia and industry (Tait & Williams, 1999).  
I focused upon my own country, Colombia, as a case study of a Latin American 
emerging economy. The legal and formal establishment in Colombia of a National 
System of Science, Technology, and Innovation (NSSI) directed my attention to the 
NSI approach as the central political artefact used to build STI policies and to design 
policy mixes to fulfil the needs of actors involved in innovation processes. In order to 
analyse the development, implementation and outcomes of STI policies and the 
particular innovation dynamics in the Colombian economy, I realised the importance 
of having a broader understanding of the perspective of the main innovation players 
in the business setting as well as political and research settings. My aim was to 
analyse how innovation actually happens beyond the official and formal version of 
public documents. Thus, I found that only through conducting an empirical study at 
sectoral levels could I open up the understanding of the functional and structural 
dynamics of innovation systems.  This is how this study moves beyond the narrow 
NSI perspectives, and through qualitative (historical and sociological research) 
brings together aspects of STI policy design, an analysis of formal and informal 
social, economic, and political institutions, and sectoral innovation.  
The differing innovation dynamics of the particular (sub) sectors studied, drew my 
attention to the governance and governability of the sectoral innovation systems 
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under study, and stressed the importance of cultural and historical factors in the 
shaping of innovation policies and in the coevolution of sectoral actors with 
technical, organisational and market changes. Hence, this study evolved from an 
initial top-down study of policy implementation, examining innovation promotion 
from the national level, to a bottom-up study centred on sectoral innovation 
dynamics.  
This research is divided into two thematic pathways. The first one presents a policy 
study of the development, implementation and outcomes of STI policies at a national 
and sectoral level beyond their formal definition. The second part of the study 
illustrates how innovation processes take place in three particular agricultural sub-
sectors. I found that in order to provide a wider and more complete picture for 
understanding innovation as a social phenomenon I needed to study different levels 
of aggregation. This is how, through an exploratory qualitative study, I attempted to 
present a comprehensive vision of a country and three sub-sectoral case studies going 
beyond the formal and narrow vision of innovation systems. 
1.1. Background 
 Innovation and the way it is promoted in countries and industries has been a well-
debated topic, particularly within the field of innovation studies, building upon 
Schumpeter’s analysis of the relationships between market structure and the 
processes of competition and cooperation, and development studies examining the 
relationship between central and periphery countries. Various scholars during the 
1980s and 1990s brought together historical insights on innovation processes; studied 
how national production systems relied on industrial dynamics affected by vertical 
and horizontal relationships between business, public, and academic actors; and 
analysed interactive learning relationships between users and producers as the main 
source of innovation. Several analytical perspectives emerged, the most successful of 
which was the National Systems of Innovation (Lundvall 1992b) followed by its 
variants (e.g. the Regional and Sectoral Systems). From this standpoint, I critically 
investigated the National and Sectoral Systems of Innovation Approach as part of the 
academic shift in innovation studies described above. I studied how the concept has 
been used and implemented in political and academic arenas – and noting a particular 
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reading that appears to have been promoted by transnational organisations. Both 
approaches have been used as guidelines for designing policies in developed and 
emerging economies. 
Given the focus of the study on Colombia, as part of the Latin American region, I 
analysed the historical background behind the evolution of science and technology 
policies and discovered that the analysis and implementation of strategies for 
encouraging innovation in the region has important roots in what is known as the 
Latin American Structuralism Approach (LACSA). LACSA is an attempt to focus on 
the particularities of the Science and Technology processes of the Latin American 
and Caribbean Countries (LAC).  
LACSA contributed practical recommendations about the insertion of S&T in Latin 
America and informed priorities about the use of international resources to develop 
technological capacity in the region, the introduction of technology as an important 
element in the development of macroeconomic policies, and the creation of S&T 
institutes to operationalize polices (Furtado, 1960; Munoz, 1981; Prebish, 1986). 
This was the first attempt to explain the different trajectory of development of the 
region from inside. This structuralist approach was based on completely different 
assumptions from ones of mainstream economics and classical international trade 
theories based on perfect competition and profit maximisation at the expense of 
weaker negotiation power. It had a focus on the systemic nature of the economic 
relationships between the centre and periphery, and the structural differences of the 
third world economy as explained by dependency theory (Kuntz Ficker, 2005; 
Munoz, 1981; Topik, 1987). Colombia was not exempted from the political and 
economic situation of LAC during the 1950 to 1990, and so Latin American 
movements determined its historical trajectory. Thus, the development stages of 
science, technology and innovation (STI) of the country are in accordance with the 
fluctuations and initiatives followed by LAC countries. 
After the LAC regional stagnation as a consequence of the Industrial Substitutions of 
Imports (ISI) during the 1970s, in the 1980s there was a recessionary inertia 
characterised by a negative trade balance, an increase in external debt, and constant 
macroeconomic fluctuations that deepen social inequality and enlarged the gap with 
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industrialised countries (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
ECLAC, 1990).  
Subsequently the National Systems of Innovation Approach (NSI), promoted from 
the end of the 1980s, and based on Schumpeter’s work, put institutions, knowledge, 
relationships between users and producers, and technical change at the centre of 
economic analysis and understanding of economic growth. It emerged as an 
alternative to the dominant neoclassical narrative that pursued enhanced 
competitiveness at the country level through the liberalization of markets, limited 
State intervention, and the presumption of a stable market where agents make 
rational choices among well-established options. In the neo-classical account, 
technical change and innovation were residual variables that were not central to 
explaining and encouraging economic growth (Sharif, 2006).  The use and 
appropriation of the NSI approach among academics and policy-makers working on 
the definition and analysis of S&T policies in Latin America expanded rapidly. 
However, in most Latin American countries the approach was adopted with a 
normative agenda that downplayed the complexity of the local particularities and 
neglected that the base conditions under which the approach was formulated, for 
explaining the innovation dynamics of the industrialised countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), was completely 
different from the emergent economies of the south (Delvenne & Thoreau, 2012).  
This is how in most of the political agendas of LAC countries, and certainly in 
Colombia, a narrow reading of the innovation system approach was taken that 
equated innovation with advances in science and technology knowledge generation 
and exploitation and sought to measuring innovation through solely economic 
performance indicators, and proxy research and development measures (Lundvall, 
2007). These approaches were studied in the first stage of this doctoral research.  
In order to understand how innovation processes were actually happening in the 
Colombian context, however, it became clear in the course of the research that I 
needed to go beyond this approach based upon whitepapers, official studies, and 
national indicators. I therefore pursued a broad approach for understanding social 
institutions, the supporting infrastructure, and broad macro-structural conditions 
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(such as the financial environment, cultural setting, political situation, and 
international context) as crucial dimensions impacting learning and competence-
building processes (Lundvall, Vang, Joseph, & Chaminade, 2009). 
The second stage revolved around the turn to sub-sectoral innovation studies. In this 
I moved away from the NSI approach to the Sectoral Systems of Innovation (SSI) 
approach to understand the industrial setting, technological evolution, dynamic 
complementarities, market and non-market interactions and organisations, demand, 
networks and knowledge; and how these dimensions co-evolve in different ways in 
each of the cases, producing particular innovation pathways and dynamics. I found 
that the SSI had better tools to address actual innovation dynamics and was helpful to 
analyse crucial factors affecting competitiveness based on technical progress. Based 
on evolutionary theory and the innovation system approach, the SSI takes into 
account dynamic competition characterized by structural transformations caused by 
struggles between new and constituted firms. It explicitly explores the entrance of 
new technologies and products and the heterogeneity of knowledge, competences 
and learning processes governed by constant interactive processes of creative 
destruction and creative accumulation (Malerba, 2002, 2006; Malerba & Mani, 
2009a). The same way that the concept and application of the NSI approach has 
evolved, the SSI approach has strengthened its theoretical and practical body of 
knowledge through the expansion of more case studies, so the framework has 
remained broad, open and flexible. However, it did not provide effective tools for 
engaging with the empirical complexity and the very differing outcomes observed in 
the study of the three sub-sectoral agriculture chains. I therefore supplemented the 
SSI approach with Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis to understand the 
connections and implications of international demand for building capacity and 
increasing competitiveness in sectors that are demand-driven and that base their 
economic activities in exports, as is the case of the coffee and flower production 
chains.  Other perspectives were also important for understanding the differences in 
political governance as well as supply chain governance, rooted in the particular 
histories and social and economic structures of the three sectors. 
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The agriculture sector continues to have strategic importance for the Latin American 
region despite the negative perceptions of primary industries that reigned during the 
second half of the 20th century. The main objective was then seen as being to 
diversify the economic activities in the LAC countries to break the colonial 
dependence of peripheral countries specialized in the production of raw materials 
that were exported to central economies. This dependence, aggravated by the 
periodic economic crisis of the central countries, intensified the underdevelopment of 
LAC countries, making them dependent not only on the export of agricultural 
products, but also on the import of scientific and technological goods and capabilities 
of developed countries (Gregson & Velasco, 2011). However, the importance of food 
production, the modernisation of agriculture practices, and insertion into GVC has 
transformed the sector and added value to the exports (Salles-Filho, Pedro, & 
V.Mendes, 2007). Although natural resources were not favoured by technological 
progress during the industrialisation period of the 20th century, and the little 
technological progress LAC countries experienced did not translate into larger 
demand or greater profits for the growers and agro-industrial firms, the shift in the 
specialized market demand and a progressive capability-building process in terms of 
infrastructure, technology and human resources during the 1990s and the 21st 
century, have changed the behaviour of the natural resources based business (Marin, 
Navas-Aleman, & Perez, 2009). The study of technological change in agriculture in 
developing countries remains crucial since it represents an important proportion of 
their national GDP and is a major source of employment for unskilled labour (N. 
Clark, 2002). With these considerations and the definition of agriculture as a 
strategic sector in every public document, I decided to base the innovation study in 
this particular sector.   
At the beginning of the second research phase, I initially planned to compare two 
different sectors within the Colombian economy. However, once in the field I 
became aware of the complexity of the Agro-industrial sector, which integrates 
thirty-seven production chains, and the sets of activities that are linked technically 
and economically from the beginning of the production and processing of an 
agricultural product to its final marketing. Given the diversity of production chains 
and their different degrees of evolution and participation in the domestic and 
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international market, there were obvious opportunities for comparative examination. 
I narrowed down my study to three specific chains that are significant and 
representative in the agricultural GDP and the overall Colombian economy. 
Colombia is well known internationally for the quality of its coffee and flowers and 
has been very innovative in the sugarcane sector diversifying the portfolio of 
products to offer non-traditional goods as biofuels coming from the sugarcane 
bagasse. My initial expectation had been that the three chains would have similar 
innovation patterns and that similar policies and practices would lead them to be 
successful at national and international levels. However, I found that even at the sub-
sectoral level there is co-evolution of different dimensions of knowledge, type of 
demand, market size, type of networks and historical determinants. What remained 
important for these three chains was the presence of fairly strong producers’ 
associations representing the growers and firms nationally and internationally to 
obtain better market conditions and to re-distribute profits between all the actors in 
the chain. Also, the existence of sectoral research centres funded by the producers 
themselves has made a difference in the existence and linkage between the 
knowledge creation and exploitation sub-systems. The knowledge sources, domains, 
applications, accessibility and cumulativeness in the sub-sectoral cases have shaped 
the innovation pathways and capabilities in the industries under study. It has also 
been crucial to keep the chains viable not only in an economic sense, but also in their 
social impact, since they are important sources of employment for the country.  
The empirical findings of this study expand the understanding of innovation as a 
path-dependent process relying on social institutions for the diffusion and use of new 
products, services, and processes. The sectoral cases show how technology, demand 
and firms dynamics co-evolve with the type and structure of interactions between 
firms and other bodies, knowledge dynamics, and processes of variety creation, 
replication and selection.  It also provides insights into the use of the NSI approach 
beyond being a currently-favoured political device to create synergies, stimulated 
from the government side, to promote flows of knowledge and learning networks 
among the heterogeneous actors that are part of the intended innovation systems. 
Finally, understanding of the cultural setting, governance and governability of the 
networks, cooperation and competition relationships between firms and power 
  8 
dynamics between actors in developing economies is crucial to explain and 
encourage upgrading and catching-up processes to narrow down global inequalities. 
It is for this reason that it was necessary to go beyond the traditional remit of the 
innovation systems research approach to include sociological and historical methods 
and perspectives. 
1.2. Aim, research questions and scope 
Being part of the Colombian National System of Innovation myself, I had an 
immediate concern to understand the nature of this so-called Colombian NSI, its 
origin and effectiveness for developing innovation in key sectors. This shaped how 
the first part of this research was initially conceived. In order to learn how a 
developing country such as Colombia managed to design an NSI and put it into 
operation, I needed to engage in a study of the policies supporting this evolution and 
investigate if the intended national purposes were being achieved. Therefore, the aim 
of this research was, in the first instance, to do a policy study on the evolution and 
implementation of science, technology and innovation policy in the context of the 
national systems of innovation approach.  
Once I engaged in the study of innovation policies, I realised that, in order to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the designated Colombian NSI, a study 
of the operation of the sectors was essential. From an NSI perspective a number of 
acute weaknesses in the Colombian NSI were visible – particularly in terms of 
linking Public Sector Research to industry. However it was difficult to understand 
the reasons behind STI policy failures just by using the NSI lens. Thus, a new 
approach was required. This is how the second pathway of this research was defined: 
to do an innovation study of the dynamic complementarities of the Colombian 
innovation system through the study of specific sectoral dynamics.  
The analytical power of the NSI approach and its utility in the policy sphere for less 
developed countries (or peripheral countries, developing economies, emerging 
economies or whatever the term used to describe countries that are not within the 
group of countries with better economic performance) has been central for this 
research. The systemic nature of innovation appeared to be an indisputable factor at  
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the beginning of this study. As the study progressed however, the NSI approach, was 
revealed as a particular heuristic tool used by Colombian policy-makers. This is why 
the literature review of this thesis portrays an extensive analysis of the systems 
analysis approach in general and the systems of innovation approach in particular to 
fulfil the research aim. Colombia was chosen as a case study as it was my home 
country, where I was well placed to undertake the kind of detailed empirical study 
that could contribute to advance and strengthen the theoretical corpus of innovation 
studies in contexts where social, political and economic problems require a broader 
and deeper approach to promoting innovation, not only to encourage economic 
growth, but also (and more importantly) to improve the living conditions of the 
population. Consequently, it was clear for me that I needed to address not only 
economic variables when innovation processes through technical change are thriving, 
but to attempt to understand the social dynamics in which the innovation systems 
were rooted (Lundvall, Joseph, Chaminade, & Vang, 2009).  
I also wanted to go beyond statistics and quantitative studies to find the reasons 
behind poor national and sectoral performance. This motivated me to perform a 
qualitative investigation. My aim was to have a closer understanding of the so-called 
national system of innovation and integrate the perceptions of those who are or were 
responsible for the national and sectoral STI strategy design. I wanted to see how 
sectoral actors interact and how actual learning processes were or were not taking 
place between public, private and academic actors. The role of intermediaries 
between the research and business systems is also taken into account, even when 
their presence in the Colombian NSI is limited. The necessity for having more 
qualitative studies is highlighted in the recent, and only, assessment of the 
Colombian National System of Science, Technology and Innovation made by the 
OECD (2013): 
The second category – evaluative studies – is less well 
developed in Colombia. There is a tradition of quantitative 
analysis of interventions that affect companies, normally 
based on surveys and econometric techniques. These are 
typically done by international funding bodies, especially the 
IDB, and are valuable in terms of accountability. However, 
they are not designed at present to generate the necessary 
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insight into the mechanisms of intervention, alternative 
means to reach the desired goals, or identification of further 
needs for intervention. They need to be supplemented by 
more qualitative, “soft” approaches that enable learning. 
Evaluation needs to be better incorporated into national 
practice. (OECD, 2013, p. 36) 
The above considerations were the standpoint to formulate the research questions 
that guided this study. The research questions emerged to some extent from the 
understanding of the systems of innovation analytical framework and the specificities 
of the Latin American innovation pathways, but they were importantly shaped by the 
empirical research and my experience as a practitioner. In this sense, as it is 
explained in chapter 3 (Methodology and Research Design), this study has an 
inductive nature. The first question is both descriptive and analytic, so it has implicit 
what and why questions.  
1. How has Colombia attempted to establish a national system of innovation? 
In order to contribute to the understanding of science, technology and innovation 
policies and instruments in Colombia, I studied the framework outlining what the 
national system of innovation is according to official public documents and the 
perception of key actors within the system. This question can be perceived at first 
glance as a descriptive inquiry about the object of study, and it certainly is, but once 
the investigation started, subsidiary questions about the divergence between the 
system described formally, and the system perceived by the actual actors, raised the 
questions: How has the process of development and implementation of STI policies 
unfolded? What has been achieved? The first part of this research deals with these 
questions. When reading policies, laws, decrees, and general normative frameworks, 
the explicit existence of a national system of science, technology and innovation was 
stated and taken for granted. My subsequent study of the evolution, implementation 
and outcomes of the STI policies both at the national and sectoral level revealed a 
whole spectrum of innovation practices beyond the normative and formal framework. 
I wanted to understand and analyse how innovation actually happens and to inquire 
about the existent challenges and opportunities to reach linkages between public 
agencies, research and educational organisations, firms and producers, and 
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knowledge brokers. I analysed the Colombian STI policies from 1968, when the 
National Institute for Science and Technology was constituted, until 2011, two years 
after the current national law of science and technology was launched. I found that 
the actual innovation agents have developed networks which have led them to be 
competitive through a variety of mechanisms that go from formal models of 
knowledge and technology transfer, validation and appropriation, to informal 
techniques of communication, cooperation and competition that have encouraged 
substantial changes in their operation.  
Once a national picture of the innovation landscape was achieved, I moved to 
investigate actual innovation dynamics between firms, research centres, sectoral 
actors and authorities. This took me to the second question. 
2. What are the main innovation dynamics differences in the Colombian coffee, 
flower, and sugarcane sub-sectors? 
As I began to address the dynamics of innovation in Colombian agriculture my 
attention was immediate drawn to the diversity of context and dynamics of the 
innovation between (sub)sectors. For responding to this question I mainly used the 
Sectoral Systems of Innovation (SSI) approach as the analytical base framework. The 
study started with the description and analysis of the agriculture sector in Latin 
America and in Colombia, and its importance in the economic activities of the region 
and the country (this also gives a sense of the social impact that the sector has in 
terms of jobs creation and absorption of unskilled labour). The purpose was to learn 
how the sectoral policies were created, the role of firm and non-firm organisations, 
and their internal interactions in the creation of learning cycles.  
Given the complexity and variety in economic activities within the sector, I decided 
to restrict the study to three successful sub-sectors in which the country is recognised 
by its good performance both at the national and international levels. By 
investigating public documents, academic and market studies, and going to the field 
(so to speak) with the main actors in charge of the production of services and goods, 
I analysed the industrial setting, technological evolution, and dynamic 
complementarities; the type and structure among firm and non-firm organisations; 
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demand, network and knowledge types; and in general how the institutional setting, 
both formal and informal shaped particular innovation patterns.  
Basically, with this question my intention was to explore these differences to 
determine and examine the factors that influence sectoral behaviour and innovation 
pathways. The subsidiary questions behind the main one are: How formal and 
informal institutions have affected the innovation pathways in the industries under 
study? What barriers and drivers to change have been crucial to generating alignment 
between actors and promoting effective knowledge generation and exploitation? 
What does the study of particular sub-sectors in addition to the Sectoral Innovation 
Approach tell us?  
The final step was to analyse the way in which the national policies, and the policy 
mix designed and implemented, promoted innovation in the productive sector. My 
interest turned to examine the connection or disconnection between national and 
sectoral policies and more specifically to analyse innovation flows between the 
named innovation systems. This aspect took me to the third question:   
3. How are top-down and bottom-up innovation dynamics within sectoral levels 
developed and enhanced? 
This is an analytic question. Once a clear outlook of the national and sectoral policies 
was in place and the intention of having systemic relationships between actors and 
components was examined, the enquiry moved to focus on the relationship between 
the macro level, in terms of industrial, economic, educational and planning 
regulations and laws; the meso level, or the existence and operation of support 
infrastructure composed by standards, intellectual property rights, and non-firm 
support organisations; and the micro level, comprising producers and firms. It is 
important to note here, that even considering firms and producers in the agriculture 
sector, I did not delve into internal firm dynamics for carrying out their innovation 
processes. The purpose was to have a bottom-up approach to understand the 
relationship between firms and producers within the same sector and with their 
upward and backward vertical and horizontal integration, but this research did not 
attempt to produce an extensive account of innovation management at the firm level. 
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By looking at the national level in the first question, I intended to have a top-down 
approach towards innovation and its promotion through national and sectoral 
policies, and this question directed the analytical attention to innovation from the 
bottom. 
The purpose was to examine the composition and relationships between enabling 
mechanisms expressed in policy mixes, and the actual dynamics and innovation 
pathways of public, research and business actors in the innovation space. I intended 
to explore the composition of the national, sectoral and sub-sectoral systems in the 
light of their purpose, the means or mechanisms available to execute innovation 
strategies and the financial and human resources devoted to achieve the expected 
goals.   
By answering these questions, I expected to find common practices and aspects that 
could be identified as successful for having radical and incremental innovation and to 
understand if these processes and pathways have been influenced by sectoral and 
national dynamics or if on the contrary, the success of these sub-sectors have fed 
inter sectoral and national practices. Mostly, as Malerba clearly says (Malerba, 
2002), it is important to determine what is co-evolving with what in the sectors, so 
more sectoral research studies can give a broader account of the importance of 
specific features and particularities to explain innovation in the heart of the backbone 
of any innovation system, the firms, and in the case of agriculture, the producers and 
growers themselves. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
Moving forward, the second chapter presents the analytical framework used in this 
thesis to answer the research questions and accomplished the research aim. I looked 
into the systems analysis approach as a mechanism to understand the world and 
provide a comprehensive view and solutions to problematic situations or to model 
intended realities. Then the national system of innovation approach (NSI) and 
sectoral system of innovation approach (SSI) were analysed as heuristic analytical 
devices to understand innovation and intervene in national and sectoral patterns to 
maximise social and economic benefits. A deep study of institutions, knowledge 
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transactions, networks and co-dependence of social, technical and economic factors 
to lead innovation in the business sector were included in this chapter. Given that the 
case study is a Latin American country considered as a developing economy, I 
provided an explanation of the economic, political and academic particularities of the 
LAC region in order to understand the historical and cultural setting that makes the 
region particular and explains the social and economic shifts which occurred during 
the 20th century. Since the innovation systems cannot be studied in isolation from the 
political framework (Foray, 2009; Galli & Teubal, 1997), in this chapter I analyse 
different approaches to design, implement and asses science, technology and 
innovation policies and highlight the importance of specific governability and 
governance types to manage innovation systems. Finally, a flexible approach to 
understand social systems and enhance innovation policies in uncertain and complex 
conditions –every human system is complex, and has different levels of ambiguity 
and uncertainty- is explored as a complementary analytical framework. 
In the third chapter, I present the methodology followed to develop this research. 
First I outline the research strategies, epistemological and ontological assumptions, 
and the research paradigms behind the options chosen. In this section I explain the 
main research choices made in the research along with an explanation of the reasons 
behind the methodological decisions. A second section explores the data collection 
performed, a description of the methods used and the distribution of research 
participants according to their action field.  The third section provides a detailed 
account of the methods and tools used to analyse the data and finally the chapter 
explores the methodological and practical limitations of the present research. 
Chapter four includes discussion and findings about the first theoretical strand of the 
thesis: the policy study of the national and sectoral systems of innovation. The 
chapter is divided into six sub-sections, two of them being introduction and 
conclusions, and the four remaining bring together findings and analysis of the 
processes of science, technology and innovation policy development, implementation 
and outcomes at the national level and a fifth section about the evolution and results 
of the Agro-industrial system of innovation. This chapter presents the top-down view 
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intended in this thesis as an analytical strategy to understand the explicit and implicit 
mechanisms that affect and guide specific innovation patterns. 
Chapter five presents the second thematic branch, the innovation study performed in 
this thesis. In this chapter I present the sub-sectoral case studies using the same 
analytical lenses to understand the sub-sectoral dynamics towards knowledge 
generation and knowledge exploitation to keep the production chains viable both at 
the economic, social and environmental levels. I found that the historical context of 
the case studies is a crucial factor to understand their innovation pathways and the 
cooperation and competition relationships between actors. I also found that the 
institutional setting for building technological capabilities and learning capacity is 
central and goes beyond the offer of certain incentives coming from the central 
government. Each sector - and in the cases studied, each production chain- has its 
own dynamics, shaping the pathways which determines how actors learn and 
consequently the behaviour of the different blocks within the subsystems when new 
sources of knowledge are part of the production activities. It is a matter of learning 
how, more than learning what, irrespective if the access to knowledge is direct or 
indirect. In this sense, applying the same rationale to support different institutional 
settings is not always effective.  
The sixth chapter brings together the analysis of the three chosen sub-sectoral cases. 
This chapter carries forward the second thematic strand and explores, in a 
comparative way, the main factors that have impacted the evolution of sectoral 
practices to be more competitive through the adaptation of their practices to market 
fluctuations and the particular composition of the actors of the sector. I analyse 
which factors are co-evolving with which and what practices and strategies can be 
recalled as successful to provide social welfare to the growers themselves, to have 
sustainable environmental practices, and to maximise the economic profit of the 
growers and firms involved in the sub-sectoral chains. Particularly I wanted to study 
the principal determinants that have shaped the capability building strategies, 
technological evolution, knowledge networks, and the institutional setting of the 
coffee, sugarcane and flower sub-sectors. Therefore, this chapter outlines the main 
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challenges, opportunities and strengths to innovate in a comparative analytical 
framework.   
Finally, chapter seven brings together the findings of this thesis. I summarise the 
main aspects found to answer the research questions, present the theoretical 
contributions developed through this particular research, and specify practical 
findings and advice to practitioners and policy makers about the understanding of 
innovation inter-firms. Also, important aspects to take into account when designing 
national innovation strategies are highlighted. The chapter closes with some 
suggestions for further research that can enhance the current research.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theoretical bases upon which we built our empirical, 
practical, and theoretical contributions. We start the chapter with an exploration of 
what it is and what it implies to follow a system analysis approach and locate the 
systems of innovation approach within the broad soft tendency of systems analysis. 
The third section focuses on the systems of innovation approach, its different 
branches, and gives special emphasis to the National Systems of Innovation approach 
and the Sectoral Systems of Innovation approach, since both of them are used in the 
formal and informal institutional setting of our case studies. The fourth section 
presents a comprehensive account of the evolution of science and technology and 
innovation studies in Latin America, and the way that the region evolved in terms of 
political choices across the 20th century. Finally, we explore the importance and 
significance of institutions in evolutionary theory and the SI approach and examine 
different approaches towards STI policy design and implementation. 
2.2. System Analysis Approach 
Before talking about systems of innovation, it is worthwhile to think about the main 
idea of what a system is. In the systems analysis approaches, be they hard or soft, the 
idea of system itself is not always problematized. In biology, the idea of system is 
widely use to explain how living organisms have intrinsic structure, properties and 
internal functions allowing them to be alive. However, even in biology or in 
astronomy, this whole notion of “system” is a conceptual device to describe 
something we can “see” in operation. Then, the whole notion of “system” is 
inscribed within a conceptual framework humanly created to make sense of a reality 
that is outside and inside us. This particular conceptual and theoretical way for 
seeing the world or Weltanschauung1 is just one of the possible ones to understand 
reality. Of course, no particular Weltanschauung is infallible. 
                                                
1 Literally ‘world view’. An individual (or collective) viewpoint, which is conditioned by 
environment, background, beliefs, upbringing, etc. It is not itself a set of beliefs, but a framework 
which underlies one’s beliefs. (Open Systems Group, 1981) 
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One of the more dangerous consequences of the scientific 
approach is a tendency to encourage people to think that their 
perceptions of reality are real and that there is indeed an 
objective reality ‘out there’. (Open Systems Group, 1981, p. 
14) 
Now, considering that the systems approach is a way among many others to perceive, 
interpret and analyse reality, it is good to return to the basics, to the meaning of 
‘system’. The most simple definition of system is found in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an 
interconnecting network; a complex whole” (Oxford University Press, 1989). This 
simple definition gives a sense of the existence of different units interconnected to 
perform a specific purpose according to the existence of certain attributes. However, 
in this definition there is no explicit mention of the role of the system analyst. 
Perhaps, a richer and more comprehensive definition of what constitutes and 
involves understanding reality as a system is given by the open group (Open Systems 
Group, 1981, p. 14): 
A system is an assembly of parts where: 
1. The parts or components are connected together in an organized way. 
2. The parts or components are affected by being in the system (and are changed 
by leaving it). 
3. The assembly does something. 
4. The assembly has been identified by a person as being of special interest. 
 
In this definition the observer participation is explicitly mentioned. Also, it outlines 
the system’s structure (components related to each other), behaviour (elements are 
changed by being in the system, there are inputs and transformed outputs), and 
interconnectivity between the structure and the behaviour (attributes and dimensions 
of action). In order to preserve a systemic dynamic, inner and external links of the 
system components need to be maintained.  
Defining a system presupposes that there is an external environment. The system has 
a boundary that defines it as a separate unit. Subsequently, the system analysis 
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implies an inner analysis of the structure, behaviour, functions, and interconnections, 
and an analysis of the feedback process between the system and the outer space or 
the environment. In this sense, defining a system is defining its boundaries. In natural 
sciences it is perhaps easier than in social sciences. Defining a system in social 
sciences presupposes the acceptance of subjectivity, because the system definition 
and its boundary are constrained by the analyst’s interests and Weltanschauung. 
Depending on the unit and purpose of analysis several systems can be defined and 
can be part of different bigger systems. 
But this interface between inner and outer is elusive. Sub-
systems may be parts of more than one whole and so may fall 
within more than one system boundary. The boundary itself 
may be differently perceived and defined by different 
elements in the system. (Vickers, 1983, p. 20) 
This makes us conclude that systems are abstract conceptualisations to understand 
reality according to specific interests, social, economic and political contexts. The 
acceptance of the existence of a system depends then on the negotiation of different 
actors to fulfil a particular purpose. 
2.2.1. Systems Thinking 
The systems’ thinking comes from biology. Biologists were among the pioneers in 
thinking of natural phenomena as a whole, a whole with components, and functional 
and structural relationships. In fact, the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy was the 
first to suggest the use of systems thinking to understand all sort of problems. 
“Biology is now established as an autonomous science which is not reducible to 
chemistry and physics. Establishing this has established systems thinking.” 
(Checkland, 1983, p. 32). The second strand using systems thinking are electrical, 
communication and control engineers. In their case, to explain how waves, electric 
impulses, and bits can be modelled.  
About the systems thinking definition, Checkland gives a useful insight: 
It is the concept of organized complexity which became the 
subject matter of the new discipline ‘systems’; and the 
general model of organized complexity is that there exists a 
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hierarchy of levels of organizations, each more complex than 
the one bellow, a level being characterized by emerging 
properties which do not exist at the lower level. (Checkland, 
1983, p. 32) 
There are open and closed systems. Living organisms are open when they exchange 
energy, information, and materials with an environment. That exchange makes them 
resilient to the changing environment. In biological systems, the living systems 
themselves create and re-create. This is something that wants to be emulated in the 
innovation systems but that is difficult to achieve. Self-monitoring and control are 
desired stages of a mature system. Moreover, living systems in the long term may 
adapt and evolve to different kind of organisms or living entities enclosing different 
systemic inner and outer relationships with the environment. For the case of social 
systems, this means that purpose and scope of a system are under constant 
negotiation by the actors. System thinking implies having flexibility to understand 
how boundaries are constantly under negotiation and the ability to capture 
information exchange between the components of the system. The systems are 
constantly evolving and therefore are always dynamic.  
2.3. The Systems of Innovation Approach 
The concept of Systems of Innovation (SI) emerged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and different authors coming from different disciplines and traditions have 
developed it since then. It is first mentioned at the national level as a reaction to 
mainstream neoclassical economics urging for perfect market conditions, less state 
intervention and conceiving technological progress as another external variable 
affecting market conditions. As Sharif explains:  
Garnering their inspiration from Schumpeter, and holding up 
List as one intellectual forebear, Freeman and Lundvall 
represented the reawakening of an institutionalist ‘school of 
thought’ within innovation studies under the NIS banner. 
(Sharif, 2006, p. 753) 
It is on this perspective and background that the systems of innovation approach 
evolved from an evolutionary and institutionalist economic dimension (Edquist, 
1997b; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988, 1992b; Nelson, 1993). The approach has 
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extended and broadened through a range of studies addressing variously: the central 
role of institutions, the importance of social and historical dimensions to study 
innovation dynamics, the role of knowledge and learning cycles among central 
innovation players, and the importance of science, technology and innovation (STI) 
policy design to operationalize systemic strategies (Chaminade, Lundvall, Vang, & 
Joseph, 2009; Galli & Teubal, 1997; Metcalfe & Ramlogan, 2008; Nelson & Nelson, 
2002; Niosi, 2010).   
Coming from another tradition, but preserving a systems thinking, the socio-
technical systems of innovation framework presents a different perspective towards 
sectoral innovation systems. It includes an explicit analysis of the role of users in 
technological change; a distinction between the actors, the systems which they are 
embedded in, and the institutions that guide the system functions; use of institutional 
theory to examine the dynamic interplay between actors and structures; and the 
explicit study of change in fluctuations between systems.  This perspective, rooted in 
the Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) (Schot & Rip, 1997), includes 
sociological and historical notions to understand long-term dynamics and socio-
technical shifts between systems.  (Geels, 2001, 2004, 2010; Geels & Schot, 2007). 
The National System of Innovation (NSI) was the first approach of the systems of 
innovation movement. The concept was both coined for academic and policy-making 
processes as a device for studying innovation and to give a common ground for 
international and national policy agents. During the 1990s the NSI approach gained 
high scientific prestige mostly because of the academic support it had and its 
diffusion by transnational organisation like the OECD (Sharif, 2006). From the 
emergence of the NSI concept, the systemic lens for studying innovation started to 
spread in academic circles. The boundaries and scope of analysis determined the type 
of system under study and the analytical tools needed to study innovation processes.  
Systems of innovation can be viewed in several dimensions. 
One important dimension is the physical or geographical 
dimension. Sometimes the focus is on a particular country or 
region which then determines the geographic boundaries of 
the system. In other cases the main dimension of interest is a 
sector or technology. In such cases, the determination of the 
relevant geographic boundaries is itself a theoretical or at 
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least methodological issue. (Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmén, & 
Rickne, 2002, p. 233)  
Given the wide variety of existing definitions of innovation systems, differences in 
the use of the approach, and the divergences found when applied to different case 
studies, Edquist argues that it would not be correct to say that the systems of 
innovation approach is a formal theory, nor even an appreciative theory. He prefers 
to label it as a conceptual framework or as an approach useful for the analysis of 
innovation. In his own words: “It is a kind of ‘wide trawl’ intended to capture 
processes of innovation, their determinants, and some of their consequences (e.g., 
productivity growth and employment) in a useful way.” (Edquist, 1997b, p. 28) 
However, in the latest development of the approach, the epistemic communities2 
working with the concept have divided into two postures. One group wants to keep 
the approach open and flexible in its interpretation and use, and the other group holds 
that the concept should have a rigorous theoretical base in order to be broadly 
applicable. The first group is mostly led by Lundvall and the emphasis is put on 
strengthening learning, innovation, and competence building systems in developing 
economies around the world (Sharif, 2006). This effort is materialised in The Global 
Network for Economics of Learning, Innovation, and Competence Building Systems 
(Globelics3), with its corresponding branches in Latin America (Lalics); Africa 
(Aficalics); and Asia (Asialics). Globelics brings together scholars focusing on 
interactive learning for the creation and strengthening of competences and 
capabilities towards generation of innovation. On the other hand, looking for an 
academic formal theorisation, Edquist has been leading, first as director and lately as 
chair in Innovation Research, the Centre for Innovation, Research and Competence 
in the Learning Economy (CIRCLE4) based at Lund University. The Centre has 
                                                
2 We agree with Sharif on calling the group of practitioners and academics building the concept and 
using it, as an epistemic community. The NSI concept was co-constructed in political and scientific 
circles by an informal network of researchers and decision-makers working in an interdisciplinary 
manner within the innovation studies field (Sharif, 2006).  
3 The first formal meeting to constitute the network took place in 2002 and has academic conferences 
every year to bring together scholars all around the world. The website is: http://www.globelics.org 
4 CIRCLE was established in 2004 with initial funding from the Swedish government, Lund 
University, and the Ruben Rausing Foundation. It is based at Lund University and has had a broad 
impact within and outside Europe. The website is: http://www2.circle.lu.se/about/ 
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researchers from all around the world and has extended its influence to academic and 
policy actors in different countries. 
Lundvall argues that the NSI is a focusing device that helps to analyse, foresee and 
explain courses of rational action and that in that sense, it can be called a theory since 
it serves the same purposes of a formal theory (Lundvall, 2007). On the other hand, 
Edquist keeps arguing the need for a theoretical base to straighten up the approach 
and make it more like a theory. That is why he led a project to compare ten small 
economy countries using the same parameters to study innovation using the SI lens. 
The main objectives of the project were: to further refine, elaborate and 
operationalize the SI approach to make it more theory-like; to use the SI approach by 
carrying out empirical and comparative studies of NSIs; and to draw policy 
conclusions (Edquist & Hommen, 2008).  
Notwithstanding the discrepancies and depth in the use and understanding of the SI 
approach, the analytical emphasis remains on the economic dimension of 
technological innovation.  It is true that knowledge, networks and social institutions 
are taken into account as part of the approach, but these are only seen as a means to 
promote or hinder innovation. The goal for having innovation at the national level is 
to generate higher levels of economic growth. Ideally, a higher economic growth can 
be redistributed in the population and can help to continue building capabilities to 
fight against poverty, but the approach does not go that far and does not provide any 
guideline to foster social innovation. Hence, the SI approach and specifically the 
National System of Innovation approach are far from being unproblematic for both 
political and academic circles in its understanding and application. 
2.3.1. Differentiation of Systems of Innovation 
One of the reasons why systems of innovation analysis remains as an approach and 
not as a theory is the diverse ways in which scholars understand and use it for 
academic and political purposes. There are different definitions of what an 
innovation system is and what it comprises and that is exactly the reason why 
(Edquist, 1997b) argues that the approach lacks of stringency to be even an 
appreciative theory. For instance, Nelson gives the following definition of an 
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innovation system: “a set of institutional actors that, together, plays the major role in 
influencing innovative performance.”(Nelson, 1993, p. 4). Carlsson et al., on the 
other hand develop the concept of technological system of innovation, but give a 
previous account of the state of the art of innovation systems. They suggest that for 
analytical purposes, it is “possible, at least in principle, to view a national system of 
innovation as the aggregate of a set of technological, sectoral or regional systems” 
(Carlsson et al., 2002, p. 236). Niosi et. al. present what they call a ‘workable 
concept’ of a national system of innovation and define it as: “the system of 
interacting private and public firms (either large or small), universities, and 
government agencies aiming at the production of science and technology within 
national borders. Interactions among these units may be technical, commercial, legal 
social, and financial, inasmuch as the goal of the interaction is development, 
protection, financing, or regulation of new science and technology” (Niosi, Saviotti, 
Bellon, & Crow, 1993, p. 212).  What remains certain in the idea of the SI approach 
is the systemic nature of innovation where private, public and academic actors forge 
complex relationships to trigger technical change to enhance business 
competitiveness at the national level. 
It is important to outline what we understand by innovation, since it is the 
cornerstone in the innovation systems approach and is central to this thesis.  The SI 
approach focuses its attention on technical innovation in products and processes and 
builds upon Schumpeter’s classical concept. Schumpeter defines innovation “…as 
the setting up of a new production function. This covers the case of a new 
commodity as well as those of a new form of organization such as a merger, of the 
opening up of new markets, and so on.” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 87). This is an 
economic definition that explains changes in the production function as the main 
aspect required to have innovation. Nelson and Rosenberg specify clearly that the 
scope of their book is restricted to technical innovation.  They propose a broad 
definition of innovation, within the main concept of National System of Innovation.  
For them, innovation “…encompasses the processes by which firms master and get 
into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to them, if 
not to the universe or even to the nation” (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993, p. 4).  
Lundvall focuses on technical innovation as a cumulative path-dependence process. 
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From that standpoint he defines innovation “as a process encompassing diffusion and 
use as well as the first market introduction” (Lundvall, 2007, p. 101). For Edquist, 
“innovations are creations of economic significance. They may be brand new but are 
more often new combinations of existing elements.” (Edquist, 1997a, p. 1). Niosi et. 
al. define innovations as “new and improved products and processes, new 
organisational forms, the application of existing technology to new fields, the 
discovery of new resources, and the opening of new markets.” (Niosi et al., 1993, p. 
209)  
Although most scholars who are part of the epistemic community using the SI 
approach limit their understanding of innovation within the economic dimension of 
technical progress, we include social innovations produced by the interaction of 
actors that result in better or newer practices that improve the welfare of a 
determined social group. We take into account product, process, organisational and 
market innovations either incremental or radical. Incremental innovations are those 
that generate improvements on products, processes or services that are already in use, 
but that can be adapted to fulfil other needs or to increase productivity through the 
use of the improved tools. This kind of innovation usually generates short wave 
disruptions in the production function of the markets. On the other hand, radical 
innovations are those that introduce a ‘new to the world’ product, process or service 
and that represent a long wave structural change in economies (J. Clark, Freeman, & 
Soete, 1981). 
There are also different types of systems of innovation, depending on the boundary 
the analyst uses to determine the object of study. Although all of the typologies have 
developed their own theoretical corpus, they shared the systems thinking perception 
and recognise the non-linearity of innovation processes. There are definitions for 
National SI (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992b; Nelson, 1993), Regional SI (Braczyk, 
Cooke, & Heidenreich, 1998; Cooke, 1992, 2001; Cooke, Gomez Uranga, & 
Etxebarria, 1997), Sectoral SI (Malerba, 1999, 2002; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996; 
Montobbio, 2004), Technological SI (Carlsson & Jacobsson, 1997; Carlsson et al., 
2002), and Continental SI (Freeman, 2002).  Yet, the boundaries between them are 
not always clear and it is easy to find overlaps between the definitions of different 
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systems. This is one of the shortcomings of the SI approach. However, the systemic 
nature of the approach makes explicit that there are always connections with 
different layers at the micro, meso and macro levels. It is also clear that the core of 
any innovation system is inter-firms interactions operating within institutions set by 
education, labour, financial, welfare and intellectual property systems. 
Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) can be specified inside a country or even inside a 
continent.  A great number of publications about RIS have used Silicon Valley as a 
case study (Kenney, 2000; Lécuyer, 2006; Rogers & Larsen, 1985; Saxenian, 1996). 
The Silicon Valley case is a de facto system, which has been taken as a successful 
example to replicate in other countries, regions, and even country clusters. However, 
as it is shown by (Brown et al., 2015) trying to replicate regional systems is full of 
shortcomings. Their study of a regional innovation policy in Scotland: The 
Scotland’s Intermediate Technology Initiative (ITI), which was supposed to promote 
high-tech regional innovation following the example of Silicon Valley, showed how 
RIS are context dependent. The program ended up being a linear model of innovation 
in practice and could not connect the knowledge production side with the knowledge 
exploitation elements. The program failed to grasp the nature of the local 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. (Brown et al., 2015)  
We will have a deeper analysis of the definition, application and analytical power of 
the Sectoral Systems of Innovation (SSI) later in this section; however, we provide a 
short reference to its definition. Malerba defines the SSI as “…a set of new and 
established products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and 
non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products. A 
sectoral system has a knowledge base, technologies, inputs and existing, emergent 
and potential demand. The agents composing the sectoral system are organizations 
and individuals.”(Malerba, 2002, p. 250) Nevertheless, the concept of SSI can be, in 
a sense, problematic in its boundaries, as it happens with the NSI, because a sectoral 
system can integrate even different NSIs, as it is mentioned by Edquist “Systems of 
innovation may be supranational, or subnational (regional, local) – and at the same 
time they may be sectoral within any of these geographical demarcations. There are 
many potential permutations. Whether a system of innovation should be spatially or 
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sectorally delimited depends on the object of study.” (Edquist, 1997a, p. 12).  Again 
issues regarding the definition of the research object in a practical case study arise.  
Finally, there are Technological Systems of Innovation (TSI).  Here, the unit of 
analysis is a particular technology represented by products and the way these 
products are related to the economic and political dynamics within the system. It is 
defined by Carlsson and Stankiewicz as “a network of agents interacting in a specific 
technology under a particular institutional infrastructure and involved in the 
generation, diffusion and utilization of technology” (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1995, 
p. 49).  According to Carlsson’s definition, the analytical approach to this class of 
systems could be done in three levels of analysis: “to a technology in the sense of a 
knowledge field, to a product or an artefact, or finally to a set of related products and 
artefacts aimed at satisfying a particular function, such as health care or transport” 
(Carlsson et al., 2002, p. 237).  According to this definition, boundaries in TSI are 
drawn depending on the spectrum of expansion a technology can have without 
geographical constraints.  Again, although an explicit methodology is proposed by 
Carlson et al. according to the different levels of analysis, the concept is broad and it 
could be problematic to define where the technological system ends and where a 
sectoral, regional or continental system begins. 
The different variants of the SI model all share a common conception of innovation 
as a (systemic) consequence of the operation of a system comprised of a set of 
components (conceived in broadly similar ways). Looking at the different definitions 
reviewed above, it is feasible to say that all of them follow the NSI model. This was 
the first concept in the SI approach developed for the Japanese case (Freeman, 1987) 
and broadly discussed by authors like Lundvall (Lundvall, 1992a). The differences 
between all these subsystems are found in the level of study (i.e.: the zoom in or 
zoom out made according to the analytical goals).  Although some SI such as the 
Technological ones focus more on the expansion, operation and effects of a 
particular technology, the system is analysed with the same principles: The 
interaction between main actors, main sectors included in the TSI, processes and 
links between sub-units and knowledge transfer throughout the system. 
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2.3.2. National System of Innovation Approach 
The most widely used definition of systems of innovation is the National Systems of 
Innovation (NSI).  The concept started to be used within the construction of 
industrial policy in Europe in the latter 1980s and was adopted afterwards by the 
OECD as a recommended analytic and political approach to be applied to national 
contexts. It emerged to challenge the Washington Consensus5 and mainstream 
neoclassical macroeconomics to bring a different perspective on economic policy by 
recognising the role that innovation and knowledge generation and exploitation had 
in the economic growth of nations (Lundvall, 2007). The approach was born and 
used simultaneously in academic and political circles, given the overlap of academics 
who for the first time mentioned it (Freemand and Lundvall) with positions within 
the OECD.  As Sharif states: “[T]he NIS concept had the advantage of proponents 
who inhabited the academic and policy realms, thereby easing the concept’s 
movement between the two worlds.”(Sharif, 2006, p. 752)  
There are many definitions of National Systems of Innovation. These definition were 
conceived first as a description of national frameworks supporting and promoting 
innovation in industrialised countries, so we could say that represents an ex-post 
account of a perceived reality identified through empirical cases. Later on, the NSI 
approach was promoted by transnational organisations like the OECD, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), so it was disseminated to developing countries as an ex-ante 
framework to build STI policy (Arocena & Sutz, 2000).  
The innovation system research and mostly the NSI approach have been understood 
and applied in two different perspectives: a narrow and a broad one. The narrow 
perspective has an emphasis on the science and technology side of innovation (STI) 
and its measure through national performance in research and development activities 
                                                
5 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of free market, floating exchange rates, and 
macroeconomic measures defined in 1989 to encourage economic development in Latin America, 
South East Asia and other developing economies. It develops ten policy recommendations that were 
supported by the US government and the international financial institutions based in Washington, 
hence its name. The aim of the consensus was to maintain macroeconomic stability and integration of 
developing economies into the international economy through major policy reforms (Williamson, 
1990). 
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and academic production. The broader one also encompasses learning and 
competence building at different levels of aggregation and focuses on learning 
through structures and relationships mediated by Doing, Using and Interacting 
(DUI). The former is the one that has been widely disseminated in policy circles 
since with this perspective it is easier to measure policy results, neglecting what 
seems more difficult to assess. This perspective also provides formal measures that 
can be used to compare countries’ performance and so can easier guide resources 
allocation. The latter, requires a deeper and contextualised analysis of tacit and 
formal knowledge, learning interactions between and within firms, and analysis of 
cooperation and competition relationships between innovation players. This 
perspective requires the analyst to examine social institutions between customers and 
suppliers and formal and informal links between research and production sub-
subsystems (Lundvall, Vang, et al., 2009). Interaction between formal and informal 
dimensions of the narrow and broad perspectives of innovation systems can be seen 
in Figure 2.1: 
 
*Includes the organizations and networks included in the narrow concept of IS as well. 
Figure 2.1. Interactions between formal and informal elements of the innovation system 
Source. (Lundvall, Vang, et al., 2009, p. 11) 
Given its multiple uses, understanding and action frameworks, we agree with Sharif 
that the NSI is a boundary object diffused by epistemic communities part of the 
academic and the political worlds (Sharif, 2006). Given its flexible nature, the 
approach has been used and even abused, using it as a label for all sort of policy 
initiatives or even academic discussions related with the study of innovation within 
geographical, sectoral or technological boundaries. In this respect Lundvall states 
that: 
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[T]he wider implications of an innovation and learning 
perspective on general economic policy have not been 
seriously considered and worked out. Innovation policy has 
been added to an economic policy based upon static 
economic theory. Policy implications have been worked out 
on the basis of a narrow definition of innovation system 
where the focus is on science based innovation. The wider 
setting that has a major impact on interactive learning and on 
the performance of the innovation system has not been given 
sufficient attention. (Lundvall, 2007, p. 98) 
Although the NSI is an approach in the sense that it does not represent a right way to 
understand innovation and to apply economic policies based on technological 
change, in most developing countries where the concept has been embraced, policy-
makers and even local academics have understood and followed an ideal model 
following the pioneer studies made in industrialised countries. It is true that the 
precursors of the NSI approach avoid such a thing as an ideal system, but it does not 
mean that there are not expectations of how a good NSI should operate and what 
results should achieve. It is in that sense that Arocena and Sutz express that “the NSI 
concept carries a normative weight.” (Arocena & Sutz, 2000, p. 58) 
Several scholars working with the SI approach have also problematized the national 
dimension of the NSI. Nelson and Rosemberg problematize the concept of national 
because it is difficult to demarcate a system as national, given the broader 
connections it has with the international context: “Indeed, for many of the 
participants in this study, one of the key interests was in exploring whether, and if so 
in what ways, the concept of ‘national’ system made any sense today. National 
governments act as if it did. However, that presumption, and the reality, may not be 
aligned.” (Nelson, 1993, p. 5) Still, they stress that the concept is valid when the sub-
systems inside the system are defined clearly.  
When a sectoral view of the whole system is performed, boundaries are visibly stated 
and consequently the concept of national can be better demarcated.  That is why 
Lundvall (Lundvall, 1992b) argues that the concept of National System must remain 
flexible and open according to the subject studied. The emphasis on the national 
level has an explanation. Since the approach emerges as a reaction to the national 
macroeconomic policies promoted by the Washington consensus, the national 
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dimension was crucial to bring another analytic dimension where learning, 
interaction between innovation players and technical change were the centre of the 
national economic measures (Sharif, 2006). Nevertheless, the concept remains 
diffuse and short in analytical tools when existing networks between the NSI and 
other broader and more specialized systems of innovation are part of the picture.  The 
NSI keeps being developed to connect different levels of analysis with the national 
level, but given the steady growth of global links between users and producers, it is 
more difficult to keep the analysis at the national level. “The concept of national 
system had a well-defined meaning in the past when basic decisions concerning the 
science, technology, and innovation policies of a given country were taken 
essentially at a national level.”(Galli & Teubal, 1997, p. 345) 
In terms of its suitability for developing economies, less developed countries (LDC) 
or countries from the South, there have been extensive debates about the 
appropriateness of the NSI approach. (Delvenne & Thoreau, 2012) present three 
main deficiencies of the NSI approach, particularly for developing economies: 1. NSI 
approaches do no pay sufficient attention to the regimes of science and technology 
and fail to integrate effectively broader socio-political landscapes and global 
contexts; 2. The approach reproduces the balance of power between richer and 
poorer countries, with many of its studies centred on OECD countries; 3. It is highly 
focus on GDP generation and economic growth as the main outputs of catching-up 
and progress. 
On the other hand, Arocena and Sutz develop a southern perception of what the NSI 
implies for Latin American countries that they formulate in four statements. The first 
two were already mentioned: the ex-ante nature of the concept for LAC countries 
given the lack of systemic socio-economic patterns towards the creation, and 
encouragement of technical change and innovation; and the normative weight that 
the concept brings when applied to LDCs. The third aspect is related to the relational 
character of the approach where connections between innovation players are crucial 
to generate virtuous innovation cycles. However, although bridge institutions or 
intermediaries between the research and industrial systems have been created in the 
Latin American countries, most of the intended NSIs of the region lack of systemic 
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connections between actors. Fourthly, they state that the NSI is a policy subject 
intended to design policy mixes that can contribute to the promotion of innovation 
through science and technology capabilities. However, S&T have never occupied a 
high position on the political agenda of Latin America, which has made failed many 
initiatives when it comes to their implementation (Arocena & Sutz, 2000).   
Even though (Alcorta & Peres, 1998) base their analysis of LAC countries from the 
origins of the strengthening of S&T capabilities from the 1940s until the 1990s using 
the NSI approach as analytical device, their findings clearly contradicts the existence 
of NSIs in the region. They analyse the Latin American countries in terms of 
technological infrastructure, interactions between organisations, public and enterprise 
investment in innovation, human capital formation, and public policies.  Among the 
most notable deficiencies they found in the region are: limitations in physical 
infrastructure (roads, energy and water supply, ports, telecommunications, among 
others); mismatch between demand and supply of research services; highly 
hierarchical functional lines of management and activities in firms; low and 
ineffective support organisations to link the research and productive systems; lack of 
cooperation among domestic firms and among national and international firms; no 
interaction between blocks of the innovation systems; little interest of cooperation 
between universities and firms; low levels of investment in R&D and innovation 
activities from the public sector and mostly from the private sector; low quality and 
variety of human resources required for technological upgrading; and overall lack of 
clarity about the objectives of the so-called systems of innovation. In other words, all 
the structural components and functional setting that constitutes a National System of 
Innovation, were missed in the countries of the region. 
This creates a paradoxical situation, where scholars stress the 
pressing need to develop an innovation agenda for Southern 
countries with a ‘Southern mindset’, while at the same time 
they continue to heavily rely on a reductionist version of the 
NIS-approach. (Delvenne & Thoreau, 2012, p. 212) 
In words of Sagasti: “Building science and technology capabilities in developing 
countries appears to be a Sisyphean task. Time and investments are made, people are 
trained, institutions are built, and policies are designed and implemented – often with 
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considerable effort – only to see them fall apart and disappear without trace.” 
(Sagasti, 2004, p. xvii). Perhaps a different approach needs to be taken both to cope 
with complexity and uncertainty in policy-making processes and to understand and 
analyse innovation in developing economies that have very particular historical and 
cultural pathways that shape their current realities. 
The response to scholars working with the broad definition of NSI about these 
shortcomings is that the SIs in developing countries are emerging rather than mature 
and so on should be analysed in a different way. “If we consider that an IS exists 
only when all its systemic aspects are in place, it would be impossible to trace and 
identify any IS in developing countries.” [original italics] (Chaminade et al., 2009, p. 
365). This suggests that for emerging systems the general principles still apply but 
some of the blocks are still being developed or are non-existent, and the connection 
and interactions between components are weak.  
2.3.3. Sectoral Systems of Innovation 
The focus of the SSI is the study of the factors that affect innovation and production 
in a sector, not necessarily within national borders; sectors can be global or local. 
The main scholar that has developed the approach is Franco Malerba. Sectoral 
studies have been central in innovation studies. Sectoral innovation studies have built 
upon two traditions: the industrial economics literature, which examines the sectors’ 
structure and dynamics in terms of concentration, vertical and horizontal integration, 
firms’ growth and the interaction between firms according to their strategic 
behaviour; and others focused on case studies looking at particular dimensions of 
sectors such as firms’ competencies and structure of production. There is an 
intermediate level of study developed and widely used by the OECD that presents 
empirical taxonomies concerning sectoral R&D intensity and Shumpeterian Mark I 
and Mark II dividing sectors characterised by creative destruction with a central role 
of entrepreneurs and new firms introducing new technological solutions, and creative 
accumulation dominated by few large firms that rise boundaries for new competitors 
and new innovation. Taking these roots, Malerba develops the SSI approach 
integrating a further dynamic view of innovation. He brings together other 
intellectual traditions and contributions about change and transformation in sectors, 
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links and interdependencies within sectoral boundaries, the innovation system 
approach, and evolutionary theory (Malerba, 2004). 
The starting point will be the empirical recognition, as it has 
emerged from the rich literature of empirical case studies, 
that (i) sectors are characterized by specific knowledge bases, 
technologies, production processes, complementarities, 
demand and a population of heterogeneous firms and non- 
firm organizations and institutions, and that (ii) sectors differ 
greatly in several of these dimensions. (Malerba, 2004, p. 15) 
Since the SSI approach pays central attention to the type of knowledge, knowledge 
dimensions and learning processes within and among firms, the characteristics of 
demand and institutions, and the relationships and networks between firms and non-
firm organisations, we will examine these factors in detail. 
2.3.3.1. Knowledge 
For the purpose of this thesis we differentiate knowledge from data and information. 
The former includes the cognitive context in which agents exchange information that 
contains meaning and a purpose from both those who build it, and those who use it 
and transform it. In that sense, information is more than codified knowledge and 
knowledge is more than the junction of information and tacit knowledge (Cowan, 
David, & Foray, 2000).  
Since organisations are mainly composed of individuals and the learning processes 
take place among the human resources the firms have, and from there evolve to 
higher units of aggregation (as sectors, technological fields, research areas), it is 
important to recall the importance of individuals and the skills they bring or develop 
in the execution of their activities. (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 73) highlight the 
importance of the skilled behaviour of individuals. Their definition of skill is: “a 
capability for a smooth sequence of coordinated behaviour that is ordinarily effective 
relative to its objectives, given the context in which it normally occurs.” 
There are three aspects closely interrelated that characterise a skilled behaviour: 
skills are programmatic; they mostly rely on tacit knowledge; and they imply the 
selection of choices between multiple options. The first characteristic relates to the 
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separation of the skill in small units that follow a particular order, or steps, to 
complete the final desired result. However, this sequence of steps is performed 
unconsciously and automatically by the individual, which makes it programmatic and 
executed without conscious volition. This brings us to the second characteristic, that 
of tacit knowledge as one that cannot be articulated. As it is explained by Polanyi in 
his 1962 book and cited by Winter and Nelson:  
I shall take as my clue for this investigation the well-known 
fact that the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the 
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to 
the person following them. (Polanyi, 1962 in Nelson & 
Winter, 1982, p. 77) 
The degree of tacitness depends on the ability of the individual to articulate their 
knowledge into words. A skill can be taught so it can be absorbed and appropriated 
through a learning process. However, to learn, the individual has to go through 
imitation and practice. That implies repetition and unconscious selection of choices 
so the desired result can be achieved. Thus, tacitness of knowledge depends on the 
recipient and not on the nature of the knowledge itself. “In short, much operational 
knowledge remains tacit because it cannot be articulated fast enough, because it is 
impossible to articulate all that is necessary to a successful performance, and because 
language cannot simultaneously serve to describe relationships and characterize the 
things related”. (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 81). The third aspect, skills and choices 
reflects upon the performance of a skill through the application of an automatic 
program where a particular set of options is chosen out the whole set of possibilities 
so the desired final result can be accomplished. This is not a deliberate process since 
the performance of a skill is a smooth flow of behaviour and is executed in an 
opportune moment (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
Loasby explains how the concept of capabilities was introduced to economists by 
Richardson and its view of firms as “a collection of physical and human resources 
which may be deployed in a variety of ways to provide a variety of productive 
services.” (Loasby, 1999, p. 49). In Richardson words, organisational capabilities 
are: 
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[K]nowledge, experience and skills. The capability of an 
organisation may depend upon command of some particular 
material technology, such as cellulose chemistry, electronics 
or civil engineering, or may derive from skills in marketing 
or knowledge of and reputation in a particular market…What 
concerns us here is the fact that organisations will tend to 
specialise in activities for which their capabilities offer some 
comparative advantage (Richardson, 1972, p. 888)  
The creation and evolution of knowledge, experience and skills is context-dependent 
and is developed within the firms, which make it an endogenous process of trial and 
error. Capabilities are not detached from the internal setting of industries and firms. 
Therefore, training programs are always constrained by the internal formal and 
informal institutional framework. Knowledge is also built following the internal 
divisions of labour creating specialisation according to the expertise area of actors 
within firm’s units, and shaping generic knowledge brought by the staff to the 
particular needs of the company. In this sense, there are different knowledge 
subsystems within firms, sectors and clusters. (Loasby, 1999).  
Kinds of knowledge 
According to Loasby, we can distinguish four kinds of knowledge (see Table 2.1.). 
‘Knowing that’ does not imply that individuals or firms ‘know how’, or that one is an 
effect of the other. The relationship between both is bidirectional and do not follow a 
particular pathway of events. Sometimes the application of knowledge results in 
unforeseeable results, which means that the application of knowledge is also context-
dependent. Moreover, knowledge in its codified form may be public, but know-how 
is a private asset acquired by firms’ maturity and experience. It is harder to codify 
‘knowing how’ and it requires a different coding system. 
Kind Direct Knowledge Indirect Knowledge 
Knowing that Formal knowledge about what a 
phenomenon is and why it exists. 
This knowledge is embedded in the 
individual. 
The individual knows where to find 
relevant knowledge to explain what a 
phenomenon or problem is and why it 
exists or happens. 
Knowing how The individual has the skills to 
perform the appropriate actions in 
order to achieve a desired result. 
The individual knows where to find 
someone that has the skills to perform 
the appropriate actions in order to 
achieve a desired result, or knows where 
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to find the relevant knowledge to achieve 
a desired result himself/herself. 
Table 2.1. Kinds of Knowledge 
Source. Made by the author based on (Loasby, 1999, p. 51) 
 
It cannot be inferred that knowing that directly gives the capacity of knowing how. 
There may be – and it is desirable – a progression from having the formal knowledge 
to its eventual application to solve specific problems, but that is not always the case. 
Not because there is knowledge available about the optimal production factors, 
rather, it means that firms necessarily know how to apply this knowledge or convert 
it to their specific needs and strategies. Hence, the only obstacle to support the 
process of building capabilities in the industrial sector is not the lack of appropriate 
incentives. Processes of knowledge appropriation and validation become 
fundamental for the exploitation of technical knowledge and capacity.   
The development of knowledge is a path-dependent process, 
in which the acquisition of certain kinds of ‘knowledge how’ 
facilitates the acquisition of further knowledge of the same 
kind, and impedes the acquisition of knowledge of 
incompatible kinds; and this principle applies both to the 
performance of productive operations and to the procedures 
by which we seek to develop new ‘knowledge that’. (Loasby, 
1999, p. 58) 
There cannot be complete knowledge or knowledge free from ambiguities. Humans 
are constrained by a bounded rationality given their cognitive limitations. This 
implies that there are no perfect choices amongst a finite and restricted set of options, 
as we studied before, when most of the choices are taken by the rational actors using 
irrational choice processes. So building knowledge that and knowledge how is an 
iterative and interactive process (Loasby, 1999). Learning is a natural and continuous 
process of doing, using and interacting. Firms innovate using existing knowledge and 
transforming it into novel creations or adapting novel knowledge to traditional 
routines. It is an evolutionary process that determines the degree of success and 
failure of companies, or a set of companies within an industry, sector or 
technological system.  
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“[A] good deal of knowledge is required in order to use 
markets effectively, and much of this…, is ‘knowledge how’. 
Using markets to obtain what one wants, like using inputs to 
create the outputs that one wants, require the appropriate 
capabilities” (Loasby, 1999, p. 57) 
In this sense, knowledge is not created and appropriated within firms in an automatic 
way. Each firm has particular capabilities that allow them to absorb knowledge and 
technologies in different ways and at different paces. The sectoral knowledge base 
and network dynamics among the actors of the system enable different learning 
processes related to innovation (Malerba, 2002).  
Moreover, the state as an active actor promoting the production of S&T as public 
goods, has failed to understand that codified knowledge, or knowledge that, does not 
imply that the appropriation process will happen automatically and be 
straightforward. The tacit knowledge, or knowledge how, is what gives competitive 
advantage to industries and leads to a process of innovation. The application of the 
old scheme of linear S&T policy is still applied in many countries, even when the 
official discourse denies it.   
Knowledge does not travel freely, a condition that rests 
largely on the importance of tacit knowledge residing only in 
the heads of the scientists and engineers engaged in its 
production. Codified knowledge may have low marginal 
costs of transmission and is thus slippery and hard to contain, 
but that is largely irrelevant if what one needs is its ‘sticky’, 
tacit counterpart. (Cowan et al., 2000, p. 222) 
The ‘sticky’ knowledge is a term use by von Hippel (1993) to underscore the cost of 
transferring information relevant for innovation activities that is not codified. Thus, 
the most valuable asset firms have is their repositories of know how that gives then a 
competitive advantage.  
Knowledge Dimensions 
Malerba has outlined different dimensions that impact the way knowledge is created, 
transferred and appropriated within sectors (Malerba, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2007; 
Malerba & Mani, 2009b). These dimensions are: 
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• Knowledge sources: Sources where the knowledge is built or where it has 
come from. It can be in universities, public or private laboratories, 
advancements in R&D, equipment and instrumentation, suppliers or users 
within the value chain, among others. If the knowledge comes from the sector 
it favours imitation, if it comes from external sources its appropriation 
depends on the integration capabilities the firms have to transform the 
knowledge in innovation. 
• Knowledge domains: Specific scientific and technological fields at the base of 
innovative activities in a sector.  
• Knowledge applications: Novel applications of new knowledge or 
recombinant of existent knowledge into new knowledge or technological 
applications. This includes the application of tacit and codified knowledge.  
• Knowledge accessibility: Opportunities of gaining knowledge that are 
external to the firm but that may be internal or external to the sector that the 
firm belongs. External sectoral or industrial accessibility of knowledge is 
related to scientific and technological opportunities that can be brought by 
human capital with a certain level and type of knowledge or knowledge that 
is developed elsewhere by firms or non-firm organisations. Greater 
accessibility of knowledge decreases industrial concentration. 
• Knowledge Cumulativeness: Degree by which the generation of new 
knowledge builds upon current knowledge. There are three different sources 
of cumulativeness: learning processes that build upon past knowledge and 
generate increasing returns at the technological level; firm-specific 
organisational capabilities that provide the base to absorb, use and create new 
knowledge; feedback from the market that guides new R&D and learning 
processes to keep innovating. These sources can be examined at the 
technological, sectoral, or firm level.  
Learning processes 
A central and crucial factor recognised by most scholars within the innovation 
studies tradition in general, and the innovation systems in particular, is the capacity 
of firms to learn so there can be effective links between knowledge generation and 
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knowledge exploitation. The most important resource of the modern economy is 
knowledge and, therefore, the most important process is learning (Lundvall, 1992b). 
The complexity in innovation processes in the global economy requires a rapid rate 
of change and adaptation of innovation players, be they individuals, firms or non-
firm organisations. In order to cope with the demands of the learning economy, a 
new mixture of cooperation and competition between firms, as well as new forms of 
governance are central factors for the production and diffusion of knowledge towards 
better economic performance (Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002).  
Interactive learning supposes informal cognitive and behavioural patterns that 
constitute the base for innovation. It is often based on Learning by Doing; and 
Doing, Using and Interacting processes (DUI), rather than through formal and 
codified forms of knowledge transfer (Lundvall, Joseph, et al., 2009).  
[B]ehavioural adaptation and cognitive evolution need to be 
closely coupled for ‘learning’, in the sense of improved 
practice, to occur. In most instances of ‘learning by doing’, 
the ‘feedback’ from ‘experience’ to inferred ‘understanding’ 
is severely constrained. The ‘doers’ have limited facilities for 
accurately observing and recording process outcomes, or for 
hypothesizing about the structure of the process they are 
trying to control. (David, 2000, p. 130) 
Agents within firms, and firms as a whole are permanently involved in evolutionary 
learning processes where the interpretation of data, the application of concepts or 
procedures and results from these actions shape the learning curve in a dynamic way. 
Actors consciously or unconsciously envisage a recurrent assessment of the 
outcomes of past behaviours and accordingly bound their cognition to repetitive 
successful selection mechanisms. “They introduce – into a system that already 
operates a process of ‘adaptation by selection’ – further elements of ‘adaptation by 
coding’ and ‘adaptation by revision’.” (David, 2000, p. 132) 
The concept of learning can have different connotations for late industrialising 
countries, as is sustained by (Viotti, 2002). For him, learning is directly related to the 
capabilities acquired by sectors and economies to absorb incremental innovations. He 
argues that developing economies are technological learners rather than innovators 
stricto sensu. Although this posture can be debated, it highlights the differences of 
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learning processes according to the economic and social setting of countries. 
Learning is even more strategic for LDCs as the most effective instrument for 
catching up with market leaders. This can be achieved through an evolutionary 
process of adaptation, validation and transformation of knowledge according to 
specific contexts. 
Historical evidence strongly supports the view that self-
sustained technological dynamism in catching-up countries is 
hardly possible without a progressive construction of 
widening manufacturing sector also involving indigenous 
skills in a set of ‘core’ technologies. (Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, 
& Stiglitz, 2009, p. 344) 
2.3.3.2. Networks 
Networks are the base constituting the structure and operation of systems of 
innovation. It is through cooperative and competitive relationships between firms and 
production units within a sector that knowledge and technological capabilities are 
shared and enforce. 
[The] competitive capabilities of a firm rest not only on its 
own knowledge or on its knowledge of the network. The 
capabilities of the firm, rather, are dependent upon the 
principles by which cooperation among firms is coordinated 
and supported in the network. (Kogut, 2000, p. 406)  
Since networks usually emerge to meet the needs, institutional setting and 
technological capabilities of a sector or a business area, they self-regulate and govern 
in accordance with the particularities of the industry. Hence, there are not generic 
rules followed by specific settings. Networks’ structure depends on the interaction of 
social, technological and economic factors. Furthermore, a business network latest 
purpose is capturing rents. The firm as a unit of accrual build cooperation and 
coordination features within the collaborative space, so there can be a sharing of 
capabilities that can result in higher profits (Kogut, 2000). In this sense, two kinds of 
network structures can be differentiated for the purpose of this study: A Burt network 
or a Coleman network. The former is characterised by the notion of “non-redundant” 
ties.  
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A tie is non-redundant if it represents the only path between 
two nodes as constituted by individuals, firms, or even 
industries. Entities that have multiple unique (i.e., non- 
redundant) ties with other nodes who are not connected 
occupy powerful brokerage positions called “structural 
holes.” (Kogut, 2000, p. 414) 
The latter are those where redundant ties are predominant, which result in a flatter 
structure and a tendency to solve problems and share capabilities collectively. “A 
Coleman rent is associated with the benefits of trust supporting coordination in long-
term relationships” (Kogut, 2000, p. 414, original Italics ). (See Figure 2.2.) 
 
Figure 2.2. Burt and Coleman network structures 
Source. Made by the author based on (Kogut, 2000) 
The way in which a network is organised is highly influenced by the way firms and 
individuals approach problems and build knowledge. Therefore is not surprising to 
find totally different network structures within sectoral and sub-sectoral systems. As 
it is explain by Loasby: 
Differently organised networks, within each organisation and 
within each individual’s brain, generate different operating 
procedures and refer differently defined problems for explicit 
consideration; each person’s and each firm’s reflective level 
will have its own way of working and so may reach a 
distinctive conclusion even if problems are similarly defined. 
(Loasby, 1999, p. 141) 
The division of labour is another important factor that determines and guides the way 
knowledge is produced and divided within firms. It is through the specialization of 
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labour that relevant knowledge emerges and thereby creates a particular set of 
relationships among the actors involved in the network, production chain or system 
(Loasby, 1999). It is also true that networks emerge based on complementarities in 
knowledge, capabilities and specialization, rather than on similarities between actors. 
Firms and non-firms are connected in sectors so they can maximise the benefits of 
cooperation with producers, suppliers and competitors, and vertical integration so 
processes of exchange, competition and command can be enhanced. The degree of 
integration between firms and non-firms and governance in the network is highly 
determined by the power and trust relationships that determine the operation and 
effectiveness of the SSIs (Malerba & Mani, 2009b). 
2.3.3.3. Demand 
The size, growth, structure, composition and source of demand are crucial for 
understanding market composition, segmentation and innovation processes between 
firms. The role of demand during the evolution of industries determines innovation 
dynamics that force firms to be more competitive in global and domestic markets. 
Demand is also heterogeneous in terms of segments, imports and exports 
compositions, entrance of public and private players and national and international 
economic fluctuations. Customer-driven sectors are very sensitive to demand 
patterns, so sectoral innovation dynamics evolve according to customers’ taste, 
requirements and consumption changes. For these sectors, more than others, 
customer behaviour plays a major role affecting innovation (Malerba, 2006).  Hence, 
study of demand taxonomies related to consumers and users and their involvement in 
research and development of products and services and their knowledge and mental 
frameworks is highly relevant to determine factors affecting innovation. 
[A] good deal of knowledge is required in order to use 
markets effectively, and much of this…, is ‘knowledge how’. 
Using markets to obtain what one wants, like using inputs to 
create the outputs that one wants, require the appropriate 
capabilities. (Loasby, 1999, p. 57) 
Therefore, to be an effective source of accrual with growing profits, it is important 
that firms develop capabilities to understand their customers’ needs and preferences 
and to have good managerial resources to generate synergy with the providers to 
  44 
make the supply chain as effective and productive as possible. In order to do that, 
firms need to ‘know how’ so they can enhance their technological capabilities. 
Moreover, technological evolution and technical change are not only, or even mostly, 
determined by the supply side of markets. Understanding that demand heterogeneity 
is an active part of the products and services creation and evolution, as well as the 
innovation processes, suggests a rationale to include demand as a link, trigger, and 
selection force within the technology production and absorption cycle (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2001). 
2.3.3.4. Coevolution 
In an SSI, innovation dynamics are subject to systemic relationships between firms 
and non-firms organisations, knowledge types, dimensions and learning processes, 
types of networks between actors, particular institutional settings and demand 
heterogeneity. That is why the process of interaction of all these factors, or their 
coevolution, is at the very heart of the interaction, cooperation and competition 
processes and are sector-specific (Malerba, 2006).  
Firms’ innovative capabilities and size appear to be an important factor that 
determines the survival in the market. Although (Klepper, 1996) recognises in his 
model the importance of firms capabilities, sectoral characteristics and innovation 
patterns, his study is overly focused on the capacity of firms to innovate over the 
product life cycle through investment and performance in R&D. It illustrates, 
however, how dominant industrial concentration is coerced by random differences in 
firm capabilities. A wider study on firm capabilities and transaction cost coevolution 
to understand firm’s vertical scope and industry evolution, is performed by 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2005). They introduce the concept of productive capabilities, 
as follows: 
[T]he term ‘productive capabilities’ embraces the underlying 
determinants of the efficiency with which firms manage to 
carry out their productive activities. Productive capabilities 
rest on the firm’s general and specific knowledge of how to 
do things (Richardson, 1972; Teece et al., 1997), and also 
involve specific investments in equipment, training, and 
retention of key personnel, etc., required to put that 
knowledge to work. (Jacobides & Winter, 2005, p. 397) 
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Selection and development of sectoral productive capabilities affect the vertical 
scope of firms and the whole industry. This is mediated by endogenous and external 
transaction costs, that in turn affects the nature of development of new capabilities 
brought by new entrants to the sector (Jacobides & Winter, 2005).  
Learning processes are conditioned and driven by the degree of integration and 
specialization of a particular industry. The knowledge cumulativeness of firms and 
actors within a sectoral setting depends on the capabilities built to respond to market 
demand and supply cycles and the further development of productive capabilities. As 
it is explained by (David, 2000), learning opportunities are developed and shaped by 
the production systems where firms are embedded: 
The creation of learning opportunities through field 
implementation of production systems, and the sequential 
incremental modification of such systems, has been found to 
constitute an important, and for some industries the 
dominant, source of cumulative productivity improvements. 
(David, 2000, p. 124) 
Following this line of reasoning, we agree with (Malerba, 2006) to pursue a finer 
degree of analysis fed mostly by empirical studies to determine what is coevolving 
with what in each sectoral case. Coevolution of the aforementioned factors is path-
dependent on sectoral structure, historical context and particular firms’ compositions 
and capabilities. Although the SSI approach grasps better than the NSI approach the 
specificity of innovation contexts, it still lacks a deeper study of the role of 
innovation in innovation dynamics, how power and trust are an essential part to 
understand the structural and functional setting of the dynamics of the innovation 
players and how different forms of governance impact upon the sectoral innovation 
goals.  
2.4. Technological Change in Latin America 
The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region has gone through several 
institutional stages that have been characterised by an unequal distribution of wealth, 
high economic dependence on natural resources, unstable political structures, and a 
slow development of scientific and technological capabilities that inhibits the region 
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from catching up with the world’s top tier countries. From the late 19th century until 
the Great Depression in 1929, LAC countries focused their economic growth on an 
export-led pattern. This path dependence was identified as the key cause of 
underdevelopment; therefore, to counteract this problem, the region followed a 
structuralist economic approach. This analysis identified three specific intervention 
strategies:  
[F]irst, Latin American countries should promote 
industrialization, producing what had been previously 
imported from abroad; second, they should rely basically on 
the internal market to find demand for their new industrial 
production; and third, as the structural changes that were 
necessary to achieve these aims could not take place 
spontaneously, the state should play a central role in shaping 
this pattern of growth. (Kuntz Ficker, 2005, p. 148) 
The Latin American Structuralism Approach (LACSA) was an attempt to focus on 
the particularities of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (LAC).  From the 
LACSA perspective, underdevelopment is not a stage in the evolution of countries, 
but a historically dependent process attached to cultural, political, social and 
economic variables (Furtado, 1960). It implies the need to go beyond the application 
of ideal models derived from developed countries to solve the structural failures in 
Less Developed Countries (LDC).  
LACSA was thought of and applied by what is known as The Latin American School 
of Thought (LAST). This was a group of academics, technicians and politicians 
formed during the late 1950s focused on LAC development. LAST contributed 
practical recommendations for building technological capacity in the region in order 
to have innovative productive sectors. The ideological corpus followed was mainly 
Schumpeterian economics (Schumpeter, 1939). The intention was to generate 
“development from within” using a strategy of temporary protection of national and 
regional industries to build internal capabilities and have a competitive advantage in 
international markets, but what prevailed “was an inward-oriented model of 
industrialization based entirely on the internal market and with a strong anti-export 
bias.” (Kuntz Ficker, 2005, p. 149) Although it can be said that the political thought 
was democratic and academic - private and public actors were building consensus 
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about the economic path that the region should take -, the result was that LAC 
economies lost dynamism; the intended “destructive creation”6 was not achieved 
because S&T capabilities were not built, or a modern industrial system based on 
innovation; and there was a strong deterioration of equity levels in the population. 
The principal achievements of the school were practical impacts on the definition of 
public policy, and stronger relationships with transnational organizations such as 
Economic Commission for Latin American Countries (ECLAC), United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the World 
Bank (WB).  Through the action of its members, most of the national entities in 
charge of S&T were created in each country. The central aim was to promote 
innovation to change the productive patterns based on S&T; however the result was 
“late industrialised region” status. As described by the ECLAC in 1990 about the 
results of Imports Substitution Industrialization (ISI): 
There are at least five main interrelated characteristics that 
should be pointed out, albeit briefly. The first is the 
slowdown in economic growth; the second, the persistent 
macroeconomic imbalances; the third, the regressive nature 
of the adjustment; the fourth, the marked weakening of the 
public sector; and, finally, the decline in capital formation. 
(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
ECLAC, 1990, p. 21) 
Consistent with the structural economic changes in Latin America, Colombia 
followed a trade liberalisation at the beginning of the 1990s and a growing tendency 
to privatise what were state-owned enterprises. An evolving structural change in the 
economic relationships between domestic enterprises and state-led investment 
programs in promising sectors, built-up a fitting momentum for attracting foreign 
direct investment, which energised the entrance and construction of new 
technological capabilities within traditional industries and the creation of emerging 
new sectors. At the firm and industrial levels, a higher dynamism was created 
downstream and upstream between users, producers and chain providers.  
                                                
6 Schumpeter’s gale for describing the processes in which the capitalist structure based on economic 
innovation goes through cycles of destruction and creation of new economic orders or regimes.  
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This dynamic setting in which the region has evolved after the so-called ‘lost decade’ 
in the 1980s product of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) taking place 
from the 1940s to the 1980s, is better analysed and explain using an evolutionary 
approach towards firms capabilities, cultural, political and economic institutions, 
learning cycles and the ‘creative destruction and accumulation’ of technological 
capabilities in industries. This approach leads us away from the concept of a 
‘representative firm’ usually portrayed in the neoclassical theory. We are dealing 
with imperfect relationships between firms and the construction of capabilities to 
succeed in the marketplace. Firms react to an incomplete understanding of the market 
and competitors, and respond to profit signals, not always maximising their 
performance and competitiveness (Katz, 2001).  
In Latin America, since the 1970s, it has been recognized that 
malignant macroeconomic contexts jeopardize long run 
investments in real and intellectual capital and have larger 
implications to industrial development than specific industrial 
and innovation policies. That is why traditional macro-
economic policies have been called 'implicit' industrial and 
technology policies (Herrera, 1971). As a number of authors 
in the region have stressed, following Herrera's insight, 
hyperinflation, high external debt and high interest rates are 
significant constraints to technological (and productive) 
development in these countries. The risk of ignoring this 
perspective can lead to the design of completely inoperative 
policies. (Lastres & Cassiolato, 2005) 
Technological change in Latin America can be seen at the firm level, within the 
competitive and technological regime that firms are immersed, and from the macro 
regulatory system and S&T policies that evolve from the ISI process. At the firm 
level, three different types of firms had a major role in the construction of knowledge 
and learning capabilities: domestic subsidiaries of TNCs, large local conglomerates, 
and SMEs. In the case of TNCs branches, during the mid-1950s until the 1980s, they 
needed to customise their based products according to the available raw material 
found in the local countries and to the local formal and informal institutions. As a 
result, many of them had to create engineering departments according to the needs of 
local production. There was a local creation and adaptation of knowledge that 
generated a downstream effect on the industrial supply chains. Most of the large 
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domestic companies based their activities in the NRs exploitation such as coal, oil, 
steal and cooper. In this case, the technical progress was embedded in the machinery 
and equipment used for the local production. However, these companies did not 
invest much in adding value to the final products, focusing their strategy on the 
extraction volume of the trading resources. The last type, SMEs, most of them 
family-owned, focused their business on manufacturing industries as textiles, shoes 
or furniture. These firms were benefited by high state tariff protection, which kept 
them alive even when they were not very efficient in their production and their 
business portfolio was based on copies of out-dated international tendencies. During 
the 1990s, when the region opened to trade liberalisation, the business sector went 
onto a deep structural reform in their competence and innovation patterns (Katz, 
2001). 
Higher competition pushed the domestic market to be more efficient and to 
modernise the technological infrastructure in order to catch up with the imported 
products and services. Thus, transnational companies’ branches based in the region 
closed down their R&D and engineering departments since the new setting they were 
a part of was global and had different parts of their supply chain in different markets 
in order to reduce costs and rise productivity. The production of goods and services 
in the local environments was minimised and with them, the construction of local 
capabilities. In the case of public companies, the region went through a privatisation 
scheme, which gave more participation to the private sector in the S&T investment, 
but also cut off resources or disappeared the great centres of basic knowledge 
production formerly funded by the state. In the case of large national conglomerates, 
a machinery modernisation process came through which produced a growth in the 
productivity levels but foreign technologies were imported with a ‘black box’ 
scheme. SME’s that could not restructure left the market, leaving room only to the 
most dynamic ones that could structure a new product portfolio able to meet higher 
quality and price standards. In terms of innovation systems, the LAC countries 
increased their private investment in R&D and went through a process of 
modernisation. However, domestic technological capabilities were not built. On the 
contrary, countries of the region relied more on imported knowledge and foreign 
‘black box’ technological solutions (Katz, 2001).  
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[T]rade liberalization and the deregulation and privatization 
of economic activities are significantly affecting the structure 
and behavior of the national innovation systems of the 
various countries in the region. To a large extent, the change 
in the global incentive regime has blurred the limits and 
national identity of the various local innovation systems, 
enhancing the role played by external firms, institutions and 
sources of know-how (Katz, 2001, p. 18). 
The region went through a transformation led by international patterns, going from 
the establishment of strong S&T institutes after the Second World War until the 
1980s when international economics started to move towards neoliberal policies 
favouring open markets and less state intervention. During this period many of the 
public research centres were dismantled and in some countries the budget for S&T 
was trimmed (Sagasti, 2010).  
In the 1990s, most of LAC countries’ NSI changed in similar 
directions…S&T institutions have also been streamlined or 
eliminated, and previous attempts to develop indigenous 
technologies through public enterprises in 
telecommunications or informatics have ceased and firms 
privatized. (Alcorta & Peres, 1998, p. 862) 
Although the ISI strategy failed, STI policy building capabilities and a school of 
thought emerged and were the base for the first regional attempts towards formation 
and strengthening of a technological base for traditional and new business sectors. It 
is remarkable that the dependency theory and the Sabato’s triangle, the precursor of 
the triple helix model, were born within the LAST movement. It was clearer during 
the 1960s than during the 2000s the structural dimension of science, technology and 
innovation in the economic and social development of LAC countries. We are struck 
by the fact that a school of thought developed those measures, based on the particular 
historical, political and social context, and that gave higher importance to the firms 
as the innovation engine. The intended results were not achieved, but that does not 
mean that there cannot be opportunities to learn from the failures and experiment 
with other policy mixes following a similar structural view of development and 
progress.  
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2.5. Institutions and the Governance of 
Innovation 
[I]nstitutions and policies always matter in all processes of technological learning and 
economic coordination and change. (Cimoli et al., 2009, p. 338)  
For evolutionary economics and the innovation systems approach, institutions are a 
key factor for moulding technologies and explaining the (differing) dynamism of 
technological change in different contexts (Nelson & Nelson, 2002). There has 
however been some debate about how to conceptualise institutions. The definition of 
institutions as explained by North and used within the SI approach is: 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives 
in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. 
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through 
time and hence is the key to understanding historical change. 
(North, 1990, p. 3) 
Hence, institutions shape and are shaped by human behaviour and interaction and 
create a set of formal and informal options and social boundaries for individuals to 
act. Formal institutions are those created explicitly by humans to regulate social 
behaviour such as laws, codes of behaviour and conduct. Informal institutions 
emerge as part of the daily life of human systems as trust and power relationships, 
implicit codes of behaviour and specific rules set by social groups. In this sense, the 
concept of institutions is different from that of organisations as formal bodies that 
have a particular purpose (firms, political parties, churches, universities, etc.) (North, 
1990). Institutions provide the framework within which economy operates and 
together with technology they determine specific innovation pathways. Both formal 
and informal institutions vary according to geographical settings (global, national, 
regional, local), industries and sectors, and specific cultural settings. The 
interrelation between these set of institutions determine the incentives and constraints 
to innovation processes and the operation of particular SIs (Dosi & Malerba, 1996).  
In the same vein, (Nelson & Nelson, 2002) integrate the concept of institutions with 
technological change and innovation systems. For them, institutions are social 
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technologies as they shape social rules of game and determine particular modes of 
governance. As such, effective social technologies promote low transaction costs 
across organisational borders.   
Indeed, institutions can be seen as the social technologies 
(Nelson and Sampat, 2001) mastering externalities and 
matching/mismatching patterns between innovative activities, 
labour training, and socially distributed skills. In turn, the 
institutions governing such externalities and 
complementarities do so also governing interaction rules 
among agents, shaping their beliefs and the information they 
may access, their ‘ethos’ and behavioural rules. (Cimoli et al., 
2009, p. 343) 
It is recognised by most contemporary scholars working on effective operation of 
market economies that innovation is a fundamental driver to bring economic growth 
and, therefore, wealth to countries. However, more attention needs to be paid to the 
role of institutions to support market and knowledge transactions. These institutions 
evolve with the interaction of market and non-market organisations and the 
development of technological. (Cimoli et al., 2009) 
From this perspective, the process of policy construction needs to take into account 
existing formal institutions and the actual dynamics of innovation players within 
domestic and global markets. If a systemic approach is thought to promote and 
strengthen innovation, STI policies need to be designed and implemented 
accordingly, taking into account the systemic or lack of systemic nature of the 
relationship between components of the SIs. 
With this purpose, (Morris Teubal, 2002) proposes a strategic perspective to build 
STI policies which includes the definition of a vision of what is intended with a 
particular innovation system; a set of strategies to achieve the purpose or purposes; 
and mechanisms to operationalize the strategies given a predefined priority to the 
expected results of the policies (i.e. programs portfolio). These strategies should be 
directed to the backbone of SIs, firms, and the supportive infrastructure to promote 
innovation (IP systems, financial systems, norms and standards, etc.). “Thus a major 
theme within an evolutionary system of innovation perspective is coevolution 
between changes in the business enterprise sector and changes in the ‘facilitating 
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structure’ of institutions and non-business organizations.” (M. Teubal & Andersen, 
2000, p. 88). However, we argue that this policy cycle, although logical, it is not 
always feasible, mostly in developing economies with highly hierarchical policy 
institutions and exploitative economic institutions. Teubal analyses the cases of top-
tier countries such as Israel and Korea, with particular institutional settings that made 
possible the application of such policy cycle. We are inclined to take a different 
approach towards the construction of inclusive STI policies in developing contexts 
and in sectors such as agriculture, that are composed by vulnerable populations under 
poverty conditions. We agree with (Hall & Clark, 2010) on embracing complex 
adaptive system theory for policy analysis and development.  
Innovation systems are composed by humans performing all sort of activities and 
acting under different narratives and dominant discourses coming from actor’s 
cultural backgrounds and broad social technologies. Under new configurations of 
innovation processes shaped by formal and informal institutions and guided by 
embedded routines that innovation actors bring to the system, policy processes 
should embrace complexity and be resilient in order to cope with unforeseen change 
(Hall & Clark, 2010).  
Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of 
political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied 
in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more 
impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints 
not only connect the past with the present and future, but 
provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical 
change. (North, 1990, p. 6) 
The CTA is one of the perspectives that advocates for the active participation of 
publics in the design and evaluation of hard and soft technologies and therefore in 
the articulation of political mixes with social problems. With this premise, the aim is 
to minimise mismatches, wrong investments, and possible social conflict with the 
introduction of technological change. CTA then acts as a mediation framework for 
technology policies and technology assessment. (Schot & Rip, 1997) 
CTA is not simply a management tool. CTA can be seen as a 
new design practice (which includes tools) in which impacts 
are anticipated, users and other impacted communities are 
  54 
involved from the start and in an interactive way, and which 
contains and element of societal learning. (Schot & Rip, 
1997, p. 255) 
As it was said in section 2.3, the CTA was a precursor and a base for developing the 
multi-level socio-technical SI framework and includes dynamics of technological 
developments with socio-technical mappings of interaction between different actors. 
Hence, when designing policy, we are analysing complex systems where narratives 
of different actors embodying differing systems-framings, goals and interests are part 
of a process traversed by risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance. What policy 
decisions and mixes are eventually designed depends on which narratives become 
dominant, marginal or hidden, and what groups’ interests prevail. “[N]arratives are at 
least partly (and often deeply) about social relationships and political institutional 
power; about who is responsible for a problem and who has the power to deal with 
it.” (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010, p. 65). Since innovation implies the 
mobilisation of different actors, knowledge and imperfect information, it requires the 
interaction of multiple actors where firms and producers are at the centre and shape 
the direction of innovation through informal, adaptive and transient arrangements. 
Most innovations are incremental and happen outside big research centres, the 
policy-making model have to look at these ‘under the radar’ innovation processes in 
order to be adaptive, deliberative and reflexive accounting social construction and 
inclusive participation. (N. Clark & Chataway, 2009) 
Lastly, the evolutionary process of policy construction depends largely on the 
interaction between governability and governance arrangements. Governability is 
focused on the governmental organisations, their role and influence on the decision-
making processes and guideline development to organise and control the 
relationships among actors of a determined system. On the other hand, governance 
privileges the organisation capacity of the system players and their capacity to auto 
regulate the rules of the game following a cooperative model for decision-making 
(Lucio-Arias, Salazar, & Durán-Sánchez, 2013).   We believe that a balance between 
governability and governance is necessary to bring together top-down and bottom-up 
approaches where actors themselves have power of coordination, but enough support 
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from central governments at formal institutional levels to carry on with their 
practices. 
Governance is a descriptive label that is used to highlight the 
changing nature of policy process in recent decades. In 
particular, it sensitizes us to the ever-increasing variety of 
terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy. 
Thus, governance demands that we consider all actors and 
locations beyond the ‘core executive’ involve in the 
policymaking process. (Richards and Smith, 2002 in Leach et 
al., 2010, p. 68) 
Therefore, governance in a complex adaptive system determines the innovation 
pathways followed by innovation players and focalise policies according to particular 
necessities that are not noticed by traditional processes of policy-making and 
governability. We agree with (Morris Teubal, 2002) that having a vision, scope, 
strategies and prioritised programs for policy mixes is ideal, but we highlight that the 
policy making processes are surrounded by uncertainty, complexity and ignorance. 
Then, a neat and rational process involving a well-defined portfolio of innovation 
programs is difficult to achieve. 
2.6. Conclusion 
In the first chapter of this thesis, we presented the research aim and research 
questions guiding this thesis. This chapter explored in detail the systemic nature of 
innovation, the policy processes behind national and sectoral performance based on 
technological and scientific capabilities and the high relevance of institutions and 
different governance approaches towards innovation networks. We built the bases for 
the understanding and analysis of our two main thematic pathways: science, 
technology and innovation policies development, implementation and outcomes; and 
understanding of innovation at national and sectoral levels. Since our case studies are 
centred in Colombia and in the agro-industrial sector, we dedicated one section to 
analyse the evolution of technological change in Latin America and found an early 
school of thought formed by Latin American scholars and policy-makers that 
developed intellectual and practical tools to understand development, structural 
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elements affecting innovation processes, and strategies to generate economic growth 
and social welfare different from the neoclassical approach.  
We identified a research gap in the understanding of the NSI approach in developing 
and emerging economies. The NSI concept seemed to emerge as a 'boundary object’ 
utilised in different (and often incompatible) ways by a wide spectrum of policy-
makers, consultants, and academics. We discovered deep failures coming from a 
narrow and simplistic understanding of innovation that encouraged the traditional 
linear thinking of knowledge construction and exploitation disguised as a systemic 
approach. In order to close this knowledge gap this study applied multiple methods 
to inquire about the nature of innovation dynamics at national and sectoral levels. 
Our first question focused upon the implementation of NSI policies; our second 
research question addressed the innovation support emerging at a sectoral level 
through comparative sub-sectoral cases; and the third research question brought 
together the national and sectoral studies from a top-down and bottom-up approach. 
This literature review sought to provide a theoretical foundation to answer this 
questions by building bridges between the national and sectoral innovation systems 
approaches and complementing these generic frameworks with a complementary 
tradition rooted in earlier Latin American theories geared towards the promotion of 
competitiveness at industrial levels using a mixture of macro economic and political 
measures from the 1960s onwards. We enriched the former approaches by including 
sociological and historical analytical lenses to capture the essence of innovation 
dynamics in socio-technical systems surrounded by uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity. The role of institutions and governance of innovation systems is crucial to 
explain particular pathways and to shape future intended trajectories in order to 
prevent undesirable lock-in. This literature review provided us with the necessary 
theoretical and analytical tools to propose a top-down and bottom-up framework to 
study developing economies. 
In light of these theoretical blocks, we analysed our data and presented a discussion 
of our major findings. We also found that the generic NSI model and the SSI 
approach can be enhanced by giving particular attention to socio-economic and 
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political institutions that are context-dependent, so they might be strengthened by 
integrating explicitly historical and sociological studies.  
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3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
“No study conforms exactly to a standard methodology; each one calls for the researcher to bend the 
methodology to the peculiarities of the setting.” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 5) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This is a qualitative study that seeks to develop a particular understanding of the 
factors influencing innovation processes in selected case studies within the 
Colombian context. We follow a ‘systems thinking’ approach to formulate and give 
answer to the research questions. Since the research aim and questions oriented our 
sight to the study of innovation systems, as explained in Chapter 1, our analysis is 
focused on the so-called systems structure, functions and purpose.  
The qualitative nature of the study is demonstrated by the following: it is conducted 
through an examination of the ‘field’ where the research object lays; it presents a 
systemic account of the context under study; it captures data through a process of 
empathetic understanding of key actors; attempts to give an explanation of the way a 
particular issue is understood by different groups of action; and the main results are 
presented in the form of statements assembled, sub-clustered, and broken into 
semiotic segments (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We conducted 50 interviews, 30 in 
the first data collection phase and 20 more in the second phase. We also conducted 
two specialised focus groups, one in each phase, and a deep documentary analysis of 
selective public documents.  
Adopting a qualitative view of the innovation processes in particular case studies 
allows us a richer and deeper look at what the systems of innovation are in ‘real life’, 
beyond the traditional statistics and assessments based on quantitative studies. Given 
the complexity of human systems, we needed a qualitative approach to capture the 
richness of the phenomenon under study, so we could provide thick descriptions and 
analyses of socio-technical innovations according to people’s lived experiences.   
The methodology adopted emerged over two research phases to understand 
innovation using a top-down and a bottom-up approach. The existence of two phases 
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was not intended from the beginning of the project, but emerged after review of 
initial findings about the operation of the Colombian NSI that highlighted a schism 
between the national policy framework and the circumstances of industrial players. 
Addressing the latter necessitated a second phase of data collection focusing on 
industrial sectors. Accordingly, we selected one macro case study (Colombia) and 
three meso case studies (coffee, flower, sugarcane sectors). We firstly conducted an 
exploratory study of the Colombian STI policies through documentary analysis, 
followed by focus groups and interviews as main research methods. 
The research questions also evolved over the research. Once we went to field and 
found an intricate set of relationships that showed the complexity and uncertainty in 
innovation processes, our understanding of the phenomenon under study was 
enhanced and key features emerged that gave us feedback and reshaped our research 
questions. In that sense, our research design remained flexible during the whole 
process. 
Your aim is to come up with a final set of research questions, 
which are relevant to the purposes of the study (which may, 
or may not, have been renegotiated along the way), which 
show clear linkage to theory (from whatever source it has 
obtained) and for which the sampling has been such that the 
data collected and analysed provide answers to those 
questions. (Robson, 2002, p. 83) 
In the following sections, we will explain the research design process, how we 
collected and analysed data and how we finally built a solid understanding to answer 
the research questions posed, in order to fulfil the research aim. 
3.2. Research Strategies and Epistemological 
Assumptions 
3.2.1. Research Questions 
The process of defining the nature and scope of a research project is done through the 
specification of research questions. Following (Blaikie, 2010, p. 60), there are three 
kinds of questions: What questions are concerned with descriptions to discover the 
characteristics and patterns of a social phenomenon; Why questions are directed 
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towards finding causes, reasons, existence of characteristics and regularities for the 
explanation of a particular phenomenon; and How questions are concerned with 
strategies and mechanisms to produce change, practical outcomes and intervention 
(Blaikie, 2010).  
Even though our main research questions do not start with ‘what’ or ‘why’, they are 
within these two groups of questions described above. The research aim is divided 
into two main enquiries: to understand the nature of innovation promoted from a 
national institutional setting, and to understand and analyse innovation dynamic 
complementarities through the study of specific sectoral dynamics.  
We decided to focus our study on Colombia, given our personal interest to expand 
the current research on innovation studies and science and technology studies in 
countries still in an emergent phase, and our interest to strengthen the knowledge 
base related to innovation dynamics of the Latin American region. Besides our 
personal interest, the study responds to a call from academic scholars to enhance 
evolutionary innovation studies with more case studies, particularly in emerging and 
developing economies (Kaplinsky et al., 2009; Lundvall, Joseph, et al., 2009; 
Metcalfe & Ramlogan, 2008). 
The final questions that guided us through the first research phase and emerged as 
part of our research analysis and shaped the second phase are presented below. 
Recommendations for policy-makers and practitioners are also expected to emerge in 
attempting to answer internal and subsidiary forms of how questions: 
1. How has Colombia attempted to establish a national system of innovation? 
This question involves a descriptive account of the Colombian National System of 
Innovation, since it is within this formal framework that the STI policies have been 
developed. This question has two subsidiary questions: 
• How has the process of development and implementation of STI policies 
unfolded?  
• What has been achieved? 
  61 
Our initial questions were focused on the promotion and institutional setting of 
innovation at the national level. After performing an exploratory study of the 
Colombian innovation public and official documents, we found that there was an 
explicit acknowledgement of the existence of a National System of Innovation. This 
focused our attention on examining the so-called national system. With the main and 
subsidiary questions, we established the bases to explore our object of study, the 
Colombian NSI, and the political institutions supporting its implementation, and 
outcomes. We also explored diverse accounts of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
STI policies and attempted to present a richer perspective of the relationships 
between social, political and economic institutions interacting in the social 
construction of the complex intended national system of innovation. This question 
was answered in Chapter 4. 
2. What are the main innovation dynamics differences in the Colombian coffee, 
flower, and sugarcane sub-sectors? 
As we began to analyse findings from the study of the implementation of innovation 
policies, we identified a gulf between those actors closely associated with NSI 
policy, who were broadly concerned with promoting the conduct and exploitation of 
public sector research, and the perceptions of industrial players who perceived these 
activities as far removed from their world. Therefore, we engaged in a study of 
sectoral innovation dynamics to understand and identify critical factors triggering 
competitiveness and technical change, according to the perception of the sectoral 
players.  
An important question arose regarding which industrial sector(s) to examine. After a 
deep documentary analysis of Colombian strategic public documents, we found a 
broad diversity of sectors identified as ‘strategic’ by different national departments, 
ministries, public missions for science and technology and long-term planning 
exercises. Each document presented a different list of sectors in which Colombia, as 
a country, should be a regional leader first and then, a world leader. Initially we 
selected agriculture, biotechnology and biodiversity as our possible case studies, but 
upon further exploration of the sectors, found that there was rather little 
biotechnology R&D and commercialisation and no identifiable exploitation model 
  62 
for biodiversity – which lead to further consideration of agriculture as a sector to 
study.  
Colombia has been traditionally recognised as an agrarian country, with vast wealth 
in natural resources. Between 2000 and 2009, the Agro-industrial sector accounted 
for approximately 30% of Colombia’s GDP growth. Agriculture is also a critical 
sector in social terms; representing 67% of formal rural employment in the country7. 
The sector is not only strategically important for Colombia, but for other developing 
countries as well, as is explained by Clark: he describes agriculture as “a context that 
has tended to be sidelined in the standard literature dealing with innovation and 
technological change…and yet for poor developing countries it is precisely the 
agriculture sector that is so crucial” (N. Clark, 2002, p. 353). For these reasons, we 
chose to undertake an in-depth study of the innovation dynamics of the agricultural 
sector in Colombia. 
Once we defined the agriculture sector as our case study, we encountered a wide 
diversity within the agricultural (sub) sectors. There are 37 sub-sectors or production 
chains; each of them with completely different dynamics and economic activities (i.e. 
livestock, staple, seafood, flowers, aromatic plants, etc.). After an extensive research 
of public documents, statistics and interviews, we discovered that the three most 
successful production chains - in terms of productivity and exports representation -
were coffee, cut-flowers and sugarcane. We also found that these three production 
chains also had a strong research element, each possessing their own research centre 
and strong producers association. We identified the oldest research centre (coffee), 
the newest research centre (flower), and one successful research centre just in the 
middle time of the creation of these other two (sugarcane). 
The subsidiary questions were: 
                                                
7 According to the European Union in its report for the European Regional Development Fund about 
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• How formal and informal institutions have affected the innovation pathways 
in the industries under study?  
• What barriers and drivers to change have been crucial to generating 
alignment between actors and promoting effective knowledge generation and 
exploitation?  
• What does the study of particular sub-sectors in addition to the Sectoral 
Innovation Approach tell us?  
These further questions directed our study towards the specific innovation pathways 
of each of the sub-sectors, the role of formal and informal institutions in the 
innovation dynamics and the transit between knowledge generation and exploitation. 
With our case studies we finally assessed the analytical power of the SSI approach 
for analysing complex sub-sectoral systems. 
3. How are top-down and bottom-up innovation dynamics within sectoral levels 
developed and enhanced? 
This is an analytical question that brings together our two thematic pathways, the 
policy study and the innovation study. With the first question, we captured the 
national landscape with its specific and general enabling policies to promote science, 
technology and innovation in order to make Colombia more competitive in regional 
and international markets. We studied the nature, weaknesses, strengths, 
opportunities and challenges of the Colombian NSI and provided a critical glance of 
the construction of national strategies to boost innovation at the sectoral level.  
With our second question, we examined the actual dynamics of three particular sub-
sectors, analysed their knowledge creation and exploitation dynamics, the 
relationship between firms and non-firms organisations, and different institutional 
arrangements related to innovation practices. Finally, with this question we examined 
the existence of synergetic relationships between macro, meso and micro levels. 
We sought to have a broader picture of innovation by adopting a top-down and 
bottom-up approach to understanding how national innovation strategies can be 
embedded in firms and industries. By exploring the composition of the national, 
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sectoral and sub-sectoral systems in the light of their purpose, the means or 
mechanisms available to execute innovation strategies and the financial and human 
resources devoted to achieve the expected goals, we aimed to go beyond a superficial 
understanding of innovation guided only by macro policies or the sub-sectoral 
perception separated from the sectoral and national realities. 
3.2.2. Research strategies and approach 
In this section, we specify the research strategies and approach adopted, since 
research strategies differ in their ontological assumptions, starting-points, execution, 
use of concepts and theories, styles of explanation and understanding, and the status 
of their products.  
In order to acquire an understanding of our object of study, the so-called systems of 
innovation, and the social phenomena of the relationships between main actors and 
drivers of innovation, we used an inductive8 strategy to generate the descriptive base 
of our study. Once we engaged in a deep examination of the characteristics, 
dynamics, pathways and the macro, meso and micro mechanisms operating to keep 
the functional structure of the systems, we employed a retroductive9 research 
strategy.  
We adopted a critical realism epistemological perspective, which suggests that social 
practices, rules and realties can only be understood according to their specific context 
and within different layers of social reality. We explained before that we use the 
systems thinking approach in the study, which recognises that we are dealing with 
open systems that are constantly evolving and changing their structural and 
functional configurations. Our focus was to identify the factors that are coevolving 
for our particular case studies as part of a broader body of realities (Robson, 2002). 
This posture does not mean that we do not have a social account of the construction 
of reality. On the contrary, our study is rooted on the STS tradition, and we 
commenced our research acknowledging that science and technology are socially 
                                                
8 “The aim of the inductive research strategy is to establish limited generalizations about the 
distribution of, and patterns of association amongst, observed or measured characteristics of 
individuals and social phenomena.” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 83) 
9 “The aim of the retroductive research strategy is to discover underlying mechanisms that, in 
particular contexts, explain observed regularities.” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 87) 
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constructed; they are active so they produce results that are socially interpreted and 
used; and therefore the products of science and technology are not themselves natural 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
At best, our outcomes will be suggestive rather than 
conclusive. They will be plausible, perhaps even convincing, 
ways of seeing things –and, to be sure, helpful ways of seeing 
things- but certainly not any ‘one true way’ of seeing things. 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 13) 
We mainly use case studies understood as: 
[A]n empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident. The case study inquiry copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies 
on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, as an another result 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis. (Yin, 
2003, p. 13) 
The macro case we selected is Colombia as the social unit where we study 
innovation processes and evolutionary dynamics. Once we started to explore the 
Colombian NSI, we engaged in the study of embedded cases at the sectoral level in 
order to have an understanding of the ‘real world’ dynamics between innovation 
players in action. As (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 26) express, “multiple cases offer 
the researcher an even deeper understanding of processes and outcomes of cases, the 
chance to test (not just develop) hypotheses, and a good picture of locally grounded 
causality.” The multiple case studies were selected and built upon the findings of the 
original case study (National setting), which made us seek to complement the first 
study by focusing on sectoral cases not originally covered (Robson, 2002). 
The selection of the three cases and undertaking of a comparative analysis to capture 
innovation dynamics in the agriculture sector followed specific criteria: (1) strategic 
sub-sectors that have had a strong pattern of growth; (2) sectors that have been 
strongly integrated into global markets and that represent an important participation 
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in the national GDP; (3) traditional sectors that have evolved to include technological 
change to further up their competitiveness both in the domestic and international 
market and that highlight industrialisation processes in the Agro-industrial sector; 
and (4) labour intense sectors that represent large employment opportunities for the 
poor.  
In the next section, we explain the research phases, methods and reflexivity that we 
employed in order to keep our study valid and reliable. 
3.3. Data Collection and Data Analysis 
This section contains the data collection methods and analysis strategies we used in 
our research. We decided to present both data collection and data analysis in the 
same section, since we developed an iterative, interactive and continuous process of 
data collection and analysis, so both processes informed and feedback the next stage 
of the other. 
“As data collection proceeds, further episodes of data 
reduction occur (writing summaries, coding, teasing out 
themes, making clusters, making partitions, writing memos). 
The data reduction/transforming process continues after 
fieldwork, until a final report is completed.” (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 10) 
Therefore, our analytic practices were informed by the data gathering and vice versa, 
which took us to divide our study into two thematic branches that were developed in 
two research phases. With both of them we followed the same analytical approach. 
We followed what (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 9) call “a fairly classic set of 
analytic moves” for analysing the data, which includes the following simple but 
powerful steps, proficiently summarised by (Robson, 2002, p. 459): 
• Giving codes to the initial set of materials obtained from observation, 
interviews, documentary analysis, etc.; 
• Adding comments, reflections, etc. (commonly referred to as ‘memos’); 
• Going through the materials trying to identify similar phrases, patterns, 
themes, relationships, sequences, differences between sub-groups, etc.; 
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• Taking these patterns, themes, etc. out to the field to help focus the next wave 
of data collection; 
• Gradually elaborating a small set of generalizations that cover the 
consistencies you discern in the data; 
• Linking these generalizations to a formalised body of knowledge in the form 
of constructs or theories. 
NVivo was used for analysing the data and organising all the information collected 
through our different research methods, which included documents, audio files of the 
interviews, memos, notes, and minutes from the specialised focus groups. We 
conducted the coding process using the software utility for coding. In that way we 
could keep all our sources in the same project and codified according to our 
analytical process. From the beginning of the project, we kept a journal with all the 
steps we followed, to include sources and codes, and also to keep our research 
memos within the project.  
Our research methods included documentary analysis, specialised focus groups and 
interviews. In the first research stage, we used documentary analysis, a focus group 
and semi-structure interviews. In the second stage, we conducted another focus group 
and more semi-structure interviews. All of the information gathered during the data 
collection was in Spanish. We recognise the problems translation can bring, but since 
data was collected in Colombia, and the national language is Spanish, we conducted 
the interviews and focus groups in the local language.  
Most of the interviews were recorded. Only two interviews were not recorded 
because we did not have permission from the interviewees. At the beginning of every 
interview, we asked for consent to record and we asked if we could use the names of 
interviewees for the research project, always providing context for their comments. 
We did not get permission to use the names in three cases.  
For transcribing the interviews we used Express Scribe, a specialised software that 
allowed us to use a transcription pedal and transcribe the text in a more comfortable 
and quick way. We kept the original audio interview files, a copy in the transcription 
software and another copy in the NVivo project. When we moved the files to NVivo, 
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we synchronised the audio with the transcription, so we could go to specific extracts 
of the interviews not only in text but also in audio. Although this process required 
more time, we decided to transcribe all the interviews, and include them in NVivo 
with audio and text synchronised in order to add reliability and validity to our 
research (Robson, 2002). However, we did not translate the interviews from Spanish 
to English, given the low analytical advance this would have given to the research. 
Instead, we translated the extracts of the interviews we used along the chapters. For 
every source that was in Spanish and we used in quotations, we translated it into 
English.  
We used memos to analytically interpret data, and to explore, explicate and find 
emergent patterns in our data as we were codifying our sources (Bex Lempert, 2007). 
We also wrote our own reflections about the on-going data collection process 
including: what we considered the data was telling us; how we felt during the data 
collection process, according to the person or persons that were part of the interview 
or focus groups; and subjectivity and judgements we had while conducting the data 
collection. We used a free narrative style, in first person, for keeping record of the 
whole process and to be aware of our own bias and limitations. 
The advantages of using NVivo were: to have an organised and single location 
storage system; quick and easy way to access all the sources and the ability to codify 
them directly from the sources without generating many copies. We could also use 
quick search, reports and graphs to visualise our data and finally it helped us to 
develop consistent coding schemes. In terms of disadvantages, NVivo required 
training to use the software and therefore we had to invest time and financial 
resources to get the training and buy the software license. There was also some level 
of confusion at different times in using different tools of the software; loss of focus at 
times with the data analysis; and loss of computer power and performance from 
using the NVivo software, which interfered with our research analysis process 
(Robson, 2002).  
Finally, given the scope of the research - which focuses upon highly aggregated 
processes rather than individual respondents - there were no particular ethical issues; 
insofar as the data collected did not impinge upon the concerns of individual 
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participants or researchers. We accessed public documents and all interviews, and 
focus groups were carried with consent of participants. We asked for permission to 
record and use the interviews and focus groups. We also asked for clarification of 
information when necessary, before using quotations in the thesis.  
3.3.1. First Phase 
Our data collection was divided in two stages. The first stage was oriented by our 
first research question to understand and analyse the way in which Colombia has 
attempted to build a National System of Innovation. This question also represents, in 
what would be our first thematic pathway, a policy study on innovation at a national 
and sectoral level. 
Throughout the study, but especially during the first phase, we triangulated our data 
in order to preserve the validity and reliability of our research results. We used data 
triangulation through the comparison of data found in public reports and government 
documents, and information gathered through interviews and specialised focus 
groups. We also triangulated our findings with the theoretical frameworks we used. 
In this sense, triangulation was used as an epistemological claim to help us find 
structural and functional settings of the innovation systems under study and their 
institutional settings (Denzin, 1988).  
3.3.1.1. Documentary Analysis 
The first method that we used in the data collection was documentary analysis. We 
selected relevant public documents related with the promotion of innovation at 
national and sectoral levels and where strategies and assessment of the Colombian 
STI policies were outlined. In the selection of documents, we followed (Scott, 1990) 
criteria for assessing the quality of documents: authenticity (the document is genuine 
and has a known origin); credibility (the document has not been distorted); 
representativeness (the document gives an extensive account of the object of study); 
and meaning (the document is clear and comprehensible). 
For analysing the documents, we adopted a ‘critical stand’ to examine the content 
and postulates of the official and report documents (Jupp & Norris, 1993). We read 
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the documents in the light of their social function and their structural position within 
the political institutions and innovation systems. We were aware of their role as 
normative documents and the power and control they exert, giving prevalence to 
certain groups over others and as part of a social negotiation. They reflect a particular 
ideology constructed through an evolutionary process and are relevant according to 
different stages in the social evolution. In that sense, we recognised that they act as a 
legitimation instrument of intended initiatives rather than on-going realities. 
Therefore, we did not take for granted what is said and exposed in them; that is why 
we planned to triangulate the analytical categories that we built in their analysis, with 
information gathered from interviews and specialised focus groups. Finally, we 
presented in our research alternatives, definitions, explanations and solutions to the 
existent documents, not only challenging their statements, but also offering a 
grounded account of the reality perceived by key actors.  
We examined in-depth fourteen documents with the following characteristics: 




and Innovation Laws 
Promote, orientate and regulate the development of national 
initiatives and programs for science, technology and 
innovation. 
Provide a legal framework for the creation and operation of a 
NSI 
2 
National Council of 
Social and Economic 
Policy (CONPES) 
Highest body of coordination for economic policy in 
Colombia. It provides the guidelines for the macro policies 
of the country. 
6 
Special missions and 
planning exercises 
promoted by successive 
governments 
Provide council, guidelines and action lines to promote 
science, technology and innovation integrated to other 
national systems as the industrial and education ones. 
3 
Decrees Legislative decrees to provide instruments to materialise law 
dispositions and sometimes change dispositions of the 
general laws. 
3 
Table 3.1. Documents analysed in the first stage of the research 
Source. Made by the author  
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We included the documents in NVivo and codified them guided by the principles of 
the SI approach, institutional theory and the principles of the Latin American 
Structuralism. We produced a total of 33 nodes codified according to the parameters 
explained earlier in this section. The nodes were codified according to three main 
analytical categories: Institutions, policy processes, and systems structure and 
functions. We also generated two complementary nodes: one with all the references 
we found of the Agroindustrial sector in the documents analysed; and other with 
information that helped us to have analytical bases to understand the political 
institutions, definitions of central concepts as innovation, competitiveness, 
entrepreneurship, science and technology, and with diagnosis about different stages 
of the NSI. A summary of the coding process in the NVivo project is presented in 
Appendix I. We divided the nodes for documentary analysis; and interviews and 
focus groups in different folders.  
 
Figure 3.1. Documentary Analysis Categories in NVivo 
Source. Made by the author. 
3.3.1.2. Interviews 
The documentary analysis was part of an exploratory phase in our research design, so 
we could choose other research methods to triangulate the information and have a 
broader account of the phenomenon under study. Given the political nature of the 
innovation processes and the importance of formal political institutions in the 
definition of national strategies, we opted for doing semi-structure interviews (see 
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figure 3.2.) with elite actors10 in academic, public, industrial and mixed-nature 
institutions that are or were part of the Colombian NSI and that could provide us with 
a context and evolution of the STI policies in Colombia, so we could have 
perceptions not explicitly mentioned in the official documents. In order to preserve 
validity and reliability in our interviews, we were aware of the constraints the 
interviewee could have as being part of a particular organisation; we were aware that 
our interviewees did not have the obligation to be objective and tell us the truth; and 
sometimes they could exaggerate in order to highlight their own role in a determined 
situation. Before conducting the interviews we investigated the role of the 
interviewee in the Colombian NSI, we probed and followed-up answers that we felt 
could be expanded or were unclear; and we remained impartial during the interviews, 
so the interviewees would feel safe in their answers (Berry, 2002). Again, we found 
that the best type of interview was semi-structure with open-ended questions.  
For projects where depth, context, or the historical record is 
at the heart of data collection, elite interviewing using broad, 
open-ended questioning might be the best choice. (Berry, 
2002, p. 682) 
Jointly with the literature review, we used the inputs of the documentary analysis and 
the first specialised focus group to design the thematic branches to follow in our 
semi-structured interviews. With the interviews, our aim was to have a reconstruction 
of events that we could not find in secondary sources. As suggested by Mason, 
“Qualitative interviewing therefore tends to be seen as involving the construction or 
reconstruction of knowledge more than the excavation of it”. (Mason, 2002, p. 63) 
                                                
10 We define elite interviews as such conducted with bureaucrats, politicians, and people in high 
administrative positions that have an overall view of the landscape and participate or have participated 
in the definition of public policies and instruments. (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002) 
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Figure 3.2. Structure for preparing semi-structure interviews 
Source. (Mason, 2002, p. 72) 
The thematic branches included in a base questionnaire were: 
• Structure and functioning of the national system of innovation 
• Institutions 
• Organisations as key actors 
• Learning cycles and knowledge transfer, adoption and validation 
• Policy framework 
We started with thirty initial questions distributed over these themes and, according 
to the expertise of the interviewee and the course of the interview we emphasised 
some of the themes, skipped some questions, or added questions that were not 
initially foreseen. Since “elites specially –but other highly educated people as well- 
do not like being put in straightjacket of close-ended questions” (Aberbach & 
Rockman, 2002, p. 674), we had protocols to probe and followed-up questions. 
According to our previous knowledge about the topics discussed in the interview and 
the experience of the interviewee, we sometimes chose to have a deeper account of a 
specific theme, rather than cover all the thematic branches we had in our base 
questionnaire.  
We selected actors in public organisations that have a direct relationship with the 
design, implementation and assessment of STI policies; organisations in the private 
sector either representing industrials, or part of firms; academics doing research on 
topics related to innovation studies and science and technology studies in Colombia; 
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and people working in mixed public-private organisations in charge of promotion of 
innovation both at regional and national levels. The reason behind choosing actors in 
high positions within STI organisations was to have a holistic view of how STI 
institutions have evolved and prevent the partial and fragmented glance that actors 
working in specific departments could have about innovation programs. Once we 
found that Colombia was following the NSI model, we selected actors in the 
aforementioned categories, in search of having perspectives from key actors in the 
main blocks of the NSI. 
The first stage of this research was focused on the national level, resulting in 
interviews with those actors representing national organisations or doing research at 
a macro level. The interviews were conducted between December 2011 and May 
2012 for the first phase of the research. We made initial contacts with influential 
people in different sectors, and from these contacts we generated more contacts that 
were insightful for the purposes of our research. In this sense, we used the snowball 
sampling strategy, which “identifies cases of interest from people who know people 
who know what cases are information-rich.” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 28) 
Table 3.2 details the number of interviews conducted by class of interviewees: 
Group Number of Interviews 
Public Sector 13 
Private Sector 4 
Research and Academic Sector 8 
Mixed public/private organisations 5 
Total 30 
Table 3.2. Distributions of interviews conducted in first stage of research 
Source. Made by the author 
As we explained before, most of the interviews were recorded and analysed using 
NVivo. The interviews that were not recorded because the interviewee did not 
authorised us, had notes taken during and after the interview, capturing the most 
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important information for our research questions. We did not dismiss any of the 
interviews we conducted and all of them were transcribed and included in NVivo for 
the codification process. 
The codification process included nodes in six analytical themes: policy processes, 
actors, agriculture, institutions, supporting nodes and systems of innovation, as can 
be seen in figure 3.4. Agriculture emerged as an important category since the 
interviewees made explicit references about the sector, mainly relating innovation 
systems to it, since there is account of the National Agriculture Research System as 
the first innovation system in the country. These findings helped us also to define the 
Agroindustrial sector as our case study for the second phase of the research. 
 
Figure 3.3. Analytical information categories interviews and focus groups 
Source. Made by the author 
3.3.1.3. Specialised focus groups 
We use the term, specialised focus groups, to denominate a guided small-group 
discussion between specific and strategic actors that could inform particular parts of 
our research and that by interacting, can produce very different results than having a 
one-to-one conversation with each one separately. Although we did not follow an 
Integrated Assessment strategy in our research, we used the focus group as a 
collection data method in the sense (Dürrenberger, Kastenholz, & Behringer, 1999, 
p. 342) use it for bridging science, technology and innovation with policy: “In the 
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context of IA, focus groups may receive expert information about complex policy 
problems and associated policy options.” 
The first data collection method that we used after documentary analysis was a 
specialised focus group with key innovation actors in the public, private and 
academic sectors of the so-called Colombian NSI. Through the results of this focus 
group, we refined and nurture our semi-structure interview guidelines. 
The focus group was conducted in Universidad del Rosario in Bogotá in December 
2011. Since we kept the academic filiation with the university, we received 
institutional support (university facilities). Although we had problems with the 
workshop date (e.g. that day there was a national protest and all people arrived to the 
central downtown square, very near Universidad del Rosario were the workshop was, 
so arriving and leaving was very difficult that day), there was a good assistance. 
There were eleven participants in total: 4 from the academic sector, 4 from the public 
sector, and 3 from the private sector. 
The topics we covered in our focus group were: identification of the major barriers 
that diminish the effectiveness of policies for STI; Colombian NSI future visions 
through the construction of ideal scenarios; linkages and connections between 
innovation players in the NSI; and knowledge flow between firms, universities and 
government.  
This was an extraordinary opportunity to have the input of key players of the three 
sectors to have a collective construction of strengths, weaknesses and future ideal 
scenarios that participants had in their minds for the Colombian NSI. The focus 
group took place between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m. so in order to make the most of 
the time and presence of the assistants and to avoid that certain participants centered 
the discussion, excluding the inputs of others, we designed activities were everyone 
could have a representation of their own voice and thoughts. An extended account of 
the activities and results of the focus group can be found in Appendix II. 
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3.3.2. Second Phase 
As explained in the introduction of the chapter, the second stage of data collection of 
this research took place after the collection and on-going analysis of the first phase, 
described in the previous section. Once we defined that we would examine in-depth 
the agriculture sector, we found that the sector is composed by 37 sub-sectors, each 
one very different from each other. Thus, we defined that we would focus on three 
case studies: coffee, flower and sugarcane production chains. 
3.3.2.1. Specialised Focus Groups 
We followed up with contacts from the first stage who had a close relationship with 
the agriculture sector to define our sources for the sub-sectoral cases. In the second 
phase, we followed the same logic that in the first phase. We conducted a specialised 
focus group, but this time with sectoral actors, academic, and policy actors. There 
were eight participants, out of eleven that confirmed their assistance.  
There were five presentations followed by a discussion that we directed according to 
a specific set of questions we had for the participants. For this second focus group, 
we invited some of the participants that were in the first focus group and new 
participants representing the sectoral case studies. In this opportunity we deliberately 
planned to allow the participants to show freely their results towards innovation 
strategies to the assistants and based on the concrete initiatives they presented, we 
planned a guided discussion towards our research topics. This focus group followed 
the same logic than the first one, and lasted four hours, from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. 
and was conducted in May 2013. For designing and preparing it, we used results of 
the analysis of the first stage of data collection. 
3.3.2.2. Interviews 
We conducted semi-structure interviews as well for the second research stage. Our 
interest in this second phase was to have a deep knowledge of the innovation 
dynamics of our selected case studies. Guided by a previous research of general 
characteristics of the production chains, we conducted 20 semi-structured interviews 
to producers associations, firms, academics, and public servants related with the 
activities of the coffee, flower and sugarcane chains. 
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We detail the distribution of the interviews in table 3.3: 
Production Chain Number of Interviews Type of actors 
Coffee 6 Firm, producers association, 
research centre 
Flowers 5 Firm, producers association, 
research centre 
Sugarcane 9 Firm, producer association, 
research centre 
Table 3.3. Interviews second phase data collection  
Source. Made by the author 
We needed to travel to the locations of the research centres and main firms; for 
sugarcane, Valle del Cauca; for coffee, Antioquia; and for Flowers, Cundinamarca. 
We followed the same structure and logic in the first phase for collecting and 
analysing the data, and included our interviews and codes in NVivo. We built three 
main information categories for the agriculture sector: production chains, SNIA 
(National Agroindustrial System of Innovation), and supporting nodes (figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.4. Agriculture analytical information categories 
Source. Made by the author  
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3.4. Methodological Limitations 
In conducting the study we were aware of the need to make a number of practical 
choices. For example the selection of Universidad del Rosario as the locus for 
conducting both of the focus groups did have implications for the research. The 
participants identified the study as partly supported by Universidad del Rosario, and 
although this gave us support at an academic level and facilitated participation, the 
research could be seen as not being independent from organisational interests. 
We also acknowledge that we did not have direct contact with producers and 
farmers. This left a part of the story out of the results presented in this study. 
However, time and resource constraints forced us to determine realistic boundaries 
about the research that could be undertaken, and we decided that our research would 
have a limited scope that would not go down to the individual level. The micro level 
for this study, in studying the dynamics of innovation was therefore firms and 
producer associations. 
The distribution of interviews and participants in the focus groups depended on the 
contacts that we could find and that finally agreed to participate in the research. It 
would have been desirable to conduct more interviews with actors in the private 
sector and we are aware of this limitation. However, to lessen the impact of this 
constrain, we selected key actors part of industrial and producer associations.  
One limitation in the flower production chain data collection was the high secrecy 
the sector has to give any kind of information. It was very difficult to have access to 
the interviewees and we had to turn to personal contacts and wait for a long time to 
get the first interview that subsequently would give us more contacts to talk to. This 
affected the number of interviews we could conduct in this specific case study. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In the introduction of this chapter, we explained the nature of this research as 
qualitative and our research strategies and epistemological assumptions related to 
data collection and analysis. Through multiple case studies, we shifted from a vision 
centred on a top-down level, as emphasised in the NSI approach, towards a bottom-
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up approach to understanding the nature of innovation processes at sectoral levels. 
With our multi-case sampling, we added confidence to our research results and 
conclusions; initially thinking that we were analysing similar cases, but after 
performing our data collection we found that they were more contrasting than similar 
in several respects. In qualitative research samples are purposive rather than random, 
that is why we set specific criteria to select our cases and developing our 
comparative analysis.  
Also, we worked with a relatively small sample of people, since we were interested 
in having an in-depth investigation of the path-dependence and coevolution of 
innovation dynamics and therefore we selected specific groups of relevant actors 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Finally, we showed how the research was carried out 
systematically, following a specific research strategy and going through dedicated 
and complementary research phases of exploration, analysis and triangulation. We 
critically verified our observations and conclusions with other experts in the field and 
with codified knowledge about the Colombian systems of innovation. Through 
recurrent validation with our informants, we could be sure that we were portraying 
their visions and statements in context and without manipulation of the information. 
Finally, we preserved ethics, ensuring that the interests and concerns of those taking 
part in the research were safeguarded (Robson, 2002). 
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4. FIRST THEMATIC STRAND: SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICY 
STUDY 
4.1. Introduction 
Consistent with the regional development, the application of the NSI approach in 
Colombia was preceded by the pioneer input of Latin American scholars, who 
spotted early, the crucial impact of S&T in the economic and social development of 
the region. Therefore, this chapter builds upon the regional context and evolution of 
the Latin American Structuralism, and provides a detailed account of how the 
Colombian STI policies have been developed and implemented from 1968 to 2011.  
The third section of this chapter is focused on the development of a national 
framework to build STI policies. Since all strategies, programs, projects, and 
mechanisms for promoting STI are embedded within the Colombian National System 
of Innovation11, we investigate the evolution of the so-called system. In section 4.4. 
we study the results obtained through the various explicit and implicit STI policy 
guidelines. This does not imply that there is a linear and single process from design 
to implementation and from implementation to expected outcomes. As we showed in 
section 2.5. (Institutions and the Governance of Innovation), policy construction is a 
complex practice that is always under constant negotiation between different 
stakeholders. 
Finally, in section 4.5. we present the structure and development of the S&T 
agriculture system, and how the coffee, sugar cane, and fresh flower sub-sectors have 
                                                
11 In this thesis the terms National System of Innovation (NSI) and National System of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
(NSSTI) are used indistinctively. Decree 585 of 1991 declares the existence of a National Council of Science and Technology 
(NCST), it mentions explicitly the existence of a National System of Science and Technology, and creates National Program 
councils for every strategic sector. But it is until CONPES 2739 of 1994 that innovation is mentioned as a key element having a 
whole chapter about innovation, competitiveness, and technological development. In 1995 the NCST decreed the existence of a 
NSI as a as a collective and interactive learning model with accumulation and appropriation of knowledge, that involves various 
actors associated with technological development, production and marketing of goods and services within a process of 
continuous pursuit of sustainable competitiveness and improvement in the quality of life of the population. After that, in 
CONPES 2875 of 1996, a National System of Innovation is recognised as part of the National System of Science and 
Technology. Then again, a NSI is presented in CONPES 3080 of 2000. Finally in “Vision Colombia II Centenario” in 2006 a 
National System of Science, Technology and Innovation is described throughout the document. The latest law 1286 of 2009 
inserts officially the concept of having a NSSTI. In practical terms, the NSI was always embedded in the NSST.  
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evolved within the so-called agriculture sectoral system of innovation. We start by 
describing the evolution and dynamic complementarities of the agriculture sector in 
the Latin American region before immersing in the particularities of the Colombian 
Agroindustrial sector.  
4.2. Policy Development at the National Level 
4.2.1. Macroeconomic environment 
The regional framework within which Colombia was situated during the first half of 
the 20th Century was discussed in section 2.4, and while Colombia has never been 
within the most critical LAC group of countries in terms of social, political and 
economic development, it has not been hugely successful either. Enhancing science, 
technology and innovation capabilities is not independent from structural conditions 
of the countries (economic structures, political institutions, population education 
level, access to health conditions) (Dutrénit, 2011). Colombian economic 
development has been characterised by deep fluctuations. During the 1980s the LAC 
region experienced a recessionary inertia, growing external debts, and a negative 
trade balance. In Colombia there was a recovery period from 1986 to 1995 that was 
followed by the deep recession that occurred in the 1990s because of a mortgage and 
financial crisis that accounted for a negative GDP growth of 5.2%. Again, the 
international economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 slowed down the economic 
performance (Figure 4.1). The economic evolution from 2010 onwards has shown a 
recovery attributed to an energy and mining exploitation boom. Needless to say that 
an economy based on the exploitation of fossil fuels is contrary to any sort of 
sustainable development.12   
 
                                                
12 “Colombia’s strong economic growth in recent years has been driven in part by extraction of oil, 
metals, minerals and coal for export. The downside of this is that these extractive industries are 
polluting soil and water, harming sensitive ecosystems and damaging human health. The review urges 
Colombia to improve its management of the environmental impacts of mining.” (OECD, 2014b) 
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Figure 4.1. Colombian GDP growth 1976 - 2012 
Source. DANE. Updated series of National Accounts for the period 2000-2011. Base 2005 
Using Total Factor Productivity (TFP) average growth as a measure for long-term 
technological change and technological dynamism illustrates that the performance of 
the country has been moderate in terms of capital, labour and knowledge inputs 
(Figure 4.2). Again, the lost decade (1980 - 1990) of the LAC countries and the 2008 
international finance crisis can be seen in the evolution of this indicator. Low levels 
of trade openness, of human capital accumulation, and of infrastructure deficits are 
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Figure 4.2. Total Factor Productivity in Colombia 1950 - 2010 
Source. Based on DNP information 
In considering the relationship with international markets, Colombia has had 
permanent fluctuations characterized for deficits in the trade balance, with some 
trade balance surplus, specifically notorious during the 1980s with the imports 
substitution strategy of the LAC region. This can be seen in Figure 4.3: 
 
Figure 4.3. Colombian Exports and Imports 1976 - 2010 
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The macroeconomic environment impacts the way that science, technology and 
innovation policies are conceived of, designed, applied and assessed. In crises times 
there are budget cuts that commonly affect STI national investment. During the 
second half of the 20th century the LAC region experienced several economic 
changes and followed a structuralist approach to overcome the inequality between 
North and South. After the Great Depression in 1929 analysts of the economic and 
political trajectory of the region noticed that having a high reliance on primary 
exports would increase the vulnerability of the region (Furtado, 1960). This is how 
the strategy became focussed upon having greater technology capabilities for 
substituting imports and producing higher value-added products for the domestic and 
international markets. However, although imports were substituted, it was not with 
competitive low cost services and products, but with low quality and highly 
subsidised products, while in the meantime the rest of the world was experiencing a 
fast process of industrialization. Although during the 1970s the LAC region had a 
deep intellectual and political development on studies, projects and programs for 
promoting S&T to overcome the region’s lag, the “lost decade” of the 1980s 
focussed all efforts on dealing with the macroeconomic crisis of all LAC countries. 
By 1990 the economic and technology gap between LAC region and the rest of the 
world was bigger.  
4.2.2. Evolution and Development of ST&I Policies in 
Colombia 
Before 1968 Colombia did not have public institutes or departments focus on 
developing Science and Technology. However, there were important milestones like: 
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1. The foundation of decentralized institutes like The Colombian Institute of 
Educational Credit and Technical Studies Abroad (ICETEX), The 
Institute for Technological Research, The Research Coffee Centre 
CENICAFE, The Colombian Institute for Agriculture (ICA), and the 
National Apprenticeship Service (SENA), among others.  
2. The increased influence of international organizations like the 
Organization of American States (OAS); the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB); and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); on the design and implementation 
of state policies. 
3.  The foundation of some of the most important universities in the country. 
 
Since 1968, the process of institutional development of Science and Technology in 
Colombia has gone through four major stages. The first, between 1968 and 1989, 
focused on the formation of human resources and research groups. This was the 
strongest stage in terms of the thought and conceptualization of S&T policies. During 
this stage, systemic relationships between actors of the private, public and academic 
sectors were built and strengthened. Although there was not a formal law formulated, 
this was the main stage to build the bases of the national system of innovation. In the 
second stage, between 1990 and 1999, the Science and Technology Policy was 
formally promulgated. As part of this policy, the National System of Science, 
Technology and Innovation was instituted, following general guidelines from the 
Systems of Innovation approach (SI), and practical recommendations produced by 
the Latin American School of Thought (LAST). During this decade, the country built 
capabilities in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) through enabling policies 
from the central government. This coincided with the Latin American and Caribbean 
(LAC) region impulse of S&T to generate economic development during the 90‘s. 
This process of formalisation of an on-going inertia started by the end of the 1960s is 
outlined by Dr. Fernando Chaparro, former head of Colciencias and Corpoica 
(Colombian Corporation for the Agricultural Research): 
The formal system of science and technology is created by 
the law, the law of 1989, the science and technology law. I’m 
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not talking of the recent law, but the one of the end of the 
80s, the first law of science and technology. What this law 
really did was to give juridical existence to something that 
started from the 70s…this is a formal discourse. If we had not 
built systemic relations between diverse actors, the law from 
the late 80s would have not been a reality. (Fernando 
Chaparro, personal communication, May 22nd, 2012). 
A third stage is identified from 2000 to 2008. During these years efforts were 
directed on developing key economic and productive sectors, according to the 
objectives and strategies included in the definition of the NSSTI. Accordingly, 
programs were launched for encouraging regional competitiveness, funding for the 
creation of more national Ph.Ds, and strengthening the S&T system through formal 
institutions. Finally from 2009 to date, government policies have focused on 
strengthening the National System of Science, Technology and Innovation. With this 
purpose in 2009 The National Fund for Science, Technology and Innovation 
Francisco José de Caldas was created. The fund allows Colciencias to integrate 
public, private and international resources to fund programs, projects, activities and 
organizations to promote STI. Innovation remains at the centre, including it within 
the government plan of the current Colombian President13 (2010 – 2018) as part of 
the five development “locomotoras” [locomotives]. This means that more financial 
resources have been invested in ST&I projects and that innovation and R&D are vital 
– at least that is what is stated in the government plan14 - for all economic and social 
sectors. 
Throughout these phases the system has acquired a stronger legal and political 
framework, at least formally. When talking to diverse major actors in the public, 
private and academic sectors, we encountered recurrent complaints about the lack of 
coherence of the public instruments, the dispersion and scarcity of funding, and a 
deep problem of linkages between actors. It seems that the so-called innovation 
system is composed by isolated islands that work together as an exception more than 
as a rule. These are not totally novel findings. Similar observations can be found as 
                                                
13 Juan Manuel Santos is the President of Colombia. He was elected by popular vote in 2010 and re-
elected in 2014. 
14 “Prosperidad para todos”. Governement Presidential Plan Period 2010 – 2014. Chapter 3: 
“Crecimiento Sostenible y competitividad” 
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early as the 1994 recommendations by an expert commission convened by the 
presidency (Colombia al Filo de la Oportunidad) (Consejería presidencial para el 
desarrollo institucional, 1995) and a report made by the UNCTAD and published in 
1999 about the Colombian Agriculture Sector (UNCTAD, 1999). In these reports 
there was clarity about the dysfunctional nature of the national innovation system 
and its lack of linkages with the sectors. Moreover, as it is clearly outlined by the 
latter report, agriculture sectors such as coffee, flower and sugarcane were becoming 
successful by their own means and initiatives more than because of a national 
infrastructure supporting their development. It seems that national organisations such 
as Colciencias should learn more from the successful sectoral cases so it can replicate 
good practices in other industrial sectors.  
 Currently, the law that regulates scientific and technological activities is Law 1286 
of 2009.15  This law modifies Law 29 of 199016, transforming the national entity that 
regulates science and technology (Colciencias) into an administrative department17, 
and strengthens the National System of Science, Technology and Innovation. Further 
considerations about the application of this reform will be done in the next section. 
A summary table with the main events of S&T in Colombia is presented according to 
the stages described: 
Institutional Development of Science and Technology in Colombia 
Stage Events 
From 1968 to 
1989 
Creation of the Institute for Science and Technology – Colciencias.  
Creation of the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education. 
Creation of the National Council of S&T. 
First Ph.D programs. 
International Forum of S&T Policy (1987). 
                                                
15  Law 1286 of 2009, Congress of the Republic of Colombia. 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2009/ley_1286_2009.html 
16  Law 29 of 1990, Congress of the Republic of Colombia. http://www.cnsc.gov.co/docs/arc_619.pdf 
17 Before Law 1286 Colciencias was a National Institute that depended of the National Planning 
Department (DNP). Now Colciencias has the same legal status as the DNP and depends directly of 
presidency. It has the status of a Ministry, at least legally speaking. 
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S&T Mission (1988). 
Consolidation of the institutional system of agriculture and its network 
of Research Centres (CENIS) associated with the guilds. 
Creation of The Colombian Association for the Advancement of Science -
 ACAC. 
From 1990 to 
1999 
Promulgation of the National Policy for Science and Technology. Law 29 of 
1990. 
Ascription of Colciencias to the National Planning Department (DNP). Decree 
585. 
Tax incentives for Activities of S&T. Law 6a of 1992. 
Mission of Science, Education and Development (1993). 
Approval of the first S&T National Council of Social and Economic Policy 
(CONPES 2739 of 1994). 
Creation of the National Commission for Masters and Ph.Ds. 
Creation of the National System of Innovation and Regional Systems (1995). 
Allocation of SENA resources to Programs for Competitiveness and 
Technological Development. Law 344 of 1996. 
Creation of Maloka Corporation (1998). 
Creation of the Colombian Observatory of S&T (1999). 
From 2000 to 
2008 
Connectivity Agenda. Focus on competitiveness. (CONPES 3072 of 2000). 
Policy of Science and Technology 2000 – 2002. (CONPES 3080 of 2000). 
Creation of the National Program of Technological and Industrial Foresight 
(2002). 
Establishment of regional agendas of S&T. 
Support to National PhD programs. BIRF Loan (2002-2003). 
Incorporation of direct resources for S&T in the National Development Plan of 
2003. 
Access Program (Access to Quality Higher Education) 2003 – 2006. 
Approval of National policies for Social Appropriation of S&T and 
Internationalization of S&T. 
Direct participation of Colciencias in the S&T CONPES. 
Creation of six Excellence Centres (2004 - 2006). 
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National Policy for the promotion of research and innovation (2008). 
From 2009 to date Promulgation of the National Policy of ST&I (CONPES 3582 of 2009). 
National Fund for STI Francisco Jose de Caldas to send national researchers to 
get Postgraduate formation in first class universities around the world and in the 
country (First generation in 2009). 
WB loan to Colciencias for the strengthening the National System of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (2010). 
National Development Plan 2010 – 2014. Emphasis on Knowledge and 
Innovation; Entrepreneurship; Intellectual Property; Development strategy 
(Locomotora): new sectors based on innovation.  
National Innovation Strategy (ENI). Developed by Presidential mandate in 
2011. 
Legislative Act 05 of 2011, for the constitution of the General System of 
Royalties (natural resources). 10% of the total royalties fund goes for a Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) Fund. Promotion of regional STI regional 
development. 
Table 4.1. Institutional development of science and technology in Colombia 
Source. DNP and information compiled by the author (National Planning Department & Colciencias, 
2006).  
In terms of formal institutions represented by official regulations, the key public 
documents can be seen in the following table. These documents have oriented the 
development and application of policies related with science, technology and 
innovation:  
Legal documents Purpose 
Law 29 of 1990 1. Gives responsibility to the State for the promotion of S&T; 2. 
States mechanisms for funding S&T projects; 3. Confers on the 
State the responsibility of establishing linkages between 
universities, the scientific community, and the private sector. 
Decrees 383, 585, 591 of 1991 Decree 383 authorizes decentralized national entities to partner 
with private organizations to do Since and Technology 
Activities. Decree 585 formalizes the decision-making structure 
for S&T (Innovation is not mentioned by this time explicitly). 
This decree defines national programs that represent S&T 
priorities to develop. It mixes productive sectors (agriculture, 
education, health) and science areas (social sciences, basic 
sciences, environment). Decree 591 regulated the different types 
of contracts for the promotion of STAs. 
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Science, Education and 
Development Mission - Colombia 
al filo de la oportunidad (1993)  
Diagnosis and analysis of the evolution, development and results 
of education, science and technology policies until 1994. 
Proposal for the development and implementation of the 
"Program for the endogenisation of science". This is a short, mid 
and long term plan for developing S&T capabilities and 
improving the educational system. 
CONPES 2739 of 1994 Policy for S&T during the period 1994 - 1998. First CONPES for 
S&T. This policy was mainly focussed on bringing 
competitiveness to the productive sector developing and 
strengthening S&T capabilities. First official document including 
innovation explicitly. It has a chapter about Innovation, 
Competitiveness and Technological Development. 
CONPES 2875 of 1996 This CONPES is highly relevant because it is the first time that 
in official documents the National System of Innovation is 
mentioned. The purpose of this CONPES is to approve an 
external loan for the improvement of technological capabilities in 
the productive sector. 
CONPES 3080 of 2000 Is the National Policy for Science and Technology 2000 - 2002. 
It mentions again explicitly the National System of Innovation as 
part of the National System of Science and Technology.  
Vision Colombia II Centenario of 
2006 - Focusing growth and 
social development on science, 
technology and innovation 
It gives an action horizon for Colombia until 2019. The focus is 
on building an economy and society based on knowledge. A 
diagnosis of the institutions and application of S&T policies is 
presented and new strategic sectors and goals are proposed. 
National Policy for promoting 
science and innovation - 
Colombia construye y siembra 
futuro (2008) 
This is the preliminary document for Law 1286 of 2009. The 
main goals proposed in the policy are: increasing knowledge 
generation; promoting innovation for competitiveness; promoting 
the public appropriation of science and technology; strengthening 
the institutionality of the NSI; strengthening the infrastructure for 
supporting information systems for S&T information; promoting 
the regional integration; and strengthening the international links 
for transversal projects of S&T. 
Definition of five strategic areas: biodiversity, water, health, 
peace, and social cohesion.   
Law 1286 of 2009 The main change in comparison with Law 29 of 1990, it is that 
gives to Colciencias the status of an Administrative Department, 
at the same level of the National Department of Planning (DNP), 
and the same status as a Ministry. 
CONPES 3582 of 2009 It outlines instruments and strategies to implement the new 
dispositions of Law 1286 of 2009. It contains also one of the 
most comprehensive assessments of the system up to 2009.  
Table 4.2. Main official documents related to science, technology and innovation policies in 
Colombia. 
Source. Information compiled by the author 
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4.3. Policy Implementation at the National Level 
4.3.1. Definition, Structure, Functions and Principal 
Actors of the Colombian National System of 
Science, Technology and Innovation!
A Colombian National System of Science, Technology and Innovation (NSSTI) is 
defined in public documents and policies, reflecting an attempt from policy-makers 
to follow a systemic approach towards the construction of STI policies. The National 
System of Science, Technology and Innovation of Colombia is defined in Law 1286 
of 2009 as follows: 
The National System of Science, Technology and Innovation 
[SNCTI - its acronym in Spanish] is an open system which 
contains the policies, strategies, programs, methodologies and 
mechanisms for the management, promotion, financing, 
protection and dissemination of scientific research and 
technological innovation, as well as public, private or mixed 
organizations that perform or promote the development of 
scientific, technological and innovation activities. (Congress, 
2009  Art. 20) 
The system operates through Research and Development (R&D) inputs, and through 
Scientific, Technological and Innovation Activities (STIA), following the Frascati 
Manual definitions. The former definition is: 
Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise 
creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to 
increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of 
man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications.  The term R&D 
covers three activities: basic research, applied research and 
experimental development. (OECD, 2002, p. 30).  
The latter are all other activities excluded from R&D. Those activities are classified 
in four subcategories: Education and Training; other related scientific and 
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technological activities; other industrial activities; and administration and other 
supporting activities.18 
According to Law 1286 of 2009, the functions of the system are: 
1. Promote the exploration and development of strategies to insert Colombia in the 
international science, technology and innovation context. 
2. Promote the improvement of the national productivity and competitiveness. 
3. Develop strategies for developing, transferring and adapting scientific 
knowledge, technological development, and innovation in the production of 
goods and services for regional, national and international markets. 
4. Do research and have innovation based on science and technology. 
5. Promote the social appropriation of science, technology and innovation. 
6. Develop STI capabilities in organizations, sectors and regions. 
7. Link supply and demand of knowledge at the national level. 
 
A careful look of the definition, units of operation and functional setting of the 
Colombian NSI shows the important role that the NSI approach has had in the vision 
and action of policy-makers in charge of STI policy and the prominent role that the 
OECD orientations have had in the way science and technology is measured at the 
national level.  
In terms of governability, Colciencias19 is the head of the coordinating system of the 
NSSTI. However, it has support and advice from the councils for the national 
programs of S&T and from departmental councils for science, technology and 
innovation. This system of coordination is illustrated in figure 4.4: 
                                                
18 A complete definition of these categories can be found in (OECD, 2002, pp. 30 - 35) 
19 Colciencias was first created in 1968 as a special department within the Ministry of Education. 
Then, after the first law for S&T in 1990, Colciencias was upgraded to be a national institute ruled by 
the National Planning Department. With the latest 2009 S&T, Colciencias was recognised as an 
Administrative National Department depending directly from the President. 
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Figure 4.4. Coordination Sub-system for the Colombian NSSTI 
Source. Elaborated by the author according to different public documents. 
 
The Advisory Council of STI20 is the highest decision-making body within the system 
and is chaired by the director of Colciencias. Its principal aim is to advise the design, 
monitoring, and evaluation of the national policies of STI. It is composed of:  
• Director of Colciencias 
• The ministers of education; commerce, industry and tourism; health and 
social protection; and the director of the national planning department 
• General Director of SENA 
• Four outstanding persons from the academic and scientific sector (Appointed 
by the President)  
• Four outstanding persons from the productive sector (Appointed by the 
President) 
• Two outstanding persons from the regional scientific sector (Appointed by 
the President). 
 
                                                
20 Law 1286 of 2009 modifies Decree 585 of 1991. Before 2009, the name of the council was National 
Council of Science and Technology. The composition of the council was different and the director of 
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Although the composition of the council is mixed in order to have input from the 
main actors involved in innovation processes, the election of the participants of the 
academic and productive sectors and the regional representation is not democratic 
and the delegates are not always the most suitable. Also, the council do not meet 
regularly and many times ministers and the SENA director are not present, instead 
they send delegates to represent them.  
The Departmental Councils of STI are the regional entities in charge of proposing, 
organising, promoting and approving local STI programs. Colombia is politically 
divided into departments, so each department has its own council for STI. Through 
the departmental councils the system links the national interests with the regional 
ones and vice versa.  
The Councils for the National Programs of S&T represent the particular areas and 
sectors of interest for the country. These programs are structured with objectives and 
tangible goals organized into projects executed by private or public organizations, 
community organizations or persons. Each national program has its own council that 
is in charge of the promotion of knowledge creation, operation, and management of 
the national programs. The current national programs are: Biotechnology; Science 
and Health Technology; Basic Sciences; Ocean S&T; Agricultural S&T; Energy and 
Mining Research; Industrial Technology Development and Quality; Social and 
Human Sciences; Scientific Studies for Education; and Promotion of Research 
Training. The Advisory Council of STI can modify these programs according to the 
national strategic interests, either changing the scope and goals of the existing 
programs or creating new national programs for developing different strategic 
knowledge areas. 
However, as happens with the national advisory council, the departmental and 
programs councils do not meet regularly and it is usual that the expected participants 
send delegates that many times do not have decision power, so the intended purpose 
of the councils is not achieved.  
In terms of the explicit model followed, Colciencias, being head of the sector, has 
used the system structure proposed by Kuhlmann and Arnold (Kuhlmann & Arnold, 
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2001, p. 2). This is a conceptual model to understand the dynamics between actors 
and subsystems in a National Innovation System. 
 
Figure 4.5. Model followed by Colciencias as head of the Colombian NSI 
Source. (Kuhlmann & Arnold, 2001, p. 2) 
The main actors in each subsystem are detailed in the following table: 
 Actors Functions within the NSSTI 
Political System 
Colciencias Head of the system. 
National Council of Social and 
Economic Policy (CONPES) 
Institutional definition of policies for STI. 
National Planning Department (DNP) Technical secretary of CONPES. 
Ministries Formulation and coordination of sectoral policies. 
SENA Promotion of technological development and innovation in 
enterprises. Technical and technological higher education. 
Education and Research System 
2
Exhibit 1: A National Innovation System Model (source: E. Arnold and S.
Kuhlmann)
Besides RCN there are also other public bodies in charge of innovation policy (SND:
risk capital, regional services; SIVA: science and industrial parks; Trade Council;
etc).  Formally, there are shared responsibilities between these bodies with respect to
the research/innovation interface. Practically though, an innovation oriented
interaction between and across these institutions still remains in an infant stage –
according to many interviews in related institutions.  Only recently, RCN and SND
made some attempts at improving their cooperation vis-à-vis industrial clients in the
regions: SND's District Offices started to offer access to some of RCN's funding
mechanisms.
In the following, we will first characterize briefly Norway's industrial development
and innovation performance (section 2) and then discuss the country's institutional
infrastructure for innovation (section 3) and how well it works (section 4), before we
draw some conclusions with respect to RCN's role in the NIS (section 5).
2 Industrial development and value creation
2.1 Industry structure and performance
The Norwegian industrial structure is unusual even among the more resource-
intensive OECD countries for its heavy dependence on oil and other mineral
extraction, which makes up 17.7% of national value added, compared with an OECD
average of 1.1%.  Manufacturing and services are correspondingly smaller
contributors to the economy.
Framework Conditions
Financial environment; taxation and
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Public Research Centres Knowledge generation. 
Private Research Centres Research in specific areas of knowledge. 
Research Groups Formal Knowledge generation in specific niches. 
Public and Private Universities Formal education. Technological and Scientific research. 
Technical and Technological 
Institutions 
Formation of technical human resources. 
Intermediaries 
Technological Development Centres 
(CDT) 
Knowledge transfer and technological services. 
Regional intermediaries (Ruta N, 
Connect Bogota, Tecnova, CTA) 
Articulation of public-academic-private networks to promote 
innovation for regional transformation. 
Trade Union Research Centres 
(ICIPC, Biotec, Cenicaña, Cenicafe, 
Ceniflores) 
Research based on sectoral needs.  
Incubators of technology – based 
companies 
Support to entrepreneurs of technology-based companies. 
Technological Parks Integration of research and technological services 
capabilities. 
Sena’s Formation Centres Strengthening of enterprise technological capabilities. 
Industrial System 
Goods and Services Companies Private enterprises for the production of economic goods and 
services. 
Production Guilds and Business 
Associations 
Producers’ guild organizations. 
Chambers of Commerce Promotion, services and registration for productive and 
commercial companies. 
Infrastructure 
First-tier banking Banks with direct operations with clients. 
Second-tier banking 
BANCOLDEX 
Private or public financial organizations with commercial 
operations through first-tier banks. 
Venture Capital Funds Capital from private investors to support viable companies or 
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projects with proportional return to risk taken. 
Fomipyme Promotion and co-financing of technological projects 
developed by SMEs. 
International Funds External resources for development of ST&I. 
Table 4.3. Actors in the Colombian National System of Science, Technology and Innovation. 
Source. Based on (Monroy, 2006) 
Although there is a general classification of the domains where actors belong, their 
functions are not always clear and boundaries are blurred most of the times. This has 
caused that actors of different subgroups end up doing all sorts of activities within 
the system to justify their existence. There is a fierce competition for scarce 
resources, so actors tend to adapt themselves to current conditions; basically they 
shape their activities according to the available funding sources. This can be positive 
in terms of encouraging resilience to adapt to changing knowledge demands, but also 
can cause their extinction since they lose expertise and focus on their core activities. 
In this sense, the functional structure of the system is messy, especially in the 
delineation of the expected roles of the actors. Actors that are in the middle of 
different domains, the intermediaries or bridge institutions, hardly recognise 
themselves with that identity and do not always fulfil the requirements of the 
business sector. Related to this situation, Luz Elena Castrillón, head of the 
Colombian Pharmaceutical Research Centre (CECIF) says: 
We need a better institutionality of the system, to define what 
role universities must play, what role has to play the 
productive sector, what is the role of technology development 
centres, what role plays a regional productivity centre as the 
CTA. All of us play different roles, so it is crucial to define 
the parameters or variables to classify us. It is not fair that 
those that do nothing capture more resources than those that 
do a lot. Such things are problems in the policy definition. 
(Luz Elena Castrillón, personal communication, March 17, 
2012) 
The system lacks systemic relationships between public, private, academic and 
intermediary agents, and also within actors in each subgroup. The coordinating 
subsystem composed by the national, departmental, and program councils has not 
been as effective as it was conceived for. This responds to several factors like: 1. 
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Although the Advisory Council of STI is the highest instance of decision for STI 
policy-making, it lacks political power to implement its decisions, mainly because 
there are not enough legal instruments to implement the policies and initiatives 
proposed; 2. National program councils have generated unequal relations between its 
members (a strong and very active academic sector, a passive and practically non-
existent productive sector, and an uncommitted and sometimes not adequately 
represented state); 3. Only some departmental councils are effective performing the 
goals they were created for, resulting in a lack of coordination between national and 
regional interests; 4. The flow of information amongst the public agencies that are 
part of NSSTI is limited; 5. The articulation in terms of budget planning and 
execution of state resources in STI is quite narrow, which is reflected in a disjointed 
and sectored budget that fails in the achievement of common objectives. (DNP, 
2009) 
It is important to highlight that the Colombian NSI is defined as such by law and 
reinforced by CONPES, decrees and government documents. As it was described in 
section 2.4, LAC countries followed the Organization of American Stares (OAS) and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines for 
promoting S&T as main factors for development. However, contrary to the cases of 
developed countries, the NSI approach was used in LAC region to build national 
innovation systems. It was the theoretical and practical base to build the Colombian 
S&T policy.  
Although S&T laws are clear about the structure and functions of the system, 
instruments to apply those guidelines are poor and incomplete. There is a gap 
between launched laws and the instruments used to ensure their compliance. There is 
a lack of legal mechanisms in the NSSTI, resulting in an inadequate level of 
operation of the system (National Planning Department & Colciencias, 2006). A 
clear example of this is the lack of decrees to enact law 1286 of 2009. Up to 2011, 
the previous decrees to ensure law 29 of 1990 are in force. And if we also take into 
account that the implementation of law 29 of 1990 had problems in its 
instrumentation, the situation becomes even more complicated. This is clearly 
highlighted in CONPES 3582: “Although law 29 of 1990 provides mechanisms for 
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coordination of scientific and technological activity, its implementation has not been 
easy or successful.” (DNP, 2009, p. 16) Referring to the policies and instruments 
mismatches, the head of CECIF mentions: 
My opinion is that there is a problem between the definition 
of the policy and what follows - such decrees and laws - there 
should be consistency. If there are not decrees and laws that 
is where the applicability comes, the policy is incomplete, 
that’s what I mean. This is a policy definition problem, and 
the fact that you present to the public an incomplete policy 
it’s a failure. (Luz Elena Castrillón, personal communication, 
March 17, 2012) 
This shows that beyond formal structures of definition, design and operation of the 
innovation system, there are barriers in the implementation of policies linked with 
governability and governance21 issues. The next section explores the policy 
implementation processes in the light of the emerging categories22 found during the 
research process. 
4.3.2. !From policy to action: A straightforward process?  
In this section we present a contrast between a linear model for policy-making and 
other participatory models that highlight the messiness of the political processes 
around policy-making. In the former, once a problematic issue is tackled through a 
political rational choice, implementing the resulting policy or policies should be a 
straightforward process. In a utopian sense, policy-making should be an objective 
and infallible process that results in feasible and optimal solutions for the issue under 
analysis. However, since courses of action are always varied and depend on the 
policy-makers views, there is a multiplicity of possible outcomes. For the latter, 
policy-making is an iterative learning process where corrections are always made 
according to experimentation that goes beyond controlled, neat and accurate policy 
rationales. As it is clearly expressed by Rebecca Sutton (Sutton, 1999, p. 5), “policy, 
                                                
21 Governability is understood in this thesis as the formal power represented by the State or any public 
organization to govern any society aspect. On the other hand, governance is understood as the 
capacity of actors embedded in any social subsystem to set consensual rules. A deeper exploration of 
these terms is done in section 2.5. 
22 See Methodology Chapter, where the process of coding and categorization is explained.  
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and policy implementation are best understood as ‘chaos of purposes and 
accidents’”.  
The linear model for policy-making still prevails in the Colombian context. This is 
why reshaping and adaptation processes from planning to implementation phases are 
limited or non-existent in the formal system. Figure 4.6. shows the linear policy-
making rationale.  
 
Figure 4.6. Linear policy-making model 
Source: (Institute of Development Studies, 2006, p. 7) 
In order to understand the alignment and misalignment of actors, agendas, expertise, 
values, interests, and views involved in policy processes; complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity are dimensions of incomplete knowledge that we have to deal with (Leach 
et al., 2010). In this sense, since there is not a single optimal pathway to construct 
policy and design instruments, multiple narratives and policy framings should be 
taken into account. Reality differs from the ‘optimal’ model, in the Colombian case, 
from a neat NSI. There have been successes and failures, and the learning curve has 
an upward trend, so political processes should be dynamically refined. 
Since any political setting is context-dependent and influenced by historical 
trajectories (Edquist, 1997b), the policy implementation processes will be seen in the 
light of main factors that have defined the evolution of the Colombian NSI. These 




The traditional and highly stylised m del of policy- akin  vi ws it as a linear process in
which rational decisions are taken by those with authority and responsibility for a particular
policy area. This approach views policy-making as involving a number of stages that lead 
to a decision: 
Within this model, policy implementation is viewed as a separate activity that begins once
policy decisions have been made. And policy implementation should lead to a resolution of
the original problem. 
This model assumes that policy-makers approach the issues rationally, going through each
logical stage of the process, and carefully co sidering all relevant information. If policies do
not achieve what they are intended to achieve, blame is often not laid on the policy itself but
on political or man gerial failure in implementing it – through a la k of political will, poor
management or shortage of resources, for example.
It is also assumed that there is a clear separation between fact (a rational policy approach
based on evidence, science and objective knowledge) and value (seen as a separate issue, 
dealt with in the political process). Policy-making is purely a bureaucratic or administrative
exercise. If politics enter the fray, it is around decision-making (in the realm of value);
implementation is an entirely technical procedure (in the realm of facts). The role of experts 
is seen as critical to the process of making rational decisions, and scientific expertise is
presumed to be independent and objective. The familiar refrain is that of ‘evidence-based
policy’, or policy rooted in ‘sound science’.
While many would disregard this as a caricature – which it undoubtedly is – the underlying
assumptions are remarkably pervasive, and this linear model remains a prevalent mindset –
particularly in development practice. However, research on policy processes shows it to be 
an inadequate reflection of reality.




Understanding the policy issue or problem (agenda-setting)
Exploring possible options for resolving the problem
Weighing up the costs and benefits of each option








Shifting the focus of analysis to a process-based view of policy means casting aside the linear,
rational policy model in favour of the complex and messy processes by which policy is
understood, formulated and implemented, and the range of actors involved. The policy
process has the following characteristics:
• Policy-making must be understood as a political process as much as an analytical or
problem-solving one. The policy-making process is by no means the purely technical,
rational activity that it is often held up to be.
• Policy-making is incremental, complex and messy, a process of ‘disjointed incrementalism 
or muddling through’. It is iterative, and often based on experimentation, learning from
mistakes, and taking corrective measures. Hence, there is no single optimal policy decision 
or outcome.
• There are always overlapping and competing agendas; there may not be complete agreement
among stakeholders over what the really important policy problem is.
• Decisions are not discrete and technical: facts and values are intertwined. Value judgements
play a major role.
• Implementation involves discretion and negotiation by front-line workers (giving staff more
scope for innovation than they are often credited with).
• Technical experts and policymakers ‘mutually construct’ policy. This is to say that scientists
contribute to the framing of policy issues by defining what evidence can be produced and 
its policy significance. And those working in policy also frame scientific enquiry by defining
areas of relevance and pertinent areas for investigation – ie jointly negotiating what
questions need to be answered and what knowledge can be provided to answer them. 
This is sometimes referred to as co-production of science and policy.6
• The co-production of science and policy often acts to play down scientific uncertainties and
ignorance, as scientists attempt to satisfy the demand for answers from policy-makers –
recasting plural and partial debates as singular, closed and certain.
• Policy processes include some perspectives at the expense of others – and it is the
perspectives of the poor and marginalised that are often excluded.
The study of policy processes therefore involves understanding the mechanics of decision-
making and implementation. Just as important, it requires an understanding of more complex
underlying practices of policy framing – the way boundaries are drawn around problems, how
policy problems are defined, and what is included and excluded.
In essence, research into policy processes asks how problems and policy solutions come to be
defined, by whom, and with what effects?
6 The French poststructuralist philosopher Foucault tells of how redundant leprosy hospitals were used to incarcerate and study people 
who in such circumstances became ‘mad’. In much the same way Guinean forest reserves, established for their supposed influence on
regional climate, became the focus of taxonomic lists and economic inventories. In turn, these and new ’biodiversity‘ lists have become
icons deployed to justify the continued existence of forest reserves in an era of biodiversity conservation (Fairhead and Leach 2003; see
below). In this way, science and policy are ‘co-produced’.
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factors were found in the analysis process where documents, interviews and focus 
groups were used as sources.  
4.3.3. Political Institutions 
The reality of developing countries causes them to give political and economic 
priorities to unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) that have to be addressed immediately. 
Since basic needs such as education, housing, food security, and employment are not 
covered for a large proportion of the population23, the structural setting to intervene 
in long-term strategies presents more difficulty for policy-makers. It does not mean 
that there are not strategic efforts for strengthening long-term initiatives based on the 
developing of internal capabilities, but that there is pressure from immediate, urgent 
and important problems that need to be solved. So in an effort to meet the immediate 
needs of their constituents, policy-makers legislate reactively to urgent problems and 
lose perspective and vision for the future of the country in the long run. However, 
there are national agencies as Colciencias, National Planning Department, National 
Research Institutes, and special programs within ministries in charge of projection a 
strategic country vision. Although there are few joint programs and initiatives 
between these agencies24 there is not enough synergy, which has caused overlapping 
government policies, with a lack of consistent and transversal state policies25. Since 
building a long-term political vision is not the common practice26, science, 
                                                
23 According to the National Statistics Department (DANE) in 2013, 30.6% of the total population 
was under poverty conditions and 9.1% was under extreme poverty conditions. For the analysis of a 
multi-dimensional poverty indicator that determines if a person is poor according to five dimensions: 
education, childhood and youth conditions, employment, health, and housing conditions, 24.8% of the 
population was under poverty conditions. See: 
https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/pobreza/pres_pobreza_2013.pdf  
24 Colciencias has started to work closer with different ministries and the National Planning 
Department (DNP) in an effort to collaborate and avoid replication of efforts. Some examples are the 
joint efforts between the National Program for Agriculture and the STI agendas for production chains 
developed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Corpoica. Also, the 
participation and collaboration between Colciencias, the direction of entrepreneurship and innovation 
within the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the group in charge of S&T policies in the DNP, and 
Innpulsa as a funding agency. 
25 This is highlighted in the latest OECD review of Colombia’s innovation policy: “Colombian system 
appears fragmented. It could achieve better use of resources and provide better service to customers 
through more co-ordination and coherence” (OECD, 2013, p. 28) 
26 To develop a country vision and promote development based on STI, there have been national 
exercises as: Visión Colombia II Centenario: Base growth and social development on STI; and other 
attemps with international cooperation as: SCOPE 2015, and ‘Convenio Andrés Bello: Escenarios al 
2020 de la educación superior para la transformación productiva, social y equidad en los países del 
Convenio Andrés Bello’. At sectoral and regional levels, there have been more exercises as the 
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technology and innovation policies are diluted in government agendas in terms of 
importance and therefore of funding. A strategic design of STI policies should have 
at least three main components: a long-term vision in alignment with other state 
systems; a strategy to achieve that desired outcome; and a set of priorities aligned 
with the proposed strategy (Morris Teubal, 2002). Since policy-makers are adaptive 
rather than optimisers guided mostly by immediate needs, the policy-design 
processes lack strategy.  
The most serious of all state problems in policy formulation 
and the implementation of educational reforms is the 
discontinuity of these policies and the administration of these 
reforms. (Consejería presidencial para el desarrollo 
institucional, 1995, p. 69) 
Short-term planning was further enhanced by the change made in the 1991 National 
Constitution where the presidential government plan was enacted into law during the 
4-year government period. Important national departments such as Colciencias, 
SENA and DNP depend directly on executive power, which make them respond to 
the government interests, so priorities change every presidential period. The 
recurrent change in policies and instruments generate confusion among actors and 
truncates long-term initiatives. Also, production of knowledge as a main variable for 
economic and social development has not been included in most of the government 
plans. It is not a matter of laws, it is a matter of political vision and political will to 
sustain successful policies and instruments in order to build an integral notion of the 
direction the country will follow for a given horizon of time. Related to this 
dichotomy, Hernán Jaramillo - current dean of the School of Economics in 
Universidad del Rosario, former sub-director of Colciencias and expert on S&T 
public policies- says: 
In the country there is not clarity about what are the strategic 
sectors, and there is not clarity because here policies are 
short-term defined. It is a dramatic problem because 
                                                                                                                                     
creation of the National Program of Biotechnology; Construction of research agendas for agricultural 
productive chains, departmental prospective agendas (Valle del Cauca, Boyacá, Huila, Antioquia, 
Caquetá, Guajira, Caquetá, Amazonas, between others); health cluster in Antioquia; health cluster in 
Valle del Cauca. There have been 32 exercises with different scope and impact for building 
consensual long-term political vision, but this is not the norm. The impact of these exercises is also 
diminished by the discontinuity of the instruments designed for government lifetimes. 
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institutions, policies, expected results are always defined and 
expected for the short-term. The political agenda is changing 
constantly. Each government changes the rules of the game 
and therefore there is not security for investors, for 
developing specific sectors, for producing relevant 
knowledge. (Hernán Jaramillo, personal communication, 
August 23rd, 2012) 
Alignment of national interests and sustained effort depends largely on the strength 
of political institutions. The perception of science and technology as important 
factors to generate economic and social welfare is limited. That is probably the 
reason why a permanent strategy in most public documents has been the 
strengthening of political institutions27, but building a stronger institutionality is a 
long-term process that should be sustained beyond each 4-years government terms. It 
requires a state vision and a higher valuation of S&T from actors within the system 
and broader society.  
In terms of the governability, as it was seen previously, councils compose the 
coordination subsystem within the NSI. However, these councils are functionally and 
structurally weak. The national council has not had the political power to execute its 
decisions, or a budget designation. National program councils, designed following 
Sabato’s triangle model28, have unequal vertices, with the stronger being the research 
and academic vertex. There are stronger and more active departmental councils than 
others, according to the importance that local actors give to STI (Colciencias, 2008). 
Even being formally defined in their composition and functional setting by law, 
                                                
27 The National policy of S&T 1994-1998 had a explicit strategy to strengthen the National System of 
S&T (NSST) (DNP, 1994). The first objective of the endogenisation program proposed in ‘Colombia 
al Filo de la Oportunidad’ (Consejería presidencial para el desarrollo institucional, 1995) was 
“Strengthen the policy decision to promote science and technology as part of the strategy for 
development”. In turn, CONPES 3080 includes as the first strategy of the national policy of S&T, 
institutional strengthening of the NSST (DNP, 2000). ‘Visión Colombia II Centenario’ also includes 
as a goal to support central skills of the vision, to consolidate the institutionality of the NSSTI 
(National Planning Department & Colciencias, 2006). In ‘Colombia construye y siembra fututo’, there 
are two strategies for capacity building for STI (including support for knowledge generation and 
institutional strengthening of agents of the SNCTI), and strengthening the institutionality of the NSI 
(Colciencias, 2008). The second strategy of CONPES 3582, the national policy of STI is again, 
strengthening the institutionality of the NSSTI (DNP, 2009). 
28 In 1960, Jorge Sábato, one of the emblematic members of the Latin American School of Thought 
(LAST), proposed a structure to describe the key actors in developing S&T policies. There are three 
vertices to compound a triangle: government, productive structure, and scientific and technological 
structure. Each vertex is related to each other, and to the external environment according its functional 
convergences.     
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members do not have a formal contract, do not follow defined guidelines, and largely 
depend on Colciencia’s budget to execute their decisions (Various, 2013). There is 
also a problem of representativity. It is usual to find that members representing 
public, private, and academic sectors delegate their participation in people with no 
decision-making power. So even having a good and balanced structure from public, 
private, and academic sectors, the council’s operation has not been optimal and could 
be improved based on more autonomy and consensual decisions.  
We exposed several weaknesses in the development, governability and governance 
of the political institutions, which impacts directly in the NSI performance. Since the 
policy-making is neither linear nor completely rational, it cannot be expected to 
always get optimal results, however there are not enough feedback mechanisms to 
have policy learning and to correct the political pathways. Additionally, a lack of 
planning and long-term strategic vision creates instability and inconsistency in 
formal institutions, which affects and compromises the actions of actors and 
performance of components within the so-called National System of Science, 
Technology and Innovation.  
4.3.4. Coherence between policies – Policy processes 
We have seen previously that there is a disconnection between the definition and 
implementation of public policies. It seems that each public document on STI 
outlines diagnostics and strategies that insist on the same problems that still persist 
and goals that have not been achieved. Since there is a lack of continuity and 
coherence in the implementation of policies, strategies do not have continuous 
support, causing constant changes in the instrumentalisation of policies, which 
prevents a sustained development.  
From the 1990s onwards, emphasis was put on having formal institutions in the form 
of laws, administrative acts, decrees, CONPES and so on. Laws have been reinforced 
with the assumption that through them an optimal operation of the NSI and its 
subsystems will be guaranteed. However, there are asymmetries between actors’ 
relationships and the functional and structural dynamics of the system. The broader 
political space where the NSI is immersed has also coordination problems between 
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industrial, financial, health, agricultural, commercial, mining, environmental, 
communications, transport and labour policies and programs. There is no coherence 
within and without the system, or effective coordination between actors and 
components.  
Referring to the lack of coherence between national policies, Hernán Jaramillo says: 
There may be different institutes, there may be different 
ministries, there may be different models, but if there is not 
good coordination, integrated and complementary public 
policy, there is nothing. (Hernán Jaramillo, specialised focus 
group, May 17th, 2012) 
Under the assumption that having a stronger department in terms of decision power, 
budget, and political participation, the coordination of the NSI would be better 
overall, Colciencias was upgraded to a National Administrative Department. 
However, Colciencias has not had the injection of financial resources that it needs, its 
political power is still very limited and, by presidential mandate, a new National 
Strategy for Innovation (ENI) was developed under the direction of DNP in 2011. 
This has generated confusion because innovation players do not know what entity is 
in charge of the science, of the technology, of the innovation, and even of the 
competitiveness in the country. By 2011, the ENI was declared as official and new 
entities became part of the NSI. This shows a lack of coherence in formal 
regulations, causing conflict between Colciencias, as head of the system, and other 
public actors that are part of the NSI Dr. Franciso Miranda, former head of 
Colciencias between 2006 and 2010, comments on this subject: 
There you have a concrete example, for a long term SENA 
tried to create an innovation system and to be head of the 
system arguing that they had more money to move things 
around. And that was an absurd sight. A new law is made 
[law 1286 2009] and the system is again reconceptualised and 
a year after, the law is not good enough and things are 
changed again. Not the law, but in practice, the system. And 
now SENA is an even more complex actor. Again the 
National Planning Department wants to redefine things 
outside the law, because law 1286 was very explicit. This is a 
very good example of how laws say something and people do 
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exactly the opposite. (Francisco Miranda, personal 
communication, April 25th, 2011) 
In this particular case, the executive power ignored a law enacted in 2009. This 
situation shows a deeper problem about the political formal and tacit institutions. 
Even when the existence of a science, technology and innovation system is declared 
as so by law (which is atypical), the formal institutions are overlapped and in 
conflict. Then, it is understandable that there are also discrepancies between the 
official system and what happens in the field. Instruments are manipulated according 
to the needs of each government and most of the time short time incentives and 
resources are used to show positive indicators in the international context. As it is 
noted by a public servant of DNP: 
Public policy is constructed through the national 
development plan, CONPES documents and all other policy 
documents that may arise. However, what we have to support 
are the priorities set in the National Development Plan 2010 - 
2014. (Public servant, personal communication, April 24th, 
2012) 
Even public servants are sceptical about the definition and application of policies: 
Look, I believe that these policies [STI policies] have been 
more reactive that intentional and that they have appeared 
more for necessity than for prospective processes.(Catalina 
Gutierrez, personal communication, October 22nd,2012)  
There is confusion among the system’s actors about the policy definition and 
implementation. In terms of governability, there are strong public departments 
competing to lead innovation policies, so there are several guidelines and replication 
of instruments for the academic and productive sectors. As it was expressed by the 
latest review assessment of the Colombian innovation policy made by the OECD: 
Colombian system appears fragmented. It could achieve 
better use of resources and provide better service to 
customers through more co-ordination and coherence, for 
instance by regrouping some RTOs [research and technology 
organizations] into larger entities or by creating means of co-
operation.(OECD, 2013, p. 28) 
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So having weak political institutions – both formal and informal – in addition to a 
general lack of coherence and coordination between public entities and failures in the 
operationalization of existent policies has affected the operation of the NSI. The 
policy-mix packet has failed to satisfy the needs of business sectors in supporting 
innovation processes. That is partially explained by the predominant linear model for 
policy-making adopted by the country that focuses on a narrow range of innovation 
models (OECD, 2013).  
4.3.5. Accessibility to Resources, Incentives, and 
Instruments 
Incentives and instruments to promote and support science, technology and 
innovation, can be grouped into four categories, independently of the public or mixed 
body that offer them (Figure 4.7). This set of instruments is conceived within the 
NSSTI in the form of competitive public grants or credits. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Instruments to promote STI in Colombia.  
Source. Based on (Colciencias, 2008) 
  109 
The incentives to promote innovation are something relatively new in the country. 
The first law for S&T in 1990 did not mention innovation at all. It was not until 
CONPES 2739 of 1994 when there was an explicit mention of innovation as a 
dimension to develop. From that CONPES forward, a set of instruments has been 
designed to overcome the so-called “valley of death” (Markham, Ward, Aiman-
Smith, & Kingon, 2010) in the innovation processes.  
However, as we can see in figure 4.7, most of the instruments to promote and support 
innovation processes are mainly directed towards the research or commercialization 
phase of the innovation cycle. This responds to the linear notion of research and 
technological development (RTD), and later on to the linear innovation model 
implemented in Colombian STI policies. This linear vision has created gaps in 
instrumentation to support RTD cycle: [basic research – applied research – 
development of products, processes or services – products, processes, and/or services 
themselves, and the market place] (Tait & Williams, 1999). The same situation 
happens with innovation. There are gaps among [invention – innovation – and 
diffusion phases](Godin, 2005).  
The novice state of Colombia in the creation and implementation of innovation 
incentives is acknowledge by Mr Freddy Pulgarín, competitiveness manager of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Antioquia, the most innovative department of Colombia: 
We are very new to the subject of developing instruments for 
innovation because although it took a while talking about 
innovation, we’ve seen that it's important and we’ve worked 
a bit on the issue of the creation of culture, but we still have a 
long way to go before having instruments for the 
entrepreneurs (Fredy Pulgarín, personal communication, 
April 24th, 2012) 
Also, Juliana Ossa, Executive of dynamic innovative entrepreneurship in Innpulsa, a 
governmental agency created in February 2012 to support and promote business 
growth led by innovation, says: 
From the point of view of tax deductions, I think that even 
though there is political will and incentives created, we have 
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a lack of tools to access these incentives (Juliana Ossa, 
personal communication, October 22nd, 2012) 
Leaving aside the lack of incentives in crucial phases of the innovation cycle, 
existing instruments have not had a big impact on businesses to be more innovative. 
Results from the Survey of Development and Technological Innovation in 
Manufacturing VI (EDIT VI)29 that presents results for years 2011 and 2012, shows 
that only 0.2% enterprises were strictly innovative; 21.5% were innovative in a broad 
sense; 4.7% were potentially innovative; and an overwhelming 73.6% were not 
innovative at all. 9,137 companies completed the survey from a total sample of 
10.315.  
One important question contained in the surveys of development and technological 
innovation in manufacturing is why companies do not apply for public resources and 
access to STI benefits.  Innovative and potentially innovative companies that had the 
intention to fund science, technology and innovation activities using public 
incentives reported the following as the main obstacles to accessing public resources:  
1. The ignorance of public funding lines, which means that there is not 
enough information about the existence of public incentives. 
2.  The lack of information on the requirements to compete for resources. 
3.  That processes are too complicated and too slow to apply, so firms prefer 
to use internal resources to have opportune results instead of going 
through a long and complicated process to access public incentives.  
                                                
29 In 1996 the National Planning Department (DNP) launched the first survey of technological 
development (EDT) applied to 885 industrial companies. Later, in 2005, a second survey of 
development and technological innovation in manufacturing (EDIT II) was done to 6.172 companies 
from the industrial sector for the period 2003-2004.  This survey and subsequent was led by the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Up to now six EDITs have been done. 
EDIT III for years 2005 – 2006; EDIT IV for years 2007 – 2008; EDIT V for years 2009 – 2010; and 
EDIT VI for years 2011 – 2012. Companies strictly innovative are those that in the reference period 
had at least a new or significantly improved good or service for the international market; companies 
innovative in a broad sense are those that in the reference period had at least a new or significantly 
improved good or service for the national market or for the company, or that implemented a new or 
significantly improved productive process for the main production line or for the complementary 
production lines, or a new organisational form or commercialisation; potentially innovative companies 
are those that in the reference period did not have any innovation, but reported to have a process or 
have abandoned an innovation project to obtain a new or significantly improved good or service for 
the international or national market or for the company; no innovative companies are those that in the 
reference period did not have any innovation or reported to have a process or a project to obtain 
innovations. 
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Divulgation of calls for supporting STI projects and access to tax benefits is 
insufficient. Calls are launched on websites but there are no effective communication 
channels with associations, chambers of commerce, guilds and business and 
producers agencies to broadcast the calls. The process to apply for and gain access to 
resources is not clear which hinders the effectiveness of the incentives. And this not 
only happens for the business sector, it also happens for the Technology 
Development Centres (CDTs). Colciencias supported the creation of CDTs from the 
1990s onwards, after the first law for S&T was launched, but not all of them had 
access to seed capital for their creation, and there has not been continuity in their 
support. The initial plan was to provide seed capital for a three year period, but 
centres got funds just for one or two years. As a result, CDTs without strong private 
support were not financially viable. Again, there is no consistency between policies 
and instruments for long-term periods (Barreto Bonilla, Bermeo Andrade, & 
Saavedra Moreno, 2008). 
There is also an imbalance between large enterprises and SMEs. Although many 
instruments have been thought to favour and strengthen SMEs, most of public 
resources are going to large companies. 80% of total resources are going to large 
companies (EDIT VI). Referring to the higher access of large companies to public 
incentives to support innovation in the business sector, Mrs Gladys Turriago, advisor 
of the cross-sectional area of the presidency of the National Association of 
Industrials (ANDI), comments: 
Large companies are most aware of the existent incentives; 
they are the ones that take advantage of, I do not know if of 
the system as such, but basically of Colciencias. They are 
vigilant of these relationships, they know when calls are 
coming, and they are very sensitive of the issue. (Gladys 
Turriago, personal communication, August 23rd, 2012) 
Also, taking this issue further and reflecting on the differences between the research 
and innovation policies, Dr. Mónica Salazar, executive director of the National 
Observatory of Science and Technology of Colombia, says: 
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On the issue of the instrumentalisation of policies, I think the 
country has been successful in terms of research. The 
research policy of the country has been successful, but the 
innovation policy has been unsuccessful. IDB's30 evaluation 
gives very good results, but just in 20 companies, we do not 
need good results in 20, but in 1000. Then, there is a very big 
problem of instrumentalisation. (Mónica Salazar, specialised 
focus group, May 17th, 2012) 
Leaving aside the unbalanced access to STI resources amongst large firms and 
SMEs, there is another structural problem that hinders the effectiveness of incentives 
within the NSSTI. Colombia has an overwhelming percentage of firms in the 
informal economy, particularly small and micro enterprises31. According to 
Fedesarrollo32 (Cárdenas S & Rozo V, 2009), business informality reaches 41.1%, so 
the actual implementation of instruments is beset with problems. This inhibits access 
to incentives for nearly half of the firms of the country. It means that in addition to 
insufficient incentives, the existent ones are not targeting a wide population of firms. 
This is a good example to illustrate the systemic nature of innovation. There must be 
equilibrium and good performance in other subsystems, so policies are geared to 
generate the intended effects. 
Seeing things from a different angle, there have also been successes. SENA is the 
public organization more recognised by industrials for promoting science, 
technology and innovation activities (STIA)33. SENA works jointly with Colciencias, 
ministries, and other public and mixed organisations to allocate resources through 
public calls. This is not surprising given that from 1996 SENA has allocated 20% of 
its resources to developing programs for competitiveness and productive 
                                                
30 The Inter American Bank of Development (IDB) launched a project in April 2011 to support the 
design of an integral program to strengthen the Colombian STI policy. Colciencias was in charge to 
execute the project. 
31 According to Law 905 of 2004, a small enterprise has a personnel plant between eleven (11) and 
fifty employees (50); or has total assets worth between five hundred and one (501) and less than five 
thousand (5,000) monthly legal minimum wages. A micro enterprise has a personnel plant not 
exceeding ten (10) employees; or total assets excluding housing value, less than five hundred (500) 
current legal monthly minimum wage. 
32 The Foundation for Higher Education and Development (Fedesarrollo) is a private non-profit 
organization established in 1970. It is engaged in research on issues of economic and social policy. 
33 According to EDIT V results, during the period 2009-2010 innovative and potentially innovative 
companies consider the following organizations as key bridges to support the execution of STIA: 
SENA (678 companies); ICONTEC (568 companies), universities (537); sectoral guilds and chambers 
of commerce (482); PROEXPORT (391) and the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (379). 
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technological development34. This has allowed long-term support to S&T initiatives 
directly aimed at the business sector. Dr. Maria del Pilar Noriega, Scientific Chief of 
the Institute for the Plastic and Rubber Research and Training (ICIPC) says 
regarding to the support given for innovation by SENA: 
For us it was very important when Law 344 came into force 
in 1996. This allowed business to have co-financing 
mechanisms, which was wonderful…We work with SENA, 
and I think we’ve worked with them about 50 projects. It 
works well… SENA is simply fulfilling its function of being 
a good financing entity with long-term policies. That is, it 
started in '96 with the law 344, and it has financed directly or 
it has transferred funds to Colciencias. Saying that in 
Colombia an entity from 1996 -we are in 2012- still has a 
path and results is a dream. In a developing country, this is 
good, and it must be said. (Maria del Pilar Noriega, personal 
communication, July 9th, 2012) 
However, there is redundancy in the calls made by different organizations. There are 
either broad calls so any project can be adapted to the call terms, or there are very 
similar calls at the same time from different organizations. This reveals that there are 
coordination problems between public organizations and that functions of each body 
related to the promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation, S&T projects, and 
competitiveness, are not clearly defined. Further, there are administrative and 
planning issues in the execution of calls, causing delays in the assignation of 
resources and meagre management and assessment. Complaining about the 
inefficiency for assigning and giving resources after fulfilling all requirements, Mr 
César Echeverry, CEO of Supracafé, a private company for coffee production and 
commercialization, and ex director of technological development of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of Colombia, says: 
I was on the advisory board Colciencias, so I know well the 
dynamics of them. They open calls with great fanfare, and 
then allocate less than 10% of the resources they promised, 
because they do not really have them. If you take into 
account that filling out the formats and requirements for the 
Integral Project Management System is an exhausting 
                                                
34 See article 16 of Law 344 of 1996. 
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process, one says as an entrepreneur, what a waste of efforts 
to get nothing. (César Echeverry, CEO Supraface, 2013) 
Nevertheless, tax incentives and all sort of instruments are not a sufficient condition 
to innovate. If there is not an explicit will from the strategy of the firm to innovate, 
there will not be good enough incentives to move the companies in that direction. 
Incentives are mechanisms to support the growth and development of the mission 
and vision of companies to move forward. There is a problem of culture and market 
protectionism. Companies in Colombia do not perceive innovation as a key factor to 
succeed, so there is fear of investing in any activity of science, technology and 
innovation, and R&D, because the economic benefits are not seen in the short term. 
4.3.6. Purpose and importance of science, technology 
and innovation policies 
Previously we discussed how science, technology and innovation policies direct 
purpose is not alleviating UBN. Moreover, an innovation policy may imply in the 
short-term destruction of jobs (i.e. investment in some sectors over others, or the 
introduction of technology that automatize processes previously done by people). 
STI policies are not intended to solve immediate poverty problems; so having 
sensible social and economic policies is an essential requirement for providing 
welfare to the population. However, strategies to improve traditional sectors and to 
develop sophisticated sectors with higher value and therefore higher profits is a 
necessary condition to change the dependency inertia followed by Less Developed 
Countries (LDC) on industrialised economies. Central governments have not 
understood what the implications on having a national strategy focus on STI are, why 
that strategy is important for the country, and how to maintain it through time. 
Research and reflection on the conceptual body for the construction of S&T policies 
is recent in Colombia, which has caused a lack of feedback to the public sector for 
having more comprehensive processes for the construction of sustainable political 
models, as it is highlighted in the latest book about the history of Colciencias 
(Various, 2013). Social and economic problems will not be solved in the short time 
with STI policies, but certainly a good long-term strategy to create, apply, and 
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validate knowledge, will bring better living conditions for the population through the 
development of a stronger economy able to compete with high added value products.  
In Colombia the construction of an institutional setting for 
science and technology is a recent issue. In developed 
countries for more than two hundred years and with a higher 
intensity in the last fifty years, there is the conviction that the 
wealth of nations and its viability is associated more with the 
capacity that a society has to create, diffuse, and absorb 
science and technology products. (Various, 2013, p. 67)  
Another issue commonly seen in the construction of Colombian STI policies is the 
unconsciously35 use of the linear thinking of innovation where exists the assumption 
that having science and the creation of new knowledge, the natural course is having 
processes of development and application of science, followed by technological 
innovations, which in turn lead to economic growth and development, all in a linear 
an unidirectional relationship, as it is explained by (Tait & Williams, 1999). 
Referring to the use of this thinking paradigm (he calls it mode one of knowledge), 
Santiago Echavarría, head of the Science and Technology Centre of Antioquia 
(CTA) says: 
Even though it is said that in Colombia we are over the mode 
one of knowledge production, there’s still a dominant 
paradigm in the implementation of policies, in the policy 
instruments to develop such policies, to favour endogenous 
production of knowledge, specially in research groups, with 
the assumption that you have to build capabilities, which is 
very important, but it is thought that somehow these 
capabilities will result in innovation. I think that our policies 
are still focus on this model, although we say we don’t follow 
it. (Santiago Echavaría, personal communication, July 17th, 
2012) 
Although science policy has been more successful in terms of its discussion and 
evolution over time36, there are shortcomings in the skills required to build 
                                                
35 In any public document there is a mention about the use of the linear thinking model of innovation 
and during the interviews done to S&T policy makers, any of them acknowledge the use of this model 
for the Colombian STI policies. 
36 Since Colciencias constitution its activity has focused on the science and research side of the system 
more than on the technology and lately innovation side. This can be noticed in the calls for projects 
opened by Colciencias and the allocation of resources for science production. 
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sustainable production processes and the use of knowledge for innovative 
technological developments. The inclusion of innovation as a predominant factor in 
the industrial and service sectors is new to the business culture, so there is still a long 
way to go in this regard. Meanwhile, policy-makers continue to focus on government 
priorities, setting aside a sustained state vision. Innovation, competitiveness and 
productivity are often terms used interchangeably. Therefore the instruments 
designed to support innovation processes are unfocused. This point is clearly 
expressed by an official of Colciencias: 
I think there is no tension [between state and government 
policies] because we don’t have state [STI] policies. I think 
we have to do a national exercise to think for a long term. At 
least 10 years later. What we want to achieve in terms of 
research and innovation. We can achieve that through 
traditional mechanisms like CONPES [National Council of 
Social and Economic Policy]. (Colciencias’ official, August 
23rd, 2012) 
4.3.7. Politics of Policy 
Colombia is a country where everything is very carefully formalised in law, 
however, Colombian society works very hard to circumvent these laws. Since 
everything is heavily formalised through all sort of legal devices, public and private 
actors try to find the exception to the norm. Negotiations between powerful actors 
can change the aim of a public incentive or intervene in public calls to favour certain 
public or private persons. That is why the process of policy construction is not a 
linear one and is always under constant negotiations. Having an operational and 
successful NSI depends less on the formal institutions behind it, and more on the 
common consciousness of players to have a win-win game with clear and transparent 
rules of game. 
One recurrent claim made by system actors interviewed is that STI policies during 
the last 20 years have not been participatory and have only been negotiated between 
powerful political actors to favour particular interests. Academic and industrial 
sectors have been put aside in policy definition, which has caused misalignment 
between the formal and real system. This claim is clearly expressed by Dr. Emilio 
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Quevedo, ex national program director in Colciencias and a prominent academic 
currently working on studies of science and technology: “Now policy is defined top-
down, and not bottom-up. That is part of the problem.” (Emilio Quevedo, personal 
communication, January 18, 2012). Also, Luz Elena Castrillón expresses it as a semi-
private actor in the national system of innovation: 
We do not have any say at all, anywhere. At first at least we 
had voice, at least we participated in the design of policy, not 
now, they invite us to see what they [policy-makers] decided, 
it does not matter if we like it or not, whatever we do, 
whatever we say, they keep on. If you start looking recent 
plans for science, technology and innovation, you will see 
that they have consulted all stakeholders, but if you look 
deeper, or if you had been part of this system as I have been, 
we know that we are not called to participate in the design of 
the policy, they just call us to let us know, that's a completely 
different thing right? They call to inform us. (Luz Elena 
Castrillón, personal communication, March 17th, 2012) 
Another factor that heavily impacts on the good functioning of the innovation 
systems is the political institutions weakness. Colombia has particular circumstances 
related to violence problems for the last 70 years. The existence of illegal armed 
groups has undermined democratic institutions, influencing the election of politicians 
with close nexus with these groups. This has caused public funds are embezzled by 
actors on the margin of the law preventing coherent strategies for long-term 
development. Of course, investment in science, technology and innovation, remain 
among the lowest priorities. It is a matter of mentality and cultural setting, where 
immediate personal gain premium on social benefits. An accumulation of political 
and economic scandals where politicians are involved has caused that Colombians do 
not trust their public representatives37. It is also a common practice that public 
positions are defined by influence peddling, and not by the suitability of the person to 
occupy it. This has caused a progressive weakening of political institutions 
(Gutiérrez, 2013). 
                                                
37 “The survey conducted by the Latinobarómetro in 2011 revealed that Colombians considered that 
the most important factors to strengthen their democratic system would be reducing corruption (63%) 
and improving the transparency of the state (54%)” (Gutiérrez, 2013, p. 2) 
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Therefore, in the Colombian case, political analysis must go beyond the regular 
components of any innovation system. It is essential to analyse the cultural setting 
and the violence problem inserted in the evolution of the country for understanding 
the success or failure of policy initiatives. It is understandable that policy priorities 
have focused on solving immediate problems of poverty, insecurity, infrastructure, 
food security, education, among others, but this short-term vision has caused a 
vicious cycle devoid of an integral country strategy. There are many interests at stake 
and the fittest has dominated to support personal interests over collective interests. 
Although this has not always been the case, it has been predominant. 
4.4. Policy Outcomes at the National Level 
4.4.1. Legitimacy and Impact of Explicit and Implicit STI 
Policies 
The national level policy development section included the evolution of STI policies 
in Colombia. Some international and national milestones were highlighted as explicit 
actions towards the development and consolidation of STI capabilities. Figure 4.8. 
shows a STI key events timeline: 
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Figure 4.8. STI key events for construction of STI explicit institutionality. 
Source. Information compiled by the author.  
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The development, implementation and outcomes of STI initiatives did not evolve and 
materialize through random actions. Colombia, as a LAC and developing country, 
was immersed in a regional trend to promote and support S&T initiatives as a way to 
generate better life conditions for Colombians in the mid- and long-terms. The 
strategy of policy-makers during the second half of 20th century revolved around the 
inclusion of STI mechanisms within economic, sectoral, industrial, and foreign trade 
policies, at least at the formal level. Debates around strategies to boost LAC national 
economies included higher investment in S&T and building suitable institutional 
settings to increase competitiveness in international contexts. So before the first law 
for S&T was promulgated in 1990, there were implicit policies in progress promoted 
by Colciencias’ policy-makers.  
The approach followed from the 1960s until the 1990s was essentially one of 
science-push and demand-pull. The regional movement known as Latin American 
Structuralism Approach (LACSA) influenced Colciencias during these decades. The 
maximum expression of this movement was the boom of an industrial period 
characterised by an import substitution strategy (ISI). There was a focus on 
generating capabilities within the national and regional firms to produce goods and 
services usually imported from developed countries. This period – from the late 
1960s until the late 1980s – had an explicit strategy on strengthening the domestic 
market through fiscal policies like subsidies to strategic industries, protectionist trade 
policies, nationalization of firms, and tax benefits. This economic package had the 
intention to reduce foreign imports, creating a sophisticated domestic market with the 
inclusion of local innovations. Development was state-led, with a heavy centralism. 
It was thought throughout the entire LAC region that strengthening domestic 
markets, dependency between “centre” and “periphery” would be broken38. The 
central assumption was that the gap between centre and periphery had a deep root on 
the labour division. Whilst centre countries were specialised on capital-intensive 
goods, periphery countries had their core on labour-intensive goods. Economists and 
                                                
38 This is part of the “dependency theory” where the key idea is that rich and developed countries 
(core states) enrich themselves through the extraction of resources from poor and less developed 
countries (periphery states).  The main authors developing this theory were Hans Singer and Raúl 
Prebisch. The latter was the Economic Commission for Latin American Countries director in 1948 
(OECD, 2013, p. 32).  
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politicians concluded that the market itself would be unable to reduce the gap so 
implementing a planned and aimed policy to improve the mechanisms for allocating 
resources, would be the best option (Munoz, 1981). Therefore, LAC could only grow 
insofar as the industrial sector was protected, at least during the initial stages of 
development (Garay, 2004). In this way, the group of academics and politicians part 
of the LACSA movement expected to build effective bridges between universities 
and national research centres and the business sector. The assumption was that once 
a stronger knowledge generation subsystem was built, the benefits of this knowledge 
would flow to the economic sector as part of a natural process (Martínez Vidal & 
Marí, 2002). However, it was not that easy. 
One main indirect STI policy was decree 444 of 1967 about the international 
exchange regime and foreign trade. Through this decree the trade and foreign 
exchange policy was controlled by giving priority to the internal construction of 
capabilities in focalised sectors. The decree adopted the crawling peg system39, 
eliminated multiple exchange rates and strengthened the control over capital flows 
derived from imports and exports. During the period 1967 – 1974 exports of finished 
products were promoted, together with a strengthening of the domestic industry. In 
1969 the Cartagena Agreement was signed so conditions were created to have 
industrial imports substitution and have a dynamic intraregional trade40. The main 
intention was to close the gap between wealthier countries and the region through an 
ambitious bet on the generation of internal capabilities of science, which it was 
believed, would bring technological development, and therefore innovation. It is 
relevant to remember that Colciencias was founded in 1968, as part of the Ministry 
of Education. This was the result of a long process started by Colombian academics 
and technicians that were part of LACSA.  Colciencias was a formal entity within the 
government to fund, promote, coordinate, and execute scientific and technological 
development projects. In 1968 the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher 
Education – ICFES – was founded too. ICFES promoted the insertion of scientific 
                                                
39 Crawling peg is an exchange rate regime to regulate depreciation or appreciation in an exchange 
rate.  The system is shaped to peg at a certain value but at the same time is designed to “glide” to 
response to external market uncertainties. 
40 However, results were insufficient, because although it partially liberalized intra-regional trade, 
there was an extensive list of exceptions, disagreements among Andean pact members, and failure of 
sectoral industrial programs. 
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and technological skills in the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) accordingly with 
the productive sector demands.  
After the creation of Proexpo (1967), Export Promotion Fund, Colombian fiscal 
policy had an even stronger concentration on exports. Through Proexpo, preferential 
loans were given to sectoral non-traditional industries41 jointly with a favourable 
exchange rate. However, from 1978 after a change in government, there was a 
revaluation process of the local currency, the Colombian Peso, which seriously 
affected exports (excluding coffee exports), going against the plan of turning 
Colombia into a leading exporting country in the LAC region. The adverse exchange 
rate added to a low diversification in exporting products caused a further 10% drop  
of exports between 1980 and 1983. The situation was worse for minor industrial 
exports, which fell on average over 114% per year due to their lower capacity to 
resist financial breakdowns (Garay, 2004).  Then, in 1981 there was an agreement 
between INCOMEX (National Institute for Foreign Trade) and Colciencias to 
promote capital goods. From that moment on, technological disaggregation for large 
investment projects of the State was mandatory. In 1983, through the first Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) loan for promotion of S&T capabilities, S&T 
projects were funded, especially those related with the modernization of research 
systems and technological services in the productive sector. 
Conversely, the second half of the 1980s experienced an increasing economic growth 
produced by an increase in the volume exported and better price conditions of coffee 
(which by 1986 represented more than 50% of total exports of the country) and oil 
exports. In 1989, following a change in the government structure, a process of 
market deregulation started gradually changing the protection strategy towards 
economic openness. This process was finally materialized with derogation of decree 
444 of 1967. Law 9 of 1991 removed exchange controls made by the Bank of the 
Republic, the foreign investment regime was freed, and equal rights between 
domestic and foreign investors were declared. At this time, several research institutes 
                                                
41 Industries different from mining, coal, coffee and other commodities.  
  123 
were opened42 to fill the gap of R&D in the country. However, there was not a 
systematic process led by an integral S&T strategy. In 1988 the first S&T mission in 
the country was formed; its aim was to reflect on the design and implementation of 
S&T strategies at the national and sectoral levels. Main reflections revolved around 
the construction of a formal institutionality. As a result, the first law of S&T was 
launched in 1990. 
New institutionality was structured to respond to the economic change. In 1991 the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade was created; Proexpo was restructured and was 
transformed into the Bank for Foreign Trade (BANCOLDEX), to provide 
preferential loans access to exporters; and Proexport was created as a unit to provide 
opportune information on international markets to Colombian exporters. But these 
measures to improve the trade balance, and encourage exports as the engine of 
national economy were counteracted with increased imports of consumer goods (on 
average a 33% increase between 1990 and 1996), and a low contribution of exports 
to GDP (on average 20% during the same period). There was an increase in domestic 
demand, but fulfilled with imports43. 
This diversification has taken place in an environment that 
has not been altogether conducive to an expansion of export-
oriented production. A lack of financial resources and the 
underdevelopment of the domestic capital market limits both 
the ability of the Government to finance support services 
such as research institutes, market identification services, and 
mineral prospecting, and the capacity of the private sector to 
finance large-scale projects. (UNCTAD, 1994, p. 7) 
 In November of 1990 -short after the first S&T law was promulgated- Colciencias, 
the National Institute for Science and Technology, gained power by being ascribed to 
the National Planning Department (DNP). Also, the political strategy was focused on 
the constitution of a National System of Science and Technology (NSST). The 
message was clear – at least formally -, S&T would be key elements in the 
                                                
42 Colombian Petroleum Institute (1985); Centre for Biological Research –CIB- (1970); International Centre for 
Medical Research  -CIDEIM- (1989); Research Centre for Sugar Cane (1977); International Centre of Physics –
CIF- (1985); among others. 
43 DANE trade balance data. Retrieved from: http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/pib-cuentas-
nacionales/cuentas-trimestrales, in 26-05-2014. 
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development of the nation, and its promotion and regulation would be State issues. 
To support this strategy, besides domestic inversion in S&T, the third IDB loan was 
released. “IDB resources II and III executed during this period were of the order of 
140 million dollars and a counterpart of the national government of 118.5 million 
dollars, which were implemented in the construction of the NSSTI.” (Plata, 2013, p. 
96) 
In 1995 a National System of Innovation (NSI) is declared as part of the NSST. This 
system is defined in CONPES 2875 of 1996 as follows: 
The National System of Innovation is conceived as an 
iterative model of creation and application of knowledge. It 
includes various actors associated with technological 
development and its link to production systems, in a process 
of continuous quest of sustainable competitiveness and 
improvement in the quality of life of the population. This 
system is part of the National System of Science and 
Technology. 
However, from 1996 to 1999 there was an important downturn of the Colombian 
economy (see Figure 4.1. GDP at constant prices). This corresponded to a 
revaluation of the exchange rate, and a significant increase in public spending. This 
generated profound macroeconomic imbalances. This instability added to the wider 
international financial crisis in 1998, which produced a negative growth of the GDP 
of 5.2 in 1999. Recuperation came with a major expansion of the tradable (industry, 
mining, agriculture exports), and non-tradable (construction and services) sectors by 
2003 (Kalmanovitz, 2004). Afterwards, imports and exports kept focus on goods 
rather than services. Goods exports were mainly coal and oil (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). 
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Table 4.4. Main external sector indicators 2001-2011. 
Source. (Fog, Salazar, Nupia, & Vesga, 2012, p. 22) 
 
Table 4.5. Goods exports by sector 2001-2011 
Source. (Fog et al., 2012, p. 22) 
During crisis periods there were cuts to the S&T budget, however, the emphasis on 
competitiveness and technological development was maintained through SENA’s 
support for firms and technological development centres; development of regional 
S&T agendas; the establishment of six centres of excellence; and the latest STI law 
in 2009. In the government plan 2010 – 2014 innovation is included as fundamental 
and cross-sectoral for social and economic prosperity. Finally, legislative act 05 of 
2011 transfers 10% of natural resources royalties for STI projects.   
After failing to develop the planned domestic S&T capabilities to meet regional and 
national markets through industrial protection came the economic liberalisation 
during the latter 1980s and early 1990s. It was expected that the exposure of national 
firms to international markets would make them more competitive. It was exactly the 
inverse assumption of the previous decades. In order to survive, companies should 
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Table 1-2. Main external sector indicators, 2001 - 2011 
Millions of Dollars 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Exports 15,059 14,251 15,735 19,482 24,397 28,558 34,213 42,671 38,227 45,314 62,646 
Goods 12,869 12,384 13,813 17,224 21,730 25,181 30,577 38,534 34,025 40,867 57,739 
Services 2,190 1,867 1,921 2,258 2,668 3,377 3,636 4,137 4,202 4,446 4,907 
Total Imports 15,871 15,379 16,618 19,816 24,904 30,353 37,444 44,773 38,503 46,697 61,753 
Goods 12,269 12,077 13,258 15,878 20,134 24,858 31,161 37,563 31,479 38,628 52,225 
Services 3,602 3,302 3,360 3,938 4,770 5,495 6,283 7,210 7,023 8,070 9,528 
FDI* in Colombia 2,542 2,134 1,720 3,016 10,252 6,656 9,049 10,620 7,137 6,899 13,234 
Colombian OI** 16 857 938 142 4,662 1,098 913 2,254 3,088 6,562 8,289 
            
Percentage of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Exports 15.2 14.9 16.5 16.7 16.8 17.3 16.5 17.5 16.3 15.8 18.8 
Goods 13.1 12.7 14.6 14.7 14.8 15.5 14.7 15.8 14.5 14.3 17.3 
Services 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 
Total Imports 16.2 15.7 17.5 16.9 17.0 18.7 18.0 18.3 16.4 16.3 18.5 
Goods 12.5 12.3 14.0 13.6 13.7 15.3 15.0 15.4 13.4 13.5 15.7 
Services 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 
FDI* in Colombia 2.6 2.2 1.8 2.6 7.0 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.0 2.4 4.0 
Colombian OI** 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.1 3.2 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.3 2.3 2.5 
Source: Banco de la República 
* FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  
** OI: Overseas Investment. 
 
Table 1-3. Goods exports by sector, 2001 - 2011 
Millions of dollars - 
FOB 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
TOTAL 12,330 11,975 13,127 16,730 21,190 24,391 29,991 37,626 32,853 39,820 56,954 
Coffee 764 772 809 949 1,471 1,461 1,714 1,883 1,543 1,884 2,608 
Coal 1,197 991 1,422 1,854 2,598 2,913 3,495 5,043 5,416 6,015 8,397 
Ferronickel 235 272 416 628 738 1,107 1,680 864 726 967 827 
Oil 3,285 3,275 3,383 4,227 5,559 6,328 7,318 2,213 10,268 16,485 27,954 
Others 6,849 6,666 7,097 9,071 10,825 12,581 15,784 17,623 14,900 14,468 17,168 
            
Percentage of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
TOTAL 12.6 12.2 13.9 14.3 14.5 15.0 14.4 15.4 14.0 13.9 17.1 
Coffe 0.8 0.8 .9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Coal 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.5 
Ferronickel 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Oil 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.5 5.0 4.4 5.8 8.4 
Others 7.0 6.8 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.7 7.6 7.2 6.4 5.1 5.1 
Source: DANE and DNP 
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lower production costs, improve quality, introduce new products and services, and 
have a proactive feedback with customers. However, the gap in terms of 
technological capabilities and innovation with companies from developed countries 
was bigger than in the 1980s, so it was very hard for enterprises to catch up. 
Competition was fierce and only the strongest companies survived44.  
On the other hand, firms’ expenditure on Science and Technology Activities (STA) 
has been limited and stagnated during the last 10 years, as can be seen in Table 4.6. 
The business sector, being the backbone of any SI besides national and international 
investment and incentives, should have a co-responsibility and awareness of the 
investment in R&D.  
 
Table 4.6. Colombian Firms STA expenditure 2002 - 2012 
Source. (Jorge Lucio et al., 2012, p. 24) 
Comparing Colombia’s overall expenditure in R&D with leading Latin American 
Countries and the regional average, it can be seen that the country is far beyond 
desirable investment, and much more from OECD countries (Figure 4.9). 
                                                
44 According to the annual survey of manufacturing firms applied by DANE from 1992, during the 
1990s there was a strong decrease in the number of SMEs, especially between 1992 and 1996. 
However, the number of large companies remained nearly constant during the same period with a 
slow decrease between 1997 and 2000. 
Indicadores de ciencia y tecnología, Colombia 2012 | Science and technology indicators, Colombia 201224
Tabla 1.5. Inversión en ACTI de las ent dades del gobierno central –ejecución, 2002 - 2012
Central government organizations STA expenditure, 2002 - 2012
Tipo de actividad / Type of activity 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2002 - 2012
I+D / R&D 10,10% 9,83% 16,65% 7,58% 16,03% 11,82% 8,41% 8,73% 10,10% 5,06% 4,61% 8,93%
Apoyo a la formación y capacitación científica y tecnológica 
Support for scientific and technological training 14,06% 16,76% 10,31% 6,36% 11,84% 9,90% 13,32% 15,35% 13,05% 14,85% 22,09% 13,82%
Servicios científicos y tecnológicos 
Scientific and technological services 14,45% 14,12% 19,72% 31,86% 18,76% 29,79% 40,98% 39,50% 45,11% 46,12% 45,33% 36,32%
Administración y otras actividades de apoyo 
Administration and other support activities 45,32% 33,16% 29,26% 14,37% 30,30% 25,70% 12,64% 5,85% 3,92% 12,07% 14,09% 15,91%
Actividades de innovación 
Innovation activities 16,07% 26,13% 24,07% 39,83% 23,07% 22,78% 24,65% 30,57% 27,82% 21,90% 13,87% 25,01%
Total ACTI / STA (millones de pesos de 2011 / million COP 
of 2011) 132.219 191.024 270.464 555.354 394.718 407.695 445.448 596.490 656.661 772.416 710.054 5.132.542
Fuente: OCyT
Cálculos: OCyT
Tabla 1.6. Inversión en ACTI de las empresas –ejecución, 2002 - 2012 
Firms STA expenditure, 2002 - 2012
Tipo de actividad 
Type of activity 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2002 - 2012
I+D / R&D 22,61% 22,61% 20,18% 23,66% 20,40% 22,41% 27,14% 30,24% 29,05% 29,05% 29,05% 25,62%
Actividades de innovación 
Innovation activities 77,39% 77,39% 79,82% 76,34% 79,60% 77,59% 72,86% 69,76% 70,95% 70,95% 70,95% 74,38%
Total ACTI / STA (millones de pesos de 
2011 / million COP of 2011) 543.484 574.832 729.691 577.899 641.523 930.674 1.117.949 737.520 876.870 943.487 1.003.551 8.677.482
Fuente: DANE - EDIT II, EDIT III, EDIT IV Y EDIT V
Cálculos: OCyT
  127 
 
Figure 4.9. Expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP for selected countries. 
Source. Information compiled by the author based on RICYT indicators. 
However, this is not a peculiarity of the Colombian business sector. Whilst it is not 
debatable that presence and synergy between different key actors within the so-called 
innovation systems (public sector, business sector, academic and research sector, 
intermediaries) is fundamental, what has been understated is the extent to which each 
one of them should intervene in the innovation pathways. A major responsibility has 
been put on State’s shoulders to boost the performance of the IS, but the business 
sector has taken a more parasitic approach in taking advantage of public investment 
without a constant and committed counterpart; known as ‘socialization of risk, and 
privatization of rewards’ (Mazzucato, 2013). So, more investment is required for 
STA at all levels. That factor is well acknowledge in the OECD review of the 
Colombian innovation policy, where firms are at the centre of the system and should 
build internal capabilities: “International evidence suggests that the most important 
source of business innovation is firms’ own efforts.” (OECD, 2013, p. 28) 
One example of an implicit policy that burdened a better building of S&T capacity in 
the flowers productive chain within the agriculture SI is that of tax exceptions and 
income protection for exporters with high dependency on foreign currency earnings. 
The aim of the policy was to protect the sector from the progressive revaluation of 
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the Colombian peso from 2003 to 2008, but it caused the sector to become largely 
reliant on the incentives and a low investment in critical factors to increase 
productivity through S&T.  Thus, there are mismatches in the policy mix within the 
Colombian context. The institutional setting lacks a stronger coherence between 
national, regional, and sectoral policies and a tension between short and long term 
policy programs. This is an important barrier for the successful functioning of SIs 
(H. Jaramillo, Villaveces, & Cantor, 2013). 
4.4.2. Results pathway. Issues for consideration 
Regardless of the policy model for building STI policies used during different stages 
of evolution, there have been divergences between intended pathways and obtained 
results. There are fundamental factors underlying the success of STI initiatives that 
will be explore in this section. Consequently, this section will be focused on four 
aspects we found as crucial for the performance of the so-called Colombian NSI. 1. 
Funding STI activities is the engine to produce changes and to promote certain 
sectors according to national strategies. 2. Building capabilities to support the 
strategic STI pillars. Without a critical mass of human resources to produce and 
absorb scientific and technological knowledge, it is extremely difficult to have 
innovation in the productive sector. This aspect takes us to the third important factor. 
3. If society does not consider the construction of S&T capabilities as relevant and 
important, it is less likely that knowledge will be perceived as a key progress factor 
in the social structure. Therefore, the insertion of scientific education within the 
education cycle is fundamental to have a broader appropriation and appreciation of 
knowledge. Not just in terms of scientific capabilities, but also in the development 
part of the research, where social problems can be effectively tackled through 
innovative technologies. 4. Since competition in the world market is fierce, it is 
imperative to channel resources and efforts to the promotion of certain strategic 
sectors. This process of selection should be consistent with medium and long-term 
strategies to generate the capacity to compete internationally (See Figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10. Key factors for performance of Colombian NSI 
Source. Made by the author. 
A good analysis on the performance of the so-called national system of science, 
technology, and innovation is CONPES 3582. In this public document there is a 
comprehensive outline of the principal weaknesses and constraints of the Colombian 
NSI (DNP, 2009): 
1. Low levels of innovation in enterprises 
2. Weak institutionalism of the system 
3. Scarcity of human resources for doing research and innovation 
4. Lack of focus on strategic areas 
5. Low social appropriation of knowledge 
6. Regional disparities in scientific and technological capabilities 
7. Low capacity to generate and use knowledge 
 
These weaknesses are consistent with our documentary analysis of the system and 
the interviews and specialised focus groups we developed as part of this research. 
We found that capabilities building and social appropriation of science are 
fundamental factors related directly with embedding social action towards resilient 
and sustainable solutions based on S&T capacity. Meanwhile, financial resources 
and the development of strategic sectors impact directly on the viability and purpose 
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of the system. All of them are inter-related and depend on each other to support the 
innovation pathways. We will now turn to examine these key factors in detail. 
4.4.2.1. Shortage of financial resources for STI  
Weak political institutions and lack of coherence between policies – previously 
studied in the policy implementation section - have impacted on the allocation of 
financial resources for STI. One of the most important studies on S&T planning at 
the national level was “Colombia: Al Filo de la Oportunidad”, (Colombia: On the 
edge of opportunity). The guiding principles for having a prosperous and equalitarian 
Colombia were science, education and social and economic development. This was a 
seminal project that declared a specific program for the endogenisation45 of science 
and technology as main variables for sustainable development. 
The program for the endogenisation of science and technology had five specific 
objectives. The first objective to promote S&T stated: “Substantially increase the 
investment in science and technology, breaking the traditional pattern of small 
annual increases, to reach at least 2% GDP investment.” (Consejería presidencial 
para el desarrollo institucional, 1995, p. 104)  
This goal should have been achieved in the next 5 years: “It is proposed, as a 
minimum goal, that in the next five years before 2000, there will be an increment in 
the current level of 0.4% of GDP to 2% of GDP to support research and scientific 
and technological development programs.”(Consejería presidencial para el desarrollo 
institucional, 1995, p. 106) 
This has been the evolution of the investment in R&D and Science and Technology 
Activities (STA) as a percentage of the GDP, according to the Colombian 
Observatory of Science and Technology: 
                                                
45 This was the word used in the document to express the necessity of developing internal capabilities 
in science, technology and education as the bases for the economic and social development of the 
country. 
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Figure 4.11. Expenditure in scientific and technological activities – STA as a percentage of GDP, 
2002 -2012  
Source. (Jorge Lucio et al., 2012, p. 18) 
In 2012 the joint expenditure in STA and R&D was only 0.62% of GDP. From this 
document, subsequent government documents have stated that it is crucial to invest 
more in STI.  The latest presidential government plan insists on increasing the public 
investment for STI.  The goal is that for 2014 the investment in STI as a percentage 
of the GDP should be 1%. This constant deviation on the expected vs. real public 
investment on STI may imply a lack of commitment from governments to build S&T 
capabilities as economic and social engines to promote sustainable welfare.  
Table 4.7 shows investment thresholds proposed by five different national 


















S&T as % 
GDP 
1% in 1998 2% in 2000 1% in 2010 and 
2% in 2019 
1% in 2010 
and 2% in 
2019 
2% in 2019 
Table 4.7. Investment in S&T as percentage of GDP proposed by several public documents. 
Source. Information compiled by the author. 
Indicadores de ciencia y tecnología, Colombia 2012 | Science and technology indicators, Colombia 201218
Gráfica 1.1. Evolución de la inversión en actividades de ciencia, tecnología e innovación –ACTI como porcentaje del PIB, 2002 - 2012
Expenditure in scientific and technological activities –STA as a percentage of GDP, 2002 - 2012
Fuentes: OCyT, DANE - EDIT II, EDIT III, EDIT IV y EDIT V, Universidad Nacional de Colombia*
Cálculos: OCyT
* En adelante la fuente Universidad Nacional de Colombia corresponde a el libro: Vicerrectoría de Investigación. (2009). Capacidades de Investigación en la Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2000 - 2008.  
Una aproximación desde el capital intelectual. Bogotá, D.C.: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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It has been clear that an increase in the investment for S&T is an overriding concern, 
at least in white papers, but after almost 25 years, the country has not even achieved 
the conservative goal of 1% of investment in S&T. Since R&D and STA investment 
is important for the proper functioning of SIs to provide incentives to innovating 
organization and innovation processes, this is a key factor to observe (Edquist, 
2004).  
This situation is acknowledge by the national planning department (DNP) in the 
previously mentioned CONPES 3582: “Progress has not been as expected, today, 
many of the limitations identified in previous diagnoses persist” (DNP, 2009, p. 7). It 
can be noticed that even when different governments have commissioned specialised 
studies to diagnose Colombia’s performance in terms of S&T capabilities and 
proclivity to innovation, and there have been several recommendations about 
investment in S&T, results show little progression from 1990 until now. 
Going further, and questioning the reasons why a repetitive goal about investment - 
known by policy-makers, and reinforced by international best practices - has not 
been achieved, we can hypothesise that the economic growth of the country has not 
been good in the last decades so the STI budget has been consequentially reduced, or 
that STI are not perceived as important factors to develop social welfare. However, 
looking at Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 – within the macroeconomic environment section 
-, it can be seen that even having difficult periods, there has been a positive GDP and 
a positive total factor productivity. This may imply that there is a low valuation of 
STI by the Colombian society, and mostly by politicians and policy-makers. This is 
acknowledge by Colciencias: 
The system has two major limitations, scarce and unstable 
financial resources and a low valuation of the STI in 
Colombian society. This ultimately has important 
consequences on the competitiveness of the Colombian 
economy. (Colciencias, 2008, p. 10) 
This situation can also be seen in the private sector. Businessmen do not perceive 
S&T as key factors to increase productivity, competitiveness, and consequently 
profits. Evidence of this is the low investment in STIA and R&D by the business 
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sector46 (see Table 4.6 – Colombian Firms STA expenditure 2002 - 2012). This fact 
is highlighted by the WB in a S&T policy assessment made in 2006: 
Total investment in technology and R&D is low and unstable. 
Private sector capacity and spending in R&D is limited and 
the scientific and technological base is insufficient, and 
public governance of the Innovation System seems out of 
touch with needs for increased emphasis and coordination. 
(World Bank, 2007, p. 17)  
The structure to allocate public financial resources is also problematic for emergent 
long-term STI projects. Research and innovation programs require at least a two-year 
cycle to develop products and/or services. Afterwards, there are processes of 
translation, testing, adaptation, and validation of these new products or services for 
the productive sector (Beard, Ford, Koutsky, & Spiwak, 2009). Having incentives 
that depend on annual term budgets, inflict inflexibility and threaten the success of 
such projects.  
Besides the difficulty in obtaining resources, there is a 
significant barrier to execute them because the total public 
resources for STI are subject to the national budget rules, 
which are provided for annual terms. This imposes rigidity to 
resources, which is at odds with the nature of the research 
and innovation projects that are characterized for being of 
long-term, high-risk, and staggered. (DNP, 2009, p. 18) 
The limited financial resources has also meant that NSSTI actors have to fiercely 
compete for scarce resources, forcing them to do many things that are beyond their 
expertise so they can earn the STI calls for projects. Private, public, and mixed 
organizations transform themselves to be able to compete in open public tenders 
(“convocatorias”), so they can fulfil the requirements of funding agencies. This is a 
major problem, as it further disfigures the functional structure of the system. There is 
no consistency between the roles of the actors.  
                                                
46 STA and R&D funding by resource type 2002-2012 shows that variation from 2002 to 2012 in STA 
funding by public sector was of 52.36%, while private sector had a 44,07%. On the other hand, R&D 
funding in the same period by public sector was 54.73%, against 40,30% from private sector (Love, 
1980).   
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Overall investment in S&T has been deficient over the last 70 years. The importance 
of building S&T capabilities as fundamental factors to generate social and business 
innovation has been a recurrent strategy. In order to achieve the goals highlighted in 
white papers to strengthen the nation’s innovation capacity, more commitment to 
long-term investment by public and private sectors is needed. However, tension 
between implicit and explicit policies; changes of governments that change priorities 
in the short-term with impact in the medium and long terms; lack of long-term 
sustained planning and execution; and a low valuation of S&T as important 
developmental variables, have led to a low investment in innovation. 
4.4.2.2. Capabilities Building 
Emphasis has been placed on building scientific capacity. Creation and enforcement 
of technological capacity has been mostly left to the business sector and enhanced by 
technological development centres (TDC)47. Colciencias has invested most of its 
budget and efforts to strengthen the knowledge generation system. With this aim, 
most calls for projects have been directed to research groups in universities and 
research centres.  Therefore, strengthening of research groups has been a main issue 
in the scientific capabilities building process48. It has been from 2009, with the 
modification of the S&T law, that design of new instruments has been a priority to 
encourage innovation in the business sector. However, this is a gradual process and 
effectiveness of these strategies will not be seen after at least five to ten years. So it 
                                                
47 “These centres arose as private and non- profit institutions oriented to the offer of technological 
services as well as applied Research and Development (R&D) to the productive sectors through, 
among others, the performance of projects aimed at the transfer, application and diffusion of 
knowledge produced by universities, research centres and themselves” (Various, 2013, p. 19) 
48 The notion of research groups and centres is set from Law 29 of 1990 for S&T. Colciencias built a 
conceptual model jointly with the scientific and academic community to classify research groups in 
the country. Under this policy, the "research group" is defined as the core or basic unit of the NSSTI 
to generate knowledge from research. Groups were ranked every year by a committee of experts on a 
scale from ‘A’ to ‘D’, with ‘A ‘being the highest rating. From 2000 on, categories of groups were 
obtained by an index. Thus, category ‘A’ corresponded to the first decile of the index. In 2008 a new 
model of classification was designed based on the weight of products of the research group. The 
maximum index score is achieved if the group’s production is equal or more than 8.5 out of 10. 
According with the score obtained and the age of the research group, it can be ranked into five 
categories: A1, A, B, C, D. A group is registered when it is inscribed in GrupLAC, the national 
platform to register research groups. A group is acknowledge if demonstrates verifiable results 
derived from research projects; has at least two members: has a declared age of at least one year: is 
endorsed by an institution registered in InstituLAC, the national platform to register research 
institutions; has a research project underway; the group leader has an undergraduate, master, or PhD 
degree; has at least one product per year; and has a production of social appropriation and circulation 
of knowledge. 
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is save to say that the Colombian NSI is more a research system than a technology 
and innovation one. We acknowledge that science, technology and innovation 
happen in an iterative cycle, so it is not our intention to separate their domains 
inextricably, however the emphasis in terms of funding and capabilities building has 
been put on the research side, following a linear approach to innovation.  
According the National Observatory of S&T (OCyT) indicators book 2012, this is 
the distribution of research groups up to April 2012: 
 
Figure 4.12. Research groups according Colciencias and OCyT’s classification 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 50) 
The distribution of ranked groups by the National Science and Technology Program 
(NSTP) can be seen in the following table: 
Indicadores de ciencia y tecnología, Colombia 2012 | Science and technology indicators, Colombia 201250
Grupos de investigación según clasificaciones Colciencias y OCyT*
Research groups, Colciencias’ ranking and OCyT’s classification
Registrados / Registered 
12.774
Avalados / Endorsed 
8.442
A1 216 A 275 B 667 C 965 D 1.945
Activos 1 / Active 
4.555
Inactivos / Inactive 
3.887
Categorizados / Ranked 
4.068
No categorizados / Unranked 
1.486
Fuente: Colciencias, GrupLAC, corte abril 2012
Cálculos: OCyT
* Para la clasificación OCyT consideramos solo los grupos que tienen aval institucional.
 In the OCyT’s classification, we consider only the groups that have been endorsed by and institution.
1 Se distingue entre grupos activos y no activos, siendo los primeros aquellos que registran un producto tipo A en los dos años anteriores al año de corte.
 We distinguish between active groups, as those that have type A production registered in the two previous years to the cut off year, and inactive groups as those 
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Table 4.8. Recognised research groups by National Science and Technology Program 2011. 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 54) 
The amount of groups has increased steadily from 2002. In 2002 there were 544 
acknowledged research groups and 1,520 registered groups. In 2012, there were 
12,744 registered groups and 5,554 acknowledge groups. The amount was almost 
multiplied tenfold in only ten years. However, the concentration tendency of research 
groups according to their research area keeps being led by social and humanities, 
with a low participation of biotechnology, electronics, telecommunication, 
informatics and research in energy, and mining. This can be partially explained by 
the political and social conflict between illegal armed groups and army forces, with 
the subsequent problems of population displacement, higher rates of unemployment, 





















































Tabla 3.2. Grupos de investigación reconocidos según Programa Nacional de Ciencia 
y Tecnología (PNCyT), medición 2011
Recognized research groups by National Science and Technology Program (PNCyT), 
measurement 2011
Programa Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 
National Science and Technology Program A1 A B C D
N.C. 1 
Unranked Total
Ciencias sociales y humanas 
Social sciences and humanities 65 91 242 334 697 516 1.945
Ciencia y tecnología de la salud 
Health sciences 39 55 106 130 226 213 769
Ciencias básicas 
Basic sciences 32 36 92 119 194 169 642
Ciencias del medio ambiente y el hábitat 
Environmental sciences 10 20 45 69 159 103 406
Estudios científicos de la educación 
Scientific studies of education 12 13 26 67 161 110 389
Electrónica, telecomunicaciones e informática 
Electronics, telecommunications and informatics 8 11 47 70 147 95 378
Desarrollo tecnológico industrial y calidad 
Industrial technological development and quality 16 13 37 54 150 84 354
Ciencia y tecnologías agropecuarias 
Agricultural sciences and technologies 18 15 29 60 90 73 285
Biotecnología 
Biotechnology 4 8 9 19 44 32 116
Investigaciones en energía y minería 
Research in energy and mining 8 7 16 20 33 29 113
Ciencia y tecnología del mar 
Marine sciences 3 4 16 10 10 16 59
Sin clasificar 
Not classified 1 2 2 13 34 46 98
Total 216 275 667 965 1.945 1.486 5.554
Fuente: Colciencias
Cálculos: Colciencias
1 N.C.: No categorizados.
 Unranked.
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groups to civilian life. Social sciences and humanities have played an important role 
to study the roots of the social conflict and to provide mechanisms to find feasible 
and thoughtful solutions to the multiple problems derived from a sustained situation 
of violence (Orozco, Ruiz, Bonilla, & Chavarro, 2013).   
Scientific and academic production of researchers within acknowledged research 
groups in Scopus and ISI Web of Science from 2001 to 2011 is shown in figure 4.13: 
 
Figure 4.13. Web of Science and Scopus documents by authors affiliated to Colombian institutions 
2001 – 2011. 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 85) 
Capabilities have been built around scientific production. Having a more 
comprehensive standard to measure research groups’ productivity and quality 
favoured the academic production of Colombian researchers in top-tier international 
citation indexes. The average growth percentage of published documents from 2001 
to 2011 in ISI and SCOPUS can be seen in table 4.9: 
IV Producción bibliográfica | Bibliographic production85
Gráfica 4.6. Producción de documentos de autores vinculados a instituciones colombianas publicados en revistas indexadas en Web 
of Science y Scopus, 2002 - 2011*
Web of Science and Scopus documents by authors affiliated to Colombian institutions, 2002 - 2011
Fuente: Web of Science, consulta septiembre 2012
Scopus, consulta septiembre 2012
Cálculos: OCyT
* Scopus ciencias básicas incluye physical sciences, life sciences y health sciences.
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Average growth percentage SCOPUS Natural Sciences (2001-2011) 21% 
Average growth percentage SCI (2001-2011) 16% 
Average growth percentage SSCI (2001-2011) 26% 
Average growth percentage SCOPUS Social Sciences & Humanities (2001-
2011) 
33% 
Table 4.9. Average growth percentage of published documents 2001-2011 in international citation 
indexes. 
Source. Based on (Orozco et al., 2013) 
The change of ranking standards for research groups in 2008 had a great impact on 
the information update in the national research information system. From 2007 to 
2008 there was an important increment in publication rate, mainly produced by the 
information update process. However, Colombia is still well behind OECD countries 
and leading countries of LAC region, as it is clearly stated by the OECD review on 
the Colombian innovation policy: 
The traditional measures of STI output are also modest. The 
volume of scientific publications has been growing in recent 
years, but at about four publications a year per 100 000 
population, Colombia is about two-thirds as productive as 
Latin America overall and well under the OECD average of a 
little less than nine. Like the scientific output of most Latin 
American countries, Colombia’s is far less frequently cited 
than that of OECD countries and lags [behind] most 
comparable Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. 
While the national system naturally has some strong points, 
Colombia faces a strong challenge in terms of scientific 
production, productivity and quality. The picture is much the 
same for patents and trademarks. Colombia ranks behind a 
number of LAC countries in terms of patents granted per 
capita as well as trademark applications at the US Patent and 
Trademark Office.  (OECD, 2013, p. 5) 
Looking into the patents application and granted patents according to main national 
sectors, we can clearly see which sectors are more active in terms of R&D leading to 
commercial innovations. The pharmaceutical chemistry sector has the highest patents 
applications and patents granted. However a major part of this sector is composed by 
MNEs, which means that most R&D is produced in its headquarters, leaving aside 
the internal industrial capabilities building. 
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Figure 4.14.  Patent applications and granted patents according to sector, 2002 – 2011 
Source. (Jorge Lucio et al., 2012, p. 92) 
The dependency rate of patents49 granted from 2002 to 2011 have been decreasing 
over time, but it is still high, as can be seen in next figure: 
 
Figure 4.15. Dependency rate 2002 – 2011 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 95) 
Self-sufficiency rate50 and invention coefficient51 have shown progress, but 
Colombia still has low levels of internal capacity for technological development and 
                                                
49 Non resident applications / residents applications. 
Indicadores de ciencia y tecnología, Colombia 2012 | Science and technology indicators, Colombia 201292
Gráfica 5.1. Patentes de invención solicitadas y concedidas ante oficina de la SIC, por sector, 2002 - 2011



































Solicitadas / Applied Concedidas / Granted 
V Títulos de propiedad industrial | Industrial property rights95
Gráfica 5.2. Índice de dependencia, 2002 - 2011*
Dependency rate, 2002 - 2011
Fuente: SIC
Cálculos: OCyT
* Número de solicitudes de patentes de no residentes/Número de solicitudes de patentes de residentes.
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a low number of patents per one hundred thousand inhabitants (See figures 4.16 and 
4.17). 
 
Figure 4.16. Self-sufficiency rate 2002 – 2011 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 96) 
 
Figure 4.17. Invention coefficient 2002 – 2011 
                                                                                                                                     
50 Residents patent applications / Total patent applications. 
51 Patent applications per 1 hundred thousand inhabitants.  
Indicadores de ciencia y tecnología, Colombia 2012 | Science and technology indicators, Colombia 201296
Gráfica 5.3. Índice de autosuficiencia, 2002 - 2011*
Self-sufficiency rate, 2002 - 2011
Fuente: SIC
Cálculos: OCyT
* Número de solicitudes de patentes de residentes/Número total de solicitudes.
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V Títulos de propiedad industrial | Industrial property rights97
Gráfica 5.4. Coeficiente de invención, 2002 - 2011*
Invention coefficient, 2002 - 2011
Fuente: SIC
Cálculos: OCyT
* Número de solicitudes de patentes por cada cien mil habitantes. 
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Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 97) 
These results are expected looking at the distribution of firms according their level of 
innovation measured in the Surveys of Development and Technological Innovation 
in Manufacturing (EDITs): 
  142 
 
Figure 4.18. Distribution of firms according to degree of innovation according EDITs 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 103) 
 
VI Innovación en la industria manufacturera | Innovation in the manufacturing industry103
Gráfica 6.2. Distribución de las empresas que respondieron a la EDIT II, III, IV y V según grado de innovación*
Distribution of firms that responded the EDIT II, III, IV and V according to degree of innovation
Fuente: DANE, EDIT II, EDIT III, EDIT IV. Boletines de prensa EDIT V
* Tomamos los grados de innovación calculados por el DANE. 
 We take the degree of innovation estimated by the DANE.
1 En la EDIT II, solo 6.172 empresas, de las 6.222 que respondieron la encuesta, son clasificadas por grado de innovación.
 Only 6.172, of 6.222, firms were classified according to their degree of innovation in EDIT II.
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In EDIT V 60% of companies surveyed were not innovative at all, having an 
increasing rate from EDIT I to EDIT V. It is true that more firms have been part of 
the latest surveys, but the results are disappointing anyway. If we compare this rate 
with the investment level of enterprises for innovation activities, we can understand 
at least looking at this single factor, an explanation for this phenomenon. Figure 4.19 
shows the investment made by Colombian firms in innovation activities from 2003 to 
2010: 
 
Figure 4.19. Firms investing in innovation activities and amount invested 2003 – 2010 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 104) 
Another problem faced in the innovation side of the system is that instruments for 
funding and supporting innovation in enterprises have not been effective enough. For 
different reasons mentioned in the previous section, companies prefer to fund their 
innovation initiatives themselves. Taking into account that there is not a strong 
innovation culture in the Colombian business sector, besides low investment levels in 
STA and R&D made directly by companies, a weakness can be detected in the 
systemic nature of the Colombian NSI. Only 30% of total R&D is performed by the 
business sector, which results in low levels of productivity and a scarce relationship 
with public and private research centres. It is a major challenge and an imperative for 




















































Tabla 6.1. Empresas que invirtieron en actividades de desarrollo e innovación 
tecnológica y montos invertidos, 2003 - 2010*
Firms that invested in innovation activities and amount invested, 2003 - 2010
Año % Empresas / firms Monto invertido millones de pesos constantes 2011 Amount invested in million COP of 2011
2003 68,53% 3.777.029 
2004 76,58% 4.258.048 
2005 43,17% 3.321.410 
2006 54,29% 3.751.010 
2007 29,87% 3.355.053 
2008 33,45% 3.450.876 
2009 26,61% 2.414.373 
2010 31,49% 2.654.457 
Fuente: DANE, EDIT II, EDIT III, EDIT IV. Boletines de prensa EDIT V
Cálculos: OCyT
* Consideramos la inversión en todas las actividades conducentes a la innovación declaradas por las empresas. Para el cálculo de la inversión en 
ACTI (capítulo 1 de este libro) se hace una depuración de la información, no se considera maquinaria y equipo dadas las dificultades que se 
han encontrado para que los empresarios distingan la cantidad de este rubro realmente desti ada a la innov ción y no  reposición de equipos 
y otras actividades no relacionadas con innovación.
 We take all the investment declared by firms. To estimate the investment in STI (chapter one of this book) some categories, like investment 
in equipment and machinery, are not taken into account due the difficulties to distinguish between the investment exclusively related to 
innovation and total investment.
Gráfica 6.3. Empresas que invirtieron en actividades de desarrollo e innovación 
tecnológica y montos invertidos, 2003 - 2010
Firms that invested in innovation activities and amount invested, 2003 - 2010
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Table 4.10. Distribution of funding for innovation leading activities 2003 – 2010 
Source. (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 112) 
There are different kinds of incentives and tools to trigger the NSI, and particular 
sectoral and regional systems. However, fiscal incentives can be unpredictable 
sometimes and cause the opposite desired effect. One of the cases studied in this 
research stands as a good example of this. For maintaining and support the flowers 
sector, the government gave fiscal incentives to flower growers for the currency 
exchange deficit. Then, when the US dollar experienced a deflation causing huge 
loses to flower enterprises, the government compensated giving subsides to the 
sector. It was maintained for a long time causing lack of competitiveness and low 
investment in S&T. This is an example of how a policy designed to strengthen a 
sector, actually caused the opposite. It also reflects important elements of the 
Colombian cultural setting, where innovation is not within business priorities and 
where there is a tendency towards short-term planning. This is directly related with 
the second aspect studied, the social appropriation of science. 
4.4.2.3. Social appropriation of science 
Appropriating the science, the technology, and the innovation is a social process that 
permeates all population levels. In the case of the public sector there must be a 
conscience in all government instances that STI is a long-term commitment that 
involves political will and a country vision. The academic sector is committed to 
scientific development, but a stronger commitment to knowledge and technology 




















































Tabla 6.8. Distribución de la financiación de las actividades de desarrollo e 
innovación tecnológica según fuente de los recursos, 2003 - 2010
Distribution of funding for innovation leading activities, 2003 - 2010
Fuente de recursos 
Funding source 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Empresariales 
Own 67,09% 64,89% 68,83% 67,18% 76,92% 79,19% 80,51% 76,14%
Públicos 
Public 6,87% 4,11% 5,29% 4,18% 0,72% 0,72% 0,71% 0,82%
Banca privada 
Banking 24,13% 27,56% 21,22% 24,11% 21,43% 19,74% 17,69% 21,60%
Sector externo 
Foreign 0,15% 0,14% 4,64% 4,51% 0,06% 0,05% 0,01% 0,07%
Otros 
Other 1,77% 3,29% 0,01% 0,02% 0,86% 0,30% 1,07% 1,38%




sector. A wider vision about the roles of universities and research centres in the 
knowledge exploitation system has to be strengthened. Expenditure on S&T is 
perceived as luxury. This can be clearly seen in the EDITs made for the last 6 years. 
But the problem cannot only be reduced to a low valuation of S&T as an exogenous 
element of the society; it is necessary to dig into the causes of this low valuation. 
Besides the high dependence and reliance on imported knowledge, teaching of 
science and technology in primary and secondary education is insufficient. To 
improve this situation, Colciencias has been implementing the “Programa Ondas” 
(Wave program), whose main objective is to promote civic and democratic culture in 
STI among Colombian children and younger population using research as a 
pedagogical strategy. The wave program is part of a broader strategy to build 
capabilities in all levels of education and age groups, as can be seen in Figure 4.20: 
 
Figure 4.20. Colciencias multi-level strategy for building human resources capabilities. 
Source. Adapted from Colciencias’ website: 
http://www.colciencias.gov.co/programa_estrategia/programa-ondas 
As part of the program, there is a special line for training school teachers on research 
and scientific understanding so they can transmit this knowledge to their students. 
There are also science and technology fairs aimed at engaging with young people, so 
processes of knowledge generation, transformation and exploitation can be socialized 
amongst the local, regional, national and international levels. The idea is to have a 




However, low levels of social appropriation of science and technology are still a 
burden for the endogenisation of S&T. Science is a subject that interests few people, 
so it is perceived as remote solution for current problems (Lucio et al., 2012, p. 112).  
The general public do not see both a relationship between S&T and the political, 
economic, and social development of the country.  
It is usually argued that having public spaces for the understanding, reflection, and 
debate of solutions for social, political, economic, and cultural problems in which the 
generation and use of scientific and technological knowledge is very important 
(Consejería presidencial para el desarrollo institucional, 1995). However, in a society 
where generation and exploitation of knowledge are still emerging systems, to build 
public understanding of the importance of scientific and technological capabilities to 
solve everyday problems is both challenging and mandatory. We believe that a 
change in the cultural attitudes towards science, technology and innovation is the 
first step to have a sustained effort to have a systemic system of S&T. Demand of 
knowledge could be more active in terms of business solutions using domestic 
research capabilities. This can be encouraged through strategic public investment in 
particular sectors and through effective instruments to energise traditional industries 
so they can successfully implement innovation networks producing new knowledge 
and adapting foreign S&T capabilities. We argue that in order to have a more 
effective demand-pull of science and technology from society, a set of policy 
systemic mix instruments could be implemented. Isolated strategies do not generate 
solutions; on the contrary they generate frustration and a waste of efforts and money. 
Related to this, Professor Emilio Quevedo, ex Colciencias public servant and 
currently director of the research group for the study of science, technology and 
professions says: 
On the one hand a stronger and clearer link is required with 
the public, and with the civil society, to understand and 
appropriate the meaning of science and technology. On the 
other hand, it is also required that the state is really aware of 
what research and innovation mean for the growth of the 
country. It is not about that one government or other has 
more or less interest in it, but to have a state policy really 
interested in building a synergic system. (Emilio Quevedo, 
personal communication, January 18th, 2012) 
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However, a constrain remains related with the trained professionals to lead and 
execute programs for the public understanding and appropriation of S&T. Colombia 
does not offer graduate programs in public communication of science, and it is not 
very common to find researchers dedicated to think about public understanding of 
science (Daza-Caicedo & Lozano-Borda, 2013). Therefore, this is another action area 
that has extensive potential to develop. 
Another important aspect, that has been left aside, is the necessary participation of 
different stakeholders in the policy-making process. That is one recurrent complaint 
made by actors within the system. This is particularly relevant for building sectoral 
policies and designing public incentives. More effective mechanisms to give voice to 
main actors of the private and academic sectors in policies related to STI build 
engagement and social construction of solutions at the national and sectoral levels. 
Although there are mechanisms to give participation to these actors in the national 
and regional councils, the effectiveness of them is very limited. This aspect is 
acknowledge in the Colombian S&T law: “Scientific communities and the social and 
productive sectors will participate in the formulation and determination of general 
policies on science, technology and innovation in the areas determined by the 
Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation, Colciencias.” 
(DNP, 2009). However, there have not been effective mechanisms to translate the 
law into feasible participatory mechanisms. 
While science, technology and innovation are perceived by people as elite issues 
outwith lay knowledge and completely distant from everyday problems and 
necessities, there will not be pressure groups calling for the importance of investing 
in strategic sectors to be more competitive in the local and global markets. Programs 
directed towards children and youth to recognise the potential of science and 
technology in solving all sort of problems is necessary but not sufficient.  
4.4.2.4. Development of strategic sectors 
It has been argued in this chapter that having a long-term national vision is 
fundamental for having progressive social and economic dividends, taking as a base 
the generation and use of knowledge. Having well-defined STI policies unlinked 
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with the social, economic, and industrial policies has seen many implementation 
problems. It is important then, to build good links and transitions between the S&T 
policies with effective and well-oriented industrial policies. Currently, the productive 
and innovation policies have been disconnected. The National Strategy for 
Innovation (ENI) has strongly emphasised this connection. Responding to this aim 
the unit Innpulsa52, as part of Bancoldex, was created. Nonetheless, the ENI 
legitimacy and continuity is questionable53. The strategy ignores the current policy 
for science and technology and weakens the formal and informal political 
institutions.   
There has been agreement, to some extent, on the importance of certain specific 
sectors in most public documents and initiatives.  Since 2005, in order to strengthen 
the system, public institutions have developed several studies54 to identify strategic 
areas and sectors to invest in and to generate innovation in the productive sector. 
Although the studies have suggested diverse strategic sectors, what all of them have 
agreed upon is that the productive sector must undergo a radical change in order to 
integrate the learning processes required to innovate.  Taking this into account, the 
studies have been concentrated on satisfying the demand from the country and from 
the international market, and to identify the opportunity niches according to the 
knowledge, human resources and mineral and natural resources that Colombia has. In 
this sense, the National Policy for Promotion of Research and Innovation (Congress, 
2009) considered four essential areas for the development of competitive advantage 
(biodiversity, water, health, peace and social cohesion). However, these are broad 
sectors and specific programs to develop these areas have not been designed.  
On the other hand, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism has defined 16 
strategic sectors for the country within the so-called “Programa de Transformación 
Productiva” (Productive transformation program). Besides these national priorities, 
Colciencias has gradually defined 12 national programs for S&T that represents the 
                                                
52 As it was mentioned in the STI policy implementation section, Innpulsa is a governmental agency 
created in February 2012 to support and promote business growth led by innovation. 
53 Look a the section Coherence between policies – Policy processes in the policy implementation 
chapter. 
54  The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism; the National Planning Department; Colciencias; 
and the State and Private Competitiveness Councils; made between 2005 and 2007 several studies 
and consultations to define strategic sectors. 
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national priorities for development using S&T as a base. Furthermore, the current 
government defined 5 “locomotives” for development, 3 as development sectors 
(agriculture, mining, housing), and two cross-sectoral ones supporting the other 3 
(infrastructure, innovation). This picture shows that there is a lack of focalisation in 
specific sectors. We do not say that the state should follow a “picking winners” 
strategy or should be completely restrictive on the sectors to support, but a lack of 
strategic investment is harming technology specialisation and therefore the economic 
trajectory of Colombia. The human and financial resources are limited and a lack of 
medium and long strategy to obtain a competitive advantage in certain economic 
areas is worsening the technological backwardness of the nation. 
There are indications that certain aspects of regional and 
sectoral planning could be improved to facilitate national 
coherence. There is so far limited co-ordination amongst the 
regions and not just in terms of their royalty projects. The 
Private Competitiveness Council recently analysed regional 
innovation and industry priorities and found a total of 80. At 
the national level, too, strategic priorities proliferate. The 
DNP sets out five “locomotive” priorities. The Productive 
Transformation Programme of the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Tourism has gradually defined 16 priority 
sectors. In practice, therefore, the extent to which there are 
strong national thematic priorities is not clear.” (OECD, 
2013, p. 32) 
This may imply that there have been difficulties in defining strategic sectors. 
Differences between ministries, DNP, Colciencias, and regional competitiveness 
committees on the methodology to define sectors have been notorious. Some appeal 
by the strategy of ‘picking winners’, others by the ‘create winners’ through private – 
public partnerships. However, there is agreement on choosing biodiversity and its 
derivatives as a strategic and competitive sector, given the country’s wealth in 
natural resources. In the case of sectors like agriculture, health, environment, 
industrial development, those are sectors that are strategic and part of the core of 
priorities of most countries. The challenge is on defining those different sectors that 
could differentiate and make Colombia highly competitive. Referring to this 
problem, Iván Montenegro, a Colciencias advisor says: 
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I do not know if you've seen this lack of concordance, lack of 
consensus on the issue of the priority areas. Then there's like 
a confusing mix of sectors called world class sectors, 
strategic research areas, and the innovation sectors in the 
development plan (Iván Montenegro, personal 
communication, August 25th, 2012) 
Several studies have been conducted with international experts collaborating to 
define a long-term investment agenda for strategic sectors55. Different approaches 
have been used as technological and innovation foresight, clusters methods, 
econometric models, global chain models, among others, but this has resulted on the 
proliferation of even more strategic sectors. This problematic situation also shows 
power battles between public agencies that want to be in charge of the innovation 
policy and want to overpass the authority domain of their peer agencies.  
4.5. Policy Development and Implementation in 
the Agro-industrial Sector 
4.5.1. Regional and national evolution of the Colombian 
agriculture sector 
Land ownership and land distribution has been a major issue in the history of Latin 
America. Inherited from European colonisers in the region, the concept of private 
property ownership was introduced during the colonial period (c. 1492-1800). 
Owning land has been an indicator and projection of social status and political power 
from this period onwards (Meade, 2010).  The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a 
continued and extensive demand for fertile ground that resulted in a progressive 
search to find suitable land for agriculture and livestock. This was consistent with the 
expansion of urban development and the attendant increase in demand for food from 
                                                
55 Prospective studies have been widely used in Colombia. As a result, there are now 30 regional and 
city development plans, 20 strategic plans for universities, and 25 S&T regional agendas. In 2009, the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism hired Mckinsey consultant for a consultancy on the 
definition of the sectors to invest. As a result, 8 sectors, in which the country already has tradition, 
went into a process of. On the other hand, 4 sectors defined as 'new and emerging' have been 
developed within a so-called productive transformation program. There was also a study made by 
Hausmann and Klinger in 2007 on strategies that Colombia should follow to achieve export-led 
growth in Colombia. Another study was conducted by the Productivity Consulting Centre of the 
Chilean Universidad Adolfo Ibañez to help build a national innovation strategy. This study also 
mentions some sectors with innovative potential. 
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a growing population. High international demand for sugar and coffee resulted in an 
intensive production of these crops in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica, 
whilst Argentina specialised in beef, mutton, and wool. Latin America specialised its 
exports on primary and raw agricultural commodities being a rich region in natural 
resources with low technological capacity (Sedrez, 2011). The Latin American role 
in the international trade landscape was focused on the production of food and raw 
materials for industrialised countries, mainly coloniser countries as Spain, Portugal, 
England, France, and the emerging market in North America. This maintained a 
perpetuation of economic exploitation and an unequal structure of social institutions. 
4.5.1.1. The starting formal institutionalisation process: 1900 
- 1989  
Latin American economy relied mostly on agricultural commodities during the 
colonial time. This tendency was sustained during the independence process of the 
colonial countries in the 19th century. During this century the main production unit 
was the hacienda, a large portion of land owned by a single landlord. Exploitation 
labour systems inherited from the colonial times were preserved. A small and 
emergent dominant class had the economic power to own the material production, 
copying colonial extractive economic institutions where wages were paid in kind 
(food and a place to stay) under asymmetrical power relationships. Servitude 
relations with no rights of ownership over the cultivated land by small farmers 
remained throughout 19th and 20th centuries (Kalmanovitz & López Enciso, 2005).  
The international demand for higher crops volumes was a trigger to modernise the 
agricultural techniques and production structure of the region. It is in this context that 
the first agricultural research stations were installed in various Latin American 
countries at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the nascent ministries of 
agriculture. However, it was not until the 1930s and 1940s that there were formal 
research departments within the ministries’ organisational structure. These 
departments were successful precursors towards a modernisation of the agriculture 
sector. Later on, these research departments would evolve into National Agriculture 
Research Institutes (INIAs for their Spanish acronym). Transnational organizations 
such as the World Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
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Caribbean (ECLAC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the United 
States Agency for International Development provided technical and financial 
support to these institutions throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Further, they supported 
the creation of international agricultural research centres in some countries of the 
region such as the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), the 
international Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the 
International Potato Center (CIP) (Echeverria, 1998). This was consistent with the 
structural changes promoted by the Latin American Structuralism movement during 
the 1950s to 1980s, where the key objective was to encourage a gradual transition 
towards greater industrialisation. For Raúl Prebisch, one of the most influential 
actors within the Latin American school of thought, the industrialisation of LAC 
countries was the only way to have technical progress and to improve the life quality 
of the population (Prebish, 1986). This was accompanied by a growing pessimism 
about the future of the Latin American countries given its strong reliance on natural 
resources. On this regard, Kuntz says: 
“This critical stance towards the role of foreign trade evolved 
in what came to be known as ‘export pessimism’, or the 
notion that primary exports were detrimental to those 
economies that specialized in their production. Export 
pessimism found its roots in the beginning of the Great 
Depression in 1929…The Depression exhibited the 
vulnerability of those economies that relied on primary 
exports to sustain their growth processes” (Kuntz Ficker, 
2005, p. 147) 
Progress was the goal and the promotion of technology-based sectors was the aim of 
most of the countries in Latin America. But given the abundance of natural 
resources, the installed infrastructure, the long expertise acquired in the agro sector, 
and the lack of training of agricultural labour in other sectors, agriculture kept as a 
key economic sector for the LAC countries. The main concerns for the Latin 
American economists was the high reliance on Natural Resources (NRs):  
 “On the demand side, they highlighted two problems: (a) 
NRs face relatively low income elasticity, so countries 
heavily specialised in NRs would not benefit from increases 
in world demand associated with world income growth, and 
(b) their demand growth was slower than that for 
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manufactures, because technological progress in the 
manufacturing sector tends to be raw-materials saving. On 
the supply side they also identified two problems: (a) that 
NRs were not favoured by technological progress, which was 
concentrated mostly in manufactures…and (b) that the little 
technological progress they experienced did not translate into 
larger demand or greater profits but in reduced prices, 
benefiting consumers in foreign countries and not producers 
in developing countries supplying the NRs.” (Marin et al., 
2009, p. 4)  
This tendency would change during the late 20th and 21st centuries. The changes in 
the production patterns with more specialised consumer-producer relationships and 
the existence of global value chains promoted a shift in the behaviour of trading 
commodities. 
Agriculture keeps being a strategic sector, not only because of obvious reasons like 
food security for domestic needs, but also because 11% of the value of food 
production is concentrated in Latin America and the region has 24% of the world’s 
arable land56. Moreover, current studies have shown how natural resources (NR) 
based industries, in a context of global value chains, have evolved to have higher 
market volume with specialised demand business niches and a higher connectivity 
through the intense use of ICTs. This shift in the market patterns, has changed 
business based on NR, and has opened broader opportunities to the Latin American 
countries (Marin et al., 2009; Perez, 2008).   
4.5.1.2. Creation of public and private agricultural 
organisations 
In 1819 farmers associations were officially established in Colombia. These 
associations were the antecedent to what would be the Agricultural Society of 
Colombia (SAC57). The SAC was founded in 1871 largely for the representation of 
farmers to government in order to discuss economic and social agricultural policies. 
In 1879 the first agricultural research institute for acclimatisation of livestock was 
                                                
56 This according to the Inter-American Development Bank in: 
http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/agriculture/latin-american-agriculture-statistics,2342.html. Retrieved in 
10-01-14.  
57 Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia 
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created to monitor the adaptation process of imported cattle breeds. The Ministry of 
Agriculture was founded in 1913 as the “Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce”, 
and in 1926 it created the first experimentation station in Palmira (part of the Cauca 
Valley department) to study costs of agricultural production, improve seeds, weather 
monitoring, pest control and soil analysis. The aim was also to do technology transfer 
through technical training to farmers (Valencia Llano & Acevedo Tarrazona, 2010). 
Given the success of the first station and the need to support regional agricultural 
development, several stations were created afterwards58. In 1948, after several 
restructurings, the Ministry of Agriculture invited the Rockefeller Foundation to 
create a cooperation program for crops production, following the same model applied 
already in Mexico. Then, in 1950 an Office for Specialised Research (OIE59) was 
debuted in cooperation with the Foundation and located in the School of Agronomy 
of Universidad Nacional in Medellín. At the beginning, research was focused on 
wheat and corn, and then it was extended to more crops and livestock. Afterwards, 
extending the support given by the Rockefeller Foundation, an Agricultural Research 
Division (DIA60) was opened in 1955 to manage all the experimental stations. This 
division evolved to be the Colombian Agriculture Institute (ICA61) in 1962, 
integrating research, extension, and agricultural training. During the 1980s the ICA 
was restructured into two main divisions, one for R&D and the other for services 
related to norms and standardization, animal and crop health, and the coordination of 
sectoral development. Since the two divisions were growing in terms of 
responsibilities and capacity62, in 1993 the institute was split and the Colombian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Corpoica63) was created to lead and perform 
                                                
58 In 1932 a new station was created in Armero, Tolima for cotton research. In 1934 another 
experimental station was created in Medellín, Antioquia.  
59 Oficina de Investigaciones Especiales 
60 División de Investigación Agropecuaria 
61 Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario 
62 The coordination and communication between researchers and farmers along the country was 
outstripping the administrative capacity of the institute. By the end of the 1980s there were 66 
regional centres for training, transfer and diffusion of technology. In addition to these centres, there 
were 25 research centres all along the country. However, there were not enough financial resources 
and the national government restricted the entrance of international funds and loans from 
organisations as the World Bank. In 1990, two additional research areas were included in the research 
agenda of the institute: biotechnology and natural resources. Then, in order to make more efficient the 
institute and the research process and impact, ICA was divided into two institutes.  
63 Corporación Colombiana de Investigación Agropecuaria 
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research for improving productivity and competitiveness within the agricultural 
sector (N. Beintema, L. Romano, & P. Pardey, 2000).  
Corpoica64 required joint efforts from the national government, producers’ 
associations, universities and regional institutes for its operation. One of the main 
objectives with the creation of Corpoica was to have greater flexibility for 
collaboration with the private sector and international networks. That is why the 
corporation has a mixed nature, which means that it has public and private capital in 
its constitution. This provides flexibility to the corporation to compete for public and 
private funding. The research agenda is set according to the regional research needs 
and the necessity of knowledge and technology transfer for the Colombian farmers 
and agricultural firms. The main research lines developed by the corporation are: 
livestock (cattle breeds, pests and diseases control, vaccines development, milk 
production), biotechnology (bio products, quality and safety, molecular biology and 
genetics), annual or seasonal crops (seeds production and control for corn, cotton, 
and soy), permanent crops (seeds production and control for oil palm) (Corpoica, 
2007). However, since its creation, Corpoica has had financial problems due to cuts 
in public resources for the corporation, and because of the cost of a functional model 
based on a large group of full-time researchers depending from the corporation. 
Besides the financial problems to support the structure of the corporation, there have 
been problems with other research groups and entities from universities and 
agriculture research centres since they perceive Corpoica as a competitor, not as a 
research partner. Also, actors within the agriculture sector criticise the applicability 
of the research results and the processes of knowledge and technology transfer from 
the corporation. Supporting this view, Claudia Uribe, coordinator of the science, 
technology and innovation agricultural observatory SIEMBRA, says: 
Corpoica has generated 70% of total research in the 
agricultural sector. If we look at the results that have been 
                                                
64 The Colombian Agricultural Research Corporation, Corpoica, is a non-profit decentralized public 
entity of mixed participation, aimed at developing and executing research, technology transfer and 
promote technological innovation processes for the agricultural sector. The Corporation follows up on 
the national agenda for research, development and innovation, and promotes the subsystem of 
agricultural technical assistance (SSATA) to support the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in the task of being engine, Actor & Support (MAS) for the National Agroindustrial 
System of Science and Technology (SNCTA). 
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actually helpful to improve the productive sector, the 
percentage is really low. Actors of the agriculture system 
don’t trust the corporation. (Claudia Uribe, personal 
communication, December 21st, 2011) 
Or the perception of Dr. Fernando Cantor, Dean of the School of Basic and Applied 
Sciences of Universidad Militar Nueva Granada: 
I think that Corpoica should play a more important role to 
organise and to coordinate the system, but instead, I perceive 
it as a competitor…Corpoica should have a national vision, 
but because they have a fiscal deficit, they have taken all the 
public research calls to pay their own researchers and to 
shape the national research agenda according to their own 
interests. (Fernando Cantor, personal communication, 
January 22nd, 2013) 
Also, the lack of integration of Corpoica with important research partners like the 
agriculture research centres is one of the weaknesses of the institute. Dr. Jerhson 
López, Chief of Biotechnology laboratory - National Sugar Cane Research Centre 
(CENICAÑA), says: 
I am completely unaware of the role of Corpoica. We 
[Cenicaña] don’t have a direct integration with Corpoica and 
in the biotechnology area is zero. (Jerhson López, personal 
communication, February 18th, 2012) 
However, Corpoica has adjusted its structural and functional setting in order to 
survive the central government institutional changes and to tackle the lack of trust of 
the agriculture sector. Corpoica is changing its role to be support and engine for the 
agricultural development in the country. It is an on-going process, but the board of 
the corporation knows that a shift in the model is needed, and is acting accordingly. 
In words of Juan Lucas Restrepo, executive director of Corpoica: 
We need to adapt the traditional [organisational] model to 
current needs of the sector. We are having a shift from being 
actors of the system [Agro-industrial innovation system] to 
be the engine of the system. We are strengthening our 
research networks to become an interface and facilitator of 
the system to generate research, development and Agro-
industrial innovation. (Juan Lucas Restrepo, personal 
communication, May 3rd, 2012) 
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Producers’ associations have been a main actor in the agricultural research system. 
The Colombian Coffee Growers Association founded in 1927, went on to create 
Cenicafe, the Colombian coffee research centre in 1938. This centre was the first 
crop-dedicated agricultural research centre in the country. Fedearroz, the national 
rice federation, was created in 1948, and between 1962 and 1963 the producers’ 
associations for cacao, oil palm, and cereals were established. In 1974, VECOL, the 
Colombian Enterprise for Veterinary products was founded, followed by Cenicaña, 
the sugarcane research centre, which was created in 1977. In 1976, the Colombian 
Association of Flower Exporters was started, Asocolflores, creating a technical 
division in 1987 within the association, and finally Ceniflores, the flowers research 
centre, in 2004 (N. Beintema et al., 2000).  
Producers’ associations are a differential characteristic of the Colombian agriculture 
system. They represent nearly a third of the agriculture GDP, and have a good 
portion of researchers specialising in agriculture. They have an applied research 
orientation that has brought important achievements for the sectors they represent in 
terms of higher levels of productivity. In turn, this has been largely positive in terms 
of allowing Colombia to compete in international markets. Producers’ associations 
are strong actors in the sectoral innovation systems and a network hub with other 
actors within the agricultural and national SIs, making strategic research alliances 
with national actors such as Corpoica, ICA, Colciencias, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  
4.5.1.3. The Globalisation period. Liberalisation of the 
markets: 1990 onwards  
After dismantling the import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, all countries 
in the region started a process (at different paces) of market liberalisation and 
reduction of protectionism for the agriculture sector. According the ECLAC 
(Sotomayor, Rodríguez, & Rodrigues, 2011), during this period there were three 
main stages: a first stage where countries went through extensive macroeconomic 
and microeconomic structural changes, reducing State intervention in the domestic 
and international trade; in the second stage there was an emergence of agricultural 
development programs for technology transfer, strengthening of international 
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marketing channels through regional free trade agreements as MERCOSUR (1991) 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1992)65; and special 
projects supported by transnational organizations as the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (i.e. the Integrated Rural Development Project in 
Colombia in 1976) and cooperation with international organisations as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, that we explored in the previous section. Finally, from 2000 
onwards, there was a process of institutional reconstruction and transformation 
following the structural changes implemented after the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation. The strategy was to strengthen sectoral policies and instruments to 
improve the competitiveness and productivity of the LAC countries.  
The openness to global markets during the nineties started when most LAC countries 
were in a vulnerable economic situation. Then, most governments opted for having a 
balance between liberalisation of markets and certain economic restrictions to protect 
domestic markets and firms’ evolution. The precarious situation for the countries of 
the region after the recessionary inertia of the 1980s made governments to be 
cautious in the allocation of public expenditure. There was a pessimistic attitude 
towards the development of Natural Resources (NR) based commodities since the 
export of these goods was less dynamic than other industrial sectors, and they 
experienced higher trade barriers in the target international markets. This 
corresponds with the budget cuts made to agricultural research centres during the 
1990s and the precarious research advance at the start of the 21st century (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC, 1990). However, the first 
sector in the Colombian economy that developed a structured innovation strategy 
was the agriculture one. This is highlighted by Dr. Fernando Chaparro, ex director of 
Colciencias and Corpoica: 
                                                
65 After twenty years that the agreement have been in place, there are mixed criticisms about the 
economic benefits that the agreement has brought to Canada, United States of America and Mexico, 
the country members. Some defenders of NAFTA show the increase of exports and imports between 
the countries and the benefits that resulted profits have brought to the economies. Others argue that 
the profits have not been as high as were expected and that the agreement has caused a massive lost of 
employment, mainly in the United States of America. More information about the current controversy 





The most structured sector in Colombia is agriculture. It has 
an integrated sectorial system that comes from the evolution 
of National Institutes of Agriculture, INIAs66, to what were 
later called National Agricultural Research Systems, 
SNIAs67.  The Colombian SNIA was established during the 
1990s and it had the ICA and in 1993 Corpoica, and 
afterwards it integrated an expanding network of research 
centres, the CENIs and the Agro-industrial schools in public 
and private universities. This is how the Agro-industrial 
system of innovation became a mature system, long before 
building a national innovation system. (Fernando Chaparro, 
personal communication, May 22nd, 2012) 
Although the Agro-industrial system of innovation is far from perfect, it has had a 
long tradition that has allowed the actors within the sectoral system to build strong 
relationships. The research and development cycle contains integrated results from 
basic and applied research to final transfer processes. As it was mentioned by Hernán 
Jaramillo, dean of the School of Economics of Universidad del Rosario, in the 
Colloquium of sectoral STI public policies done as part of this research: 
The agricultural sector has had a complete research cycle for 
a long time. Research is totally integrated within the sector. If 
I need to solve a variety problem, I have to do molecular 
biology, and then I have to think how to transfer that 
technology to the farmer. It just simply makes no sense to 
develop this kind of research to leave it in the laboratory. 
(Hernán Jaramillo, personal communication, May 17th, 2012) 
Next section will explore the so-called Agro-industrial system of science and 
technology, the formal and informal institutions behind it and some contrasting 
visions from actors of the system. 
4.5.2. Agro-industrial Science and Technology System 
Consistent with the creation of the National System of S&T, law 607 of 2000 
officially promulgates the existence of an Agro-industrial National System of S&T 
(SNCTA):  
                                                
66 Institutos Nacionales de Agricultura 
67 Sistemas Nacionales de Investigación Agrícola. The English acronym is NARS. 
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Through the present law, the Agro-industrial National System 
of Science and Technology is established, which has the 
overall aim to contribute to agribusiness knowledge, 
methods, technologies, and technological products needed for 
a good performance according to national requirements and 
the international environment. (Colombia, 2000, p. Art. 3 
(d)). 
The main system components are the so-called production chains68. There are 37 
production chains69, which aim to improve the competitiveness of all processes 
around the chain product70. Since there is only one production chain for each 
product, all the product producers and stakeholders have to work within the same 
chain in order to receive recognition from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MADR71), benefits such as participation in calls for projects and 
access to preferential tariffs for export, access to funding and technical assistance 
given directly from the MADR or the regional entities in charge of technology 
transfer and assistance72. Members of the productive chain should offer their 
organisations’ research and commercial capacity for the benefit of the chain instead 
of competing against each other. The last goal is to achieve a better economic 
performance both individually and collectively preserving the autonomy of each firm 
represented within the chain. There are internal agreements among the chain partners 
to define cooperation projects with the intended results. The concept of production 
chains comes from the strategic planning theoretical branch. It is a mixture of two 
different approaches. The first one comes from the early work of Albert Hirschman73 
                                                
68 Law 811 of 2003 defines the production chains as the set of activities that are linked technically and 
economically from the beginning of the production and processing of an agricultural product to its 
final marketing. The chain may be formed by agreement at national level, at the level of a production 
zone or region, producers, employers, trade associations and organizations representing both 
agricultural production, livestock, aquaculture, forestry, fishing, and the processing, marketing, 
distribution and service providers and inputs. 
69 For detailed information about the production chains and their performance, see: 
http://www.siembra.gov.co. Retrieved on 10-08-14. 
70 According to law 811 of 2003, the production chain should at least cover the following aspects: 
improve productivity and competitiveness; development of goods and factors of the market chain; 
reduction of transaction cost between different actors in the chain; development of strategic alliances; 
improvement of information among the chain actors; linking of small producers and entrepreneurs to 
the chain; management of natural resources and environment; training of human resources; research 
and technological development. 
71 Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 
72 This topic will be developed further bellow in this chapter. 
73 The concept was first introduced in Hirschman’s book The Strategy of Economic Development first 
published in 1958. 
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about consumption, production, and employment linkages expressed at different 
levels: horizontal, vertical, forward, backward, and lateral. These linkages are used to 
understand the decision-making process between different actors around production 
processes of products and services. The second is the concept of ‘value chain’ 
proposed and developed by Michael Porter74. It comprises all the links from the 
suppliers of raw materials and inputs to the final consumer of any product or service. 
During the 1990s LAC countries included the term “production chains” as part of 
their sectoral and industrial policies using elements from both theories (Isaza, 2008).  
The strategy developed and pursued by the MADR from 2006 onwards has focused 
on the construction of research, technological development and innovation agendas 
through prospective exercises75. In 2011 Corpoica led the process of having a 
consolidated and unified research, technological development and innovation agenda 
for each one of the 37 productive chains. To support the construction and assessment 
mechanisms of this national agenda, the Observatory of the Agro-industrial National 
System of S&T76 was launched on the same year to support the design and 
production of STI indicators for each one of the system chains. The observatory’s 
purpose is to have centralised and up-to-date data to allow the central government to 
track, monitor and evaluate mechanisms for the agriculture SI.  
Corpoica acts as the coordinator entity of the SNCTA. The formal institutional 
structure of the SNCTA can be seen in Figure 4.21. The SNCTA is part of the 
NSSTI, and work to a similar structure as the NSI. There are specialised 
organizations for promoting S&T; for providing technical assistance; for training, 
and for institutional and financial support. In this sense, the system has three main 
functional blocks: A research block, a technical assistance and transfer block, and a 
regional network for agricultural innovation (Gallego, 2011). 
The Subsystem of Agricultural Technical Assistance (SSATA) provides services for 
suitability of soils; planning of farms production; application and use of appropriate 
                                                
74 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage, 1985. 
75 The latest project doing prospective exercises was sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Colciencias and the WB. It was called: Proyecto Transición de la Agricultura. It developed 
prospective research agendas for 25 production regional and national chains.  
76 The observatory is called ‘Siembra’: http://siembra.gov.co. 
 
 162 
technologies and resources; access to funding sources; marketing of produced goods; 
and promotion of producers’ associations77. The direct rural technical assistance is a 
mandatory and a subsidized public service for small and medium farmers. This rural 
technical assistance is provided by the municipalities in coordination with 
departmental and national authorities, and is regulated by the MADR (Colombia, 
2000). The SSATA operational units are the Technical Assistance Service Providers 
(EPSAGRO), and Technical Assistance Municipal Units (UMATA).  
Up to 2013, the SNCTA has 279 agribusiness firms; 130 universities and R&D 
centres; and 182 trade unions. Regarding technological linkage institutions, there are 
937 EPSAGRO registered in the agriculture secretariats; 40 EPSAGRO authorized 
by the MADR; 525 UMATA; and 38 Provincial Agribusiness Management Centres 
(CPGA) (Contreras Pedraza & Uribe Galvis, 2013).  
There are different actors that are part of the Agro-industrial system of innovation. 
As it is seen in figure 4.21, there are S&T organizations that support the research side 
of the system in terms of production and transfer of technology and knowledge. 
These organizations have different roles according to the production chain that they 
interact with78. Production chains that have their own research centres or CENIs, 
interact less with NGOs, Corpoica, and Technology Development Centres different 
from the CENI of the chain. The same pattern can be seen in the case of the technical 
assistance. When the producers are well organised and have a strong producers 
association, there are internal mechanisms within the chain to provide transfer, 
appropriation and validation of K&T. Organizations as BANCOLDEX79, 
PROEXPORT80, ICFES81, and ICETEX82 provide commercial, financial and training 
support to producers associations organised in production chains. 
                                                
77 The National Constitution establishes in the Article 64 the obligation from to State to provide access 
to technical assistance. Laws 101 of 1993 and 207 of 2000 establish that the rural technical assistance 
is a public decentralised service subsidized for small and medium producers. 
78 Production chains that have a strong union behind and are well organised in terms of interaction 
between growers, producers and consumers usually interact in a better way with sectoral and national 
actors and organisations to generate innovation. 
79 Bank of Foreign Trade, in Spanish, Banco de Comercio Exterior. 
80 Now known as PROCOLOMBIA, it is the organisation in charge of the promotion of Colombian 





Figure 4.21. Actors of the National Agro-industrial System (SNCTA) 
Source. Adapted from (Contreras Pedraza & Uribe Galvis, 2013, p. 15) 
                                                                                                                                     
81 Colombian Institute for the Promotion of the Higher Education, in Spanish Instituto Colombiano 
para el Fomento de la Educación Superior. 
82 Colombian Institute for Education and Technical Studies Abroad, in Spanish Instituto Colombiano 
de Crédito Educativo y Estudios Técnicos en el Exterior 
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As it was mentioned before, the Agro-industrial innovation system is composed by 
three different subsystems. The research system function is to produce pertinent 
knowledge and technology according to particular needs from growers and producers 
within the system, and to produce cutting edge knowledge from agricultural research 
centres, research groups based on universities or international research organisations 
(i.e. CIAT, International Center for Tropical Agriculture) to be implemented in the 
different sub-sectors. This transfer of needs to the research system can be done by 
representatives of the production chains or directly from extensionists or technicians 
that are part of the technical assistance system. As it can be seen in figure 4.22, the 
technical assistance system provides three different technical assistance approaches 
according to the needs of the recipients. The characteristics of the basic, intermediate 





Basic Subsistence small growers and producers.  
Support in production, commercial, marketing and 
enterprise management. 
Intermediate Small producers in 
transition to a firm model  
Formulation and execution of business plans. 
Training in business practices and in land and 
crops technical practices. 
Advance 
Small producers with high 
specialisation levels, 
medium and large 
producers. 
Specialised technical assistance in specific crop 
problems. 
Table 4.11. Agriculture technical assistance types 
Source. Based on (Gallego, 2011) 
The way the system captures the producers and growers needs and has a link with the 
primary stage of the sector is through the production chains. The production chains 
are regional and work as clusters bringing together all actors involved in the 




Figure 4.22. Structure of the Colombian Agro-industrial system of innovation 
Source. Information compiled by the author. 
However, the Agro-industrial IS has shortcomings that have been difficult to 
overcome. The subsystems do not always deliver the expected results, the 
institutional setting does not meet the functional dynamics between the components 
of the system and the support infrastructure represented by public and private 
organisations is not always effective. One of the main problems that remain unsolved 
is to provide an effective technical assistance. There is confusion at the 
municipalities level about who are the actors providing this service. It used to be the 
UMATAs, but when the law changed and introduced the EPSAGROs, some 
municipalities adopted the change, some did not, and some dismantled the 
UMATAs, but did not replace them with a technical assistance service provider. 
Referring to this problems within the system, Claudia Uribe, coordinator of the 
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National Observatory of Agriculture and coordinator of the Agricultural Transition 
project, says: 
The biggest rupture can be seen between the knowledge 
generation and its adoption. First at all because there may be 
knowledge but not relevant in terms of what the sector needs 
or in terms of its applicability; second of all there may be 
available technologies but too expensive, so the producer 
cannot afford them, or technologies that cannot be applied in 
field. The bridge between knowledge and technology 
generation and its adoption is failing. There is a gap in terms 
of the available institutionality to support the technical 
assistance of the system. (Claudia Uribe, personal 
communication, December 21st, 2011) 
This means that the interaction and functional dynamics of the basic blocks of the 
Agro-industrial IS can be improved, mostly in the production, pertinence, transfer 
and adoption of K&T. These issues were highlighted by the expert team from the 
UNCTAD that visited Colombia in 1996 and made a review of the Colombian 
agricultural sector. The team found deficiencies in accessing to financial resources, 
poor performance of ICA and Corpoica as key actors of the Agro-Industrial SI, an 
inefficient technical assistance system, and a weak NSI supporting the agricultural 
production chains (UNCTAD, 1999). 
4.5.2.1. Operation of the SNCTA 
The contribution of the agriculture sector to the national GDP has grown 
substantially between 2000 and 2009, having an overall average of 27.4% of growth. 
Similarly, agribusiness exports represent on average 30% of total exports of goods in 
the country. This sector has been fundamental for the social and economic 
development of the country (Flórez M, Morales, Uribe G, & Contreras Pedraza, 
2012). 
Agriculture has had a long trajectory and has been a key economic sector for the 
LAC region and for Colombia. However, the participation of the sector in the overall 
country GDP has decreased over the past years, and so does the Agriculture GDP 




Figure 4.23. Agriculture GDP Growth and Participation of total GDP 
Source. Information compiled by the author. Agriculture GDP Growth (DANE, 2013). Agriculture 
added value as % of GDP (WB, 2012). 
This is partially due to a decline in coffee exports over the past 40 years, to a 
substantial diversification in the composition of exports, and to internal conflicts 
with illegal armed groups that has caused a large displacement of growers from their 
lands to capital cities83. Figure 4.24 shows the evolution of exports composition 
during the last years. Traditional growth represents the oil and coal expansion 
supported by government incentives. The non-traditional exports account for export 
products different to coffee, oil, and minerals. 
 Average annual growth of non-traditional exports between 
1970 and 2005 not only was 5.3 times higher than overall 
average annual export growth, but also was characterized by 
increasing exports of manufactures of medium and high 
knowledge content. (Meléndez A & Harker R, 2008, p. 20) 
 
                                                
83 Colombia has the second largest number of displaced people in the world with about 3.6 million 
people forced to flee their homes and off their lands. This has caused a strong impact on the 




Figure 4.24.  Composition of exports 2000-2011. 
Source. (Hernández, 2012) 
The importance of the agriculture sector has fallen during the past 20 years. The 
decreasing share of agriculture in overall GDP and exports has been taken up by the 
industrial and services sectors. Nevertheless, it remains a key sector, not only for the 
economic growth, but also for the employment levels the sector generates (Stads & 
Romano, 2008). 
There are 285 agriculture research groups recognised within Colciencias 
classification, which accounts for 5% of the total number of research groups within 
the national S&T programs84. Looking at OECD statistics, it can be seen that 6% of 
the total active research groups in Colombia are within the agriculture studies area. 
However, given the importance of the sector for the social and economic 
development of the country, more effort should be made in terms of building 
capabilities.   
The funding sources distribution in this sector has also changed during the past 20 
years (Figure 4.25). Currently there is a higher private investment in S&T activities 
mainly accounted by producer associations. Some producer associations have their 
                                                
84 For having detailed statistics on every National S&T program, look (Jorge Lucio et al., 2012) 
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Exports driven by mining and energy sector products 
Total exports increased by 43% yoy in 2011, the fastest growth in the last 25 years. These record 
levels are directly related to the boom in the mining and energy sectors, whic h accounted for 71% of 
the total and increased at 62% yoy, due to a combination of higher international prices and an 
increase -though relatively smaller- in local production (Chart 1). If we also include products such as 
gold, emeralds and other minerals, 8 0% of the country's exports are actually commodities. 
Non-traditional exports (i.e. other than oil, coffee, coal and ferronickel) were at a similar level to the 
peak of 20 0 8, but they were exported to different destinations (Chart 1). The Venezuelan market has 
contracted sharply; an increased share of some manufactured products is going to the United 
States; and Colombia is taking advantage of expanding neighboring markets. There has also been a 
mode te upturn in food sale  to Venezu la, boosted by a policy of internal supply in that country. 
The sector composition of non-tradition l exports has also changed since 20 0 8 (Chart 3). Industry 
continues to lead the country's exports, but its share fell by over 7 percentage points. F our years 
ago this sector accounted for 73% of the total, and included exports of high technology it ems such 
as achinery, vehicles and other commodities, due to demand from Venezuela: in 2011 this had 
fallen to 66%. Meanwhile, the share of mining sector sales (mainly gold and emeralds) increased 
from 9% to 19%. 
Industrial exports to Vene zuela still not substituted 
In 20 0 8, non-traditional exports to Venezuela accounted for 25% of the total, with a value of over 
USD 6 billion, the highest figure in history. The main products exported with livestock (16% of the 
total), clothing (12%), chemicals (8.5%), leather (8%), textiles (7.8%), paper (5.5%), food (5.3%) and 
vehicles (5.1%). The majority of exports were therefore medium-high technology. However, 
Ven zuela th n broke off diplomatic relations with C lombia, restricting sales of vehicles and 
livestock; it also imposed very low market shares for other products, due to currency shortages. As 
a result, Venezuela now accounts for only 8% of Colombia's non-traditional sales. 
In 2011, only three of the 15 sectors other than fuel and precious metals managed to exc eed the 
export levels of 20 0 8: food, chemicals and plastics (Chart 4). There has been a noteworthy 
atomizati n of export destinations in recent years, wi h strong participation by new trading partners 
in South America and Europe. There have been reductions in exports of other industrial products, 
as these have not managed to replace reductions in the Venezuelan market; this resulted in exports 
from the sector being 11% lower in 20 11 than in 20 0 8. However, 20 11 was the first year of increased 
industrial sales, following consecutive falls in 20 0 9 and 20 10 .  
 
Chart 1  
Total exports 
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own research centres (CENI) funded mostly through production taxes (cesses) paid 
by producers themselves85. There are 7 CENIs in the country: CENICAFE (Coffee), 
CENICAÑA (Sugar Cane), CENIPALMA (Oil Palm), CENIFLORES (Flowers), 
CENIACUA (Fishing), CEVIPAPA (Potato), CENIVAM (Tropical Medicinal 
Aromatic Plant Species). CENIs have been created by strong producers associations 
for promoting the generation and absorption of applied knowledge by small, medium 
and large producers86. However, only 7 production chains out of 37 registered chains 
have their own research centre.  
 
Figure 4.25. Composition of R&D Spending. 
Source. (Stads & Romano, 2008, p. 6) 
Expenditure on agriculture can also be seen in the evolution of the overall and 
distributed number of researchers in the private, public, academic, and mix sectors. 
“In 1981 ICA/CORPOICA researchers accounted for 71% of Colombia’s total 
agricultural R&D staff. This share has gradually fallen over the years to 53% in 
1991, 36% in 2001, and just 27% in 2006. Concurrently, the share of R&D staff at 
the producer associations increased substantially, from 15% in 1981 to 35% in 
2006.” (Stads & Romano, 2008, p. 6) 
                                                
85 Agricultural products paying cesses currently are: coffee, sugarcane, oil palm, cotton, raw sugar, 
cocoa, and fruits.  
86 Looking at official statistics from DANE and MADR, it can be seen that the productive chain that 
have a CENI supporting them have experienced a larger growth in terms of productivity and exports 
sharing. 
caused CORPOICA’s salary levels to fall well below those of 
the universities and private sector. Many CORPOICA scientists 
have, therefore, taken up positions at the producer organizations 
and universities, either voluntarily or out of necessity after being 
laid off. As a result, the cut in staff at Colombia’s largest 
agricultural R&D agency had only a limited effect on the 
number of research staff in the country as a as a whole. 
CORPOICA is currently facing serious challenges in 
retaining its capacity. Its most experienced scientists are well 
over 50 years old and are approaching retirement age. Because 
many of these scientists have been government employees for 
numerous years, they have built up good retirement plans. 
However, since the establishment of CORPOICA, research staff 
are hired on a contract basis. Younger scientists typically 
receive short-term contracts for one or two years and are not 
entitled to pension benefits, making it very difficult for 
CORPOICA to provide ongoing training and to maintain a 
critical mass of highly qualified research staff. Besides, building 
up a long-term research program becomes increasingly difficult. 
Many younger scientists, therefore, perceive CORPOICA as a 
less attractive employer than some of the producer associations 
or universities, which offer better salaries and work conditions. 
The other government agencies category experienced the 
strongest growth in its research staff during 1981–2006, albeit 
from an extremely small base. The number of fte researchers in 
this category remained stable at around 3 during much of the 
1980s but rose rapidly during the 1990s and reached 190 in 
2006. This was due mainly to the founding of new government 
agencies under MAVDT after the reorganization of government-
led agricultural research and the establishment of CORPOICA 
in 1993. 
Colombia’s agricultural R&D agencies in the nonprofit and 
higher education sectors also showed steady growth in their 
research staff totals during 1981–2006, with annual growth rates 
of 5.9 and 4.0 percent, respectively. Nonetheless, growth in 
research capacity in the higher education sector has stalled since 
2000, with researcher totals stabilizing at around 180 fte’s. 
Modest growth in human research capacity was still recorded 
for Colombia’s producer associations in recent years, with all 
the larger agencies in the nonprofit category reporting steady 
growth in their research totals. Although Colombia did not start 
to grow oil palm on a large scale until the 1980s, today it is the 
world’s fourth largest exporter of palm oil and other oil palm 
products, following Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria. This 
strong growth is reflected in CENIPALMA’s researcher totals, 
which doubled from 25 ftes in 1998 to 49 in 2006. CENICAFE 
also reported steady growth in its research staff numbers. Its 
total research capacity increased by more than 50 percent from 
112 fte’s in 1996 to 170 one decade later. 
The institutional structure and focus of agricultural R&D in 
Colombia are much more diversified now compared with the 
early 1980s because of a rapid fall in researcher totals at 
CORPOICA and increased agricultural research activities 
undertaken by producer associations, higher education agencies, 
and government agencies other than CORPOICA. In 1981 
ICA/CORPOICA researchers accounted for 71 percent of 
Colombia’s total agricultural R&D staff. This share has 
gradually fallen over the years to 53 percent in 1991, 36 percent 
in 2001, and just 27 percent in 2006. Concurrently, the share of 
R&D staff at the producer associations increased substantially, 
from 15 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 2006. This was the 
result of staff increases by the three largest producer 
associations and the initiation of research by other nonprofit 
institutions. The combined share of agricultural R&D staff of 
the other government agencies in Colombia was negligible 
during the 1980s (less than 1 percent). However, it increased 
rapidly during the 1990s and reached 19 percent in 2006 due to 
the aforementioned establishment of the agencies under 
MAVDT and an increased focus on fisheries research with the 
move from INPA to INCODER. Colombia’s higher education 
sector accounted for 18 percent of agricultural R&D staff in 
2006, up from 13 percent in 1981. 
Total public agricultural research expenditures in Colombia 
rose rapidly in constant prices during 1981–2002, from $105 
million in 1981 to $161 million in 2003 (Figure 1b). Overall, 
ICA/CORPOICA’s expenditures fell 1.2 percent per year during 
this period, but like the organizations’ research staff 
developments, spending showed an erratic trend. From 1983 
onward, ICA’s expenditures were rapidly augmented with funds 
brought about by the introduction of the National Plan for 
Agricultural Technology Transfer (PLANTRA), which are 
financed by World Bank loans and additional funding from 


































Sources: Compiled by authors from ASTI survey data (IFPRI 2007–08), 
Beintema, Romano and Pardey (2000), and a number of agency websites. 
Notes: See Table 1. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of agencies in 
each category. Agency totals are higher than in Table 1 due to the inclusion of 
agencies that are no longer involved in agricultural R&D: Other government 
includes the Agency for the Development of Renewable Natural Resources 
(INDERENA), which stopped conducting R&D in 1993. Producer associations 
includes the Andean Fruits Center (CFA) and FEDERALGODON, which 
stopped conducting R&D in 2000 and 1991, respectively. Staff and expenditure 
data were unavailable for 1997–2003 for all agencies, except CORPOICA. Staff 
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Figure 4.26. Composition of R&D staff 
Source. (Stads & Romano, 2008, p. 8) 
At the public level, the principal funding bodies are the MADR, Colciencias, SENA, 
and regional governments. Funding come mainly from the national budget, royalties 
and external loans. There have been two important cooperation loans with equal 
counterpart from the Colombian government: National Program for Agricultural 
Technology Transfer (PRONATTA, 1995 – 2003), and the Agricultural Transition 
Project (2005 – 2009), both hosted by the World Bank. The total budget for the 
former was US$56 million and US$30 million for the latter. The main objective of 
both programs was to facilitate the regional access of small and medium farmers to 
environmentally sustainable, equitable and competitive technologies. Also, there is a 
National Fund for Agricultural Financing (FINAGRO) whose aim is to provide 
funding and support to the sectoral and regional agricultural policy through special 
loans to small, medium and large producers87.   The fund was established on the 22nd 
of January 1990 as a second-tier bank. It was created due to a necessity in the rural 
sector for an independent and specialized organization that could concentrate several 
resources in one fund, rather than having credit resources dispersed in several 
                                                
87 Finagro, Fondo para el Financiamiento del sector Agropecuario, was created through the law 16 of 
1990. Its aim is to stimulate the creation of new production, marketing, and processing of agricultural 
and fishery products companies, by investing in specific projects. At least 40% of the national 
government funds for incentive of rural capitalization must go to projects registered by small 
producers. 
caused CORPOICA’s salary levels to fall well below those of 
the universities and private sector. Many CORPOICA scientists 
have, therefore, taken up positions at the producer organizations 
and universities, either voluntarily or out of necessity after being 
laid off. As a result, the cut in staff at Colombia’s largest 
agricultural R&D agency had only a limited effect on the 
number of research staff in the country as a as a whole. 
CORPOICA is currently facing serious challenges in 
retaining its capacity. Its most experienced scientists are well 
over 50 years old and are approaching retirement age. Because 
many of these scientists have been government employees for 
numerous years, they have built up good retirement plans. 
However, since the establishment of CORPOICA, research staff 
are hired on a contract basis. Younger scientists typically 
receive short-term contracts for one or two years and are not 
entitled to pension benefits, making it very difficult for 
CORPOICA to provide ongoing training and to maintain a 
critical mass of highly qualified research staff. Besides, building 
up a long-term research program becomes increasingly difficult. 
Many younger scientists, therefore, perceive CORPOICA as a 
less attractive employer than some of the producer associations 
or universities, which offer better salaries and work conditions. 
The other government agencies category experienced the 
strongest growth in its research staff during 1981–2006, albeit 
from an extremely small base. The number of fte researchers in 
this category remained stable at around 3 during much of the 
1980s but rose rapidly during the 1990s and reached 190 in 
2006. This was due mainly to the founding of new government 
agencies under MAVDT after the reorganization of government-
led agricultural research and the establishment of CORPOICA 
in 1993. 
Colombia’s agricultural R&D agencies in the nonprofit and 
higher education sectors also showed steady growth in their 
research staff totals during 1981–2006, with annual growth rates 
of 5.9 and 4.0 percent, respectively. Nonetheless, growth in 
research capacity in the higher education sector has stalled since 
2000, with researcher totals stabilizing at around 180 fte’s. 
Modest growth in human research capacity was still recorded 
for Colombia’s producer associations in recent years, with all 
the larger agencies in the nonprofit category reporting steady 
growth in their research totals. Although Colombia did not start 
to grow oil palm on a large scale until the 1980s, today it is the 
world’s fourth largest exporter of palm oil and other oil palm 
products, following Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria. This 
strong growth is reflected in CENIPALMA’s researcher totals, 
which doubled from 25 ftes in 1998 to 49 in 2006. CENICAFE 
also reported steady growth in its research staff numbers. Its 
total research capacity increased by more than 50 percent from 
112 fte’s in 1996 to 170 one decade later. 
The institutional structure and focus of agricultural R&D in 
Colombia are much more diversified now compared with the 
early 1980s because of a rapid fall in researcher totals at 
CORPOICA and increased agricultural research activities 
undertaken by producer associations, higher education agencies, 
and government agencies other than CORPOICA. In 1981 
ICA/CORPOICA researchers accounted for 71 percent of 
Colombia’s total agricultural R&D staff. This share has 
gradually fallen over the years to 53 percent in 1991, 36 percent 
in 2001, and just 27 percent in 2006. Concurrently, the share of 
R&D staff at the producer associations increased substantially, 
from 15 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 2006. This was the 
result of staff increases by the three largest producer 
associations and the initiation of research by other nonprofit 
institutions. The combined share of agricultural R&D staff of 
the other government agencies in Colombia was negligible 
during the 1980s (less than 1 percent). However, it increased 
rapidly during the 1990s and reached 19 percent in 2006 due to 
the aforementioned establishment of the agencies under 
MAVDT and an increased focus on fisheries research with the 
move from INPA to INCODER. Colombia’s higher education 
sector accounted for 18 percent of agricultural R&D staff in 
2006, up from 13 percent in 1981. 
Total public agricultural research expenditures in Colombia 
rose rapidly in constant prices during 1981–2002, from $105 
million in 1981 to $161 million in 2003 (Figure 1b). Overall, 
ICA/CORPOICA’s expenditures fell 1.2 percent per year during 
this period, but like the organizations’ research staff 
developments, spending showed an erratic trend. From 1983 
onward, ICA’s expenditures were rapidly augmented with funds 
brought about by the introduction of the National Plan for 
Agricultural Technology Transfer (PLANTRA), which are 
financed by World Bank loans and additional funding from 


































Sources: Compiled by authors from ASTI survey data (IFPRI 2007–08), 
Beintema, Romano and Pardey (2000), and a number of agency websites. 
Notes: See Table 1. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of agencies in 
each category. Agency totals are higher than in Table 1 due to the inclusion of 
agencies that are no longer involved in agricultural R&D: Other government 
includes the Agency for the Development of Renewable Natural Resources 
(INDERENA), which stopped conducting R&D in 1993. Producer associations 
includes the Andean Fruits Center (CFA) and FEDERALGODON, which 
stopped conducting R&D in 2000 and 1991, respectively. Staff and expenditure 
data were unavailable for 1997–2003 for all agencies, except CORPOICA. Staff 
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caused CORPOICA’s salary levels to fall well below those of 
the universities and private sector. Many CORPOICA scientists 
have, therefore, taken up positions at the producer organizations 
and universities, either voluntarily or out of necessity after being 
laid off. As a result, the cut in staff at Colombia’s largest 
agricultural R&D agency had only a limited effect on the 
number of research staff in the country as a as a whole. 
CORPOICA is currently facing serious challenges in 
retaining its capacity. Its most experienced scientists are well 
over 50 years old and are approaching retirement age. Because 
many of these scientists have been government employees for 
numerous years, they have built up good retirement plans. 
However, since the establishment of CORPOICA, research staff 
are hired on a contract basis. Younger scientists typically 
receive short-term contracts for one or two years and are not 
entitled to pension benefits, making it very difficult for 
CORPOICA to provide ongoing tra ning and to maintain a 
critical mass of highly qualified rese rch staff. Beside , building 
up a long-term research program becomes increasingly difficult. 
Many younger scientists, therefore, perceive CORPOICA as a 
less attractive employer than some of the producer associations 
or universities, which offer better salaries and work conditions. 
The other government agencies category experienced the 
strongest growth in its research staff during 1981–2006, albeit 
from an extremely small base. The number of fte researchers in 
this category remained stable at around 3 during much of the 
1980s but rose rapidly during the 1990s and reached 190 in 
2006. This was due mainly to the founding of new government 
agencies under MAVDT after the reorganization of government-
led agricultural research and the establishment of CORPOICA 
in 1993. 
Colombia’s agricultural R&D agencies in the nonprofit and 
higher education sectors also showed steady growth in their 
research staff totals during 1981–2006, with annual growth rates 
of 5.9 and 4.0 percent, respectively. Nonetheless, growth in 
research capacity in the higher education sector has stalled since 
2000, with researcher totals stabilizing at around 180 fte’s. 
Modest growth in human research capacity was still recorded 
for Colombia’s producer associations in recent years, with all 
the larger agencies in the nonprofit category reporting steady 
growth in their research totals. Although Colombia did not start 
to grow oil palm on a large scale until the 1980s, today it is the 
w rld’s fourth largest exporter of palm oil and other oil palm 
products, following Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria. This 
strong growth is reflected in CENIPALMA’s researcher totals, 
which doubled from 25 ftes in 1998 to 49 in 2006. CENICAFE 
also reported steady growth in its research staff numbers. Its 
total research capacity increased by more than 50 percent from 
112 fte’s in 1996 to 170 one decade later. 
The institutional structure and focus of agricultural R&D in 
Colombia are much more diversified now compared with the 
early 1980s because of a rapid fall in researcher totals at 
CORPOICA and increased agricultural research activiti s 
unde taken by producer associations, higher education agencies, 
and government agencies other than CORPOICA. In 1981 
ICA/CORPOICA researchers accounted for 71 percent of 
Colombia’s total agricultural R&D staff. This share has 
gradually fallen over the years to 53 percent in 1991, 36 percent 
in 2001, and just 27 percent in 2006. Concurrently, the share of 
R&D staff at the producer associations increased substantially, 
from 15 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 2006. This was the 
result of staff increases by the three largest producer 
associations and the initiation of research by other nonprofit 
institutions. The combined share of agricultural R&D staff of 
the other government agencies in Colombia was negligible 
during the 1980s (less than 1 percent). However, it increased 
rapidly during the 1990s and reached 19 percent in 2006 due to 
the aforementioned establishment of the agencies under 
MAVDT and an increased focus on fisheries research with the 
move from INPA to INCODER. Colombia’s higher education 
sector accounted for 18 percent of agricultural R&D staff in 
2006, up from 13 percent in 1981. 
Total public agricultural research expenditures in Colombia 
rose rapidly in constant prices during 1981–2002, from $105 
million in 1981 to $161 million in 2003 (Figure 1b). Overall, 
ICA/CORPOICA’s expenditures fell 1.2 percent per year during 
this period, but like the organizations’ research staff 
developments, spending showed an erratic trend. From 1983 
onward, ICA’s expe ditures we e rapidly augmented with funds 
brought about by the introduction of the National Plan for 
Agricultural Technology Transfer (PLANTRA), which are 
financed by World Bank loans and additional funding from 


































Sources: Compiled by authors from ASTI survey data (IFPRI 2007–08), 
Beintema, Romano and Pardey (2000), and a number of agency websites. 
Notes: See Table 1. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of agencies in 
each category. Agency totals are higher than in Table 1 due to the inclusion of 
agencies that are no longer involved in agricultural R&D: Other government 
includes the Agency for the Development of Renewable Natural Resources 
(INDERENA), which stopped conducting R&D in 1993. Producer associations 
includes the Andean Fruits Center (CFA) and FEDERALGODON, which 
stopped conducting R&D in 2000 and 1991, respectively. Staff and expenditure 
d ta were unavail ble f r 1997–2003 for all agencies, except CORPOICA. Staff 
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organisms. It works as a complementary variant of the political economic of the 
Colombian Central Bank88.  
Increasing diversification of funding and research agencies has changed the 
institutional setting for the agriculture system. CORPOICA’s budget has been 
sharply reduced from 2002 as a result of its strong reliance on national government 
funds89, which has been compensated with the participation of other government 
agencies, higher education institutions, producer associations and special projects 
and programs with international cooperation bodies. However, the contraction of the 
investment in agricultural R&D in the last 10 years can be seen in the fall of FTE 
researchers, and the total spending as a percentage of agricultural output90. 
4.5.2.2. Main obstacles and problems in the agriculture 
sector 
From its emergence, the agricultural sector has faced a number of factors that have 
jeopardized its stability in the short, medium and long term. While each subsector of 
agriculture has a large number of specific problems, there have been identified five 
major cross-sectoral problems: lack of legal clarity about the use and land tenure; 
lack of adequate infrastructure for competitiveness; high cost of agricultural inputs; 
fall in the price of agricultural commodities; and an exchange rate appreciated 
against the countries of the region that are agricultural competitors like Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Peru (Asocaña, 2014a) 
In Colombia owning land is a symbol of status and wealth, so it is common to find 
landowners that do not use it for commercial purposes. “Land ownership as a symbol 
                                                
88 Information retrieved from https://http://www.finagro.com.co/qui%C3%A9nes-somos/overview. 
Retrieved 20-05-2014, 2014 
89 After the national economic crisis in 1998, there was a fiscal deficit that produced a cut in 
government expenses in several sectors, especially for agriculture. “The disbursement of government 
funds to CORPOICA has also changed over the years, moving away from a virtually exclusive 
reliance on open-ended block-funding arrangements toward more time-bound research contracts” 
(Stads & Romano, 2008). 
90 The total number of PhD-qualified agricultural researchers in Colombia is very low (96 PhD’s out 
of 999 FTE’s in 2006) compared to other countries in South America with much smaller total 
agricultural research capacities. In 2006 Colombia invested $0.50 in agricultural research for every 
$100 of agricultural output, which was lower than the corresponding ratio in 1996 (0.61) but slightly 




of social status and political power; the 'rent-seeking' that is characteristic of some of 
the more affluent social groups in the country, and the lobbying power of the 
landlords in Congress in Colombia, explains this systematic sabotage to the attempts 
to make a genuine agrarian reform” (Fundacion Agenda Colombia & IICA, 2005, p. 
13). Regulation on distribution of land in Colombia remains unclear, which has 
caused a poor distribution of the land for having productive projects towards a better 
land use. Figure 4.27 presents intended and actual use of Land in Colombia, 
according to the National Geographic Institute, Agustín Codazzi.  
 
Figure 4.27. Intended and real use of land in Colombia 2012 
Source. (Asocaña, 2014a, p. 27) 
Transport has been always a main burden in the insertion of Colombian products to 
international markets. Fluvial transport was mainly used during the nineteenth 
century, connecting the north coast part of the country with the centre through 
Magdalena River (the most important and bigger river of the country). However, 
there was not an enabling infrastructure in terms of ports and steamboats to respond 
adequately to the local and international trade demands. Construction of railroads 
was not exempt of problems either. Regional and central governments did not have 
strong budgets to support the building process. By 1883 there were 150 kilometres of 
track built, with a final length of 1,120 kilometres by 1915. Then, during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mules remained as the principal transport 
mean for the coffee transportation from farms to the central markets and ports. 
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(Palacios, 1980). Colombia has continued having poor quality in the overall 
infrastructure91. According to the global competitiveness report 2011-2012, 
Colombia is ranked in the position 95, out of 142 countries. This is accounted by an 
almost inexistent railroad infrastructure (99), few commercial and small commercial 
ports (109), and high transactional cost in the air transportation (94). As a result, 
travel time and costs associated to transport of raw and finish products hinders the 
country capacity to be competitive in the world commercial trade. This especially 
affects the agriculture sector that relies heavily on the mobilization of products both 
for domestic and international markets. 
The contraction in international demand due to the global economic recession of 
2008 and 2009 originated in the USA caused a slowdown in the production of 
agricultural commodities and a fall in exports. Given that the USA is the main 
destination country for agricultural exports, the Colombian agriculture sector 
suffered more intensively the crisis. Also, the fall of dollar, with strong fluctuations 
between 2006 and 2009 has been a substantial burden for the international trade and 
final direct profits for Colombian agricultural producers. The Colombian economy 
still relies heavily on the North American market. With the fluctuation of the 
exchange rate, profits associated to the agriculture production have fluctuated as well 
(MADR, 2013).  
Sectoral agricultural policies are not only focus on the economic performance and 
productivity of the production chains. A main concern is the social equity and 
improvement of living conditions of small and medium producers. In that respect, the 
sector can still improve working conditions of labour. Figures 4.28 and 4.29 show 
the Quality of Life Index (QLI) and Unsatisfied Basic Needs index (UBN) for the 
main productive chains in the country. Sub-sectors as sugarcane provides better 
conditions for labour force than the national average. The ideal would be to elevate 
these two indicators for the labour force of every production chain (Arbeláez, 
Estacio, & Olivera, 2010).  
                                                





Figure 4.28. Quality of Life Index for main producers Agriculture Commodities in Colombia 
Source. Based on (Arbeláez et al., 2010) 
 
Figure 4.29. Unsatisfied Basic Needs for main producers of Agriculture Commodities in Colombia 
Source. Based on (Arbeláez et al., 2010) 
4.6. Conclusion 
There is certainly a formal framework in Colombia that supports the existence of a 
National Innovation System, which at most represents an atypical case taking into 
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account that the NSI is a framework to promote innovation within countries more 
than a normative law scheme92. The legal structure links enabling policies in order to 
generate a positive atmosphere to build and sustain relationships between firms and 
public and private research institutions. However, when it comes to the 
implementation and instrumentalisation of these enabling policies the desirable 
outputs have not been achieved. In this chapter we discovered that there is a gap 
between the ideal model proposed in policies and whitepapers and the real 
interaction between actors to encourage innovation processes.  
Even though officially is said that there is a systemic vision of innovation, the policy 
mixes built upon innovation show a linear view of innovation. There is an unbalance 
between the emphasis put into the scientific and technological system and the 
innovation side of the policies. Most of the efforts have been directed to strengthen 
the research side of the system under the assumption that with public investment in 
research, knowledge exploitation happens as a natural reaction. We conclude that 
Colombia and Latin America are locked-in into the NSI approach, and even though 
there are criticisms about the way the approach has been understood and applied, 
discussions remained within the same framework.  
When we turned our view towards the Agro-industrial sector, we found there are still 
many challenges that need to be addressed. The insertion of agriculture products in 
Global Value Chains and the enhancement of local capacity are pressures that can 
trigger production chains productivity. A greater diversification in R&D funding 
sources has been beneficial for the sector, but a larger expenditure needs to be done 
both to have more researchers and to fund special projects for small, medium and 
large producers. Products like flowers, potatoes, exotic fruits, bananas, and rice are 
important in the country’s total crop value, but there are limited capabilities built in 
those chains, so greater support to producer associations should be provided by the 
government. The agro-industrial sector remains as a strategic sector for the country 
and the social impact of the sector requires more attention from the national side to 
encourage effective governance systems.  
                                                
92 See section 2.3.2. 
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5. SECOND THEMATIC STRAND: INNOVATION 
DYNAMICS AT SECTORAL LEVEL 
5.1. Introduction 
As we have explained in the introduction and the methodology, we developed our 
study into two thematic strands. In this chapter we present the second pathway where 
we examine innovation dynamics in three agro-industrial sub-sectors. The coffee, 
sugarcane and fresh-cut flower production chains are studied using the sectoral 
systems of innovation lens and a complex adaptive view of the relationships between 
growers, firms, associations, public organisations and research centres. For each 
industry we followed the same structure, analysing: the industrial setting, 
technological evolution, and dynamic complementarities; demand types; the 
characterisation of sectoral organisations; and the knowledge and technology 
transfer, adoption and validation patterns.  
5.2. Sectoral Cases – Coffee 
Coffee has been central for the economic and social evolution of Colombia. It was 
the main export product until the 1990s and the production and exports of the crop 
still shapes the macroeconomic behaviour and stability of the country. It has been 
argued by several authors93 that the production and commercialization of coffee 
shaped the socio-political structures of Colombia given its hegemonic tradition in the 
country’s historical pathway.  
However, it was not until the 1980s that Colombia evolved from having small and 
dispersed coffee productive land units to extensive coffee production dominating the 
exports of the country. From 1730, with the earliest evidence of coffee cultivation in 
Colombian territory, until 2005 when Colombian coffee was the first product in the 
country to have a protected designation of origin, this crop and its derivatives have 
remained a central product upon which the economy relies. The privileged position 
                                                
93 The classic studies about the economic and social impact of coffee on the national and regional 
development has been summarised and analysed by Ramírez Bacca (RamÍrez Bacca, 2010), (M. 
Arango, 1977, 1982; Bejarano, 1980; Bergquist, 1981, 1986; Brew, 1977; Calderón, 1978; Deas, 
1976; Errázuriz, 1986; Jiménez, 1981; Machado, 1975, 1977; Palacios, 1980; Parsons, 1961; Samper, 
1988; Zambrano, 1977) 
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of the country on the equator, plus the presence of the Andes Mountains, the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans and the vastness of the Amazon, cause exceptional climatic 
conditions and rainfall regimes that allow for coffee production during all months of 
the year. As a result, Colombia is the only country that can offer fresh coffee to the 
market continually.94 
Colombia is today the third coffee producer in the world, and the largest producer of 
washed Arabica coffee. The sector is currently going on a recovery phase after a 
sustained rainy season during 2010-2011, which caused the spread of one of the most 
harmful diseases for the coffee, the coffee rust. In 2013, after renovating 80% of the 
coffee plantations for young coffee groves and adoption of technical production 
systems, besides a 61% of the coffee plants resistant to coffee rust, the productivity 
increased by 27% rising from 11.1 coffee bags95/ha in 2012 to 14.1 bags/ha in 2013. 
The most important Colombian coffee export destination is the U.S. representing 
44% of the total international trade, followed by Europe with a sharing of 31% and 
Japan having 11% of the total exports. However, during 2013 the international and 
domestic coffee price fell by 28% due to three factors: increase in world coffee 
supply coming from Brazil, Vietnam and Colombia; a larger reserve of coffee in the 
importing countries; and the instability in the world macroeconomic conditions led 
by U.S.A and Europe during 2013 (F. N. d. C. d. C. FNC, 2014). These fluctuations 
in the market have put pressure on the national coffee industry and have threatened 
the viability of it, creating a social crisis for more than 560,000 Colombian families 
that depend on the coffee business. 
5.2.1. Industrial Setting, technological evolution, and 
dynamic complementarities 
The Italian botanist, Prospero Alpini, made the first reference to a coffee plant in 
Europe in 1591 after living in Egypt for 3 years.  In 1713 the French naturalist 
Antoine de Jussieu described the coffee plant as a jasmine, but it was Carolus 
Linnaeus in 1737 who reclassified the plant as a genus with one unique species, the 
                                                
94 Information gathered from the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation webpage: 
http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/nuestro_cafe/el_cafe_de_colombia/. Retrieved 
in 11-10-14. 
95 The standard bag has 60 Kg of green coffee. 
 
 178 
Arabica Coffee. Today up to 126 species of coffee have been classified, with Coffea 
Arabica and Coffea Canephora being the most popular for consumption (Estrada, 
2011). It is believed that Dutch colonists brought the first coffee plants to South 
America in 1714 to the Dutch Guiana. From there, French colonisers took the first 
plants to the Caribbean islands in the first half of the 18th century and from there it 
entered Colombia and Brazil.96 
The production cycle of coffee has a time span of five years on average from 
planting the coffee groves until the first commercial harvest is obtained. Plantations 
are usually replaced every 8 years. Colombia produces 100% Arabica coffees. The 
Café de Colombia is characterised as a clean cup drink, with medium/high acidity 
and body, and pronounced aroma. The main varieties of Arabica coffee that are 
grown in Colombia are: Typica, Bourbon, Maragogipe, Tabi, Caturra and Castillo 
varieties. The Castillo variety was formerly known as Colombia variety. The 
selection of plant material is developed in Cenicafé, the national research centre for 
coffee.97  
According to Estrada (Estrada, 2011), the evolution of the coffee sector can be 
analysed within three different development stages: 1. Consolidation of the coffee 
economy (1850 – 1910); 2. The coffee boom period (1910-1950); 3. Formation of 
class and regional alliances and instability within them (1950 – 2010). However, we 
consider that the last period can be divided in two different stages, given that from 
the 1990s the development of the sector has focused on the stabilisation of domestic 
production to cope with both climatic variations and the fluctuations of international 
coffee prices. In that sense, we describe and analyse a fourth stage, the ups and 
downs in the coffee industry and modernisation of the marketing strategies.  
During the first stage, the predominant production unit was the hacienda, a large area 
of land with a strong hierarchical work system and inherited colonial institutions. 
The second stage reveals the shift from a single and powerful landlord with a vast 
                                                
96 A broader historical context can be found in: 
http://www.cafedecolombia.com/particulares/es/sobre_el_cafe/el_cafe/el_cafe/ 
97 Information gathered from the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation webpage: 
http://www.cafedecolombia.com/particulares/es/el_cafe_de_colombia/un_cafe_sobresaliente/. 
Retrieved in 11-10-14. 
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holding of land to the partition of the haciendas into small production units (land 
parcels of 3 hectares in average) with small landowners or campesinos98. The third 
stage is characterised by the positioning of the Colombian Coffee Growers 
Association (FNC – for its acronym in Spanish) as the sole coffee producers 
association with an active involvement in the coffee production chain, from 
cultivation until commercialisation. Finally, the fourth stage has been focused on 
generating a sustainable and competitive sector in a changing environment shaped by 
other competitors, specialised customers, climate change, and scarcity and surplus of 
world coffee production.  
The importance of coffee in the national development goes beyond the economic 
benefits that it brings to the macro and micro economic structures. It stimulated 
reflexion and discussion among the political elites about the development of 
inclusive social institutions, and even the establishment of democracy in the country. 
Colombian democracy was born in the rural areas through the political impetus of a 
working class composed of small farmers. Not to mention the broad impact in the 
development of port cities, revitalisation of domestic markets, employment 
generation, and industrialisation that the coffee sector has had in the evolution of the 
Colombian economy (Posada Carbó, 2012). 
5.2.1.1. Consolidation of the coffee economy (1850 – 1910)   
Three regions were producing coffee by the end of the nineteenth century: the north-
east (Santanderes), the centre and south-east (Boyacá-Cundinamarca-Tolima), and 
the west (Antioquia). During the second half of the century, given the agrarian nature 
of the country, three agriculture products dominated: coffee, tobacco, and indigo. 
The economic capital for coffee plantations came mainly from the tobacco trade and 
mining. By this period, the economic performance of Colombia was modest, even 
compared with countries of the region (Palacios, 1980). 
                                                
98 We use the term campesino instead of peasant to differentiate it from the notion of an “estate-like, 
caste-like, corporate or subordinated social group, characterized by specific restrictions on 
geographical or social mobility, limited rights, and obligations to provide services and perform 
particular deference behaviours for superordinate groups.” (Edelman, 2013). A campesino is a small 
farmer who makes a living from agriculture. 
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Between 1870 and 1930 Latin America followed an economic development pathway 
characterised by an export-led and outward-looking development based on 
agriculture and mining products. However, the export boom in Colombia did not 
start until 1910 mostly accounted by the predominance and strength of the coffee 
production. The rise in coffee demand from 1870 onwards shaped the future 
domination of this commodity in the Colombian exports (Palacios, 1980).  
Coffee introduced greater variety to the agricultural structure. 
It was grown in the temperate zones — heights between 
1,000 and 1,800 metres above sea level - alongside traditional 
crops, whose production had evolved considerably since 
colonial times. The most important of these crops was sugar-
cane, which was crudely processed in rustic trapiches which 
extracted the miel to make guarapo and aguardiente 
(fermented drinks), and fabricated panela (loaves of 
unrefined sugar). (Palacios, 1980, p. 12) 
The main production unit during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was the 
coffee ‘hacienda’. The landowner was the supreme authority and under his command 
he had a work system where labour classification was made according to factors of 
class and race. Since the landlord was absent much of the time, he had an 
administrator (usually a middle-class white man) and the administrator usually had a 
groundsman or mayordomo who was in charge of the campesinos. A semi-servile 
system of work was in operation with a strong hierarchical structure, where the 
‘indios’ or indigenous people were the last ones in the command line. In order to be 
resilient to internal and external economic fluctuations, haciendas adopted a multi-
crop fields strategy to respond to market price changes, to supply domestic market 
demands, and to buffer against the cyclical rise and fall of coffee prices (Palacios, 
1980).  
5.2.1.2. The coffee boom period (1910 – 1950) 
Big haciendas ceased to be productive during the first part of the 20th century, 
additionally unequal distribution of land brought social unrest. Also, a diversification 
in the commodities exports structure was needed to deal with the international 
macroeconomic environment. Workers previously employed in small farms or fincas 
in the mountains started to take part in their own right in the coffee market. Although 
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the haciendas survived the civil war99 of the end of nineteenth century -la guerra de 
los mil días (the war of the thousand days)-, they could not stand the pressure of an 
extensive export market. Campesino families started to trade with retailers and 
marketers that had connections with North American and European markets (Estrada, 
2011). 
This change in the land structure was more prominent from 1930 onwards. Small 
landowners started to dominate the production of coffee, making their own families 
the main source of labour. This labour structure has survived until the present day. 
The development of the coffee sector promoted the birth of a regional working class 
that would be taken as a model by other sectors in the country (Posada Carbó, 2012). 
However, the average income level of these small landowners did not increase 
accordingly with the profits rate, which has been the cause of instances of social 
discontent and strikes during 20th and 21st centuries.100  
Trade balance by the end of the First World War improved dramatically, as can be 
seen in Figure 5.1. By 1927 Colombia was the fourth South American country in 
terms of foreign trade volume. The department of Caldas101 produced a third of the 
national coffee volume, consolidating its position as the most important coffee 
region. Colombia’s economy relied on coffee as the main export product and one 
single dominant market, the United States of America. During the 1920s there was a 
strong presence of North American roasters in the domestic market, buying cheap 
raw material and exporting higher value-added coffee to external markets. This 
generated an expansion in Colombian coffee international trade based on traditional 
agriculture techniques, with low introduction of technology, low productivity, and 
inequitable distribution of profits. Intermediaries and storekeepers captured the main 
benefits and profits. (Palacios, 1980)  
                                                
99 Civil war that took place between October 17th of 1899 and November 21st of 1902 held by the two 
traditional Colombian political parties, Liberals and Conservators, to gain political dominance.  
100 The latest protest directly made by the Colombian coffee growers took place in February 2013 and 
last for eleven days with strong confrontations between the Colombian police and the growers. The 
Colombian Coffee Growers Federation rejected the protest. The coffee growers were asking for more 
subsides from the government given the poverty conditions in which they live because of the low 
production and low prices of coffee through the years. 




Figure 5.1. Index of growth of foreign trade 1905 – 1929 
c.i.f. stands for Cost, Insurance and Freight; f.o.b. stands for Free OnBoard 
Source. (Palacios, 1980, p. 207) 
After the great depression, in 1930, the price of coffee fell by 50% and many 
production labourers lost their jobs. Colombia depended greatly on the United States 
market and much of the macroeconomic stability of the country was depending on 
loans and foreign participation for the key national economic activities. English 
investors that were dominating the domestic and international market lost power and 
control, giving way to their North American competitors (Sevilla Soler, 1992). 
As an effort to regulate and characterise the sector, the Colombian Coffee Growers 
Federation (FNC) conducted the first official Coffee census, including the totality of 
coffee regions, in 1932. This was the first official statistical work made about coffee 
production and trade. However, the data was not completely reliable in terms of the 
technical accuracy of the statistical measures and of the veracity of the information 
itself (Fernández-Muñoz, 2014). This census differed greatly from previous partial 
statistics for the sector.102  
5.2.1.3. Class and regional alliances and instability among 
them (1950 – 1990) 
Coffee demand is driven by habit, not necessity. In that sense, there is always 
demand for the product but with different volume rates, which determines the 
                                                
102 Coffee statistics can be found in: “Anuario de Estadística de Colombia” published in 1875; Boletín 
de Estadísticas de Cundimarca, published in 1923; Economía y Estadística, published in 1929; 
Estadísticas de Antioquia, 1914; and Colombia Cafetera, 1927. There are clear inconsistencies 
between these previous regional censuses and the first oficial Coffee Census. Palacios (Palacios, 
1980) argues that these divergences can be explained by the manipulation of data done by the FNC 
given its strong influence in the definition of sectoral policies. 
207 Coffee expansion and the model of development, 1910-50
The 'Colombian Renaissance9
The growth of foreign trade between 1905 and 1929 shows a curve
similar to that experienced in the laissez-faire period from 1850 to 1875;
the movement of continued growth was more evident after 1916, by which
time the levels of the 1885-1910 period had been far surpassed.




















Source: Banco de la Repiiblica, XLII y XLIII Informe Anual del Gerente a la Junta
Directiva (2 vols., Bogota, 1965-6), vol. 2, p. 190.
The expansion of coffee production in the twenties was based on tra-
ditional methods of cultivation of an extensive nature, with low technology,
but with costs of production kept low, as the majority of peasant producers
maintained a standard of living which bordered on subsistence level. Between
1920 and 1930 coffee production doubled, and the resulting increase in
employment, demand, and savings was the principal cause in the expansion
of means of payment, given the policy of monetary restriction and exchange
stability maintained by the Banco de la Republica. Inflation in those years,
moderate in comparison with that of the Regeneration or of the present
day, was not a decisive factor in the expansion of coffee production, given
that after 1922 external prices recovered and remained at profitable levels
until the crisis of 1929. It was therefore possible for exports to increase
despite the fact that the rate of exchange specifically favoured the importers
of consumer goods and foodstuffs.
The great geographic and occupational mobility of the labour force
which arose out of the expansion of the internal market and of coffee
production after the First World War had unforeseen consequences for the
economic organization and the social, political, and institutional life of
Colombia. Modern forms of social organization spread through the centres
which felt the impact of accelerated economic growth, such as the banana
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elasticity and term of the supply cycles. The production of coffee depends mainly on 
the climatic and soil conditions, although low technical development has hindered 
productivity. On that subject, Palacios explains (Palacios, 1980, p. 238):  
[U]ntil 1970, the average differential productivity of coffee 
land cannot be attributed to the fact that some 'efficient' units 
use fertilizers, better cultivation methods, and superior 
botanical varieties, but rather that they are located in better 
lands and climates. 
However, productivity has been always a major issue, particularly because of the 
prevalence of small farmers based on subsistence economy and a traditional family 
division of labour. The average coffee productivity by unit of production in 1970 in 
the Colombian coffee regions was 541 kg/ha, well below the world average 
productivity of 1000 kg/ha for the same year (See Figure 5.2.).  
 
Figure 5.2. Distribution of national coffee production in 1970 
Source. (Palacios, 1980, p. 240) 
In 1960 the FNC started a market strategy for competing through differentiation. The 
Colombian coffee would be promoted as different from the other world coffees. Café 
de Colombia was introduced in the international market as a quality standard. In 
1982 a broader marketing campaign was launched using a distinctive seal for the 
Colombian coffee as the “finest coffee in the world”, with the signature 100% Café 
de Colombia. Shortly after, the Juan Valdez icon was added to integrate tradition to 
the quality seal. This was a strategy to protect the product against the increasing 
tendency of big roasters to combine different coffee beans without differentiation. 
Colombian coffee would be identified through tradition, effort, and the artisanal 
work of campesinos to produce “the best coffee in the world” (R. Arango, Taniguchi, 
240 Coffee in Colombia, 1850-19 70
estimates in terms of tons of pergamino coffee per hectare produced by
the 'traditional' as opposed to the 'modern' unit of production. The modern
unit is considered to produce above 1,000 kilos per hectare. If we consider
that, in 1970, the national productivity average stood at only 541 kg/ha,
then it is apparent that th  Colombian coffee sector must still be considered
largely 'traditional'.15
In 1970 38.3 per cent of all coffee veredas displayed average productivity
levels equal to or greater than the national average of 541 kg/ha. Of these
veredas 5.2 per cent (955) had average productivity levels in excess of 1000
kg/ha, while 2.6 per cent (472) ad over 876 kg/ha. Of th se two groups 80
per cent of the veredas were situated in Antioquia, Viejo Caldas and Valle.
Number %
Less than 300 kg/ha 3,281 18.1
301-375 kg/ha 2,903 16.0
376-500 kg/ha 4,939 27.3
501-750 kg/ha 4,648 25.7
751-875 kg/ha 869 4.8
876-1,000 kg/ha 472 2.6
Over 1,000 kg/ha 955 5.2
Total 18,067 99.7
Source: FNCC, Boletin de Information y Estadistica, no. 45 (1971), p. 34.
If we take three municipios in which the Programa de Desarrallo y
Diversificaci6n has been operating we arrive at the results shown in table 36.
In order to give some idea of the results provided by this programme, we
need only mention that in 1974 an area of 132,000 hectares which was
under cultivation and using these new intensive techniques (10 per cent of
the country's total coffee area in that year) produced approximately 30
per cent of the national crop. Thus far, it would seem difficult to make
any serious criticism of the plan. However, if we stop to consider that, of
the 132,000 hectares mentioned above, only 8 per cent belonged to owners
who could be classified as 'family units' then we may appreciate the extent
to which the 'green revolution' has tended to produce appreciable changes
in the social structure. Furthermore, its stated objective of modernizing
methods of cultivation, and the productive units themselves, will lead
logically to the disappe rance of the peasant coffee-producer, whether or
not by a process of assimilation.16 For example, in 1970 the cost of
cultivating one hectare of coffee land controlled by the new system stood
at around 40,000 pesos (including the price of the land) while the average
family holding at that time earned a total monetary income of 5,600
pes s.17 Thus it would in eed appear to be t ue t at the new style of
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Johnson, Tamayo, & Petit, 2010).  
Also from the 1960s the “Program of Development and Diversification103” was 
launched by the FNC as a response to a low world production of coffee, which 
resulted in a coffee supply crisis during 1957 – 1962. The key program strategies 
were to increase productivity for the whole agriculture sector, to provide food 
security for the country within the early globalization movement, and specifically for 
the coffee sub-sector, to stimulate the creation of manufacturing industries. 
Welcoming the recommendation of the Coffee International Organization (CIO), the 
FNC promoted the renovation of old coffee groves with new varieties and better 
cultivation techniques and management of units of production. However, changing 
the cultural setting of traditional campesinos, introducing the idea of the renovation 
of their plantations for newer, more productive ones (according to technicians from 
the Federation), was a shocking process given that a new coffee grove takes between 
3 and 5 years to have the first harvest according to the variety, soil and climate 
conditions. By 1974, only 10% of the total planted area had renovated their coffee 
groves (Palacios, 1980).  
There was an important coffee bonanza between 1975-79 characterised by a 
prominent rise in the international coffee price, combined with higher inflation in the 
country and a lower rate of devaluation of the Colombian peso. Although this period 
was good at a first glance for the sector, it was not for other tradable goods. This high 
income of foreign currency produced a higher relative price of non-tradable products, 
and a price reduction of other tradable goods, affecting the overall competitiveness of 
the economy (Edwards, 1984).  However, as Raju and Melo argue (Raju & Melo, 
2003), since coffee booms have had a positive real output for the macroeconomic 
conditions of the country and visible long-run effects on reducing the country current 
account and government deficits this economic effect should not be understood as a 
Dutch Disease effect.104 This boom was followed by other ones in 1986 and 1995.  
                                                
103 The program was underway during the period 1973 – 1978 as a broader strategy for all economic 
sectors to create a stronger internal market and strengthening different manufacturing industries. Since 
coffee was the principal export product by that time, a great emphasis was put on the sector. 
104 “…coffee price (revenue) shocks have exerted an important influence on money growth, inflation, 
and real exchange rates, and the direction of these effects are in line with some of the predictions of 
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5.2.1.4. The ups and downs in the coffee industry and 
modernisation of the marketing strategies (1990 – 2011)  
The market liberalisation during the 90s decade, fluctuation in international prices 
with a sustained downward trend, changing weather conditions having periods of 
drought (El Niño phenomenon) or excessive rainfall causing floods (La Niña 
phenomenon) and spreading of coffee rust105, has caused a marked drop in coffee 
production. Also, the entrance of new competitors in the world marketplace with 
lower production costs, higher coffee production in Brazil, and the introduction of 
technological advances that has favoured a higher consumption of Robusta coffees, 
has resulted in a loss of competitiveness (Otis, 2013). With a production of 10.5 
million sacks in 2000/2001, Vietnam surpassed Colombia taking the second 
production place in the world. In 2011, Vietnam doubled the Colombian production 
(International Coffee Organisation). However, the economic importance of the coffee 
sector remains prominent in the national landscape. More than 560 thousand families 
base their household income on coffee production and about one million people are 
involved in different phases of the production chain including activities such as 
processing, commercialisation, and exports. 
The different stages of the coffee production chain can be seen in Figure 5.4. Small 
farmers with an average plantation of 4 hectares prevailed. The coffee plant cycle 
from the planting process until it is ready to sell takes on average 5 years. One of the 
distinctive characteristics of the Colombian coffee is that farmers, given the terrain 
conditions, handpick it, which makes very difficult the use of specialised machinery. 
Only the red coffee cherries are collected, which needs the judgement of the coffee 
growers and impact directly in the final quality of the coffee. The pulping process 
consists of the separation of the coffee bean from the skin and pulp; it is usually done 
right away after harvesting. The remainder of the pulp is removed through a 
                                                                                                                                     
traditional Dutch Disease type models…We find that in the time horizon of 5 years after the boom, 
real output has increased in response to the effects of the coffee boom. The finding that coffee booms 
can result in positive long-run output effects is an important finding since it contradicts the traditional 
conclusion of Dutch Disease type models which envision an adverse long-run effect on output.” (Raju 
& Melo, 2003, p. 963) 
105 Coffee rust was first discovered in Latin America in Brazil in 1970. From that moment onwards, it 
spread throughout the region. It is a typical fungus that affects the leaves and the tree, causing 
defoliation and reduces yield. It is mostly spread by wind and rain water. It can be seen on the leaves 
as pale yellow spots breaking through its epidermis (Schieber, 1972). 
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fermentation treatment or through a dry method. The grains, still wrapped in a tough 
shell, are placed in water for 24 hours. This causes a mild fermentation that impacts 
on the coffee aroma. Once the grain is completely clean from pulp and shell, it is 
washed with clean water. The dry method consists in the removal of the remainder 
parchment skin and mucilage, once grains are completely dried (García Cáceres & 
Olaya Escobar, 2006).  (See Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.3. Cross-section of a coffee cherry 
Source. Retrieved from http://pixgood.com/coffee-cherry-structure.html 
The coffee grains are raked or turned by hand for improving the drying process 
which consist of a sun drying process in extensive terraces and when the parchment 
coffee is almost dry, it is put into special machines to dry it completely. The hulling 
process is done by specialised machines to remove remaining skin or pulp. When 
there is still skin on the coffee cherries, a polish process is done to improve the 
appearance and flavour of the grains.  The best quality grains are packed into sacks 
to be transported to the nearest collection centre. The buyer makes a classification of 
the grains according to the aroma, colour, size, humidity, and texture. The best grains 
are sold for export, the remaining are sold in the domestic market (García Cáceres & 




Figure 5.4. Coffee production chain structure 




In the Colombian context, once intermediaries106 have bought the parchment coffee 
grains from coffee growers, most of them local campesinos, the threshing and sorting 
process starts.  The process consists of separating the parchment from the coffee 
grain and removing all impurities. The resulting product is green grain coffee; 
usually exported in this stage to the international market (only the grains with an 
olive green colour are selected for export). Before the grains are sold to international 
markets, the FNC test a sample of the grains to certify that it meets the quality 
specifications. This certification process is known as “Seal of approval”107 to assure 
that the coffee meets standardised quality characteristics and it is a compulsory 
requirement for all exporters. There is also regulation to control the supply and 
demand of coffee in the marketplace and to stabilise prices. The coffee price in the 
countries where is consumed still responds to the speculative international 
fluctuations, so the internal price paid to the producer is fixed by sectoral support 
organisations108 and the government (García Cáceres & Olaya Escobar, 2006). 
Once the green coffee is classified and roasted, the milling process starts. It is one of 
the most important steps because the coffee grinding affects the final flavour and 
aroma. Then coffee is ready for packing. Also, coffee can be processed to be 
lyophilised or soluble. The former is made through a sublimation process at low 
temperatures, and the latter through a process known as spray-dry where the water is 
evaporated through the introduction of hot air (García Cáceres & Olaya Escobar, 
2006). So the coffee can be exported as parchment coffee, green coffee, roasted 
coffee, milled coffee, decaffeinated coffee, liquid coffee or as instant coffee 
(lyophilised or soluble). 
Most agricultural crops are very sensitive to climatic variation. In the case of coffee, 
the excess of rain raises the probability of coffee rust in the plantations. However, 
when the climate is very dry and there is predominance of high temperatures, there is 
                                                
106 This can be private threshers or coffee grower cooperatives. 
107 The process is divided in two stages: a sample is weighed and rated, then another sample is picked 
from the same first sample sacks.  The new sample is roasted, milled, and tasted in a fresh cup of 
coffee. Experts then give their score for aroma, acidity and uniformity. If experts are not satisfied with 
the quality of the coffee, the harvest is rejected for export. (García Cáceres & Olaya Escobar, 2006)  




a higher probability of having coffee berry borer.109 Coffee price is subject to 
different externalities that affect the production costs. Besides climatic variations, 
factors such as government incentives, phytosanitary problems110, and fluctuations of 
prices are crucial for the coffee business. As coffee growers reported in a study 
conducted by Fedesarrollo: “With the rainy season 90% of the crop was lost during 
the past year, it also affected the phytosanitary control because the risk of diseases 
increased.” (Perfetti, 2012, p. 59). 
Labour represents the highest direct cost of growing coffee (around 40%), followed 
by harvesting costs (around 17%). 
“The agricultural component of the Chain (planting, 
harvesting, gathering, processing and drying of coffee), 
highly generates employment, while the purely industrial 
stages are capital intensive and require relatively less 
work…It is estimated that the occupation of the first link of 
the chain can reach about 500,000 direct jobs, while the 
industrial component thereof does not exceed 5,000.” 
(Espinal, Martínez, & Acevedo, 2005, p. 5)  
The distribution of the coffee lands is characterised by a predominance of small 
farms, but there are also few farms with 100 or more hectares. However, from 1970 
onwards, there has been a shift towards smaller coffee production parcels and a 
larger number of coffee growers with a subsistence economy focus on growing food 
for feeding themselves and their families, besides their coffee production to sell in 
the domestic market. The cultivated coffee land area in 1970 was of 1.05 million 
hectares, while by 1997 this number had decreased to 869 thousand hectares. This is 
also seen in the average size of coffee farms, passing from 14.8 hectares to 5 
hectares. Currently, most of Colombian coffee growers are small landholders 
(García, 2003) (See Table 5.1). 
 
                                                
109 Coffee berry borer is the most damaging pest for coffee. In Colombia sixty per cent of coffee 
plantations remained untreated by 2006. It is a small beetle that attacks developing coffee berries from 
about eight weeks after flowering up to harvest time. Each berry is attacked by a single female (J. 
Jaramillo, Borgemeister, & Baker, 2006).  




Percentage of surface area 
(ha) 
Percentage of coffee area 
(ha) Percentage of farms (ha) 
Size 1970 
1993 - 
1997 Change  1970 
1993 - 
1997 Change  1970 
1993 - 
1997 Change  
0 - 5 8 17 125 17 43 144 53 80 50 
5 - 10 8 14 64 14 18 26 17 10 -43 
10 - 30 22 27 20 28 23 -18 19 8 -60 
30 - 
100 29 26 -10 25 13 -48 8 2 -71 
> 100 33 16 -51 15 3 -78 2 0 -83 
Total 100 100   100 100   100 100   
Table 5.1. Distribution of coffee land and farms by size. 
Source. (Forero Álvarez, 2010, p. 99) 
According to the FNC of 563 thousand Colombian coffee grower families, up to 96% 
have less than 5 hectares of coffee plantations. By 2000, seventy-eight per cent of the 
coffee growing area was planted and harvested by campesinos. Although the number 
of farms doubled during the period 1993-1997, the coffee area cultivated dropped by 
18.6% compared to 1970. Looking at table 5.1, 80% of the coffee farms had a size 
less than 5 hectares during this same period (Forero Álvarez, 2010). Although crop 
diversification has been a livelihood strategy, many coffee growers are living in 
poverty conditions.111 This has been worsened by the aging of plantations and 
weather problems that have increased the incidence of pests and diseases in coffee. 
As a result, the quality of life for farmers has deteriorated. Unemployment in coffee 
areas increased by 7.8% compared to 5.7% in the rest of the country. It is estimated 
that losses of coffee cultivation in 2001 had an economic impact equivalent to 
257,000 jobs per year, of which 181,000 were direct jobs in the coffee sector 
(Fonseca, 2003). 
“These very fundamental changes reflect a profound 
restructuring of the coffee sector in the country to much 
smaller sizes of plantations: in 1970, the percentage of farms 
with less than one hectare coffee was 12.6% compared to 
60.6% today, while the share of parcels larger than 20 
                                                
111 In the coffee zone the population bellow the poverty line increased between 1997 and 2000 by 6.7%. In the 
same way, the households bellow the poverty line increased 2.8%. “…the major limitation to family production is 
limited access to land. Paradoxically, their systems are productive and economically efficient, but because they 
are small they generate meager incomes that are insufficient to raise most small coffee growers above the poverty 




hectares was 16.5% compared to 0.5% today [2003].”  
(Fonseca, 2003, p. 5) 
The sector keeps suffering because of both external and internal factors. In 2012 the 
coffee industry had one of the strongest crises. Coffee production began to decline 
rapidly since 2009 and was worsened by a rainy season that produced constant and 
heavy rains in the coffee zone. This resulted in the rapid spread of coffee rust in the 
coffee plantations, besides flooding and road disturbances, which also affected the 
transport of coffee to the market places. Brazil has kept high productions of coffee, 
having a record of 50.8 million bags to export in 2012. With steady decrease in levels 
of coffee consumption in the North American and European markets, there has been 
a surplus in coffee consuming countries. This has had a direct impact on the small 
coffee growers who are not making a profit, and actually losing money (Otis, 2013). 
Also, infrastructure problems represent a major burden for the agriculture sector, and 
particularly for the coffee growers. “Poor transportation networks create a major 
barrier to improved farm income and coffee farmer profitability. Poor sanitation and 
housing keep people impoverished and unable to successfully cultivate high-quality 
coffee at commercial production levels” (Mueller, Gómez, & Ricketts, 2013, p. viii). 
It is ironic how a sector that has represented a major economic activity for the 
country, has gone through a process of deterioration of the quality of life of the 
coffee growers. It could be an indicator for the FNC and the Colombian governments 
that more efforts to keep the sector competitive are needed, adopting different 
supporting strategies. 
5.2.2. Demand 
The coffee production in Colombia is concentrated in four regions: Central Western 
(includes Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, Tolima and Valle departments); 
East (includes Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Norte de Santander and Santander 
departments); South (includes Cauca, Huila and Nariño departments); and North 
(César and Magdalena departments). The central-western region concentrates the 
65.9% of the national coffee production (Fonseca, 2003).  
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Coffee is the largest cultivated area crop in the country. According to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (2011) 744.162 ha were planted in 2010, 
representing 19% of the total harvested area in the country, including temporary and 
permanent crops. The largest destination of the Colombian coffee exports is the 
United States, followed by Japan and Germany, as can be seen in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Volume of Colombian coffee exports by destination country – Annual (Thousands of 
sacks of 60 kg of green coffee) 
Source. Translated and modified by the author from Website Colombian Coffee Growers 
Association112  
However, the contribution of coffee to the GDP has been declining over the years. In 
1990 coffee accounted for 17.6% of the agriculture GDP and 2.8% of the national 
GDP. In 2001, the participation was of 12.9% and 1.8% respectively (Espinal et al., 
2005). Also, there has been a rapid decline in the share of coffee in total national 
exports. Coffee went from being the most important export product in the country in 
1989, to second in 1990 after oil and oil by-products, and third in 2001 after coal. 
This is partly due to the increasing demand of other traditional products in the 
                                                
112 Retrived from: 
http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/quienes_somos/119_estadisticas_historicas/ in 
October 01, 2014. 
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international markets, and an increase in exports of non-traditional113 sectors (See 
Figure 5.5). This was also caused by the crisis that the coffee market suffered in 2001 
when world production exceeded the world consumption leaving a surplus of around 
10 million 60 kg bags. Consequently, the international price went below USD$50 for 
46 kg (Flores, Bratescu, Martínez, Oviedo, & Acosta, 2002).   
 
                                                
113 Traditional export Colombian products are: oil and oil by-products, coffee, coal and ferronickel. 
Non traditional products are those that are not frequently exported. In this group are all exports 




Figure 5.5. Evolution of traditional and non-traditional Colombian exports 




An important market segment that has been developed from the early 21st century is 
that of specialty coffees. This refers to whole bean sales or to beverages sold in 
coffee shops. According to the coffee exporter’s guide, specialty coffees can be 
classified as those with: 
[R]eliable and consistent grading procedures, strict 
compliance with contractual obligations and regular delivery 
will add value in the sense that the product will be preferred 
by primary buyers over those from less consistent origins. 
Certain growths of coffee, on the other hand, may be highly 
prized for their flavour characteristics and attract a suitable 
premium” (International Trade Centre, 2011, p. 38) 
In order to compete in the international market and fulfil consumer requirements the 
FNC adopted three main strategies: First, the positioning of the ‘Juan Valdez 100% 
Café de Colombia’ as part of a broad marketing campaign to differentiate the 
Colombian coffee by having high quality standards. “The outcome was a terrific 
success and by 1980, 74 brands carried the Juan Valdez logo on their packages” (R. 
Arango et al., 2010, p. 4). Second, direct sales to consumers through Juan Valdez 
shops. The business model started in 2002 to generate added value to the Colombian 
coffee growers and the Juan Valdez brand. Up to 2014 there are two hundred Juan 
Valdez shops in Colombia and eighty-four shops around the world. Third, the FNC 
has built a strong linkage between the small coffee producers and world consumers 
seeking specialty coffees. In fact, most of the Colombian specialty coffees (organic, 
sustainable, fairly produced and commercialised, with special characteristics of 
acidity, aroma, and cleanliness in cup) are produced by small farms (Forero Álvarez, 
2010, p. 103). Figure 5.6 shows the evolution and contrast between the volume and 
value of added-value coffee sales. It includes specialty coffees, freeze-dried coffee 
Buendía (Good Day)114, and the Juan Valdez coffee shops sales. 
                                                
114 This is the coffee brand of the company Buencafé, owned by the FNC. It only produces freeze-
dried coffee mainly for international markets. The sales distribution in 2011 was: East Europe (27%), 
Western Europe (26%), North America (22%), Asia-Pacific (13%), Colombia (8%), Central and South 




Figure 5.6. Volume and value of the added value coffee sales 2002, 2007 – 2011. 
Source.  (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2012, p. 14) 
 
The production of high value-added coffee has allowed higher profits for the coffee 
growers. In 2011 the price of these coffees was USD$4.9 higher per pound of coffee 
than the regular Colombian coffee, which represented for the 109 thousand of coffee 
growers growing these kind of coffees an additional USD$7.7m (Colombian Coffee 
Growers Federation, 2012). 
Every firm that wants to export or sell coffee for the domestic market in any of its 
forms (green, toasted, soluble, freeze dried) has to be registered with the FNC. Only 
the Federation can certify the authenticity of the Colombian coffee and all the coffee 
exported from Colombia needs to have the Federation seal of approval. Also, every 
coffee exporter has to register its transactions with the Federation. In this sense, the 
Federation acts as a union but also as a competitor since it has its own companies 
selling all coffee by-products and the green coffee. The Federation represents its 
associates, but it is also part of the value chain. 
As it has been seen in the different development stages of the coffee sector, the great 
fluctuation in prices and diffusion of pest and diseases has hindered the viability of 
coffee production. Although the Federation has implemented subsides and has sought 
fiscal incentives to protect the producers, the efforts has not always been successful 
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and evenly distributed. The Fondo Nacional del Café collects private and public 
funds coming from the national budget. The coffee sector has had perks like this 
special fund and preferential subsidies that no other agriculture sector has 
experienced, and it is still experiencing serious financial problems. Referring to that, 
the coffee mission, convened by the national government in 2013, presents 
conclusions about the role of the FNC and the financial benefits given to the sector.  
In Colombia the coffee policy seems to have had inconsistent 
objectives, while at the same time sought to stabilize prices 
and to maximize producers’ income. This dual purpose was 
contemplated from period to period, which has led to low 
savings in times of high prices and high tax costs when 
international prices are depressed awarding preferential 
grants. (Portafolio, 2014) 
The expansion to other markets and higher volumes of coffee are the principal aim of 
the Federation as sectoral union and regulator of competitors. Focus now has centred 
on the growth of the specialty coffees market and alliances with commercial partners 
to be part of bigger coffee by-product markets (i.e. coffee beverages, dairy products 
with coffee) that represent higher profits for the sector in order to keep it viable in 
the mid and long terms. 
5.2.3. Sectoral Organisations  
The main organisation representing Colombian coffee growers is the Colombian 
Coffee Growers Federation.  It was founded in 1927 to represent the sector nationally 
and internationally. Although it was created as a private initiative, it has had great 
support from public funds and it has had a strong influence on the sectoral policies 
for coffee. From its origin, the Federation has had close ties with the State, 
participating in the economic and social construction of the country, always 
protecting the interests of its members. 
The FNC became a central actor after merging with a special coffee fund, ‘El Fondo 
Nacional del Café’. This fund was supported by the government and had a special 
account within the national budget. “The Fondo was technically an account in the 
Treasury which handled special taxes on bills for the export of coffee, and it was 
intended to finance the purchase and storing of coffee in order to meet the upper 
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limits set upon exports by the pact.” (Palacios, 1980, p. 223). It consists of a non-
fiscal tax known as the coffee contribution paid exclusively by coffee growers, and 
public subsidies given by the state. It has two sub funds: one to invest in profitable 
business and enterprises owned by the FNC, and the other to stabilise the coffee 
profit reducing the effects of international price volatility. As explained by Luis 
Fernando Samper, Chief of Communications and marketing officer in the FNC 
(2012), the fund contains the royalties from the Juan Valdez trademark and the 
opening of every Juan Valdez shop. Also, every coffee producer has to pay six-dollar 
cents for every pound of coffee exported.  With that money it is funded the extension 
service that provides technical assistance, partially Cenicafé, quality control 
processes, and promotion and advertising of Colombian coffee in the international 
market. However that money is not enough for funding all of these programs, so the 
Federation searches for other funding resources. Each Juan Valdez branch opened in 
Colombia or the world has to pay royalties for the use of the Juan Valdez trademark. 
This is other important source of resources: 
[R]oughly the proportion of resources that is leveraged is 7-1, 
that is, for every dollar contributed by the producers, we get 7 
dollars from other sources. Trademark royalties are used to 
pay for the promotion of the Colombian coffee. We are 
always looking for ways to balance costs so the producer has 
the least possible direct cost.” (Luis Fernando Samper, 
personal communication, January 15th, 2013) 
During the fifties the FNC became stronger having wide international connections 
not only with the USA but also with Europe. The Federation invested in the first big 
national merchant fleet, getting better commercialization prices and trade channels. It 
also invested more funds to give technical assistance to small coffee growers, mainly 
in the regions of Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Antioquia. By the 1960s, 
coffee accounted by 70% of the total exports of the country (Palacios, 1980). 
The Federation represents 563,000 families growing coffee along the country. It has 
a hierarchical structure and a special government system based on democratic 
elections every four years. This is a mechanism intended to provide democratic 




Figure 5.7. Coffee Growers Federation representative system 
Source. Information gathered by the author. 
The National Congress is the maximum authority of the Federation. Federated coffee 
growers elect it every 4 years in the coffee elections, as well as the representatives of 
the Departmental committees. The National Congress conveys at the end of 
November every year and gives the general guidelines and strategies to keep the 
competitiveness of the sector. The National Committee of Coffee Growers 
establishes the policies for the domestic coffee industry and is composed of policy-
makers and delegates from the FNC’s board, it also defines the distribution of the 
National Coffee Fund for special programs and projects. The Board of Directors has 
representatives from each of the 15 Departmental Committees and is approved by the 
National Congress. It coordinates and regulates national initiatives proposed by the 
National Congress and works for the departmental necessities of coffee growers. 
There are 15 Departmental Committees of Coffee Growers that represent the 
departments that produce more than 2% of the overall national production. The 
members of these committees are elected during the Coffee National Elections. 
These committees are a main linkage mechanism between the central FNC’s 
government and the regional branches. There are 366 municipalities that possess at 
least 440 federated growers and produce at least 60,000 arrobas (about 690,120 Kgs) 
of parchment coffee. These municipal units have a Municipal Committee of Coffee 
Growers that can present special projects to the Departmental Committees for getting 
economic and technical support. Finally, the federated coffee growers are those who 
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are permanent coffee growers in an area of at least half a hectare and with not less 
than 1500 planted coffee groves. These coffee growers are identified within a 
database in the FNC and have a special ID, the intelligent coffee ID that besides 
serving for identification purposes, has a magnetic band and an intelligent chip that 
can be used to receive payment for their crops (C. C. G. F. FNC, 2014a). 
The presence of the FNC across the country and its long trajectory in the structural 
development of the sector has been instrumental for the execution of long-term 
strategies and coherent governance for the sector (Urrutia, 1983). The power and 
presence of the FNC has prevailed during the years and it controls the whole coffee 
production chain. Referring to the presence and power of the National Federation of 
Coffee Growers, Dr. Gabriel Cadena, Head of Cenicafé from 1988 to 2009, says:  
In Colombia there are not strong firms [coffee firms] that can 
compete with the Federation. The Federation is everything 
and does everything. It has presence in all coffee 
municipalities. It is the best company that has been created in 
Colombia and it is the most original one. (Gabriel Cadena, 
personal communication, January 15th, 2013) 
However, there is criticism and doubt about the transparency of the Federation’s 
board elections and decisions. “Critics of the Federation say that it has been 
governed by a closed group of large coffee growers and exporters who have steered 
some of its policies and administrative decisions in their favour.” (Forero Álvarez, 
2010, p. 97) Some companies of the Federation, such as the Great Colombian 
Merchant Fleet, accounted for large losses before it was liquidated. Although the 
FNC has made efforts to respond to international price fluctuations and to respond to 
climatic variations that have affected the overall national production, it seems to be 
insufficient given the continuous government subsides given to the sector and strong 
decline in coffee volumes because of the effects of diseases. Even having varieties 
resistant to coffee rust and coffee berry borer developed by Cenicafé is insufficient as 
less than forty per cent of the total coffee plantations have been planted with these 
breeds (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2012). There are many factors that 
can influence the expansion and adoption of these breeds, but it could be concluded 
that the Federation has failed to some extent in the persuasion and incentives given to 
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the coffee growers to change their coffee groves and their harvesting techniques to be 
more productive. 
The FNC has a system of cooperatives to guarantee the purchase of coffee from 
producers. This system is supported by the Fondo Nacional del Café (FoNC). The 
relational purchase –how it is called by the FNC - provides stable prices to the coffee 
growers and offers future purchase guaranteed at pre-determined prices, which 
lowers the risk for the producers. During 2011 the international price transfer 
percentage to the producer was of 95%, and the price paid to the coffee growers was 
4.6% higher than the base average price paid during that year for dry parchment 
coffee (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2012). However, other countries like 
Brazil, Vietnam, Guatemala, India and Mexico that do not have this mechanism had 
higher price transfer percentages to the producers during 2012, which undermines the 
assumption that the purchase guarantee assures higher prices to the small farmers. 
Moreover, large producers get a higher price for their coffee than the small ones 
(Echavarría, 2014).  
Figure 5.8 shows how the FoNC buys most of the coffee production negotiated by 
the cooperatives in order to offer better conditions to producers. Expocafé is the 
export company of the coffee producers’ cooperatives.  
 
Figure 5.8. Distribution of coffee purchases from coffee cooperatives  
Source. (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2011, 2012) 
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These mechanisms have been designed by the Federation to protect the small 
producers. However, it has been argued that the active role of the Federation in the 
design of sectoral policies to regulate the sector and set prices, the commercialising 
role both for the domestic and international market, the administration of public and 
private funding sources through the FoNC, and the competition it exerts with private 
companies to export and produce final coffee by-products is not beneficial and have 
actually prevented the sector from being more competitive (Dinero, 2014).  
Nevertheless, the role that the Federation has played to maintain sector viability 
cannot be denied. The FNC has been a main actor in promoting better production and 
business practices to have a fairer distribution of profit among the growers. However, 
it plays several different and in many ways antagonist roles. The Federation is a 
competitor with other companies, designs sectoral economic and social policies and 
regulates the market. It is a powerful organisation with power disputes between 
actors, it does not always represent the interests of the small growers and given its 
hierarchical structure and number of staff members, it responds slowly to the rapid 
changes of the market. It is also at the same time union and regulator, which make its 
role confusing.  
5.2.3.1. Cenicafé 
Eleven years after the National Federation of Coffee Growers was created, Cenicafé, 
the National Research Centre for Coffee, was founded (1938) to study on-farm 
production, harvest, grain quality, use of sub-products of the coffee production, raise 
productivity levels, and ultimately to have a sustainable exploitation of the coffee 
regions. The research centre was created and supported economically by the 
Federation. Cenicafé headquarters are in the municipality of Chinchiná, in Caldas 
department. Besides the main laboratories, Cenicafé has eight experimental bases 
distributed in the three mountain ranges that cross the country. They are strategically 
located so researchers can have access to most of the environmental areas where 
coffee is grown in the country (Cenicafé, 2014).  
The first research projects in Cenicafé were related to characterisation of soils and 
weather. Thereafter efforts were focused on increasing the coffee plantations 
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productivity. As a result, a formal research project on plant breeding was started in 
1955. The first Arabica variety developed was typical variety, followed by Bourbon 
variety. The former did not have high productivity levels, whilst the latter - although 
more productive - was not widely adopted by the coffee growers because of the small 
size of the coffee grains. From 1960, Cenicafé developed more and better 
technologies for the management of coffee plantations both at agronomic level and at 
the harvesting process. In 1972 Caturra variety was developed and tested, its 
characteristics being: low-stature, high productivity, good grain quality, and 
excellent adaptation to the ecological conditions of the Colombian coffee zones. This 
advance resulted in a productivity increment of 58% ten years after the plantations 
were renovated with this specific breed. In 1982 when coffee rust arrived in the 
country, Cenicafé researchers already had a resistant breed to this disease that started 
to be developed 20 years previously, Colombia variety. Yet, the adoption process 
was not completely successful115, which can be explained by the socio-economic 
structure of the coffee growers. On the one hand, they lived – and still live - in a 
subsistence economy basis, which meant that they could not afford the groves 
renewal. As was explained before, the time spam for a coffee plant to be productive 
is of three to five years. On the other hand, there was a lack of trust from the 
campesinos to the technicians in charge of the renewal process. Nonetheless, as a 
result of the good performance and resistance to coffee rust, in 1991 Colombia broke 
all previous production records registering a production of 18 million export bags of 
coffee. This production level has not been reached again (Cadena Gómez, 2005). In 
2005 an improved coffee variety was developed and tested, Castillo variety. Castillo 
variety is coffee rust resistant, has a 17% higher productivity than Caturra and 
Castillo varieties, and 83% of the total green coffee has also a larger size and density. 
These advantages resulted in an improvement of the crop profitability and 
industrialisation (FNC, 2012). Castillo variety was developed by Cenicafé 
crossbreeding Caturra variety and the Timor hybrid. It has seven regional sub-breeds 
adapted to the specific climatic conditions. After the expansion of coffee rust and 
coffee berry borer started in 2009 and having the most devastating effects in coffee 
                                                
115 “Of all domestic production, which is about 12 million bags of 60 kg (720,000 Tons of green 
coffee), the main cultivated variety is Caturra (43%), followed by the Colombia variety (26%). The 
remainder are mostly high bearing varieties as Typica and Bourbon.” (Puerta-Quintero, 2003, p. 2) 
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production in 2012, the FNC started an intensive program for the renovation of 
coffee plantations, renovating mostly Caturra coffee trees with the different Castillo 
varieties, raising the resistant plantations up to 54% of the total coffee grown in 
Colombia in 2012. The regional Castillo varieties were developed to adapt to the 
seven agro-climatic zones were coffee is grown in Colombia. Every regional breed 
was named after the experimental station where it was created116 (Cortina Guerrero, 
Moncada Botero, & Herrera Pinilla, 2012).  
Referring to the type of research conducted by Cenicafé, Dr. Gabriel Cadena says: 
We had time to do basic research, the one where immediate 
results are not expected and needs long term periods to be 
done. Cenicafé could do both, basic research on coffee 
genomics to develop disease and pest resistant varieties and 
plant physiology, and applied research on topics as ecological 
benefits and reduction of environmental pollution caused by 
coffee processing. Both modalities of research could be done 
simultaneously because while we were delivering results to 
farmers, we were doing basic science. (Gabriel Cadena, 
personal communication, January 15th, 2013) 
Other important research program of the centre was an integrated pest management 
program (IPM) created primarily to control the diffusion of coffee borer beetle. The 
first strategy was to generate a biological pest control through the insertion of natural 
enemies in the plantations, accompanied by better collection practices of ripe coffee 
berries, leaving the use of pesticides as the last resort, so the secondary effects for 
both humans and environment would be minimised. Also important, is the water 
management project. The pulping and treatment processes consume high amounts of 
clean water and impact directly on the final quality of the grain. The main result of 
this project was to reduce the consumption of water to up to a tenth part of what it 
was initially (from 40 to 4 litres/kg) in the decontamination of solid (pulp) and liquid 
(fermented mucilage) waste. These advances have contributed to environmental 
sustainability and have had a considerable positive economic impact for the coffee 
growers (Zambrano Franco, Rodríguez Valencia, & López Posada, 2011).   
                                                




After the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement117 in 1989, Cenicafé’s 
mission was completely focused on lowering production costs; producing better 
coffee varieties resistant to pests and diseases; and having higher rates of 
productivity. The producers association knew that the only way to mitigate 
fluctuations in international market prices and maintain coffee production as a viable 
business for the thousands of families depending on it was being innovative. 
Cenicafé has developed cutting-edge research useful not only for the coffee sector, 
but for the agriculture sector as a whole.118  
Given that Cenicafé was the first research centre in Colombia – it existed even before 
the creation of the Colombian Agriculture Institute (ICA) - it has had a long research 
tradition in the country and has always had the latest technologies and laboratories to 
develop basic and applied science related to the coffee plantations and its by-
products. On this subject, Dr. Néstor Riaño, senior researcher in Cenicafé and 
coordinator of the research program of coffee production and climatic variability 
who has worked for Cenicafé for 20 years, remembers: 
The latest equipment and latest technology entered the 
country through the National Federation of Coffee Growers, 
even when many universities did not even know the 
technology. And that was basically because Cenicafé 
researchers and the laboratory for coffee chemistry, which 
was very important, had the financial resources and the vision 
to have the latest instruments and practices. This shows how 
from the very beginning the sector believed and invested in 
research as a main strategy. (Néstor Riaño, personal 
communication, January 9th, 2013)  
                                                
117 The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) is controlled by the International Coffee Organization 
(ICO). The ICO was created in 1963 after the signature of the first ICA in 1962. “The general goals of 
the first four International Coffee Agreements (1962, 1968, 1976, 1983) and therefore of the ICO 
during that time were thus: to achieve reasonable balance between the supply and demand of the 
various types of coffee (Arabica and Robusta), to contribute to the economic development of producer 
countries, to maintain reasonable coffee prices, to encourage coffee consumption throughout the 
world, and to foster cooperation on issues related to coffee production” (Boudon, 2006, p. 840). In 
1989 when the 1983 ICA had to be renovated there was an “Indefinite suspension of quotas after the 
system breaks down under the pressure of competing demands from exporters for market shares under 
the new ICA then being negotiated. Backed by the United States, Central American states and Mexico 
press for a much bigger slice of the market at the expense of Brazil (which resists this) and of African 
producers” (International Trade Centre, 2011) 
118 The development of a coffee rust variety, Colombia variety and more recently an improved version 
of the Colombia variety, the Castillo variety represents by itself a radical innovation. Cenicafé was the 
first research centre in the world that developed such varieties.  
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One of the most important, and also criticised, projects developed by Cenicafé is the 
coffee genome. In 2003 a joint project led by Cenicafé with the participation of 
Cornell University, University of Maryland and the Institute de Recherche pour le 
Développement of France, was launched to study coffee, coffee berry borer and 
Beauveria bassiana fungus genome. The main objective of the project was to keep 
developing rust resistant coffee breeds. The permanent genetic improvement project 
has impacted directly productivity and profitability for coffee growers with the 
development of the breeds already described, all of them of the coffea Arabica 
family (Cadena Gómez, 2005). However, some have criticised it, given the great 
amount of financial resources required by the project and the slow pace for 
delivering results, including researchers within Cenicafé (personal communication, 
January 2013). The results have been conclusive: 
In the course of this work, there have been identified 95% of 
the coffee genes and described 90% of genes of the coffee 
rust, the coffee berry borer and the fungus Beauveria 
bassiana. Likewise, there is a molecular characterization of 
the Colombian Coffee collection or gene bank (80%) and 
there have been identified 70% of coffee berry borer and rust 
resistance genes, among other important results. This is 
certainly valuable information that is currently used in many 
disciplines and research projects within the Centre. (C. C. G. 
F. FNC, 2014b)  
The model of the research centre has been successful for training human resources. 
Many researchers start their careers in Cenicafé by developing their undergraduate 
dissertation in the centre. The centre also has master and doctoral students doing 
research projects according to the research areas and strategic interests of the centre. 
A mixture of basic and applied research has been always present in the evolution and 
reason for being of the centre. Dr. Gabriel Cadena, current Principal of Universidad 
de Manizales, one of the most important public universities in Colombia, and ex 
director of Cenicafé says: 
During the 21 years that I was the director of Cenicafé more 
than 400 students were trained in Cenicafé doing their 
undergraduate, masters or PhD thesis. We gave them the 
possibility to join any of the existing projects and their 
respective directors. Then the student, after selecting a 
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project, had a supervisor but he/she had to do the literature 
review, write the project, present the project to a research 
committee, and then be responsible for the execution of the 
project. Every year each student had to present a report, just 
the same as every researcher in the centre, and present the 
results of the project to the other researchers. Obviously this 
young researchers were extremely strengthened after being in 
the centre. (Gabriel Cadena, personal communication, 
January 15th, 2013) 
Up to 2013 the centre has 159 researchers distributed as can be seen in figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9. Research human resources composition Cenicafé 2013 
Source. Data presented by Dr. Huver Posada, Researcher Cenicafé, in October 20 of 2013.  
 
The centre has been the result of a long-term vision of the producers association from 
the start of the modern production of coffee in the first half of the 20th century. The 
development of varieties has been crucial for the sustainability of the sector and has 
preserved the coffee production as a profitable activity. A sustained training program 
for early career researchers mixed with a collaborative environment within the 
different areas of the centre and with other research centres has been a successful 
practice and model for other agriculture production chains. Even in the most difficult 
financial crisis for the sector, the research centre has been preserved as the main 
source of knowledge and innovation production.  
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5.2.4. Institutional Setting 
We explained in section 4.5. how the distribution of land has hindered the 
productivity of the agriculture sector in the country, affecting also the growth and 
strength of the coffee sector over the years. As it is argued by Fernandez-Muñoz 
(Fernández-Muñoz, 2014)  the lack of clarity about property rights during the 
colonial and post-colonial times had an impact on the way the coffee regions were 
structured and the success of some regions over others.119 Also, the way labour was 
structured during colonial times has had an impact on the relationships amongst the 
actors in the production chain replicating unequal and exploitative economic and 
social institutions. However, non-exploitation systems of labour, with clear wages 
and fair trade have proved to bring higher economic benefits (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012). Stable political and financial institutions in terms of regulation and 
surveillance, restriction of power from public servants and control over financial 
organisations is also important for the success of the different economic sectors.  In 
the Colombian coffee lands, the west-central region has been more successful in 
terms of production, as was seen earlier in this section, in part because of the land 
distribution and a production system based on small land owners with enough labour 
to work in the coffee plantations (Murillo Lozano, 2010). In the early 20th century, 
colonization of vacant lands in the departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío and 
Risaralda was made by two kind of social groups: independent miners in search for 
gold, and traders with enough money to start settlements around the regions. This 
new social order resulted in the appearance of new towns and settlements with an 
egalitarian land distribution based on small land units mainly dedicated to coffee 
production with clear trade and property rights. This historical process is known in 
Colombian history as the Colonización Antioqueña (López Toro, 2009). A tangible 
result of the impact of a positive institutional framework on the production and 
                                                
119 From 16th century when Spaniards started the colonization period until early 19th century when 
Colombia, as well as other colonial territories were independent from Spain, the distribution of land 
and property rights have followed in most of the Colombian regions the inherited colonial institutions. 
For the coffee regions, three structures of land distribution can be seen, one where the big haciendas 
predominated and were surrounded by small land parcels owned by campesinos; a second one where 
small families in need of land started a fierce fight to break the large extensions of land owned by one 
landlord, but without achieving formal property rights; and those regions where small growers and 
traders achieved to have legal property rights over the land, so large haciendas were less in number 
(Fernández-Muñoz, 2014, p. 220).   
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adoption of technological change can be seen in table 5.3. Municipalities that were 
part of Colonización Antioqueña experienced a higher mechanisation and 
introduction of modern techniques of farming when comparing per capita coffee 
plantations area. 
Municipalities with Coffee 
Plantations 
Coffee per capita area by 
municipality (1993/1997) 
Coffee per capita area with 
mechanisation by 
municipality (1993/1997) 
Colonización Antioqueña 0,152 0,121 
Rest of coffee municipalities 0,086 0,052 
Table 5.3. Comparison of coffee plantations in municipalities part of the colonización antioqueña 
and the rest of the country. 
Source. (Fernández-Muñoz, 2014, p. 221) 
Both the adoption of technological packages offered by the extension service of the 
Federation, and the economic and social structure of small pieces of land planted by 
independent campesino families has sustained the production levels of the sector. 
The coffee institutionality promoted by the Federation, and adopted to a greater 
extent by the coffee zone (Caldas, Risaralda and Quindío departments) of the 
country, has enabled increased productivity per hectare and in that way it has 
compensated, to some extent, for the constant price fluctuations affecting household 
income (Murillo Lozano, 2010). 
The sector is characterised by a very formal and hierarchical structure represented by 
the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC). The National Coffee Fund 
(FoNC) is an important component of the Federation since it provides funding for 
research and also keeps the whole formal structure working. The main purposes of 
the fund are: to provide an income stabilisation for the coffee producers, especially 
for the small ones; to fund research and development for the sector; to deliver better 
life conditions and welfare for coffee producers; and to support the national and 
international marketing strategies to promote the consumption of Café de Colombia 
(Espinal et al., 2005). However, the Fund has suffered de-capitalisation as a result of 
continuous crisis in world coffee prices, adverse weather effects, an unfavourable 
exchange rate, and entry of new competitors. As Fonseca explains: 
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During the nineties, the total assets of the Fund decreased by 
67%, from $ 4.8 trillion to $1.6 trillion and assets shrank by 
71% ($ 4.4 trillion to $ 1.3 trillion). This decline is mainly 
explained by the loss of major investments such as the Banco 
Cafetero, Corfioccidente and the settlement of the 
Grancolombiana Merchant Fleet, the declining of more than 
70% of the inventories of coffee and deficits generated during 
1991 -1993, 1995 and 2000-2001, besides low international 
prices. (Fonseca, 2003, p. 23)   
Most of the institutions created by the FNC to support growers have focused on 
providing the technical, commercial, and social support to make the business 
profitable. The main mechanisms created have been: transfer of the final selling price 
to the producer; promotion of coffee value sales; support for insertion to new 
markets; and a program for domestic consumption (Colombian Coffee Growers 
Federation, 2012). 
The price transfer to producers’ strategy has different programs. It was shown in 
figure 5.8 how the FoNC plays a central role in the coffee producers’ cooperatives 
sales. This is one of the mechanisms used by the Federation to transfer a higher final 
price to the first link of the production chain, the coffee growers. In 2011, there were 
34 coffee growers cooperatives120 with 540 purchase-points distributed in the 
different coffee regions. These cooperatives bought forty-one per cent of the total 
annual sales. The role of the cooperatives concerns the evaluation of the coffee 
quality and the final payment to the producers according to the coffee characteristics. 
For specialty coffees, the producers receive a second payment after the coffee cargo 
is sold to the final client, so the extra price is fairly distributed among the growers 
(Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2012). Also, the Federation has a coffee 
bonded warehouses company, Almacafé S.A. It provides logistics services to the 
Federation and other customers and products. Almacafé has expanded its services to 
determine the quality of parchment coffee according to Federation quality standards 
and customer requirements. It produces finished products so it offers services of 
                                                
120 The coffee cooperatives are private, non-profit organisations. They are governed by the solidarity 
sector and supervised by the superintendence of solidarity economy. They were created during the 
1960s to mitigate the coffee price manipulation of individual buyers of coffee. The cooperatives 
operate with resources from the National Coffee Fund and own resources and buy parchment and 
green coffee for the FNC.    
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threshing, classification, roasting, and milling, along with the packaging, transport 
and distribution of green coffee or final products. Through Almacafé operation in 
2010, threshing performance was substantially improved having higher volumes of 
green coffee from the industrial process of the parchment coffee, passing from a 
73.2% to 76.9% yield, which represented higher profits for the sector that positively 
impacts the sums received by the Fondo Nacional del Café (Colombian Coffee 
Growers Federation, 2012). There is also a mechanism to manage risk, which 
includes financial instruments to share the price fluctuations and expected production 
levels with buyers. So the scheme allows producers to fix a price and volume of 
coffee up to 6 months ahead. During 2011 the final prices paid to the producers were 
77% higher than the average price of coffee from 2006 to 2010 (Colombian Coffee 
Growers Federation, 2012).   
In terms of monetary and agricultural policies, two changes have affected coffee 
production: the cutting of subsidies through credit—coinciding with a severe price 
increase in placement rates in the early 1990s—and the partial withdrawal of state 
bodies and resources previously devoted to rural development (Forero Álvarez, 2010, 
p. 96). However, the sector has had more benefits and subsides than other production 
chains and other main economic sectors, along with preferential export taxes, which 
has been highly criticised. Dr. Marcela Meléndez, part of the coffee mission called 
by the national government in 2013, noted that:  
The activity in the [coffee] industry is not developed in a flat 
terrain of competition: there is an agent that is both 
competitor, policy maker and regulator of the market, who 
does not face the same level of risk in its business decisions 
than their competitors, because it is covered by public funds 
(our taxes) and that does not face the same tax obligations as 
their competitors. (Meléndez, 2014) 
The coffee institutionality, as it is called by the FNC, is going through a crisis that 
may culminate in a radical structural change. Although the sector has kept profits and 
expansion in the domestic and international markets, it is falling behind in its share 
of the Colombian economy and in the world coffee market. The strategy of selling 
specialty coffees is a good start to tackle the continuous falling of coffee prices, 
however the transition has not been quick enough and it represents less than one-fifth 
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of national coffee production. The tension remains while some defend the model 
followed by the FNC as a way to generate greater social benefits for the small coffee 
growers and others who claim that unless a liberalisation of the coffee market 
happens in the short-term with incursion in the growth of different kind of coffees, 
the robusta ones, the sector will suffer a vast reduction affecting thousands of 
families that live from coffee production. 
5.2.5. Knowledge and technology transfer, adoption, and 
validation model 
The knowledge and technology transfer, adoption and validation process followed by 
96% of the Colombia coffee growers (those associated to the FNC) has three 
fundamental pillars: Cenicafé, the extension service, and Fundación Manuel Mejía. 
For the purpose of knowledge and technology validation the FNC has a participative 
investigation program to link coffee growers, extensionistas121, and researchers. The 
strategy is based in on-site visits to farms to validate new coffee varieties, hybrid 
materials of corn for packaging and as alternative crop business, new coffee 
harvesting tools, and new and better methods for drying coffee. The K&T model 
followed by the Federation can be seen in figure 5.10. It is important to highlight that 
68% of coffee growers have only primary education, 19% have no formal education, 
7% have secondary education and 2% higher education. Also, 61% of the coffee 
growers are between 31 and 60 years old, which means that young generations 
coming from families dedicated to the coffee business have decided to diversify their 
economic activity leaving their hometowns and breaking the traditional cycle of 
having same family coffee growers generations. Furthermore, it means that the 
extension services have been adapted to supply the needs and learning capabilities of 
the population according to their age, education level and socio-economic level 
(Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2006). 
                                                
121 “An extensionista encourages dynamic thinking to the farmer and his7her family. He/she links the 
gremial, technical-economic, and social aspects in the interest of a competitive and sustainable coffee 




Figure 5.10. Knowledge and technology transfer, adoption and validation model for the coffee productive chain 




The Coffee Congress created the extension service in 1959 with the purpose of 
unifying training and technical assistance services. Up to 2012, there were 1,669 
trained professionals providing support and training to small, medium and large 
coffee growers. Currently, the service also includes programs to transfer managerial 
skills and financial support to have access to different funding sources with 
preferential interest rates. The service has been created to be comprehensive in the 
context and environment of coffee producers. In that sense, the focus of the 
professional trainers or ‘extensionistas’ is to provide financial advice, business 
management, and food security techniques along with the knowledge and technical 
transfer, adoption, and validation activities focus on the coffee plantations.  
The extension service is delivered through three major methods: individual contact 
(personal visits to farms), group meetings (method demonstrations, coffee growers 
meetings, results demonstrations, technical tour, field day, contests, videos), or mass 
dissemination (exhibitions, newsletters and brochures, newspaper articles, dedicated 
radio and TV programs). The service is funded with the tax paid by the coffee 
growers themselves (Fondo Nacional del Café), public funds, and some national and 
international resources coming from NGOs and international organisations. This 
service transfer the technical and applied knowledge developed by Cenicafé. 
However, it is a two-way relationship, because extensionistas provide feedback to 
Cenicafé researchers about the adoption and validation of techniques and varieties 
developed by the research centre and report new needs found in the field through the 
communication with the coffee growers (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 
2005). The main principle of the rural extension service is to provide training to the 
coffee grower and his/her family through efficient and proved techniques to raise the 
productivity and income level of producers. 
Fundación Manuel Mejía is a private non-profit educational organisation founded in 
1960 by the FNC and some of the companies owned by the Federation by that time. 
The foundation’s purpose is to provide classroom and virtual training to coffee 
growers and staff of coffee agribusinesses. Growers have access to these programs as 
part of their benefits of being part of the FNC, so do not have to pay any extra cost 
for the training. The main methodology in the educational project is learning by 
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doing. In that sense the foundation has an experimental farm to develop field 
practices and educational projects. After the coffee crisis of the 1990s, the foundation 
went through a restructuring process to become self-sustaining and to optimise 
resources by providing only focalised training according to specific needs. The 
recipients of the educational courses are: coffee growers and union leaders, technical 
and general staff of the FNC, Cenicafe staff, coffee cooperatives members, coffee 
growers’ children, and extensionistas. It offers tailor-made programs to satisfy 
specific needs of companies, and standard programs focus on three projects that are 
developed in alliance with other educational institutions: Rural youth education and 
rural development122; a national project to transform the technical and technological 
training123 in coffee regions, and a regional centre for higher education (CERES)124. 
It also offers distance education programs. Between 2004 and 2006 four programs 
under this modality were designed, one for food security for the coffee growers so 
they can produce food for their own consumption; solidarity economy to encourage 
associativity between producers; comprehensive management to produce quality 
coffee, which includes technical and managerial principles; and administrative and 
financial management of agricultural enterprises to manage the small coffee farms as 
productive enterprises. Also during this period virtual training courses were launched 
via ‘Blackboard’ a web-based learning management system (LMS). These courses 
are dedicated to extensionistas, Cenicafé researchers, and faculty of the foundation. 
Given the success of the virtual courses for technical staff of the FNC, a virtual 
classroom for coffee growers was designed mainly for giving further support to the 
technology transfer and adoption provided by the extension service (Fundación 
Manuel Mejía, 2008). The foundation has direct contact with Cenicafé and includes 
in its curriculums new knowledge developed by the research centre. This is one 
successful practice particular to the coffee production chain. The FNC has 
encouraged the training of specialised human resources according to sector needs and 
                                                
122 It is a project to formulate and validate an educational model for rural population with specific 
pedagogical tools to develop basic and work skills for the rural youth and with the main aim of 
expanding school coverage (Fundación Manuel Mejía, 2008).  
123 The objective is to improve quality, coverage and pertinence of the technical and technological 
education in the coffee regions. It integrates secondary education with higher education to train youth 
according to coffee sector requirements (Fundación Manuel Mejía, 2008). 
124 It is an educational centre in the town of Chinchiná. It offers formal education to underserved 
communities, especially to those within the coffee sector activities.  
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particularities. The Foundation was a tangible effort to complete the knowledge 
creation, accumulation and transfer cycle. The methodology of all programs is based 
on learning by doing techniques since it is orientated to education for work, and to 
fulfil specific desirable skills needed for the sector. The training is based on practice 
and done within the producers’ farms to see tangible results. This is undoubtedly a 
great success of the Federation and its organisations.  
An aspect that can be found within the coffee production chain, that is transversal to 
all economic sectors in the country and has been mentioned before, is the difficulty 
of having research agreements between the productive sector represented by the 
FNC, coffee business companies and the national universities. Again, it is easier to 
have MoU with foreign universities, because processes are standardised and there are 
specialised technology transfer units for extension services. This hits directly at one 
of the biggest weaknesses identified by the MEAS team125 in the assessment of the 
extension service of the FNC (Mueller et al., 2013). There are no strong links with 
universities, so the overall capacity to train trainers or extensionistas could be 
dramatically improved if there were more alliances with higher education institutions 
that have agriculture research groups.  
The whole model is supported by the Coffee Information System (SICA – for its 
acronym in Spanish). It is a geo-referenced database with national coverage. It 
contains information on the coffee parcels with their geographic coordinates and 
altitude above sea level, and also information about coffee growers’ socio-economic 
variables, farms, and production characteristics. The system is fed by the extension 
service and also provides services to the coffee growers themselves to have detailed 
information about their farms and to have direct contact with the extension 
technicians (Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, 2006). There is another service 
that has been implemented from 2012. The FNC established alliances with 
                                                
125 This was a service hired by the FNC to assess the extension service from January to May 2013. 
MEAS, Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services, is composed by researchers from the 





technology companies126, banks, and the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technologies to provide tablets with special applications preloaded 
(management of the plantation, specific climatic information, site specific agriculture 
information, daily internal coffee price, latest news on the coffee market, technical 
information, amongst others) to support the whole coffee production chain. The main 
aim of this program is to provide timely and accurate information to extensionistas, 
coffee growers and people in the distribution and storage business. It also brings 
connectivity and Internet access to coffee growers in the whole coffee region (Luis 
Fernando Samper, personal communication, January 15th, 2013). However, the 
program is still under test and has not reached total coverage of the coffee actors. In 
this regard, external researchers have advised the FNC to keep up their effort to 
“increase and expand investments in communications and knowledge-sharing 
technology” (Mueller et al., 2013, p. viii). 
Given the number of small coffee producers (more than 550,000), campesinos living 
on subsistence economy, the process of providing technical assistance and 
technology transfer methods is challenging and not sufficient with the high demand it 
presents. The service is good, but more extensionistas and technical personnel are 
needed to access all the coffee farms in the different regions of the country. This was 
one of the main aspects found in the evaluation of the extension services of the FNC 
(Mueller et al., 2013). But it is not enough to extend the service; it is also necessary 
to provide more financial support to these producers. Small coffee growers have 
scarce resources so planning in advance about financial decisions is problematic 
given their subsistence economy. This aspect is highlighted by César Echeverry, 
currently General Director of Supracafé, the most important company producing 
special coffees in Colombia, and who has been a coffee grower himself, 
representative at municipal, departmental, and national level of the FNC, and director 
of technological development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
of Colombia: 
                                                
126 The FNC signed up alliances with Samsung and Banco de Bogotá, among other organisations to 
access latest generation tablets at better prices and to provide special loans for the their acquisition by 
the coffee growers. 
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“There is much room for improvement. We have 550,000 
families who could not even appropriate technology that was 
available 30 or 40 years ago. This responds to levels of 
education, isolation, economic [and] subsistence problems. 
The extensionista can say to the campesino: ‘if you use 
fertilisers you can raise the productivity’. They have known 
that for 30 or 40 years, but when the householder has to make 
a decision, he/she says: ‘well, I buy the bulk of fertiliser or I 
buy food for my family’. The decision is obvious. Those are 
the kind of decisions that all campesinos have to make daily. 
So there is technological offer, but not enough instruments 
for technology adoption.” (César Echeverry, General Director 
Supracafé, January 9th, 2012)  
The process of technological change and extension to coffee growers has had some 
flaws, especially in gaining access to the most remote coffee farms in the coffee zone 
region. This had a major impact on the crisis in 2011, when the climatic conditions, 
the Niño phenomenon followed by La Niña, devastated more than half of the coffee 
production. This could have been prevented by the renewal of coffee plantations with 
varieties resistant to coffee rust, mostly when Cenicafé developed them in the mid-
20th century. So we are facing a complex problem of the viability of the business 
given the poverty conditions of the coffee growers. In the coffee sector the challenge 
is not only to generate knowledge and technology to be transferred to the producers, 
but also the availability of subsides and preferential credit lines so coffee growers 
can effectively access to the knowledge and technology available. Resources can be 
available, but lack of structural conditions (transportation, roads, availability of basic 
public services as water, light, medical services, housing, education) can hinder 
completely the K&T transfer, adoption and validation model. 
5.3. Sectoral Cases – Sugarcane 
The sugarcane sub-sector is one of the most successful production chains within the 
agriculture sector. It is not only an up-and-coming sector within the Colombian 
context, but also important within the world market since Colombia has the highest 
productivity in production of sugar per cultivated hectare in the world. According to 
the International Sugar Association (ISA) in 2013 Colombia was the twelfth largest 
sugar producer in the world with a 1.42% of the world total sugar production. The 
most important producers of sugar in the world are Brazil, India, the EU, China, 
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Thailand, the USA, Russia, Mexico, Pakistan, Australia, and Indonesia (Asocaña, 
2014a). This responds to the proportion of number of hectares of sugar cane 
cultivated in each country. In 2007, there were 22 million of hectares cultivated in 
the world, of which 0.22 million were grown in Colombia (Colima, 1998). 
The added value of agriculture as a percentage of GDP in Colombia has remained 
constant at around 6% from 2010 onwards127. The importance of the sugarcane sub-
sector for the national economy is prominent. Sugar mills generate, directly and 
indirectly, more than 180,000 jobs, with an average wage 51% higher than the 
average industrial wage128. Also, 90% of tax revenues from more than 30 
municipalities in the Colombian southwest depend upon the activity of the sector 
(Arbeláez et al., 2010).  
It was highlighted in a study made by the Economic Commission for Latin American 
and the Caribbean that “[t]he Colombian sugar industry suggests having a balanced, 
incremental, consistent and integrated development in a particularly intense political, 
social and economic environment, which is configured as a conglomerate, making it 
an interesting case study.” (Economic Comission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002, p. 7). We will explore the characteristics of the sector and 
its success and failure factors both within the national and agriculture sector levels.  
5.3.1. Industrial Setting, Technological Evolution, and 
Dynamic Complementarities 
Sugarcane first arrived in Colombia around 1538 through Spanish colonization in the 
16th century. Three sugar mills began their operations around 1560, near the Amaime 
River on the other side of Cauca River. By the end of 17th century many more sugar 
mills had been established and were successfully producing sugar. Plantations were 
                                                
127 The percentage share of agriculture has decreased by about two points from 2000. In the case of 
manufacturing, where the production of sugarcane derivatives is included, there has been a slower 
decrease, having 4.1% of the GDP in 2000 to 3.6% of the GDP in 2013. This lost of participation in 
the total GDP has been gained by sectors as mining, construction, and services. (Data retrieved from 
Agronet, the digital platform of the MADR: 
http://www.agronet.gov.co/www/htm3b/repparamnuke_2011.asp?cod=134. 
128 “The average monthly wage per worker of sugar mills was $2,6 million pesos [around £800], while 
the average salary of the manufacturing industries, according to the Annual Manufacturing Survey 
was $1,3 million pesos [around £400]” (Arbeláez et al., 2010, p. 37). That represents around. 
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not large, but planting and harvesting times were planned in advance. By 1721 there 
were already thirty-three sugar mills distributed in the Cauca River Valley. Besides 
the production of sugar, other sugarcane by-products as molasses and distilled 
liquors called ‘aguardientes’ were commercialized within the region. In the early 20th 
century the technology used for processing sugarcane was improved. Steam boilers 
operating with a central engine were introduced to replace the used animal traction 
mills for extraction of sugar. Farms were modernized and were transformed to 
mechanised sugar mills, had better roads, improved transportation methods and the 
introduction of specialised techniques and machines to get different sugarcane by-
products, which allowed higher productivity. 
In 1901 the first imported mill using steam for cane milling 
and for getting centrifuged sugar was put into operation. With 
it the traditional methods hitherto used for the production of 
panela and sugar were left behind (Economic Comission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002, p. 15) 
However, sugar was still imported to the country. In 1927 an agricultural 
experimental station (EEA) was created in Palmira, a small town in Cauca Valley. 
New sugarcane varieties were cultivated and plant hybridization was tried. In 1929 
an expert Puerto Rican scientist on sugarcane cultivation, Carlos Chandon, visited 
the region introducing different sugarcane breeds with a higher content of sucrose. 
Latterly, this visit would be known as the ‘Chandon Mission’. By 1940 there were 
sugar mills in different parts of the country, but these would gradually disappear 
because they could not compete with the ideal climatic and soil conditions for 
growing sugarcane in the Cauca Valley. However, as the production of sugar rose 
and became enough to satisfy the domestic market, sugar imports were phased out by 
1948 (Ramos, 1995).  
By the end of the 1950s there were 19 mills in the region, however due to economic 
and competence factors such as the cost of machinery versus sales participation in 
the domestic market and better infrastructure conditions as roads, electricity and 
water in some departments over others, the number dropped to 18 in 1978 and 16 in 
1981. The area planted in number of hectares achieved sustained growth; passing 
from 18,625 ha in the early 1950s to 130,200 cultivated hectares by 1979.  This 
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coincides with two of the main developmental phases in the sugarcane sector: the 
first between 1901 and 1960 with the emergence and structuring of the sector, and 
the second from 1960 onwards during which the sector experienced a process of 
expansion and modernization.  Other important factors affecting the development of 
the sugarcane industry were: the allocation of an export quota of 5,000 tonnes of 
sugar through the International Sugar Agreement between 1953 and 1959129; the 
Cuban Revolution in 1959 that transformed the sector into an exporter, mainly to the 
United States; the establishment of the sugarcane growers association, Asocaña, in 
1959 as a result of the demand of sugar from international markets; and internal 
regulations on the production, storage, and handling of surplus in the domestic and 
foreign markets (Guardiola Mora, 1995). 
The sugar cane lands are distributed within the same geographical region of the 
country, called “Valle del Cauca” or the Cauca Valley located in the south-west of 
Colombia and composed of three departments: Cauca, Valle, and Risaralda. Forty-
seven municipalities within these three departments grow sugarcane. In this 
geographic area there are pronounced climatic differences in temperature and 
humidity between day and night, which is a needed condition for the concentration of 
sucrose in the sugarcane plant. Such climatic conditions allow for sugarcane 
harvesting and processing throughout the year, in sharp contrast to other sugarcane 
producing areas of the world where the cane harvest lasts between four and six 
months. As a result of these year-round harvesting conditions, the fixed costs of 
investment in factory, field equipment and working capital per ton of cane produced, 
are half or even a third part of those in the sugarcane areas of the world (Asocaña, 
2014a). In terms of the commercialization of sugarcane derivatives:  
Of the total production of sugar, 43% goes to the export 
market and the remaining 57% to the domestic market; of this 
percentage, 53% is for direct human consumption and the 
other 47% is used as raw material in the process of adding 
value (Economic Comission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002, p. 10).  
                                                
129 The international sugar agreement was signed in London in 1953. Its main purpose was to ensure 




Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the average production of the main derivatives of sugar cane 
from 2000 until 2013. In the case of Ethanol, the statistics are presented from 2006 
given that the first ethanol plants were opened at the end of 2005. 
 
Sugarcane 














2013 21,104,791 2,269,909 1,365,906 898,669 381,898 311,598 48,930 
 Table 5.4. Average of sugarcane, sugar and molasses production from 2000 to 2013 
Source. Data compiled from Asocaña Statistics. 
 
 
Alcohol Fuel (Thousands of litters) 
 
Production 
Sales to the domestic 
market* 
Average 2006 
– 2013 313,376 317,058 
Table 5.5. Average of alcohol fuel production 2006 – 2013 
* Sales includes the volume of ethanol with addition of about 2% of denaturing (gasoline) 
Source. Data compiled from Asocaña Statistics. 
According to Cenicaña’s information (Cenicaña, 2014), the sugarcane planted area in 
Cauca Valley during 2013 was 225,560 ha. This land area is divided into small lots 
called ‘suertes’ (luck/fortune in English). Each suerte has an average area of 5 
hectares. Of those hectares, 86% was harvested and used by the sugar mills and the 
remaining hectares were directly harvested by sugarcane growers. Concerning land 
property, 76% of the land is owned by more than 2,700 sugarcane growers and the 
remaining 24% belongs to the mills of the region: Tumaco, Incauca, Carmelita, 
Maria Luisa, Mayagüez, Pichichi, Providencia, Risaralda, Sancarlos, La Cabaña, 
Manuelita, Riopaila, Castilla (two plants) and Lucerna. Sugarcane growers provide 
the raw cane to the sugar mills through long-term supply contracts (generally 
between 5 and 10 years). This corresponds to the crop production cycle and the 
required investment for the planting and harvesting process (return on investment). 
Sugar mills are the main consumers of sugarcane in the region, having control 
directly or indirectly of virtually the whole sugar market in Cauca Valley. This 
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aspect is highlighted in the sugarcane cluster study done by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: 
However, because of the type of contract between mills and 
growers (lease, joint accounts, suppliers administration), the 
mills retain control or direct management of 50% of the 
cultivated area.” (Economic Comission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002, p. 22) 
There are fourteen sugar mills, five of which produce alcohol fuel.  Traditionally, the 
main product produced by distilleries was sugar, however, the sugarcane derivatives 









Table 5.6. Distribution of companies in the sugarcane industry 
Source: (Cruz Aguilar, 2010) 
Since 2006 there has also been the production of ethanol as a main biofuel for 
domestic consumption. Current installed capacity allows for the production of 
1,050,000 litres of ethanol per day. In 2013, according to Asocaña statistics 
(Asocaña, 2014b), there were produced 387,859 thousand of litters by the biofuels 
plants in Cauca Valley. That represent nearly 102.5 millions of US gallons. 
According to the Renewable Fuels Association130, in 2013 the USA, the main fuel 
ethanol producer had a production of 13,300 million of gallons, followed by Brazil 
with 6,267 millions of gallons. Colombia is not competing for international market 
sharing; the domestic market consumes the fuel ethanol production. Moreover, fuel 
                                                
130 See: http://ethanolrfa.org/pages/World-Fuel-Ethanol-Production  
Food Beverage and Liquor Firms 40 
Co-Gen Power Plants 2 
Chemical Plants 3 
Specialised Suppliers 50 
Business Associations  88 
Workers Co-Op 1 
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ethanol producers are only allowed to export their product if the domestic demand is 
fully stocked131. The total production of alcohol fuel in Colombia is done exclusively 
in Cauca Valley through the bagasse processing (Unidad de Planeación Minero 
Energética, 2009). Also, there has been experimentation in using biomass to produce 
other sources of energy. Yet, sugar is the main product. In Colombia, four main types 
of sugar are sold: raw, white, special white (specially produced for the baking 
industry) and refined. Not all mills produce the four types, that way they have 
differential markets and specialities for other industry sectors. 
A map of firms and non-firms organizations from the growing of the crop until the 
final commercialization of the finished products is presented in Figure 5.11. 
 
                                                





Figure 5.11. Sugarcane productive chain structure 




Cenicaña, the centre for research of sugarcane, has identified 156 relatively stable 
agro-ecological zones defined by biophysical factors in Valle del Cauca (Figure 
5.12). For each of these agro-ecological zones Cenicaña has a complete 
characterization of weather (hydrological balance), and soil (humidity groups and 
homogeneous soil groups). These databases allow having a site-specific 
agriculture132. 
 
Figure 5.12. Agro-ecological zoning for the cultivation of sugarcane in the Cauca River Valley 
Source. (Cenicaña, 2011) 
Having structured and comprehensive information of the subsector is a differential 
aspect of the sugarcane production chain. Information is centralised in Cenicaña’s 
databases, but databases are fed by different information sources like Asocaña, 
Tecnicaña, Corpoica, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the National 
                                                
132 Agriculture based on data about humidity, nutrients, soil composition for specific parcels. These 
data is usually processed by specialized software to determine precise procedures for particular crops.  
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Geographic Institute Agustín Codazzi, and the National Institute of Hydrology, 
Meteorology and Environmental Studies (IDEAM). Cenicaña provides information, 







Comparative analysis of the productivity of 
sugarcane breeds harvested in every agro-ecological 
zone. Users can see information for specific time 
periods, sugar mills, agro-ecological zone, age and 
number of crop cuttings. 
Statistical analysis Experimental and commercial information used in 
the different intervention areas. It includes design of 
experiments, sampling design, spatial statistics, and 
data analysis. 
Economic analysis In order to ensure the profitability of technology 
products generated in the research process, Cenicaña 
sets economic criteria for project evaluation, 
development of impact studies, and efficiency. It 
includes: costs, economic evaluation of research, 
analysis of business information, impact assessment, 





Cenicaña builds communication technology transfer 
strategies embracing the principles of social 
marketing to meet the demands of producers with 
technological solutions. The model is based on a 
census of the producers that includes different socio-
economic variables. To keep information up-to-date 
there are dynamic tracking studies using surveys and 
direct interviews with producers participating in the 




AMN stations Meteorological and climatological information of the 
entire region of Cauca Valley across 34 
meteorological stations. Reports by hour, day and 
week. Wind-speed information, meteorological 
maps, and tracking of specific climate effects (El 





It is an automated application developed by 
Cenicaña to facilitate the calculation of the water 
balance in the soil and formulate the irrigation 
programming required for the cultivation of 
sugarcane. This tool is useful for saving water; 
therefore, its aim is to achieve a sustainable 
management of water resources. 
Humidity In-house software developments 
It is an online system to determine the humidity 
group that better describes the soil humidity 
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The geographic database contains mapping with 
precise boundaries of the farms and lots harvested by 




Renova Economic report on the additional net gain, valued at 
the time of the consultation, that would deliver a 




SEF – In-house 
software development 
The Fertilization Expert System (SEF) is a tool that 
brings together the expert knowledge of the 
nutritional requirements of sugarcane in the Cauca 
River Valley, according to Cenicaña’s research. The 
SEF provides fertilizer recommendations and 
amendments to cane production units with 
specifications for doses, times, sources and methods 
of application. 
Table 5.7. Information services provided for the Cauca River Valley sugarcane sector. 
Source. Compiled information by the author from Cenicaña’s intranet and interviews. 
The development, use, adaptation and validation of technologies for sectoral 
requirement and evolution have been progressive and have allowed producers to 
maximise production and revenues. Cenicaña has developed three research programs 
to support producers’ needs: varieties, agronomics, and factory processes.133 The 
varieties program focuses on seeds and breed selection, supporting the adoption of 
specific varieties for every agro-ecological zone. It also includes modern molecular 
techniques for disease detection. The agronomy program is intended to undertake 
research aimed at reducing production costs by developing the technology required 
to improve the productivity and quality of sugarcane. One of the main results of this 
research program is the reduction in water consumption for the sugarcane fields. This 
has been achieved by combining different irrigation techniques. Finally, the factory 
processes research program develops knowledge and technology for the optimization 
of industrial processes as energy consumption, integration of field and industrial 
operations of the sugar and alcohol production plants, automatic process control, and 
information management. Amongst the most significant results of this program are a 
50% reduction of water consumption in plants, a lower percentage of sucrose in the 
sugarcane bagasse maximising the utilization of cane for sugar production, and 
                                                




improvements to the processes of fermentation and production of ethanol (Cenicaña, 
2014). As a result, there have been significant improvements in the harvesting 
technology. A shift from burning cane fields to cleaner production techniques has 
been a main issue from the 1990s onwards. Also, the introduction of mechanical 
harvesters and specialised machinery in the sugar mills has positively impacted on 
the manufacture of final products.  
Application of improved harvesting techniques like alternate furrow irrigation, water 
balance, reduced tillage, application of ripeners and biological pest control are part of 
the most significant developments in the sector. Most technological advances are 
centred around the improvement of land adaptation; diseases and pest control; 
creation of new varieties according to site-specific agriculture requirements and 
intended use of the crop; fertilization with use of chemical and non-chemical 
products; crop irrigation techniques and equipment; cane maturation to have shorter 
harvest cycles; and cane harvesting process (Cock, Luna, & Isaacs, 1995). 
Within the mills there have been significant improvements as well. The use of 
specialised electronic machinery, in-house laboratories for pest control, higher 
production of sucrose, replacement of steam turbines by hydraulic motors, and better 
processes in molasses production has allowed for growth in productivity. The other 
component of the sugarcane processing is the area related to biofuels. With the 
introduction of specific sugarcane varieties for alcohol generation and modern 
production plants, the business strategy has been expanded.  
All of these improvements and the investment in research and development has 
resulted in the highest productivity in the sugarcane agroindustry worldwide (See 
Figure 5.13) in terms of tons of cane per hectare (TCH) and tons of sucrose per 
hectare (TSH). Productivity has doubled in the past 25 years; there is a 50% 





Figure 5.13. Sugarcane productivity in the world 2002-2007 by main sugar producers. 
Source. (Cenicaña, 2011) 
5.3.2. Interactions amongst Firms and Organizations: 
Type and Structure 
Synergic and collaborative work is one distinguishing aspect of the sugarcane sector. 
No organization works in isolation from the others. The fact that sugar and biofuel 
production is concentrated in the same geographical area is an advantage, and has 
helped growers to organize themselves better, not only in terms of production and 
logistics, but also in the definition of sectorial strategic vision and a consequent 
research agenda. The peculiar organization of the sugarcane subsector could be 
characterised as a cluster134, in the sense of horizontal and vertical cooperation. As it 
is explained by Schmitz (Schmitz, 2000), there is bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation at the vertical and horizontal levels (see table 5.8). In the sugarcane 
subsector there is bilateral cooperation between sugar mills to optimize financial and 
knowledge resources using joint organizations for international and domestic sugar 
commercialisation, Ciamsa and Dicsa respectively, and joint research programs with 
                                                
134 “…the existence of a cluster can only be acknowledged when the existence of intelligent 
communities is evident, and these communities have strategic capabilities to arrange and manage a 
shared vision; to guide changes and ensure the creation of knowledge-based competitive advantages; 
and there is a high command in the global value chain to which the cluster belongs.” (Economic 
Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002, p. 24) 
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Cenicaña’s collaboration. Sugar mills operate also in block in front of the 
government to intervene in the definition of sectoral policies. Vertical bilateral 
collaboration can be seen between providers and clients in the form of joint alliances 
for specialised services, machinery acquisition, and consultancy processes. 
Multilateral horizontal cooperation is seen in the existence of different sectorial 
associations as Asocaña, Procaña and Tecnicaña [A description of these association 
is given below]. And finally, multilateral vertical cooperation can be seen in the links 
between the production chain and the agriculture sector, and also in the relationships 
between the associations with Colciencias, Corpoica, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, other National Agriculture Research Centres (CENIs), and 
different regional and national entities (Economic Comission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean   ECLAC, 2002).  
Cooperation Bilateral Multilateral 
Horizontal Sharing of some activities Sectorial association 
Vertical Improvements in the relationships among 
producers (providers and clients) 
Alliances between the chains of a 
local value chain 
Table 5.8. Cooperation types. 
Source. Adapted from (Schmitz, 2000).  
The central actors in the productive chain are the sugar mills, and their operation is 
highly integrated with non-firm organization such as the producers associations, the 
growers, and R&D centres, particularly with Cenicaña.  
The cluster is characterized by a high degree of cooperation 
between participants. Formal and informal relationships exist 
so that sugar mills can unite forces to deal with suppliers, 
train their employees, use the same distribution channels, and 
share information. There is also a high degree of forward and 
backward cooperation between sugar mills, consumers and 
suppliers. Cooperation is generally seen through established 
contracts, for example in labour outsourcing, equipment 
repairs or consulting services.(Dueñas, Morales, Nannig, 
Noriega, & Ortiz, 2007, p. 26) 
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However, this shows as well the power that sugar mills have within the sector, which 
has caused unrest among some sugarcane producers who claim that Asocaña, the 
Association of Sugarcane Growers of Colombia, only represents the interests of the 
sugar mills and not of the small and medium sugarcane growers. Procaña, the 
Colombian Association of sugarcane producers and providers, represents the small 
and medium independent sugarcane growers, and through this association there have 
been several quarrels with the sugar mills. During 2007, the president of Procaña, Mr 
José Vicente Urrutia, said: “management of this entity [Sugar Price Stabilisation 
Fund –FEPA-], which is in the hands of Asocaña, has allowed the sugar mills the 
deed of the domestic sugar market and it has barred the assembly of new production 
plants in the country” (País, 2007). As a response, seven sugar mills instituted a 
formal complaint to the Colombian Superintendence of Industry and Commerce 
against Procaña and Azucari, the Association of Sugarcane Growers of Risaralda, by 
collective pricing in sugarcane with the direct involvement of these associations. The 
accusation is unfair competition and violation of the rules of free competition. The 
complaint was approved by the Superintendence and formal investigations were 
opened to Procaña and Azucari, and against their legal representatives in 2010135.  
Although there are horizontal and vertical cooperation between actors of the 
production chains, there are unconformities between sugarcane growers and mills 
and rigid supply and demand relationships between them causing a high 
interdependency. 
13 sugar mills located in the geographic valley of the Cauca 
River, process 99.7% of the total production of sugar cane in 
the country, implying that the growers negotiate only 0.3% of 
its product with other market players such sugar trapiches 
[artisanal sugar mills] (Superintendencia de Industria y 
Comercio, 2010) 
5.3.3. Demand 
Demand for sugar (in its different forms) has been characterized by surplus and 
deficit mismatches with the world market. There was a high surplus of sugar in 2006 
                                                
135 Resolution 7580 of 2010. Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. Superintendence of 
Industry and Commerce.  
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that affected the international prices, and from 2009 the sugar production has grown 
faster than consumption (See Figure 5.14). As a result, mills have accumulated large 
stocks of sugar: 
After a fourth consecutive season of large global surplus, 
world sugar prices weakened in late 2013. Market 
fundamentals provide little support to prices during the 
remaining months of the current season (1 October 2013 to 
30 September 2014). World sugar production is now 
expected to grow less rapidly at the beginning of the outlook 
period, signalling the end of the surplus phase in the world 
sugar cycle. But any world sugar price recovery is likely to 
be muted in the short term by the accumulation of large 
global stocks in a number of countries since the beginning of 
the surplus phase in 2011. (OECD, 2014a) 
 
Figure 5.14. Relationship between sugar price and production in the world market. 
Source. (Asocaña, 2014a) 
 
The international sugar prices are defined in the stock markets of New York for raw 
sugar, and London for white sugar. There are other markets for different types of 
sugar and niches, but the prices are traded mostly in these two stock exchanges. The 
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price volatility depends on the movements of supply and demand and the 
protectionist policies of producing countries (ISO, 2013). 
The sugarcane market in Colombia is free, so exports and imports have no tariff 
barriers. With only 1.1% of the total world sugar production, Colombia is a price 
taker, so the price fluctuations directly affect not only the exports, but also the price 
in the domestic market. Additionally, there has been a sustained increase in the sugar 
imports volume, which has caused a sharp deterioration in financial revenues and 
margins of the mills, and therefore of cane growers (Asocaña, 2014a). However, 
Colombia, as part of the Andean Community136 (AC) adopted in 1995 a 
comprehensive price band system known, as the Andean Price Band System (APBS), 
to control domestic price instability in some agriculture products, sugar (raw and 
white) included. It is basically a variable levy system where there are price floors and 
ceilings to buffer international price shocks. This has been beneficial in overcoming 
crises caused by strong price volatility, but the gains have been smaller than were 
expected. “For rice and sugar producers…the APBS has induced greater stability in 
real incomes and associated welfare gains, though these gains are relatively small” 
(Villoria & Lee, 2002, p. 11). Through the APBS the government controls the 
domestic price for sugar to protect the sugar mills production and stability. Sugar 
mills export part of their production (around 40%) to external markets but getting 
usually lower sugar prices than the domestic sugar price.  
[I]n 2002 the reference price for imported raw sugar 
fluctuated between 234 and 289 US$/ton, values 
corresponding to the floor and ceiling of the price band; 
while the international price (trading in New York, 
considered as the free market price) stood at 141.3 US$/ton. 
For white sugar, in the same year, the domestic wholesale 
price was 496 US$/ton while the international FOB price in 
the London market only reached US$203/ton (Prada Owen, 
2004, p. 1) 
Besides the APBS, a Stabilization Fund for Sugar Prices (FEPA – for its acronym in 
Spanish) was created in 2001. The intention was preventing future falls in the price 
of sugar, after the global sugar overproduction in 1999 that affected the domestic 
                                                
136 Group of 4 South American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
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market. The FEPA controls the sugar offer, so the mills receiving a price above the 
price weighted transfer gains to those mills with prices below the weighted price 
through the FEPA. The purpose of the fund is to prevent the fall of the domestic 
sugar price. Since the domestic sugar price is higher than the international price, the 
FEPA offset the mills that have higher sales in the international market, with those 
that have a higher proportion of sales in the domestic market and therefore have 
higher profits. The FEPA has a weighted average price of all sugar sales, so those 
sugar mills that get higher prices than the FEPA price for sugar transfer the 
difference to the fund in order to compensate to those sugar mills that have prices 
bellow the FEPA price (Prada Owen, 2004). The way that the FEPA intervenes in the 
Colombian sugar market can be seen in Figure 5.15: 
 
Figure 5.15. Role of FEPA in the Colombian sugar market 
Source. Modified from (Prada Owen, 2004, p. 3) 
The supply and demand dynamics for sugar in the domestic and international 
markets have caused a shift in the mills strategy towards the production of other 
products derived from the sugarcane. “The core business of the cluster has been 
migrating from sugar to sugar sub-products. Every sub-product in the cluster (sugar, 
bagasse, molasses and cachaza) occupies the same economic relevance and helps 
diversify the economic structure of the cluster.” (Dueñas et al., 2007) The total 
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production of ethanol produced by the mills in Cauca Valley is absorbed by the 
domestic market. In 2001, Law 693 regulated and approved the entry of alcohol fuels 
and other fuel sources, as alternatives for the composition of the country’s energy 
basket. From 2008, gasoline composition has 10% of ethanol and the intended use 
should rise up to 85% of ethanol and 15% of fossil fuel (Unidad de Planeación 
Minero Energética, 2009). This has clearly opened a new business opportunity and 
dynamism for the sugarcane cluster.  However, as it happens in the case of 
production of sugar, the guaranteed domestic market137 for the fuel alcohol has 
prevented the distilleries to be innovative in their production and higher quality of 
ethanol produced. There is not a specialised demand that pushes the suppliers138 (in 
the Colombian case the sugar mills of the Cauca region) to be more innovative in 
their products, either to have higher incentives to differentiate from their domestic 
competitors.  
The final price paid to the sugarcane growers is set depending on the sucrose 
extracted from the plant in the case of sugar production or the litters of ethanol 
produced in the case of biofuels. Then, the final payment to the sugarcane growers is 
made according to fixed or variable participations of the crop yield. There are 
different forms of contracts between growers and mills. A description of the kinds of 
contract and payment modalities can be seen in table 5.9:  
Type of Contract Description Payment 
Purchase of production Between grower and mill. The 
grower is responsible of the 
planation until the cut-off stage. 
• Kilos of sugar per ton of 
cane produced 
• Percentage of sugar per ton 
of cane produced 
• Combination of the two. 
Production Participation Farm owner and mill agree 
beforehand a set participation 
on the sugar produced by ton of 
Kilos of sugar per ton of cane 
produced. 
                                                
137 This aspect is highlighted by Mr Jorge Bendek, president of the National Federation of Biofuels of 
Colombia: “The biofuel market has been favourable. Everything that is produced is consumed. There 
are not negative variations that we need to worry about.” (Retrieved from: 
http://www.fedebiocombustibles.com/v3/nota-web-id-1992.htm, December 10th, 2014) 
138 “Demand sophistication in Colombia is low. While most developed nations have fifteen types of 
sugar quality, Colombia produces only four types: raw, white, white special and refined. This is a 
result of the quality specifications demanded by sugar-based industries such as food and beverages. 
As competition in these markets intensifies, the specifications will increase and therefore the demand 




sugarcane. The mill or a third 
party is responsible for the 
plantation 
Land tenure The mill or a third party rent an 
extension of land and are 
responsible for the plantation. 
• Kilos of sugar per monthly 
leased gross area. 
• Fixed monthly fee. 
Plantation administration The grower signs a contract up 
with the mil for the sugarcane 
plantation administration 
Mill charges a percentage of the 
administrative costs. 
 Table 5.9. Contract modalities and payments between growers and sugar mills. 
Source. Information gathered from the author by interviews and Finagro139 information. 
Different modalities of production, associations between growers and mills, and a 
balance between demand and supply have resulted in the development of 
sophistication from the start of the chain. Since the sugarcane produced has to meet 
high quality standards and meet a minimum production of sugar per ton of harvested 
sugarcane plant, the modernisation of the sector has evolved rapidly, so has the 
formal type of contracts between growers and sugar mills. However, the sugarcane 
by-products demanded by final industries like food, beverages and liquors are not 
sophisticated, so the sugar mills do not innovate either in their final products.  
The production and commercialization process from the delivery of the sugarcane to 
the sugar mills, to the sale of processed derivatives to the domestic and international 
market can be seen in figure 5.16. The sugar mills pay Asocaña 0.65% of the sale 
price of the derivatives, regardless of the type of contract they have with the 
producers. This tax is deducted directly from the sugar mills to the farmers. In this 
way, the payment collection is easier and more organized, since there are more than 
2700 growers in Cauca Valley (Alvaro Amaya, personal communication, April 24th, 
2012).
                                                
139 State agency for supporting the agriculture sector through projects funding. More information can 





Figure 5.16. Pricing model from the raw plant to the final product and the profit return to sugar mills and farmers. 





5.3.3.1. Panela as Another Sub-Product of Sugarcane 
There is another product for domestic consumption derived from sugarcane, which is 
the panela. Panela is a product derived from unrefined whole cane sugar. It is a solid 
form of sucrose derived from the boiling and evaporation of sugarcane juice. It is 
used to sweeten food and drinks. The production of panela is concentrated in six 
departments distributed in different zones of the country. Panela producers are 
associated in Fedepanela, the National Federation of Panela Producers140, and 
although there are certain collaborative links between them and Asocaña, the 
associations operate separately. Most of the panela production is made by local 
farmers with small land parcels. Until recently, the production of panela was 
absorbed mostly by the domestic market. Now Fedepanela is encouraging and 
supporting the technological upgrade of local companies to export different 
presentations of panela to the international market (solid, powder, liquid, cubes with 
flavours, etc.).  
Panela producers have been unionized since 1976 and have received support from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Corpoica. This derived 
product is not studied in this thesis since it represents a separated production chain 
within the agricultural classification of Colombia, and it is independent from the 
producers of sugar and energy. However, a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the panela and sugar productive chains should be examined in more 
detailed.  
Fluctuations in the sugar price and entrance of cheaper imported sugar also affected 
the panela sector. In terms of production, about 40% of producers buy sugarcane 
directly from the growers, and the remaining 60% grow it in their own lands. As it is 
explained by the agronomist and professor of Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
Héctor Ramos: “when sugar prices are low in the international market, the cane price 
rises too, which generates that some panela producers go to the illegal market and 
                                                




buy cheaper imported sugar to melt and produce panela” (Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, 2014). Although whilst in terms of organizations, budgets, geographical 
distribution, target markets, and legal representation both productive chains are 
differentiated, they are closely related in terms of economic fluctuations and research 
necessities.  
5.3.4. Sectoral organizations 
Asocaña is the Association of Sugarcane Growers of Colombia. It was founded in 
1959 and it integrates fourteen sugar mills and a small group of sugar cane growers 
in the Cauca Valley. Asocaña does not represent independent sugarcane growers. Its 
main role is to negotiate sectoral policies with the government, and other national 
and international organizations related with the sector. Besides Asocaña, the sugar 
industry has other organizational units for specialized tasks in the areas of research, 
training, and international marketing of sugar: Ciamsa, the international commercial 
trader of sugar and molasses created in 1961 as a commercial and international 
market branch of the sector that manages joint exports from the mills; and Dicsa, 
which is the national enterprise in charge of sales and distribution of the mills 
products for the domestic market; Tecnicaña, established in 1971, is the Colombian 
Association of Sugarcane Technicians, and it is in charge of training and technology 
transfer for technicians of the sector; Procaña, founded in 1973, which is the 
Colombian Association of sugarcane producers and providers, holds the 
representation of almost all natural or legal persons who grow sugarcane; and 
Cenicaña, created in 1977, is the sugarcane research centre, created and maintained 
with private funding from sugar mills and farmers. 
5.3.4.1. Cenicaña 
The main organization within the innovation system is Cenicaña. Through its 
operation there is knowledge creation and circulation, technology transfer, validation 
and appropriation processes in the productive chain.  
Cenicaña is a private non-profit corporation created by Asocaña in 1977. Before the 
creation of the centre, the growers were doing the technological development process 
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by themselves, but in order to avoid duplication of efforts and redundancy in 
technological solutions, the centre was created. 
The initial trigger for the creation of the centre was the emergence of two major 
sugarcane plant diseases: sugarcane carbon, and sugarcane rust. These two diseases 
devastated entire sugarcane fields in South Africa and Barbados. With the imminent 
threat, a group of industry executives visited the main sugarcane production fields in 
the world. As a result, they understood that investment in R&D was essential, so 
Cenicaña was created following the South African model. South Africa’s sugarcane 
research centre was sponsoring Cenicaña for ten years since its foundation. After 37 
years of research, Cenicaña has developed 21 varieties of sugarcane with plant 
breeder’s rights. Until mid-1970s most of the sugarcane breeds were foreign, now 
more than 70% of the varieties planted in the Cauca Valley are Colombian. Currently 
the centre receives royalties from countries such as Peru and Ecuador, and countries 
in Central America for using these varieties, which is another funding source for the 
centre.  
Since sugarcane growers and sugar mills fund the research centre, their main aim has 
been to support the sector in bringing the latest technology and research. 
Commenting about the mission of the centre, Dr. Álvaro Amaya, executive director 
of Cenicaña says: “Creating value through research products is not enough. Our task 
is not completed until our products are in use” (Alvaro Amaya, personal 
communication, April 24th, 2012). That is why R&D priorities are defined in 
association with the producers. The centre proposes developments based on the state 
of knowledge in the area, bringing together producers needs and problems to 
generate real solutions. There is direct contact between users and the research centre 
through special committees141. However, it is important to mention that independent 
                                                
141 Cenicaña’s board is comprised of sugar mills representative and growers who are Asocaña’s 
donors. There are 3 main research programs in Cenicaña: Varieties program; Agronomy program; and 
Factory processes program. There is a Programs committee that defines the research priorities for 
every program. This committee has participation of the board and the research committees of each 
program where Cenicaña’s researchers participate, as well as technical managers and sugarcane 
providers of the sugar mills. There are also technology transfer groups (TTG) that are composed by 
sugarcane growers, sugarcane mills, Cenicaña’s researchers, and Tecnicaña technicians. Members of 
the group have similar interests and come together to exchange technological information. Finally, in 
every sugarcane mill there is a technological validation area where technologies are tested according 
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sugarcane growers –those who are not associated in Asocaña- are not part of the 
committees structure and do not get any benefit from the centre, since they do not 
contribute with the percentage of their sales for the funding of the centre. The 
independent sugarcane growers, associated in Procaña, represent 19.8% of the 
sugarcane planted area.  
Cenicaña has three research programs: varieties, agronomics, and factory processes. 
Across these programs are committees and research support services for producers, 
researchers, and other specialists of the industry. The whole idea of having these 
three main research programs is to integrate geneticists, breeders, entomologists, 
plant pathologists, biotechnologists, and all necessary specialities to support different 
phases of a project, favouring transverse and cross-disciplinary research. This has 
allowed the centre to achieve comprehensive results for the industry142. This means 
that the research’s aim is always attached to tangible and feasible impacts in the 
field. The executive director of Cenicaña repeatedly highlights this:  
For me it is vital that the researcher is close to who needs the 
solution. It is not only a matter of acquiring knowledge and 
making it available to a full extent. And here things are done 
rigorously, because they have to be done in that regard. But 
we must go further. We complete the whole cycle from 
investment to impact. (Alvaro Amaya, personal 
communication, April 24th, 2012). 
In summary, there are three factors that may be directly attributed to the success of 
the centre’s structural and functional dynamics: 
1. Clearly defined beneiciaries. This provides a clear strategic line of priorities 
and outcomes. 
2. Stable funding sources. Main funding sources come from the producers 
association Asocaña. Research has been a priority so funds are constant. 
                                                                                                                                     
to research results and products delivered by the research programs. Validation of technologies results 
is shared with all members of Asocaña.  
142 Results on quality and efficiency in resources management; better practices and use of technology 
to have environmental sustainable practices; higher productivity of sugar, ethanol and electricity 
depending on the purpose of the plantation per production unit; generation of new sugarcane varieties; 
site-specific agriculture compiled un specialized databases; innovative methodologies to transfer, 
adoption and validation of knowledge with the sugarcane growers and sugar mills (Cenicaña, 2012).   
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3. Good synergy between the producers and users of knowledge and 
technology. The transfer, adoption, and validation model is focussed on 
producers’ needs, so many different mechanisms are used to improve 
communication between actors have been created. 
A general relationship map between actors in terms of exchange of knowledge and 
technology (K&T) and the generation of innovative practices, products, or services, 
can be seen in Figure 5.17. In the case of the sugarcane subsector the research centre, 
Cenicaña, acts as a hub linking stakeholders interested in innovation for the 
subsector.  
  
Figure 5.17. Relationships between actors in the sugarcane productive chain for innovation 
generation. 
Source. Information gathered by the author.   
The relationships between heterogeneous actors in the productive chain has resulted 
in the construction of a still emerging but strong knowledge base to boost firms’ 
competitiveness in the domestic and international markets. This has been specifically 
relevant for the cohesiveness and innovation capabilities of the sector, and seems to 
be an essential characteristic of a sectoral innovation system, as Malerba expresses it: 
  



















[I]nnovation and industry evolution are highly affected by the 
interaction of heterogeneous actors with different knowledge, 
competences and specialization, with relationships that may 
range from competitive to cooperative, from formal to 
informal, from market to non-market. (Malerba, 2006, p. 15) 
Benefits of the multilateral vertical and horizontal relationship between actors can be 
seen in the performance of some indicators. In 2007, sugar mills made a direct 
contribution of 0.54% to the national GDP, and 0.86% to the industrial GDP. 
Additionally, for each Colombian peso of added value generated by the sugar mills, 
3.9 Colombian pesos are generated in the national economy; for each peso of taxes 
paid by the sugar mills, tax production payments of 10.3 pesos are generated to the 
economy; and finally, for each job created by the mills, 28.4 jobs are created derived 
from their activities (Arbeláez et al., 2010, p. 1). This suggests a good and valuable 
contribution of the sector to the national economy and particularly to the agriculture 
GDP. The sugarcane sub-sectorial composition as a cluster has been beneficial for 
generating innovation in products and services and stronger industrial dynamics.  
5.3.5. Institutional Setting 
We described in section 4.3 (Policy implementation at the national level) the 
existence of national University-Enterprise-State committees (UEE) working 
regionally on different strategic sectors to link key actors from the academic, private 
and public sectors to work on special projects together. The department of the Cauca 
Valley has a UEE committee lead by the governor of the department and with the 
important participation of the Universidad del Valle, one of the most important 
universities in the country. Cenicaña is sometimes invited to these committees when 
topics related with agricultural development and the sugar and energy sectors are 
under discussion.  However, the Cauca Valley UEE committee has the same 
problems of other regional committees. The lack of commitment from the business 
sector to participate in the meetings and low trust in the successful execution of joint 
projects; weak representation from public institutions expressed in the constant 
change of public servants attending to the meetings and their lack of decision-making 
power; and representatives from academic institutions that do not have any 
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motivation from their HEIs to develop projects with the private sector, jeopardizes 
the medium and long-term decision-making process.  
The development of Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) is a nascent process that 
requires further maturation. Few universities in Colombia have a TTO, so the link 
between universities and firms and non-firms within the NSSTI is weak. As Dr 
Alvaro Amaya, Executive director of Cenicaña, noted: “We interact with 
universities, and I give a great value to the university, but I would like to see 
universities engaging with research centres, and with the companies themselves, but 
that simply does not happen.” (Alvaro Amaya, personal communication, April 24th, 
2012). Once again, the failures perceived and described in the National System of 
Innovation, are replicated at the sectoral level. Universities in Colombia are in a 
transition period to generate internal mechanisms and policies to ease research 
projects with firms and other research institutions and be able to perform successful 
knowledge transfer projects.  
Asocaña has a strong influence on the definition of sectoral policies. As a result, the 
sector enjoys especial regulations as the creation of FEPA, the inclusion of sugar 
within the Andean Band Price System, and the guaranteed purchase of ethanol from 
the distilleries owned by the sugar mills. 
The Colombian sugar cane industry represents a market with 
high barriers to entry. Some of these barriers are: (i) the great 
influence that sugar mills have in defining industrial policy 
resulting from the market power that mills have over prices 
and suppliers. (ii) The economies of scale created by high 
fixed costs. (iii) The established quotas to distribute the 
market proportional to the production capacity of each mill. 
(iv) The oversupply of sugar in the internal and international 
markets. (Dueñas et al., 2007, p. 25)  
However, the associations do not always work together or in a synchronized way. 
Asocaña and Procaña have had some disputes about the prevalence of sugar mill 
representation in sectoral decisions, lobby towards the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, and public funding agencies. For example, in December of 2007 
elections were held to establish the board of the FEPA. For this election, industry 
associations should be present to vote, but Procaña decided not to attend because, 
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according to the president of the association, there were no guarantees for the 
sugarcane growers to defend their interests against those of the sugar mills. Thus, 
Procaña blamed Asocaña to maintain a monopoly within the cluster for the benefit of 
the sugar mills143. In terms of public sectoral policies, table 5.10 describes the most 
important policies that have affected the evolution and development of the sector: 
Policy Category Description 
Infrastructure 1919 – 1922: Construction of the commercial dock of Buenaventura. 
1926 – 1940: Construction of road infrastructure to connect the 
Cauca Valley with the centre of the country. 
1992: Dock of Buenaventura privatization.  
Research 1920: Experimental farm in Palmira. 
1926: Chardon Mission. 
1977: Creation of Cenicaña. 
1990: Tax incentives through National law of S&T. 
2000: Creation of NSSTI. 
2009: Tax incentives through National law of STI.  
Price policies 1990: Colombia, as part of the Andean Community, joins the Andean 
Price Band System. 
2001: Creation of the Stabilization Fund for Sugar Prices. 
Agriculture policies 2000: Creation of the Agro-industrial National System of Science 
and Technology. 
2001: Introduction of alcohol fuels to the energy sector. 
2003: Creation of agriculture productive chains. 
Table 5.10. Formal institutional setting affecting the sugarcane industry 
Source. Made by the author. 
As mentioned before, collaboration between actors is a key feature of the cluster 
either backwards (between the growers and the mills) and forward (between mills 
and industries in demand of sugarcane by-products). As Alberto Otoya, Strategic 
                                                





Projects Manager of Manuelita sugarcane mill highlighted, procedures to weigh 
sugarcane crops when they are delivered to the sugar mills, and the amount or 
percentage of sugar or ethanol produced from the cut-cane is a regulated and 
transparent process to growers at all stages of the chain from harvesting until 
distribution (Alberto Otoya, personal communication, February 18th, 2012).  
It can be argued that sugarcane in the Cauca Valley has been an outlier within the 
agriculture sector because of the privileged geographical location, strong growers 
associations –even counting the differences between Asocaña and Procaña-, a long-
term view from the producers based on S&T as main variables for the viability and 
sustainability of the sector, and the diversification of sugarcane by-products to open 
new market channels. The director of Corpoica, Dr. Juan Lucas Restrepo, said 
referring to the sugarcane sector in the Cauca Valley: “It is a self-sufficient sector in 
terms of resources, with few major firms that absorb the whole production of the 
cluster, highly associated, and with a great influence in the sectoral exports and 
imports policies” (Juan Lucas Restrepo, personal communication, May 3rd, 2012).  
5.3.6. Knowledge and Technology Transfer: Adoption, 
and Validation Model 
Knowledge and technology transfer, adoption and validation processes have been at 
the heart of the sugarcane industry. As it was described in the previous section, 
Cenicaña was created as an initiative of the association of sugarcane growers to solve 
extant problems and, as far as possible, to anticipate and manage risk. Then the focus 
of the research centre is to provide updated and relevant knowledge and technologies 
to its users. One differential aspect of the sugarcane production chain has been the 
emphasis put on knowledge as the base of competitiveness from an early stage of the 
modern production of sugar in Colombia. Production and implementation of new 
techniques and technologies to improve practices in field, harvesting, manufacturing, 
and distribution have increased efficiency and productivity in the sector, bringing 
higher profits to both growers and sugar mills. Cenicaña, acting jointly with the other 
sugarcane associations, performs constant technological monitoring and evaluation, 
so it can deliver better solutions to its clients (the growers and the sugar mills). 
Technological surveillance has been a non-stop process in the Colombian sugarcane 
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industry: “The development of new technologies has been a key aspect for the 
advancement of the sugar industry. It has enhanced the productivity, and has helped 
to fight against diseases as roast and coal of the sugarcane.” (Cock et al., 1995, p. 24) 
The K&T transfer, adoption, and validation model is outlined in figure 5.18. R&D 
processes are centralized in Cenicaña, but the centre receives feedback from its 
contributors to develop the research agenda and set priorities. For gathering 
producers’ demands there are committees composed of Cenicaña’s researchers, 
Tecnicaña’s technicians, technicians and engineers from the sugar mills, and farmers 
who are the sugar mills suppliers144. According to Cenicaña’s Technology Transfer 
Chief, Camilo Isaacs, for transferring K&T there are Technology Transfer Groups 
(TTG) operating in different agro-ecological zones. These groups organise field trips 
to the most innovative farmers’ plantations. The farmer presents how he/she uses a 
particular technology for having better productivity results. Then the sugar mill 
presents its advances on the specific topic under discussion, and finally Cenicaña and 
Tecnicaña introduce the new technique, technology, or variety that can be used to 
achieve particular production goals. Upon completion of these field trips, round 
tables are set to discuss and hold Q&A sessions with participants, and also for 
understanding other needs they may have.  
From 2013 onwards, the technical cooperation and transfer technology service of 
Cenicaña implemented a new Program for Technical Assistance (PTA). The aim of 
this program is to educate and provide guidance for trainers. Researchers from 
Cenicaña provide training to technicians and engineers working in the sugar mills. 
Cenicaña leads a process of identification of knowledge and technological needs in 
order to design and provide training programs focused on real sectoral necessities. 
There are specific methodological guidelines for the training courses, so they can be 
replicated for different groups of growers across the region. As of June 2014, one 
hundred and twenty technicians at different levels have been trained in three specific 
new technologies to increase productivity in plantations (Camilo Isaacs, personal 
communication, August 5th, 2014). 
                                                
144 Basic information about the technical cooperation and technology transfer service, can be found in: 
http://www.cenicana.org/investigacion/sctt/index.php. We had access to protected information in the 




Figure 5.18. Knowledge and technology transfer in the sugarcane sector. 
Source. Information gathered by the author. 
Members of Cenicaña, sugar mills, and growers’ representatives compose the 
research programs committees.  Through these committees, research agendas are 
defined. The main tool used to determine the K&T transfer strategies and programs 
is the “Puyol model for innovation”. It consists of: 1. Determining the characteristics 
of the technology that will be transferred; 2. Determining the psychological and 
socio-cultural characteristics of the producers; 3. Determining the installed 
infrastructure of the farm. Then these three variables are compared and different 
profiles and types of transfer strategies are implemented (Puyol, Estebáñez, & 
Méndez, 1995).  
Making the model participative has proved to be beneficial for the cluster, since it 
reduces the mismatch between K&T demand and supply. It also eases the technology 
transfer process. A success factor of the model is the differentiation of target publics. 
Cenicaña has robust databases containing all sorts of information not only about 
geographical, technical, and biological data. All producers are registered, and every 
record not only contains information about size of the farm, production levels, and 
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land characterization, but also information about socio-economic factors as schooling 
level, average income, composition of families, and others. 
In this way, the TTGs are carefully defined. Cenicaña classifies producers in three 
different categories after applying the Puyol model: innovators and early adopters; 
late adapters; and stragglers. Then, Cenicaña structures TTGs mixing the three types 
of growers, so learning and feedback processes have a higher impact on those who 
need to catch up with new technologies and techniques. There is also an on-going 
program to identify the growers and producers attitudes towards adoption of K&T. 
The intention is to understand psychological and sociological characteristics, risk 
aversion or proclivity, traditionalism and possible fears growers and industrials have. 
The integration of more social and psychological characteristics allows directing 
better products and strategies to the targeted groups. As stated by the Chief of the 
service of technical assistance and technology transfer of Cenicaña, Camilo Isaacs:  
You can try to transfer new knowledge and technology, or try 
to transmit better practices with the current knowledge and 
technology, but if they [growers] do not have an open attitude 
and a willingness to listen, it is impossible to start any 
technology transfer process. We want to go further by 
increasing the adoption levels. They are not bad, but we want 
to reach the ceilings. Each technology has its ceiling of 
adoption level and we want to target that. (Camilo Isaacs, 
personal communication, February 18th, 2012). 
Cenicaña has a specific market oriented model for technological development that 
integrates the research and transfer of technology actions so there can be synergy 
between the industry expectations and the research centre. The main purpose is to 




Figure 5.19. Technological development model market-oriented followed by Cenicaña. 




This K&T transfer, adoption, and validation model was adapted from the experiences 
of Chile and Argentina145. Although the model is very focused on the producers’ 
needs, researchers have the autonomy to present research projects on different topics, 
as long as there are feasible and have applicable results for the producers. The centre 
does the whole R&D cycle, from production of basic science, through the generation 
of applied knowledge, to appropriation by growers and sugar mills, and finally to the 
validation of new technology and knowledge with the final users. It is not a linear 
and sequential process; there is always intervention of Cenicaña’s researchers, 
representatives of sugar mills and feedback from sugarcane growers in different 
stages of the knowledge and technology generation. It is important to maximise the 
research centre resources so results are focalised on products to help growers to have 
higher productivity, less use of water, biological pest control, more efficient harvest 
and transport techniques and even managerial skills centred on the sugar and ethanol 
production (Camilo Isaacs, personal communication, February 18th, 2012).  
Concrete results can be traced and seen in action after successful R&D projects. As it 
is highlighted by Fernando Villegas, head of the agricultural mechanization research 
group in Cenicaña:  
Thanks to research done in the centre [Cenicaña] we apply 
today 50% less irrigation water without affecting crop 
production. We use less fertilizer for nutrition, achieving 
greater efficiency of the products we apply. We maintain 
crop health using mostly biological controls. As soon as a 
new pest appears, immediately we start looking for natural 
enemies. Rarely a chemical is applied to control an insect 
pest (Fernando Villegas, personal communication, May 18th, 
2012).  
Training of human resources necessary for meeting field and sugar mill requirements 
is a main part of the K&T cycle. Tecnicaña, for example, is closely related to 
Cenicaña. Tecnicaña’s main services are to disseminate, promote, share and transfer 
knowledge and technical research in different areas of the sugar industry. Cenicaña 
                                                
145 In 2002 a group from Cenicaña went to Chile and Argentina to see how they managed their process 
of technology transfer in different agricultural subsectors. As a result of that visit, the technology 
transfer groups were created in Cenicaña, bringing together producers and researchers. In the Chilean 
and Argentinian cases these were self-managing groups leaded by the most advanced farmer. In the 
Cenicaña’s model, the groups are managed by the technical assistance and technology transfer service. 
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transfers the latest knowledge and technology to this association and they train the 
professionals of the sector. Besides the close relationship between Asocaña, 
Cenicaña, and Tecnicaña, there is a special agreement between them and SENA to 
develop training programs for trainers. These programs keep running parallel to the 
new program for technical assistance. 
Cooperative relationships with national and international partners have been 
fundamental for understanding sugarcane genetics and producing varieties with 
higher levels of sucrose and resistant to diseases and technological solutions adapted 
to the particular geographic conditions of Cauca Valley. In order to share knowledge 
on biotechnology, a consortium was created between five important sugarcane 
producer countries: Australia, South Africa, Brazil, United States and Colombia. The 
chief of Biotechnology in Cenicaña, Dr. Jerhson López, explains that the intention on 
participating in this consortium is to bring together efforts to produce research results 
maximizing physical and intellectual resources. Research project expenses are paid 
between members of the consortium according to the benefits each centre receives 
and the expected impact on the sugar, biofuel, or energy produced. Additionally, 
training of researchers and technicians in new techniques are essential, so there can 
be diffusion of results to the producers. Knowledge and technology is always 
available to the members of the association (Jerhson López, personal 
communication, February 18th, 2012). 
Summarising, we found a well-organised system for the production of knowledge 
and technological solutions for the different actors within the sub-sectoral innovation 
system. Cenicaña has remained as a fundamental hub for bringing together the 
growers and sugar mills necessities with cutting edge S&T production so the sector is 
updated and remains competitive to meet domestic and international market 
demands. It has also opened the possibility to develop new business opportunities, as 
in the case of ethanol, so what was waste in the early stages of the industrial 
development, it is now an important source of clean energy.  
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5.4. Sectoral Cases – Fresh-Cut Flowers 
The cut flowers sector is in many senses sui generis in the Colombian agriculture 
sector. It is a non-traditional agriculture sector that emerged as an initiative of a 
group of private investors who saw a business opportunity in the potential 
development of fresh-cut flowers plantations in Colombia for the international 
market. Given good land areas and climatic conditions, technology and expertise was 
imported from Holland in the 1960s. During the 1980s the sector experienced an 
important growth mostly supported through governmental incentives such as tax 
exceptions, direct subsidies and special credit lines. The success of the sector was 
aided during the 1990s by large companies that bought many small and medium 
flowers companies and then introduced modern packaging and transportation 
techniques (Madrid & Lovell, 2007). However, the sector composition is mixed in 
terms of firms’ size. The production chain is controlled by SME’s and large 
companies that own the flower farms and in some cases the brokerage firms in order 
to avoid intermediaries in the merchandising and distribution links of the chain. 
These companies hire low-skilled local labour surrounding the flower plantations. 
After twenty years, the sector experienced important growth as a result of a period of 
maturation in cultivation and harvesting techniques and a supportive institutional 
setting. The cut flowers, foliage, young plants, and trees trade is known as 
floriculture. It has evolved over time from being a good, grown by consumers 
themselves, to a dynamic and expanding market worldwide (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 
2013).  
Colombia is the second largest exporter of fresh-cut flowers and flower buds after the 
Netherlands with exports of over one billion of US dollars in 2009. For the same 
year, the total world export of fresh cut flowers was US$6,466,810 billion according 
to the International Trade Centre (ITC) (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2013).  The flower 
industry is recognised as one of the most successful and dynamic sectors in 
Colombia, being the principal exporter of fresh flowers to the United States and the 
world-leading exporter of carnations. The flower industry is the second largest 
foreign exchange revenues generator in the agriculture sector, after coffee (Reina, 
Acosta, & Oviedo, 2008). It is also highly relevant for the social development of the 
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country since it is the agriculture production chain that generates the highest 
employment rate with an average of sixteen employed persons per hectare. The 
second agriculture sub-sector in terms of employment is coffee with an average of 
0.8 persons per hectare (Castellanos Domínguez, Fonseca Rodríguez, & Buriticá 
Ospina, 2010). This production chain represents the highest agriculture non-
traditional exports in Colombia and generates nearly 200,000 jobs (both direct and 
indirect) which represents up to 4.5% of agricultural employment (Arbeláez, 
Meléndez, & León, 2012). The sector is a major source of exports and jobs in the 
Colombian economy, but has also been surrounded by deep structural crises that 
have put its stability at risk in the mid- and long-term. 
5.4.1. Industrial Setting, technological evolution, and 
dynamic complementarities 
5.4.1.1. Fresh Flowers Industry in the world 
When the flower trade started in the 17th century, the main producers and consumers 
were centralised in Europe, Germany, France and Japan being the leading countries 
in the flowers market (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2013). It was in the Netherlands 
where the first greenhouses were developed to commercialise cut flowers. Tulips 
were imported from Turkey to the Netherlands during the 16th century, which opened 
the interest and consumption of exotic flower bulbs in this country. The development 
of this market segment in the Netherlands has been done through the domestication 
and adaptation of foreign flower bulbs during the last five hundred years (Benschop, 
Kamenetsky, Le Nard, Okubo, & De Hertogh, 2010). Then, following the European 
model, David Landreth Company opened a store offering flowers’ seeds in 1784 in 
the United States. There was an emergent and growing market that represented a 
good business opportunity (McDonald & Kwong, 2005). However, the major 
expansion of the floral industry took place during the 20th century. The Netherlands 
continued to be the major producer and exporter of flower bulbs, even when new 
competitors entered the marketplace during the second half of the 20th century. Given 
the need for fresh soils and better climatic conditions; lower production costs, 
especially in labour; and the flexibility to produce flowers customised to market 
demand, the floral industry has been in a process of diversification. “…globalization 
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and increased competition have led to the development of new bulb and flower 
production centres. For example, floricultural production in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia is increasing rapidly.” (Benschop et al., 2010, p. 10).  
During the 1980s there was a modification in the cut flowers 
market. Holland, main producer and marketer in the world, 
increased its investments in other countries through different 
strategies, for example: knowledge transfer through training 
to producers and private firms providing seeds, fertilizers, 
etc. (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 24)   
The commercial products offered as part of the floriculture can be seen in figure 
5.20. Colombia has specialised its commerce on fresh-cut flowers and foliage, either 
loose or as finished bouquets. The Colombian flowers market is customer-driven so 
production depends on international demand tendencies. The business niche that will 
be analysed in this section is the traditional fresh-cut flower since it represents higher 
sales and revenues for the chain.  
 
Figure 5.20.General scheme of the commercial products of the floriculture business 
Source. Based on (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 18) 
The evolution of the flower market composed of flowering, foliage, fresh-cut 
flowers, finished bouquets and greens has experienced an important growth, as can 
be seen in figure 5.21. Between 2002 and 2007 the sector grew 34%, and maintained 
the position of Colombia as the second exporter of flowers in the world, after the 
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Netherlands (Reina et al., 2008).  From 2003 to 2008 the tendency on flower 
exporters, in terms of millions of dollars exported, continued to favour the 
Netherlands (53%) and Colombia (16%) as the main exporters, followed by Ecuador 
(7%), Kenya (7%), Ethiopia (2%) and Italy (1%). Roses and carnations are the 
flowers with higher demand in the market, the Netherlands being the lead exporter 
for the former and Colombia for the latter. The Netherlands holds the first position in 
market exports not only because of its flower production, but also because it is the 
biggest re-export centre in the global market, mainly importing flowers from Kenya, 
Israel and Ecuador. It is in Holland where the flowers and foliage European market 
set prices through an auctions system (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 5.21. World exports of fresh-cut flowers production 
Source. Based on (Reina et al., 2008, p. 3) 
5.4.1.2. Colombian Fresh Flowers Production Chain 
The floriculture business in Colombia emerged as a business opportunity spotted by 
a young researcher, David Cheever, who wrote his floriculture bachelor’s degree 
dissertation about the potential that Colombia had for growing flowers that could be 
exported to the U.S. market. Since the climatic and soil conditions, and cost of labour 
were not optimum146 in the aforementioned market, his innovative proposal found an 
                                                
146 Short days, with low light intensity and bad conditions during the wintertime made flower 
production very expensive. Also, labour is more expensive and soil conditions are not as good as the 
fertile soils and stable temperature of tropical countries. 
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audience in Colombian and American investors interested in developing the business 
opportunity. Even including transportation costs, growing flowers in Colombia was 
31% cheaper than do it in the United States:   
[T]he discovery process in Colombian flower exports began 
in the mid-1960s when floriculturists and businesses 
(American and Colombian) identified the potential for this 
activity, thinking exclusively of external markets, with the 
United States as the core target (Arbeláez et al., 2012, p. 77). 
From the very beginning the core market was North America, so Cheever, together 
with two investors from USA, founded Floramérica in 1969 which would dominate 
Colombian exports as early as one year later. The company introduced innovation in 
three areas (production technology, distribution channels, changes and adaptation to 
the product to satisfy the U.S. demand and training for the labour force). Domestic 
companies set up during the same period like ‘Flores la Conchita’, ‘Flores 
Colombianas’ and ‘Flores de los Andes’, rapidly copied these techniques to improve 
their production. Floramérica created a brokerage firm, Sunburst Farms, to avoid 
intermediaries in the value chain for commercialising the flowers coming from 
Colombia (Arbeláez et al., 2012).  
The prevailing sales and distribution channels during the 1990s were intermediated 
by an exporter who had the responsibility to deliver the boxes of flowers to the 
buyer, typically a wholesaler, who then sold to a retailer, who in turn distributed to 
florists. In 1998, Floramérica and Sunburst were bought by Dole (a multinational 
food corporation from the U.S.), which also acquired other small Colombian firms, 
becoming the largest flower company in the country. The multinational bought 
around 25% of the flower farms and controlled about 20% of the Colombian flower 
exports. In order to counter the market control of Dole, many small Colombian firms 
merged to gain negotiating power with the wholesalers (Salom Serna & Sepúlveda 
Calderón, 2012). 
Colombia has maintained its position as the second exporter of fresh-cut flowers and 
flower buds for bouquets or ornamental purposes with a 16.1% share of the market 
(Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2013). In 2009, ornamental plants and floriculture products 
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represented 3.21% of the total Colombian exports according to the Colombian 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE)147. Flower plantations are 
mainly concentrated in the department of Cundinamarca, in the region known as the 
Savannah of Bogotá (approximately 79% of the total hectares) and Antioquia 
(approximately 17%). The remaining 4% is distributed in Cauca Valley, the Coffee 
Region and Nariño (DANE, 2010).  During the expansion of the world floral trade, 
between 2002 and 2007, Colombia increased its floral industry exports by 1.4 times 
(Reina et al., 2008). The flower production chain is considered a successful case 
since it grew by 144% during the 1990s when the general growth for the overall 
agriculture sector was 63% during the same period. The evolution of flower exports 
in Colombia, normalised at 2007 US Dollars, can be seen in figure 5.22.  
 
Figure 5.22. Colombian floral industry exports 2002 – 2011.  
Source. Data from 2002 – 2007 from (Reina et al., 2008, p. 5). Data from 2008 – 2011 retrieved from 
DANE statistics: Colombia, exportaciones según capítulos del arancel 2008 -2004148.  
Up to 2008 the hectares cultivated for cut flower production amounted to 8,352, 
experiencing a constant growth in terms of area cultivated and tons of flowers per 
hectare (see Figure 5.23). 
                                                
147 Calculations made by the author based on DANE information: 
http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/comercio-y-servicios/comercio-exterior/exportaciones. Retrieved 
in 07/01/15.  
148 Retrieved from: http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/comercio-y-servicios/comercio-




Figure 5.23. Cut flowers area evolution in Colombia 
Source. Adapted from (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 43) 
From 1962 when the first plantations were established in the Savannah of Bogota 
until the end of the 1970s the sector was preparing to compete with the international 
flower business leaders. Once the production levels were stabilised and the producers 
absorbed the knowledge required to produce more technologically intensive flowers 
like roses, exports increased. Over the years the exports have grown, ranging at 119 
per cent year-over-year increase during the 1970s and then at a slower pace during 
the 2000s (Arbeláez et al., 2012). This tendency can be seen in figure 5.24. 
 
Figure 5.24. Colombian Flower exports from 1962 to 2009 
Source. (Arbeláez et al., 2012, p. 70) 
 
70  EXPORT PIONEERS IN LATIN AMERICA
Overview of the Sector
Production and Exports
Colombian flowers are grown in different regions. The Sabana de Bogotá, ac-
counting for 76 percent of total production, mainly grows roses, carnations, 
and astromelias. Rionegro (Antioquia), accounting for 19 percent of produc-
tion, mostly grows chrysanthemums. Valle del Cauca and Eje Cafetero produce 
5 percent, mainly ferns and tr pical flowers (Asocolflores, 2010). Product evo-
lution started from the simplest crops demanding the least technology, like 
carnations an  chrysanth mums. The , wh n flower growers gained greater 
market knowledge and expertise, they began growing roses, which required 
higher investments in technology. In 1996, export  of roses surpassed those 
of carnations. Today, more than 50 varieties of flowers are produced and ex-
ported, including exotic, agrotropical flowers like heliconias and orchids.
Since its inception, flower production has been export-oriented and the 
export share of production over the years has ranged from 70 percent to 95 
percent. The value of flowe  exports grew from $20,000 in 1965 to $1 mill on 
by 1970, the year of the first exports of one of the key pioneers (an average 
year-over-year increase of 119 percent). Since then, exports have consistently 
increased, soaring to $1,052 million by 2009 (Figure 3.1).
























































Exports in US$ Growth Rate
Sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), UN COMTRADE, and authors’ calculations.
 
 261 
The fresh-cut flowers production chain stages and processes can be seen in figure 5.25: 
 
Figure 5.25. Fresh-cut flowers production chain structure 





The main products offered by Colombian floriculture are fresh-cut flowers and 
foliage. Flower plantations have two modalities: greenhouse and open air. Most of 
the farms producing flowers have their plantations under greenhouse, leaving the 
open-air technique mostly for growing alstroemerias. The composition of Colombian 
flower exports up to 2008 was: 29.69% roses, 12.74% carnations, 6.72% mini 
carnations, 7.53% chrysanthemums, 32.48% bouquets (that includes a mixture of the 
exported varieties and foliage) and 10.83% of other kind of flowers, including 
tropical flowers (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 44).  
5.4.1.3. Competitiveness of the sector 
The appreciation of the Colombian peso has represented a major threat for the flower 
production chain. Even when the exports have increased, the profit in local currency 
has declined as it is shown in figure 5.26. If it is taken into account that one of the 
higher direct costs for fresh flowers production is labour (30.2% of the total costs) 
and wages are paid in Colombian pesos, then higher production with lower revenues 
generates a strong impact on the economic viability of the industry. There is a 
marked contrast between the 43% export growth in millions of dollars between 2002 
and 2007, and its equivalent in Colombian pesos, which was only 6%. Additionally, 
during the same period, the total costs of the sector (including operational, sales, 
services, management and taxes) increased by 38% (Reina et al., 2008; Tenjo G, 
Montes U, & Martínez T, 2006). 
 




Source. (Reina et al., 2008, p. 10) 
To cope with precarious income levels, firms have increased their debt, causing 
overruns. Short-term loans increased 2.1 times between 2002 and 2007. This 
indicates that liquidity levels have deteriorated over time. In 2007 short-term debt 
reached 54% of the total financial liabilities. Additionally, financial costs rose 
because of an increase in loan interests. Also, the fresh-cut flowers market price has 
not had a substantial increment, compared with other agricultural commodities. 
Products like corn and bananas doubled their prices between 2006 and 2008. 
Summing up, the revaluation of the Colombian Peso in a sector with growing direct 
and indirect costs paid in local currency but with exports paid in US Dollars has 
caused an economic deterioration of the firms, lower profits and the necessity of 
higher indebtedness levels to keep the business alive. This has raised the 
vulnerability of the fresh-cut flowers production chain (Reina et al., 2008). 
The flower production chain can be characterised as an export oriented, customer-
driven business, composed by SMEs and a few large companies exporting directly to 
their customers who are mostly based in the USA market. Up to 2012 there were 
around 600 firms, most of them producers and direct exporters. From those, 55% 
were small and 30% medium. Despite the large number of firms participating in the 
industry, nearly 60% of the total exports were concentrated in the largest firms 
(DANE, 2010). “In 1974, 9 per cent of total firms (the largest firms) accounted for 
60 per cent of total exports, while in 2000, the same 9 per cent of firms accounted for 
45 per cent of total exports” (Arbeláez et al., 2012, p. 74). 
The main source of competitiveness among the Colombian flower firms is the 
creation of value in the supply chain, particularly in the last stage concerned with the 
trading, transportation and distribution of the final product. Innovation in trading 
channels has been a major concern for the industry; so new models are constantly 
implemented in order to obtain higher profits. Producers know that the closer they 
can get to the final consumer, the higher the revenues they can obtain. According to 
Salom and Sepúlveda, the flowers production chain in Colombia has gone through 
three stages with regard to distribution channels. In a first stage, between 1990 and 
1998, Colombian firms used indirect channels. Firms controlled their distribution to 
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Miami’s airport, where the flowers were sold to a wholesaler, who would sale them 
to a retailer and from there, to the final consumers, usually florists. Then, from 1999 
to 2001, the industry dynamics changed with the entry of two big competitors, Dole 
and USA Floral. Flower volumes increased; there was more associativity between 
Colombian firms to compete with these two multinationals that were controlling up 
to 20% of the exports and up to 40% of the Colombian flower distribution in the 
USA. With the increase in flower supply and a greater number of intermediaries in 
the distribution channels, the prices dropped, which made USA Floral disappear in 
2001 and caused Dole’s sale of the business because it was not profitable. The last 
stage has taken place since 2002, when importers and wholesalers have looked for 
other strategies to survive in the market. Two models have been followed according 
to the size of the firms, determined by the volume they can export. 80% of the sales 
are made by 20% of the companies. These companies have handled their own export 
processes and from 2004 they started to sell directly to large supermarkets, mostly to 
Wal-Mart Stores, Kroger Co, and Costco Wholesale Corp., which represent up to 
40% of the USA market. In this way, they can control the logistics from the very 
beginning until the end of the distribution network. Small and medium companies 
that do not have the volume required to sell directly to retailers have followed a 
FOB149 sales model using wholesalers (Salom Serna & Sepúlveda Calderón, 2012). 
As it was recalled before, the appreciation of the Colombian peso has represented a 
huge imbalance between sales and the final profit captured by the producers. This 
aspect is particularly critical for the sub-sector since sales are not representative 
enough to offset losses caused by exchange rates. Other factors that impact the 
chain’s performance are the highly technology dependence from the Netherlands that 
prevents the development of local breeds to offer differential products to the 
marketplace; and sales cycles determined by festivities and seasons, which makes the 
firms very dependent of the market fluctuations (See figure 5.27).  
 
                                                
149 ‘Free On Board’ is an agreement model for international shipping that specifies responsibility for 
the goods in transit, insurance costs, and freight charges. With an FOB agreement, seller and buyer 
agree on a designated point of delivery for the goods, so from that point onwards, the seller is released 





Figure 5.27. Main characteristics of the Colombian fresh-cut flowers production 
Source. Made by the author based on (Tenjo G et al., 2006, p. 7) 
Summing up, the main factors that bring competitiveness to the Colombian flower 
industries are: high value added to the flowers per hectare in terms of cultivation 
techniques, less use of water, cutting and packaging techniques, and most 
importantly, innovation in the trade and distribution of flowers to the customers that 
can be wholesalers, retailers or supermarkets. 
5.4.1.4. Social and environmental sustainable development 
In contrast with major producers like the Netherlands and Israel, the composition of 
the flowers sub-sector in Colombia is characterised by relatively few owners (about 
300 national and foreign companies) and 111,000 wage labourers. Of those workers, 
60% are women, mostly head of the household. The flower farms were an option for 
rural under skilled female workers to have a higher wage than being domestic maids 
or having freelance jobs in other crop cultivations. During the 1990s there were high 
rates of unemployment and high rates of informal jobs, conditions that added to a 
higher mobilisation of labour to an emergent industry. Women were hired mostly as 
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lower rank supervisors, and for planting, cutting and packaging duties. However, 
many of these women were hired with salaries under the legal minimum wage and 
exceeding the legal working hours without receiving further compensation. These 
cases were reported by several NGOs and academics (Korovkin & Sanmiguel-
Valderrama, 2007; Meier, 1999). Thus, it can be argued that the concentration of the 
local population in the flowers industry and the destination of the land for a non-food 
agricultural product has put the already poor population in an even more vulnerable 
scenario of food security and unstable labour conditions.  
At the household level, the competitive strategies of the 
Colombian cut flower agro-industry and the neoliberal 
policies of the national government have adverse implications 
for domestic poverty alleviation and the vulnerability of 
households, including their capacity to maintain unremitting 
food security. While state regulation and the flexibilization of 
employment practices in the cut flower agro-industry have 
succeeded in making it internationally competitive and a 
model of success in export-led growth, these gains have not 
‘trickled down’ to the individuals upon whom this so-called 
success is built (Patel-Campillo, 2010, p. 290).  
There has been a great controversy about the labour conditions of the field workers 
of the flowers industry. By the end of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st 
century, some NGOs, academics and activists, drew attention to the work conditions, 
stability and wages received by the employees in the Colombian flower companies. 
“In Colombia, the product is produced under exploitative conditions and the benefits 
of increasing revenues for the companies do not reach to the workers” (Madrid 
Berroterán, 2003, p. 3). 
As a response to national and international pressure to have sustainable development 
practices, both environmental and social, Asocolflores - the Colombian Association 
of Flower Exporters - developed a strategy to certify the Colombian flowers 
produced under fair trade conditions. “Florverde® is a comprehensive strategy aimed 
at optimizing the use of resources, with projected long term and permanent dynamics 
to improve the competitiveness of the Colombian flower industry in the concept of 
sustainable development.” (Asocolflores, 2010, p. 1). In 2002 Asocolflores signed up 
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an agreement with SGP150 to demonstrate that the Florverde® certification was 
compliant with national and international standards, so it could be recognised in 
international markets. Afterwards, during 2004 and 2007, there was an equivalence 
between Florverde® and GLOBALGAP (The Global Partnership for Good 
Agricultural Practices) and also a recognition that the standard was fulfilling the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) in terms of labour fair conditions. When the standard 
started it had 28 companies certified. In 2008 there were 132 companies participating 
that represented 2,843 hectares and employed 43,000 workers (Asocolflores, 2010). 
During 2011 Florverde® was renamed as Florverde Sustainable Flowers® after a 
comprehensive review. As a certification scheme, the standard was separated from 
the producers’ guild in 2012, so there is more transparency to assess the 
implementation of good practices in farms. The latest version of Florverde has 
regulations and standards in fifteen different dimensions seen in table 5.11: 
Dimension Category Number of requirements 
Management System 
Managerial responsibility 5 
In-house inspection and auditing 1 
Customer service for non-conformities, 




Child Labour 2 
Volunteer work 4 
Discrimination 2 
Freedom of association and freedom to join 
employee unions 
1 
Remuneration and Salary 7 
Working hours 3 
Outsourcing 5 
Total 24 
Employee Education and Training Employee Education and Training 4 
Employee welfare Employee welfare 5 
On-the-job health and safety 
management 
Health and safety program 2 
Committee on the advancement of industrial 
health and safety 
1 
                                                
150 Sustainable Green Printing Partnership is a non-profit organisation that builds in economic, societal 
and environmental pillars to provide certifications to raw material manufacturers, converters, printers, 




Company employees responsible for industrial 
health and safety  
1 
On-the-job health and safety management 22 
Total 26 
Rational use of water resources 
Rational use of water resources 8 
Irrigation water quality 4 
Total 12 
Fertilization and soil/substrate 
management 
Use of substrates 3 
Soil management 3 
Monitoring of nutritional needs 2 
Fertilizer application programs and records 2 
Safe handling of fertilizers 7 
Total 17 
Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) 
Pest-Free Plants 2 
Pesticide selection 9 
Pesticide programs and records and other 
control strategies in place 
3 
Minimizing chemical pesticide risk 7 




Prevention and minimization 7 
Reutilization and recycling  3 
Treatment and final disposal 9 
Total 19 
Farm, landscaping and 
biodiversity management 
Background and farm management 6 
Biodiversity and conservation 7 
Total 13 
Energy efficiency and equipment 
and machinery maintenance 
Energy efficiency and equipment and 
machinery maintenance 6 
Origin of plant material Origin of plant material 9 
Post-harvest product handling 
Post-harvest handling 6 
Post-harvest water quality 3 
Total 9 
Traceability and record keeping Traceability and record keeping 4 
Status and use of the Florverde 
Sustainable Flowers Conformity 
Trade 
Status and use of the Florverde Sustainable 
Flowers Conformity Trade 2 
Total of Requirements 190 
Table 5.11. Florverde Sustainable Flowers® Standard 
Source.  Table based on (Asocolflores, 2013) 
The standard has been strengthened given the criticism it had when it was first 
launched in 1996, because it was mostly focused on improving the profitability of the 
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firms through the use of cleaner practices but little was done concerning the workers 
welfare. Also, the independence of the standard from Asocolflores was crucial for 
bringing independent third parties to assess compliance with the standard. Another 
critical issue is that the construction of the standard did not take into account the 
input and feedback from the field workers, which make them feel excluded and 
dominated by a new source of power (Talcott, 2003; Wright & Madrid, 2007).  
5.4.2. Demand 
Fresh-cut flowers are a special trade product in many senses. First of all, it is a 
luxury good and as such it does not represent a staple commodity. It has a high 
demand elasticity, which means that as income increases in the domestic economy, 
its demand also increases (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010). Second of all, being 
extremely perishable and taking into account that its value relies on its freshness and 
outer beauty, handling and transportation are very important aspects within the 
production chain. Thus, for the cut flower chain, logistics is a main aspect for the 
business (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2013).   “Good logistics, in addition to marketing, 
consumer-oriented production and outstanding management, have produced 
significant growth in Colombian flower exports” (Eyerdam, 2009). 
The distinctive features of cut flowers as a product remain in the social and cultural 
meaning that they have for the consumers according to their cultural setting. 
“Flowers are ‘cultural’ as well as ‘natural’ products. Cut flowers are not just 
‘another’ commodity produced by international capital (such as shoes, clothes) for 
mass consumption, they are constructed as a ‘natural’ commodity, they are loaded 
with cultural meanings and they are often given as gifts, producing and reproducing 
social relationships between giver and receiver” (Madrid Berroterán, 2003, p. 1). 
The consumption pattern of flowers is seasonal, influenced by festivities such as San 
Valentine Day, Mother’s Day, Women’s Day, St Patrick’s Day and Christmas. 
During these periods, the demand for fresh-cut flowers and bouquets increases, so 
flower farms adjust their production to these specific dates of the year. Also, 
important consumers such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
have a higher demand from the external market during the winter season, when their 
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flower production is low. One of the major challenges for the industry is achieving a 
reconversion of the product to be consumed during the whole year with reasonably 
stable demand. The consumption of fresh-cut flowers has increased considerably 
from the late 20th century and into the 21st century. This corresponds to an increasing 
population with purchasing power that can buy luxury goods. The European Union 
consumes more than 50% of the flowers market and includes many countries such as 
Sweden, Norway, Holland, Germany and the United Kingdom with high per capita 
flower consumption (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010).  
The main consumers of fresh-cut flowers in the world are Western Europe, North 
America and Japan. In 2008, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, the 
Netherlands, France, Russia, Japan and Italy in that order, were the main importers of 
fresh-cut flowers in the world. Worldwide, the European Union (EU) is the leading 
flowers and foliage importer with imports of up to USD 5,000 million in 2008 
(Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010). In Europe, the prices are set according to an 
auction system established in the Netherlands. This country is the first producer and 
exporter of fresh-cut flowers in the world. Around 6,000 small families grow flowers 
in farms of 1 to 2 hectares size. In order to change the tendency of the industry from 
being customer-driven in prices, growers organised themselves and set up a grower-
led cooperative auctions to maintain economic leverage over buyers (Patel-Campillo, 
2011).  
The Dutch cut-flower cluster consists of breeders, small 
growers, a grower-led cooperative auction, traders, buyers, 
and logistic firms, among others, located near the grower-led 
cooperative auctions of FloraHolland in Naaldwijk and the 
Aalsmeer Flower Auction (VBA) in Aalsmeer. (Patel-
Campillo, 2011, p. 2520) 
The Colombian case is different, since growers have not organised themselves to act 
as a block for the international customers. The main export destination market for 
Colombian flowers, the USA, is led by individual bargaining between firms and 
customers, who can be wholesalers, retailers or supermarkets. In this case, customers 
have total control over the producers and given the wide offer market with slight 
differences in the final product, the growers are at a disadvantage. This market 
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dynamic, coupled with the Colombian peso appreciation that started in 2003 has 
placed growing pressure on the sub-sector.151 The Colombian flower sector 
composition in terms of direct and indirect associated costs has grown the financial 
stress of the firms. Taking into account that the main production costs are labour, raw 
materials (mainly agrochemicals and plastics) and land – all of them with costs in 
Colombian pesos -, it can be understood that the sector has lost liquidity and raised 
its debt levels (Reina et al., 2008). 
The performance of the floriculture activity in Colombia is 
extremely sensitive to the behaviour of the exchange rate, to 
the extent that all of its income from abroad is denominated 
in USD and more than eighty per cent of its costs are in 
Colombian pesos. According to Asocolflores estimations, a 
period of sustained appreciation reduces the sector's 
competitiveness on world markets, make its products more 
expensive in foreign exchange and reduce the income of the 
companies in local currency.(Reina et al., 2008, p. iii) 
Colombia supplies around 51% of the total demand of the US market, which for 
2006 represented USD 1,117 millions. Roses are the main product in this market 
with 33% of the total imports, followed by carnations and mini carnations with 8%, 
chrysanthemums with 7.6%, alstroemeria 5.7%, foliage 9,2%, and other tropical and 
garden species with 36.5% (See figure 5.28). The price is set by the clients, with high 
levels of competition between providers, which hinders the negotiation power of the 
producers (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 38). There has been a growing 
tendency to sell directly to large supermarket chains in the USA, which has changed 
the way the products are offered, shifting from cut flowers packed in boxes, to 
finished bouquets, ready for the final customer. This product represents higher profits 
for the Colombian firms (Tenjo G et al., 2006). 
                                                
151 In February 2003, one USD dollar had a price of $2,968 Colombian Pesos. That was the highest 
value that the USD dollar had before a process of continuous revaluation of the Colombian Peso up to 
2014. The dollar dropped by 40% during these years for various reasons: growth in exports, mainly 
from the oil and mining sectors, higher Foreign Direct Investment product of better national 
macroeconomic conditions and control of the internal conflict, and the economic crises suffered by the 




Figure 5.28. USA imports by type of flower, 2006. 
Source. Made by the author, based on (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 38) 
However, from 2004 other markets have become increasingly important. Russia and 
Japan have grown 275% and 117% respectively from 2000 to 2006. The main 
customers for Colombian flowers during the period 2001-2007 can be seen in table 
5.12. The tendency has not changed dramatically in the latest years: 
Country Position Market share Growth (%) 
2001 2007 2001 2007 2001- 2007 
USA 1 1 79% 80.50% 62% 
Russia 5 2 2% 3.63% 275% 
UK 2 3 5% 3.62% 20% 
Japan 7 4 1% 2.51% 117% 
Canada 3 5 2% 1.77% 49% 
Spain 4 6 2% 1.70% 46% 
Holland 6 7 1% 1.39% 50% 
Germany 8 8 1% 0.78% 95% 
Subtotal top 8 
  
94% 99% 65% 
World 100% 100% 58% 
Table 5.12. Colombian flower imports by main destination markets 
Source. Adapted from (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 47) 
The fresh-cut flowers production chain is customer driven and adapts its practices, 
production, logistics and technology to the requirements of the clients. Since its 
inception the chain has replicated the Dutch model of production, importing 
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practices, technology, and seeds. Colombia is a follower, not a pioneer, in the flower 
global production chain. It is easy to understand why the Dutch model for the 
production and merchandising of flowers is successful. There is important support 
from the government for the development of the sector, both in terms of standards 
and organisations such as the KCB (Kwaliteits Controle Bureau) and Naktuinbouw 
(Netherlands Inspection Service for Horticulture) that ensure compliance with EU 
quality standards, and collaboration from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality for research in every part of the value chain of the industry. Besides the 
governmental support, the producers work jointly as a block and have direct 
collaboration with Wageningen University, the VHL University of Applied Sciences, 
and specialised research centres (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010). This has 
allowed the Dutch flower industry to be at the forefront of innovation in the 
development of new breeds with specific characteristics and in everything 
concerning the logistics of the chain.  
5.4.3. Sectoral Organisations  
Asocolflores is the Colombian Association of Flower Exporters and represents nearly 
75% of the producers. It was created in 1973 to support the nascent flowers industry 
in the country. The association has focused its action on the creation of effective 
mechanisms for promoting and supporting logistics, research, and marketing to 
penetrate international target markets for Colombian floriculture. In order to be part 
of the association, flower producers have to pay a membership fee in accordance 
with their annual production. Up to 2009, there were 272 companies as part of 
Asocolflores, most of them located in the Savannah of Bogota. Since 95% of the 
flowers production is exported, the association has focused its attention on 
representing the industry internationally, so it is a member of the most important 
flower associations in the world to keep Colombian firms updated with customer 
expectations and the latest innovation in the sector. The lobby function is very 
important for the associates (Asocolflores, 2010). 
The association has a participatory government system where all the associates have 
the right to nominate members for chairs of the board. However, the number and 
importance of chairs is determined by the amount of the hectares cultivated by the 
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firm. Thus, small producers are unlikely to have a significant position and support 
within the board. As Fabiola Valcárcel, scientific advisor for the flowers sector with 
25 years of experience working with large and medium flower companies expresses:  
The hierarchy in Asocolflores is determined by the area, by 
the size of the company. If you are a large company, then you 
can have a chair in Ceniflores. How big are you? Then you 
can be the president of the board. If you are a small producer 
you can only be a member of the board. So it is said that the 
system is pluralistic and democratic because there is 
representation of all producers, but these have 10 chairs, 
these have 3, and these have 1. Small producers do not have 
real participation in the decisions of the association. (Fabiola 
Valcárcel, personal communication, January 16th, 2013) 
After the financial crisis that the sector suffered because of the revaluation of the 
Colombian peso and the negotiation power held by the customers over the 
Colombian flower exports, Asocolflores lost important members who had paid high 
membership fees. From 2010 onwards the association lost influence with the 
government and the main international clients. Since there is not an auction system 
for setting the price of flowers in the USA, prices are set mostly by customers that 
have higher negotiation power, since there are many providers offering the same 
product. Competition between flower companies is based on transportation and 
distribution logistics, volume, and price. In this sense, Asocolflores has been losing 
its bargaining power to represent the entire sector and achieve better negotiation 
conditions. Firms are also very wary of their customers, so do not reveal who they 
are, and do not let anyone approach them because the competence is fierce and most 
of the companies depend on the loyalty of their customers. These factors added to the 
financial stress that firms have faced have caused the voluntary departure of several 
associates. Flower growers from the Savannah of Bogotá and Antioquia, started to 
call Asocolflores, the club, in the sense of a social club, since they could not perceive 
the benefits of being part of the association (Head of a large Colombian flower 
company, personal communication, September 7, 2013; Fabiola Valcárcel, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2013).  
Besides Asocolflores, there are other small associations such as the Association of 
west central flower growers, Colfloras; the Colombian federation of tropical exotic 
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flower and foliage producers, Fedecolflorex; Corporación parque de las Heliconias; 
Tulúa Association; Flora Tropical and the Association of Sevilla (Valle) producers. 
These are all small flower growers associations focused on the production of exotic 
flowers and foliage for bouquets. These associations work separately and all together 
do not exceed 480 planted hectares (See table 5.13).  
Department Number of Producers Total hectares Heliconias Foliage Other flowers 
Cauca Valley 141 289.4 270.6 14.8 4 
Risaralda 56 83 33.5 45.06 4.5 
Caldas 6 36.4 16.9 14.71 4.8 
Quindío 56 62 44.9 17.08 0 
Total Region 259 470.8 365.9 91.65 13.3 
% Over the 
total hectares     77.7% 19.5% 2.8% 
Table 5.13. Distribution of flowers plantations in the Colombian west central region 
Source. Adapted from (Díaz M, 2006) 
The largest association of the aforementioned is Colfloras. It was created in 2001 to 
provide technical assistance, research, training and help in the commercialization of 
flower producers in the coffee zone and north part of the Cauca Valley Department. 
The association had initially 23 members that traded around 47 flowers and foliage 
species with more than 123 varieties (Ocampo García & Osorio Franco, 2007).  
These flower growers concentrate their production in exotic varieties, such as the 
Heliconia flowers and a wide range of foliage for bouquets. Up to 2007 there was an 
important growth of this business branch having more than 120 hectares cultivated, 
150 flower producers as part of Colflora and exports above USD$1.5 million. The 
main destinations for exports are USA, Spain, UK and Italy (DNP, 2007).  
5.4.3.1. Ceniflores 
Ceniflores is the youngest agricultural research centre in the country. It was founded 
in 2004 as the research centre associated to Asocolflores. Before the creation of 
Ceniflores, Asocolflores had a technical division in operation since 1976, which was 
the predecessor of the centre. This technical division was created as part of the 
growing need of flower growers to have solutions for recurrent diseases and pests in 
the plantations. From the beginning, this technical division was supported by 
 
 276 
research groups based in universities and by international experts that were hired 
according to specific problems that Colombian floriculture had at the moment 
(Edison Valencia, personal communication, December 15, 2012). Most of the 
diseases found in the plantations came with the rootstocks imported from 
international breeders. In the 1960s the Colombian Institute of Agriculture (ICA) did 
not have standardised procedures for imported biological material, so in a joint effort 
with Asocolflores, regulation and standards started to be defined. During this first 
stage, the flower farms received technical support of specialists from Israel, since 
there were no local capabilities to deal with common phytosanitary problems 
(Arbeláez et al., 2012). The learning curve began to develop, but always with a 
heavy dependence on external knowledge and technology. 
Ceniflores provides services to Asocolflores associates and works as a virtual 
Technology Development Centre (CDT), which means that the centre does not 
perform research directly and does not have physical capacity installed. Ceniflores 
acts as knowledge broker or bridge institution between the firms’ needs and research 
organisations. In this sense, the centre has important alliances with local universities, 
international research groups and other agriculture research centres (Edison 
Valencia, personal communication, December 15th, 2012).  There are three research 
programs developed by the centre: technological upgrade, crop protection and soil 
and substrates. Each program has several research lines that are developed with the 
support of Colombian universities that provide the human and physical resources to 
perform the investigations. The key partners are Universidad Nacional, Universidad 
Militar Nueva Granada, Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, and Universidad de la 
Sabana. These mainly support the farms located in the Savannah of Bogota and 
Cundinamarca department. For the Antioquia region, there is collaboration with 
Universidad de Antioquia. 
Ceniflores is funded partially by Asocolflores, but one of the major motivations for 
migrating to a research centre was having access to different funding sources. 
Asocolflores decided in 2004 to strengthen the technical service, but did not want to 
invest more financial resources to create a research centre, so given the possibility 
within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to have virtual research 
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centres to support production chains, this was a feasible strategy. In words of 
Valcárcel: 
I was part of the technical committee before the creation of 
Ceniflores. I was there when Ceniflores was founded and 
then this committee became Ceniflores’ board. We changed 
the title, but we just kept doing the same as we did before. 
What we did was to formalise our status to obtain state 
resources…We were always struggling to develop in-house 
research, but Asocolflores’ board always held the position of 
not even having a microscope of its own. They always 
wanted to have partners with the infrastructure and training to 
do research and deliver results. And that is what they have 
done. (Fabiola Valcárcel, personal communication, January 
16th, 2013) 
Before the creation of Ceniflores, most of the technical and logistic problems were 
solved directly by the firms. This responded partially to the secrecy and lack of trust 
between firms in the sub-sector, but also because of the lack of a central organisation 
to collect producers’ needs and to create common sectorial solutions. Then, large and 
medium companies had their own research groups or technical departments to 
investigate particular problems with the crops. However, the main interest of the 
firms’ administrators was to maximise profits and research to face common pest 
management and productivity problems. Thus, it was imperative to create a stronger 
instance within Asocolflores to support producers’ needs, and this is how Ceniflores 
was born. This is how the decision of having a virtual research centre was approved. 
Referring to this process, Dr. Fernando Cantor, Dean of the School of Basic and 
Applied Sciences of Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, says: 
They decided to form a virtual research centre, which meant 
that they had only one office to make alliances with research 
centres and universities. Each one would receive support 
depending on its participation to support the needs of the 
sector. We were invited to those early meetings. All actors 
were defining the priority of the industry research agenda, 
and that was when the trouble started. Everyone was trying to 
impose their own necessities, and then there was use of all 
sort of influences below the table. Finally they [Asocolflores] 
defined an agenda, and that agenda is focused on traditional 
themes like transport, roads, the airports, the planes, and little 
on the technical part [pest control management, crops and 
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soils studies, substrates, etc]. (Fernando Cantor, personal 
communication, January 22nd, 2013) 
From the constitution of Ceniflores until 2013, the centre has not standardised 
procedures to collect research needs from the sector, transfer knowledge to all 
Asocolflores’ associates, or have regular mechanisms for K&T appropriation and 
validation with producers. This has caused discontent between the firms because they 
feel they are not represented within the system and their needs are not satisfied. This 
situation has encouraged secrecy and isolated efforts from producers to find solution 
to common problems by themselves. In this aspect, the role of Ceniflores could be 
improved to have a higher impact with its research products. As mentioned before, 
Asocolflores has lost representativeness of the sector because the associates do not 
perceive direct benefits to remain part of the association. There are complaints about 
the role of Ceniflores and the impact of the research projects funded by the centre. 
As noted by the general manager of a flowers company in the department of 
Antioquia: 
I am no longer affiliated with Asocolflores. That represents to 
my company 200 million pesos a year [USD$100,000 
approx.]. I cannot pay 200 million to not receive anything. I 
paid it someday, but I left. They don’t accompany us, they 
don’t visit us, they don’t consult us about what they are doing 
there. Then we do our own research. I cannot pay that sum to 
be part of a club. (General Manager medium flower firm, 
personal communication, January 18th, 2013) 
5.4.4. Institutional Setting 
The flowers production chain, as a sub-sector within the agriculture sector, is 
regulated by the agro-industrial institutional framework. However, there are some 
environmental regulations that have had an important impact on the sector, 
particularly with respect to environmental standards. The main normativity 
impacting the chain can be seen in table 5.14: 
Regulation Description 
Decree 1843 of 1991 Legal regulations for the use and manipulation of pesticides 
Law 101 of 1993 General law of agricultural and fishery development 
Law 306 of 1996 Creation of the agricultural solidarity fund 
Resolution 1068 of 1996 Agricultural inputs handbook creation 
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Resolution 1023 of 1997 Regulates the distribution, marketing and sales of agricultural 
inputs 
Law 373 of 1997 Sets the program for the efficient use and conservation of water 
Resolution 1367 of 2000 Authorization procedures for import and export of biological 
diversity specimens 
Law 822 of 2003 Regulates the production and commercialization of generic 
agrochemicals 
Table 5.14. Main legal institutional framework regulating the flowers production – chain. 
Source. Based on (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 92) 
In terms of the macro external conditions regulating the international market and 
benefiting the Colombian fresh-cut flowers sub-sector, there are some important 
international agreements with the main customers of Colombian floriculture. The 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (APTDEA) is an agreement 
signed between the United States of America and Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Bolivia to allow free trade for 6,500 products (including flowers) to enter the United 
States. Before the agreement was in force, the average import duty for flowers was 
6%. This gives Colombia a preferential place against its competitors in this market. 
As already noted, the European Union countries are one of the most important 
consumers of Colombian flowers. Being the second region (overall) with the highest 
import levels, the Generalised System of Preferences for trading with certain 
developing economies, where Colombia is included, has meant an important 
incentive and expansion of this market for the Colombian firms. The aim of the 
preferences is to promote sustainable social, economic and environmental 
development, in addition to promoting good governance and fighting against drugs. 
Concerning the Russian market (which had an extraordinary growth of 275% 
between 2001 and 2007), there is a correlation between the Colombian flowers 
exports to this country and the enacted Resolution 414 of 2000, where a list of 
products coming from developing countries have preferential tariff conditions. This 
agreement is known as the Russian Generalised System of Preferences. Thanks to 
this agreement, Colombian flowers have a zero entrance tariff to the Russian 
Federation. Finally, the program known as Plan Vallejo allows Colombian firms to 
import raw materials or supplies used in the production of export goods with total or 
partial tax exemption from customs duties (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010). 
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These commercial agreements have positively impacted the growth of the sector and 
have allowed the survival of many flowers firms that depend almost exclusively on 
the international market.  
In 2007 the Program for Rural Development with equity (DRE – for its acronym in 
Spanish) was created. The aim of this program has been to improve the 
competitiveness and productivity of the agriculture sector promoting at the same time 
a sustained social development. For that purpose, the central government, through 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, assigns 500 thousand millions 
of pesos (approximately US$ 25 million) annually to support small and medium rural 
producers. One of the instruments of this program is the Incentive for Rural 
Capitalisation (ICR – for its acronym in Spanish). Through this incentive, producers 
can obtain up to 40% of an investment for renovation of plantations; land 
improvements and irrigation systems; crop biotechnology development; production 
infrastructure; or even machinery and specialised equipment for agriculture 
production.152 The fresh-cut flowers sub-sector has used this incentive along with the 
sanitary incentive and the program for the revenues protection for exporting 
producers. The former was given from 2006 to 2010 to exporters of flowers and 
foliage, plantains, bananas and palm for supporting the sanitary control and 
management of plagues and diseases according to a set budget for every year. All 
producers registered in the Colombian Institute of Agriculture (ICA), with a 
Certification for integrated pest management (IPM) given by ICA and with exports 
equal or superior to USD$1,000 could claim this incentive. In 2008 the MADR gave 
104,000 million of pesos (approximately USD$52 million) to the flowers and foliage 
sub-sector to promote appropriate sanitary conditions in the plantations. The latter 
consists of an economic support to counterbalance fluctuations in the exchange rate 
through the acquisition of coverage mechanisms like European put options153 
(Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, 2009; Reina et al., 2008).  
                                                
152 More information about this program can be found at: 
https://www.minagricultura.gov.co/ministerio/programas-y-proyectos/Paginas/Programa-Desarrollo-
Rural-con-Equidad-DRE.aspx  
153 An option contract in which the holder has the right, but not the obligation, to sell some underlying 
asset at an agreed-upon price on or before the expiration date of the contract, regardless of the 
prevailing market price of the underlying asset. One buys a put option if one believes the price for the 
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Between 2005 and 2009 the flowers sector received 664,258 million of pesos 
(approximately USD$3,300 million) in incentives from the Colombian government. 
Besides the IRC, sanitary incentive and the program for the revenues protection for 
exporting producers, one of the most important incentives given to the Colombian 
flower industry during 2005 and 2006 was the incentive for exchange hedging (ICC, 
for its acronym in Spanish). Given the persistent decline of the US dollar because of 
Colombian peso appreciation from the end of 2003, and steadily during 2004, the 
government decided to support agriculture producers with high exports and low 
production inputs imports, a subsidy of 200 pesos for each dollar that enters the 
financial system from their international sales, up to the FOB value of the total 
production exported in 2004 (DNP, 2004). During 2005 fresh-cut flowers producers 
received 86,080 million of pesos (approximately USD$43 million) and 3,546 million 
of pesos (approximately USD$1.7 million) during 2006. This incentive was 
suspended and changed from 2007 onwards for the revenues protection program with 
resources coming from the MADR and managed by FINAGRO. This program 
differentiates the benefits according the producer company size and has a daily, 
weekly and monthly maximum limit to cover for medium and large producers. 
Flower growers have also benefited from special credit lines.154 Only during 2007 
and 2008, the industry received 270,417 million of pesos (approximately USD$143 
million) through: a preferential credit line for flowers, a special credit line for 
exporters, a special credit line for the rainy season, and a special program Agro 
Ingreso Seguro (AIS) (Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010). 
This inventory of fiscal and research incentives shows that the sector has not been 
neglected by the central government. On the contrary, it has received more perks 
than many agricultural production chains. However, subsidies and special credit lines 
have not been enough for the firms. This raises doubts about the efficiency of the 
                                                                                                                                     
underlying asset will fall by the end of the contract. If the price does fall, the holder may buy and 
resell the underlying asset for a profit. If the price does not fall, the option expires and the holder's loss 
is limited to the price of buying the contract (Farlex Financial Dictionary, Retrieved from: 
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/European+put+option, February 11, 2015).  
154 In 2006, Banco Agrario, state financial institution for supporting the agriculture sector, provided 
subsides of up to 90% of raw material for flower firms. Also, a special line for exporters supported by 
the Ministry of Agriculture gave credits for a value of $46,630 millions of Colombian pesos in 2006. 
More special credit lines have been available from Banco Agrario, Finagro, Bancoldex and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
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sector and its viability without government intervention. The question remains about 
what can make the chain more competitive and what strategies can be used to reduce 
the labour dependency of the population working in the flower farms, mainly in the 
Savannah of Bogotá and several municipalities in the department of Cundinamarca. 
Contraction of the sector appears to be the tendency. Strategic alliances and merger 
of firms to be more competitive is one pathway that has been in development during 
the sectoral crisis (Reina et al., 2008; Salom Serna & Sepúlveda Calderón, 2012; 
Tenjo G et al., 2006). However, less is said about the need of the sector to develop 
research capabilities in order to lessen the high dependency on international breeders 
coming mainly from the Netherlands. Competition solely through mass production, 
small incremental innovations, and price reductions will not bring much higher 
profits for the sector. Cheap labour, lower cost of land and revaluation of the US 
dollar are not sufficient conditions to keep the sub-sector competitive. Referring to 
this topic Hernán Jaramillo, dean of School of Economics of Universidad del 
Rosario and former sub-director of Colciencias and Corpoica, says: 
It is inconceivable to pay ROI per exported flower. Why? 
Because it was a sector that always lived protected from 
everything. Subsidised credit. Part of the special government 
program Agro Ingreso Seguro. Subsidy for the exchange rate 
revaluation. Then, do you think that a flower grower will 
make a risk loan for innovation? Never! Then there is a 
dynamic inconsistency of public policy. If you want a sector 
to be more dynamic, do not subsidise it. (Hernán Jaramillo, 
personal communication, May 23rd, 2012) 
There are doubts about the viability of the sector without State aids. Having the 
sector highly protected has caused market imperfections that have kept an artificial 
balance between supply and demand. It has also hindered a proactive attitude from 
firms to look for innovative strategies to continue being competitive in the 
international market reducing direct and indirect costs and being innovative in the 
products offered. After all, this is not the only industrial sector with high export 
reliance, which means that the public subsidies and preferential treatment cannot be 
the main source for keeping the sector alive. We believe that it is necessary to protect 
sectors in their infancy, especially those perceived as strategic at the national level, 
but excessive protection can hinder competitiveness instead of encourage it.  
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5.4.5. Knowledge and technology transfer, adoption, and 
validation processes 
Domestic research for the flowers sector is still scarce and has not had a long-
trajectory of development. As it was explained in the first section, the sector was 
developed by a group of private investors that imported knowledge and technology 
from the United States and the Netherlands to develop the sector in Colombia, given 
good climatic and soil conditions, land availability, cheap labour, and a relaxed 
regulatory framework. It was with the generation of new regulations and customer 
requirements that internal capabilities started to build-up, mainly within the firms 
controlling the production. Most of the research developed in the industry is done by 
transnational firms and imported by those companies, the producers associations or 
directly by the producers. The knowledge and technology generation by local actors 
is mainly concerned with trials of technologies developed abroad. 
There are few national and multinational companies doing 
research [in flowers] in Colombia. Floramérica, a producer 
and exporter of Colombian flowers, began its research 
program in 1982. Hoechst, a German multinational, started its 
research activities in Colombia on agrochemicals and seeds 
in 1985. Hoechst merged with Schering in 1997 to form 
Agrevo. Cargill, an American multinational, began testing 
sorghum hybrids locally in 1987 but their research activities 
in Colombia were taken over by Monsanto in 1998. (N. M. 
Beintema, L. J. Romano, & P. G. Pardey, 2000, p. 13) 
The breeding of new flower varieties is focused on two main aspects: the external 
appearance dominated by colour and size; and the resistance to diseases, which also 
impacts the longevity of the plant. The R&D process for these developments is 
performed by foreign countries. This represents a huge weakness for the sector 
(Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010).  
Even though Colombia is positioned as the largest exporter of 
carnations in the world, yet the progress made in the 
development of new improved varieties of carnations is 
almost nil. The plant material is imported from leading 
countries in developing biotechnology and breeding 
techniques such as Italy, Israel and the Netherlands. 
(Castellanos Domínguez et al., 2010, p. 83) 
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The Colombian fresh flower industry has remained a follower in developing 
knowledge and technology for the sector. There is a total dependency on leading 
flower-breed research countries for the production of specific flower varieties. Since 
there has not been a local development of new varieties, customers’ preferences are 
fulfilled by imported varieties grown in Colombian territory but without any strategic 
differentiation in the final product.  
Although successful in mass production—more than 80% of 
the Colombian exports consist of roses, carnations, and 
pompons (Asocolflores, 1998)—other countries, with the 
Netherlands in a leading position, control the research and 
development as well as the promotion of new trends in the 
consumer markets. (Meier, 1999, p. 276)   
To compete, the chain approach has been to mobilise towards mass production and 
adaptation to customer requirements. However, the producers are powerless in terms 
of radical innovation in their products. There is no research towards the development 
of original, new flower varieties to offer in the marketplace. The improved 
production processes within the chain have achieved better quality standards of the 
flower and longer vase life, which are important aspects for the final customer, but 
since there is not a radical new product to offer the market, the firms keep paying 
royalties for the use of specific varieties and are subject to the world market prices. 
In the U.S. case, they are subject to the price paid by the customer and in the 
European case they are subject to the prices of Dutch auctions. About this topic Dr. 
Fernando Chaparro, former director of Colciencias and Corpoica, says: 
It is myopia of certain business leaders in specific production 
chains. For example, one very successful case is flowers. A 
success story, impressive, but with an Achilles heel, 
producers did not invest in basic research, contrary to the 
Dutch case. And Holland, without the genetic resources that 
we do have, is selling seeds of sophisticated flowers to us. I 
don’t mean the flowers that are sold here [Colombia] for 
mother’s day, no, I mean sophisticated flowers that have 
certain characteristics according to specific market 
specifications. The Dutch master the industry. The flower 
market in Amsterdam keeps on giving the worldwide 
standard. (Fernando Chaparro, personal communication, May 
22nd, 2012)  
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Some farms have their own laboratory for the production of fertilizers and pesticides 
based on botanical or biological alternatives, however most of the companies rely on 
agrochemicals for their plantations care, leaving to their technical staff the role of 
identifying the mixture and quantity of chemical products needed. These 
agrochemical products are provided by a group of companies that import most of 
these products, either chemical or biological, from countries such as the USA, 
Germany and China. This has turned into a problem for the agriculture sector in 
general, since 46.6% of the agrochemical products are classified as extremely 
hazardous (Level 1A) or highly hazardous (Level 1B)155. The flowers sub-sector is 
one of the sectors that consumes more of these kinds of products (Castellanos 
Domínguez et al., 2010).  
Since the business was created in Colombia, in the sense that it was not a traditional 
agriculture crop and it was not commercialised before the 1960s, the evolution in 
terms of construction, application and validation of knowledge was promoted by the 
producers themselves. They started to face problems in the production chain that 
were solved in so far as the industry was growing. Phytosanitary problems like lack 
of nutrients in the soil for flowers cultivation; plant diseases and quality of water 
were just some of the difficulties that the growers had to cope with. Floramérica, 
mentioned before, was a pioneer in the flowers industry in Colombia and as such, it 
was the first company that had a research area dedicated to find feasible solutions for 
the oncoming problems. Knowledge diffused rapidly among companies, which 
started to copy the techniques used by Floramérica. 
On one occasion, the United Kingdom stopped admitting 
flowers from Floramérica because worms were found in the 
shipment boxes, a direct consequence of the contaminated 
water in which the flowers were packed. To solve this 
problem, Cheever and other exporters learned about dry 
packing. Flores de la Sabana started employing this method, 
and knowledge of its use spread rapidly (Arbeláez et al., 
2012, p. 81).  
                                                
155 The World Health Organisation has defined a toxicological classification of pesticides to 
distinguish between the more and the less hazardous forms based on acute risk to human health (that 
is the risk of single or multiple exposures over a relatively short period of time). There are five 
groups: 1A-extremely hazardous; 1B-highly hazardous; 2-moderately hazardous; 3-slightly hazardous; 
4-Normaly not hazardous.  
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So the starting model for knowledge and technology transfer was that of imitation. 
Turnover among farms, knowledge diffused by agrochemical providers for the 
treatment of diseases and higher productivity in-field, and the advice given by 
international experts directly to the firms, were the major sources of innovation in the 
early stages of the industry development. This tendency has prevailed over the years. 
Now the flower firms are better organised and have changed their distribution 
channels so they can get first-hand requirements from the customers. However, 
international breeders keep as the R&D leaders in the flower industry. Colombian 
firms import rootstocks according their customer requirements and pay royalties for 
the commercial use of the varieties exported (Edison Valencia, personal 
communication, December 15, 2012). Colombian firms are followers also in the 
consumption tendencies of the final customers that absorb the trends from European 
countries. Breeders and agrochemical companies provide the cuttings and technical 
assistance (TA) about the best practices for growing each variety. These 
transnational companies have a bidirectional relationship with Colombian and 
international research groups to transmit growers’ needs to the research centres and 
to provide support to local research initiatives. The knowledge and technology 





 Figure 5.29. Knowledge and technology generation and transfer pattern in the fresh flowers production chain 




It has been explored in the previous section how the Colombian flower firms have 
had a high dependency on foreign knowledge and technology from the creation of 
the industry until now. The flower companies depend on breeders that provide the 
rootstocks and also specific agrochemicals. The learning curve has grown and K&T 
have been adapted to the climatic and environmental local characteristics. In this 
sense, once the customers express their product requirements, the firms that grow, 
harvest, do the post-harvest process of classification and packaging (in boxes or 
design and composition of bouquets), prepare their production in accordance. Most 
of the firms have their regular clients so they have certain stability of the production 
size and characteristics they need to have for every production cycle (Sepúlveda 
Calderón, 2014). When there are problems in the plantations related with 
phytosanitary conditions or when an optimisation of resources is needed to maintain 
the profit or to meet clients’ requirements (like environmental and social sustainable 
practices or a specific kind of flower or bouquet), firms contact breeders to get 
specific variety specifications; international advisors to have field visits or offer 
remote advice; or Ceniflores to develop bigger research projects that can be useful 
for the chain. We can see here how the production chain follows patterns of learning 
economy meeting demand and supply requirements downstream in terms of 
appropriation and adaptation of knowledge for local production and upstream in 
terms of feedback on the imported rootstocks and ways to improve them. 
Ceniflores does not have a standard periodical procedure to have communication 
with the technical staff within the firms. The approach followed is that of action-
research where through direct communication with the firms, producers manifest 
their needs and Ceniflores find the human and financial resources to structure a 
research project. Sometimes there are special workshops with the firms in their 
farms, this is what the research and projects coordinator in Ceniflores told us 
(Alfonso Alvarado, personal communication, February 11th, 2015). There is also an 
annual seminar sponsored by Asocolfores where research projects are socialised in a 
two-days event, and where national and international experts are invited to present 
the latest trends in: production systems for ornamental substrates, leachate 
recirculation, knowledge and management for phytosanitary problems, development 
of biological control strategies, adapting technologies for flower production systems, 
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improving technical and logistical processes, and the establishment of a climate 
monitoring network. Ceniflores has a research journal where scientific papers related 
to common problems of Colombian floriculture are published, but this has not always 
been a periodical journal.  
There are on-going research projects in three strategic areas for the flowers industry: 
technological upgrade in everything related to machinery and techniques in field and 
packing and transport techniques; soils and substrates in terms of plant nutrition, 
integrated systems of pest management, irrigation and fertilization; and crop 
protection with special use of biological control (Ceniflores, 2014). Then, there are 
two mechanisms to establish relations with the research groups: Ceniflores approach 
the researcher directly in the universities with an invitation letter to participate in the 
projects, or the research groups present projects of interest to the guild to be funded 
by Ceniflores itself or in association with research funding bodies. Once the projects 
are structured, they are presented to Ceniflores’ board for their approval and to 
national entities such as Colciencias, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Corpoica, ICA, or other international agriculture research bodies to 
find physical or financial resource cooperation. Also, there is cooperation with other 
research centres in the country. Since Ceniflores is the youngest CENI, and is a 
virtual one, it receives advice from other research centres like Cenicaña, Cenicafé 
and Cenipalma. The collaboration is both about internal procedures and functioning 
of the centre and cooperation for specific research projects in cases where common 
laboratories can be used or expertise applicable to the flowers plantations can be 
gained (Edison Valencia, personal communication, December 15, 2012). For 
example, Ceniflores uses Universidad Militar Nueva Granda labs and the flowers 
guild has played a part in the development and changes of the biology undergraduate 
program of this university. Referring to the relationship with Ceniflores, Dr. 
Fernando Cantor, Dean of the School of Basic and Applied Sciences of the 
aforementioned university, says: 
Ceniflores knows our profile and knows our line of work. 
They have seen our results, so when they need to discuss a 
research project for the sector, they call us. We have 
presented projects to them also and we have developed close 
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research ties. (Fernando Cantor, personal communication, 
January 22nd, 2013)  
Innovation in the Colombian chain can be seen in two levels: product and process. 
Innovation in product is done through technical treatments to the flower plantations 
to prevent and control diseases and to prolong the flower vase life when it reaches 
the final consumer. There is little room for improving the characteristics of the 
flowers themselves since the rootstocks are imported and come already with specific 
characteristics that are guaranteed by the breeders and are protected by plant 
breeders’ rights.  This is clearly outlined by Edison Valencia, executive director of 
Ceniflores 2012 – 2014: 
There are some small local developments in genetic 
improvement for some varieties, but most of the genetic 
improvement is done through cooperation with breeders, or 
with companies that have their headquarters in U.S., the 
Netherlands, or France. R&D is performed in other countries 
and then we sign intellectual property and technology 
cooperation agreements with the breeders. (Edison Valencia, 
personal communication, December 15th, 2012)   
On the other hand, actors in the chain have developed innovative procedures and 
logistics in the plantation techniques, cutting, packaging, transporting, and 
distribution channels. Higher productivity per hectare, through the use of effective 
cultivation techniques in soil or flowerbeds has been fundamental to keep the 
business viable. The strategy has been to keep the same production in tons of cut 
flowers but using less land and labour. Also, it has been important to shorten the 
growth cycle of the flowers, so more crops can be produced per year. This aspect is 
highlighted by one of the general directors of a large flower company, included as a 
case study in Salom and Sepúlveda’s study: 
The situation with carnations is different. The volume has 
remained stable despite the increase in productivity. In 2003 
there were between 1500 and 1600 hectares planted in total; 
today there are about 800. This promotes price 




The aim has been to produce more with the same resources or with fewer resources. 
This is where firms irrespective of their size, have dedicated their research resources. 
For some large companies this has been achieved through buying plantations of other 
growers, besides their own production. This strategy allows them to have direct 
contact with hyper and supermarkets since they have the volume and variety of 
flowers to export finished bouquets. In the case of medium and small enterprises, the 
strategy has been to merge or act as a block to negotiate with international clients. 
However, given the high levels of industrial secrecy in the chain, there is not much 
vertical and horizontal integration, and it is worse for bilateral horizontal integration 
between firms (See table 5.8. Cooperation types).  
So the research groups supporting the Colombian flowers industry can be classified 
within biology, chemistry, agronomy, agrochemical engineering, and related areas, to 
produce knowledge-focus on the planting and harvesting procedures; and groups 
working on management and logistics to support the post-harvest areas of the 
production chain. When there are research agreements between Ceniflores and 
international research groups, the aim has been to have intellectual property rights, or 
the right to use the technology exclusively for a period of time.  
5.5. Conclusion 
We conclude this chapter by highlighting that even examining industries within a 
sector, the innovation pathways and dynamics are very different and follow 
distinctive development patterns. It is not enough to focus the attention on the firms, 
particularly in cases as coffee and sugarcane where the growers are at the centre of 
the innovation systems. The historical and social evolution of the sectors is crucial to 
understand the type of networks actors build and the power and trust dynamics 
between them. Innovation is not only an important economic feature that needs to be 
study and developed. In developing countries, with an important proportion of labour 
absorbed by the agro-industrial sector, innovation could and should be a source to 
improve social conditions of poor farmers. Efforts directed towards successful 
insertion in global value chains with a fair distribution of profits among the growers 
is a social and economic imperative requirement. In the cases of coffee and 
sugarcane where knowledge generation and exploitation models have been built over 
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the years, we could find positive results in the evolution of the industries. The initial 
motivation from the growers to organise themselves and form a producers 




6. CROSS-SECTORAL ANALYSIS: 
COMPARISSON OF THE SUB-SECTORAL 
CASE STUDIES 
6.1. Introduction 
So far we have studied the Colombian National System of Innovation and the Agro-
industrial System of innovation following a top-down approach guided by social, 
political and economic institutions heavily formalised in the cultural setting of the 
country. The next step was to study how innovation actually happens and what 
factors affect it in chosen sub-sectors or production chains. Following the sectoral 
systems of innovation approach (SSI) to study the sub-sectors and a complex 
adaptive system understanding, we analysed the industrial setting, technological 
evolution and dynamic complementarities; the type and structure of interactions 
among firms and non-firms; the role of demand in each production chain; how 
sectoral organisations have shaped the evolution and dynamics of the chains; what 
are the institutional settings, both formal and informal, of each sub-sector and how 
they have conditioned their innovation dynamics; and finally we studied the way that 
knowledge and technology are transferred, adopted, and validated in each of the case 
studies. This analysis allowed us to see the systems of innovation from a bottom-up 
approach, mixing codified information with perceptions of key actors of each case 
study.  In this section, we analyse the three sub-sectoral case studies: coffee, flower, 
and sugar cane, comparing how their structural and functional setting have been 
shaped by the coevolution of institutions, networks, knowledge, technology, and 
demand. 
K.J. Joseph recalls that is important to study sectoral systems in developing countries 
since the innovation patterns in these economies are different than those observed in 
countries of the so-called North:  “…the challenge of innovation scholars dealing 
with sectoral systems in developing countries is therefore to highlight the unique 
characteristics in the South, so that they can contribute towards informed policy 
making.” (Joseph, 2009, p. 184). In this sense, our analysis is novel not only because 
of the analysis of the particular characteristics of the Colombian Agro-industrial 
innovation system, but also because through a deeper examination we discovered in 
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our individual cases that innovation is affected by different factors within branches 
of the same sector. It is not enough to observe complex sectors as a unit of study 
within national or regional innovation systems. In a sector such as agriculture that 
has different sub-sectors with diverse economic and social behaviours, it is necessary 
to have a nuance approach to understand the dynamics of innovation. This study 
highlights some successful and challenging practices, models, and patterns followed 
by these particular productive chains that can serve as examples for other sectors or 
production chains. It ultimately sheds light on key factors of innovative trajectories 
constrained by the evolution of industries, structural transformation, dynamic 
competition, technological specialisation, and knowledge and learning properties. By 
complementing the macro study of the Colombian NSI with our sub-sectoral studies, 
we portray a comprehensive view of innovation dynamics, identifying the factors 
that support and hinder national and sectoral mechanisms towards firms’ 
competitiveness. 
6.2. Sectors structure, market and non-market 
interactions, demand 
We studied and analysed three sub-sectors within the Agro-industrial sectoral system 
of innovation. Some of the reasons why we chose these three production chains out 
of the 37 registered in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development (MADR) 
is because these chains exemplify successful cases within the Colombian economy, 
represent products for which the country is recognised internationally, and have an 
associated research centre or CENI. We wanted to investigate the differential factors 
which have positioned these industries in the domestic and international markets. 
Now that we have presented a separate analysis of each chain, we will develop a 
comparative framework guided by the sectoral systems of innovation approach. In 
this section, we will discuss the industries structure as part of the Agro-industrial 
sector and as part of the Colombian economy. 
Table 6.1. presents some structural features of the sub-sectors that are important to 
size the industries within the agriculture and national context. These factors are 
important to understand the way in which the chains operate and their strategies to 
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remain competitive in the market. Since innovation is the ultimate aspect we study, 
we see these characteristics as dynamic complementarities that contribute to the 
coevolution of actors, knowledge, demand and institutions. As Montobbio outlines it: 
“In fact, sectors not only display differences in the technological domain but also in 
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Table 6.1. Structural comparison between the coffee, flowers, and sugarcane production chains. 
*Average from 2000 to 2009 
Source. Information compiled by the author. 
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It can be seen in table 6.1. that there are main differences in size, characterisation of 
producers, market composition, demand type, and institutional setting. Coffee is the 
sector that has the largest size in cultivated area and number of producers. It is also 
the sector with the longest tradition in the Colombian agriculture sector, being the 
most important export product from the beginning of the 20th century until 1990, 
when oil and oil by-products had a faster growth and greater international demand. 
This long trajectory allowed the sector to be highly integrated combining national 
economic policies with special tailor-made incentives to protect and support the 
growers. In order to remain competitive and to organise the growers, the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC156) was founded in 1927, being the first 
producers association in the country. As commercial production was increasing and 
there were more demanding customers, the FNC decided to invest in research and 
development creating its own research centre, Cenicafé, in 1938. This was the first 
agriculture research centre in the country, existing even before a national agriculture 
research institute. The FNC has remained a strong producers association, with a 
strong lobby, in the national government characterised by the creation of special 
privileges for the guild, a market protected from the international coffee price 
fluctuations, and the construction of a trademark for the international market to get 
higher prices for the quality seal of Colombian coffee. The sector has evolved 
through the production of specialty coffees with the use of coffee varieties developed 
by Cenicafé and with special cultivation and collection techniques that influence the 
final taste of the coffee. This characterises the sub-sector as a special commodity 
niche. 
The sugarcane sector is slightly younger in terms of having an organised production 
and modern commercialisation, since it started to have a mass production almost 40 
years later than the coffee sector, however, represents the higher participation of the 
GDP. It was with the creation of Asocaña, the Association of Sugarcane Growers of 
Colombia, in 1959 that the sub-sector began an expansion process that finally 
allowed the country to produce its entire domestic consumption of sugar and to 
export to international markets. The sector actors developed a standard pricing model 
                                                
156 Federación Nacional de Cafeteros 
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where the price of the final product is transferred to the growers. In an attempt to 
increase productivity, the producers association created Cenicaña, the sugarcane 
research centre, mainly funded by the producers themselves through a voluntary fee. 
The industry works as a cluster, with highly integrated production and 
commercialization processes. Agglomeration of sugar and biofuels production in the 
same geographical area has been beneficial in building stronger firm capabilities and 
the effective generation and exploitation of knowledge. In terms of size, the 
plantations represent less than a third of the total coffee cultivated area, which makes 
it easier to manage the commercial and technological strategies. The existence of a 
strong research centre has facilitated the compilation of information for every 
sugarcane planted plot, or ‘suerte’, as the sugarcane growers call them. Cenicaña has 
built a strong geographical information system with meteorological, hydrological, 
soil information and varieties grown in each suerte, as well as socio-economic and 
commercial information of growers associated to Asocaña. These information 
systems and their use by the research centre have given the sector a competitive 
advantage having radical and incremental innovations impacting the productivity, 
sustainability and profitability of the cluster. 
For the fresh flowers sector, the historical trajectory is different. Industrial activity 
began in the late 1960s through a private foreign initiative to supply the United 
States market with good quality, and cheap, fresh-cut flowers. From the beginning 
the flower sector had a clear geographical market segment to export to. This 
dependency on a specific market moved the chain towards a customer-driven pattern. 
The main producers association, Asocolflores, was created in 1973 and its aim has 
been to create effective mechanisms to penetrate international target markets with 
better prices and conditions for the Colombian flowers. However, producers do not 
work with each other, and are very jealous of their business models and their on-field 
plantation techniques. This could be partially explained by the model followed by the 
producers at the beginning of the industry setting, when replication of good practices 
from competitors led to attitudes of mistrust and secrecy amongst firms in the 
industry. The association has been successful in strengthening a beneficial 
institutional setting for the national industry in terms of law regulations and better 
export conditions, but it has not been sufficiently strong to promote bilateral 
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relationships between firms for the construction of a good knowledge and technology 
base for the industry. At the beginning, sectoral production focused on the Savannah 
of Bogotá and its proximities, this helped the guild to create joint regulations and 
formal institutions for the sector, as well as finding cheaper and more effective ways 
to transport the fresh-cut flowers to their final destination. Also, the proximity of the 
farms to main international airports157 has been beneficial for delivery logistics. The 
flower sector is not traditional, not only because it is a young sector and does not 
represent a staple like most of the other agriculture products, but also because it 
offers a luxury product for very specific markets and customers’ tastes. The chain 
depends on imported rootstocks to grow specific flower varieties demanded by 
international clients. Thus, innovation is mostly developed in the logistics processes 
to achieve the highest possible profit for the firms. The sector established its research 
centre in 2004, the youngest CENI in the country, Ceniflores. This research centre 
has a different dynamic than Cenicafé and Cenicaña given its virtual nature, which 
means that it does not have a research infrastructure (researchers and installations) 
belonging to the centre, but acts as a bridge between the flowers firms needs and 
national and international research groups and centres to produce and transfer 
knowledge and technology. 
In the coffee and sugarcane chains, growers are involved -to some extent- in the 
production of the final products going to the market. There are some other actors 
involved in later stages of the chains for the production of specialised products, also 
agents in charge of marketing, commercialisation and transport of the finished 
products, but growers have a price transfer from the finished products sales. In the 
flower production chain, the industrial activity is controlled by SMEs and large firms 
that have their own flower farms and have control over the chain from the growing 
stage until at least the transportation of the flowers to the port of shipment. In this 
case, firms hire labour to perform the growing and harvesting activities on the 
plantations. Since the Colombian flower industry depends on breeder companies to 
grow the specific varieties required by customers, it is difficult for a small grower to 
set up their own plantation as an independent part of the chain. Investment in 
                                                
157 Air transport is the most used for flowers delivery to their final destination. 
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greenhouses, fertilizers, irrigation technology, and logistics is high and therefore 
non-viable for small families to produce flowers themselves, which is different from 
the case of coffee growers. All of these factors influence the evolution and 
technological behaviour of the different subsectors, as Katz explains it: 
Understanding the specificity of each environment is, in fact, 
crucial if we are to proceed toward a richer description and 
interpretation of the forces underlying inter-country and inter-
industry differences in technological behaviour. (Katz, 2001, 
p. 4) 
Even being part of the Agro-industrial sector, the three sub-sectors have developed 
different trajectories to innovate. These trajectories are path-dependent to their 
particular industrial setting, technological evolution, and dynamic complementarities. 
6.3. Networks  
The three production chains have different patterns of cooperation. It is evident that 
in order to be competitive, firms need to have differential factors amongst their 
competitors and that an important source of differentiation is the knowledge the firm 
privately holds for its commercial activity. However, collective construction of 
knowledge in industrial and sectoral networks has shown to be beneficial for the 
cluster of firms related directly and indirectly with the economic activity performed 
by the sector (Kogut, 2000). This is clearly seen in the three chosen cases where 
cooperation between actors has been crucial. In the case of the coffee sector, 
cooperation has maintained the sector through the toughest crises; and has made the 
Colombian sugarcane industry competitive making it the most productive in the 
world in terms of tons-per-hectare of sugar. The opposite case is seen in the flower 
sub-sector, where the lack of trust between firms has hindered the construction of an 
effective cooperation network. Firms do not share knowledge unless a business 
consortium is set to meet very specific customer requirements. Bridges to share 
knowledge and technologies useful for the entire chain are weak. This is one of the 
factors that have caused the sinking of several small, medium and large firms and the 
requirement of further assistance from the government to overcome the sector’s 
internal crisis. However, the industry stays viable and has innovated in the logistical 
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links of the production chain, which leads us to think that a stronger cooperation 
between actors could expand the potential of the business to promote radical 
innovations. 
The network constituted by growers and sugar mills in the sugarcane case has 
improved the joint performance of the actors within the chain and has engendered 
routines and rules on how production from cultivation until finished product is done. 
Growers have seen the necessity of having more productive sugarcane varieties since 
their payment is subject to the final sugar obtained from the cut sugarcane delivered 
to the mills. Therefore, Cenicaña is at the centre of the network as the provider of the 
latest K&T, which is in turn translated into more profit for all the actors in the 
network. 
One possible hypothesis to explain the difference between the network structures in 
the case studies is the specific characteristics of each sector due to their historical 
pathways and the market niches where competence is held. In the coffee case, early 
entry into the international market and the possibility to develop knowledge and 
technology not only at the local level, but also in a wider global context, accentuated 
the need from growers to associate and invest in research to preserve a leading 
position in the international market. Coffee, being a product with a consumption 
pattern ruled by quality has had a wide framework of action to improve the final 
product. The strategy was to compete with quality and differentiation against bigger 
competitors in terms of volume, like Brazil. There were not many available 
technologies used in the industry so the coffee sector evolved at a similar pace as 
other strong competitors and was a pioneer in the research of varieties resistant to 
common coffee diseases.  
In the sugarcane case, the initial aim of the sector was to completely supply the 
domestic market. The infrastructure required for processing sugarcane has a high 
associated cost, which generated a positive discrimination of the fittest competitors 
in terms of efficiency and productivity, so production costs can be reduced and the 
implemented technology can be used at its highest potential. Technologies were 
available in other parts of the world for sugar production, however, growers during 
the modern stage of the industry (1960 onwards) realised that having an accurate and 
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complete knowledge of the production units could increase their productivity. The 
perfect weather conditions were not a sufficient factor alone to be competitive, so 
research was needed to grow the right varieties according to the soil conditions and 
later on, varieties resistant to diseases. Then, as it happened with the coffee chain, the 
sectoral research centre produced technologies to meet producers’ needs, creating 
dynamic complementarities among growers in terms of cultural, social and 
educational backgrounds to absorb new knowledge and technologies. The pursued 
objective in the sugarcane sector was not to compete with differentiation, but with 
productivity. Innovation was focused on efficiency in the growing and processing of 
raw materials. An effective regional system was built to keep the sector ahead in 
terms of productivity and later on to diversify the products portfolio into biofuels.  
The fresh flowers sector is different from the other two case studies. Colombia did 
not have a tradition in the fresh flowers market, so the industry was created with the 
assumption that good climatic and soil conditions, in addition to cheap labour and a 
relaxed regulatory framework, would make the business profitable. Colombia was a 
latecomer to the flowers industry, which made it a follower of international leaders. 
The strategy was to compete with volume of production according to customer 
demand. The chain is composed by firms rather than by growers, and there is not 
much differentiation in the products the firms offer to the final client in terms of 
quality since they all use standard imported rootstocks. Differences remain in the 
target markets, final price, fair trade strategies, access to larger customers through 
larger production, effectiveness in delivery logistics, and lately in the offer of 
finished bouquets ready to sell to the final customer.  
The networks formed in the flowers, coffee and sugarcane production chains 
emerged in response to the systemic interaction of social, technological and 
institutional factors during the industries evolution. The structure and governance of 
these networks is an expression of the coevolution of actors, knowledge, demand, 
technology and institutions changing dynamically according to cooperation ties built 
within the networks. We observed that for these three case studies, having an entity 
coordinating the network and representing the sectoral actors in external institutional 
settings directly impacts the proclivity to innovation. For the agriculture case, 
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producers associations fulfil that role. The representativeness of the growers and 
producers in the association and the internal governability of the guild affect the 
industrial dynamics and the sectoral knowledge generation and exploitation.  
A hierarchical governability structure like the one seen in the coffee case imposes 
certain rigidities on the production chain and constrains, to a certain extent, the 
producers’ capacity to survive in the open market.  The coffee sub-sectoral 
innovation system is dominated by the highest authorities of the FNC that also 
determine the knowledge and technological requirements for the small coffee 
growers. The system is democratic in the election of authorities but the pyramidal 
structure of the network makes difficult for the base to have power to influence 
changes in the evolution of the industry. There are no large or small firms that can 
compete with the Federation, that besides being the producers association is a 
competitor in the domestic and international market, selling raw and finished 
products. In this case, we see a Burt network structure (see section 2.3.3.2.), where 
the FNC is a non-redundant tie between the growers, the cooperatives, the export 
firms and the final clients.   There is no market interaction that is not intermediated 
by the Federation. 
In the flowers case, international suppliers at the start of the chain have influenced 
the low R&D local efforts. The core innovation source is foreign, leaving local 
efforts to innovate in the logistics of the production chain.  There are dispersed SMEs 
and a few large firms that compete with each other for clients and technological 
capacity to respond to the everyday challenges of the business. Asocolflores, as 
mentioned before, has not exercised an effective role to promote cooperation 
between the producers. The nature of the chain is also different from the other two in 
terms of the characterisation of the actors. Asocolflores represents firms, not 
growers. However, firms own the land and plantations and hire unskilled labour for 
the planting and harvesting processes. Few professionals with technical skills guide 
labour. The owners are usually in charge of the administrative and logistical 
processes. Each firm is an independent unit that only have contact with other firms 
for specific business opportunities, but always keeping their own knowledge out of 
the commercial agreements. In this sense, Asocolflores and Ceniflores in most cases 
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operate a one-to-one relationship basis to support firms individually. The nature of 
this network is ruled by opportunist links between firms, which does not necessarily 
imply long-term commercial relationships. The network has clusters of small and 
medium firms that join to gain bigger customers and to compete with larger firms. In 
this sense, we cannot see a Burt or Coleman network structure, but a network that 
redesigns itself constantly according to demand dynamics. 
The sugarcane cluster works with horizontal and vertical relationships between 
growers, sugar mills and the existent producers associations. Asocaña is an important 
actor in the network since it has the largest number of growers associated as well as 
all of the sugar mills. Asocaña has intermediated the relationship between growers 
and sugar mills, but the association is not the only bridge between both of them. The 
growers have bilateral relationships promoted by Cenicaña and share contextual 
knowledge related with the productivity of their plantations. There are fixed prices 
set by the sugar mills in accordance to the national and international sugar market 
prices and there is guarantee that the growers’ production will be bought by the sugar 
mills. The network is not completely flat, because the sugar mills exert power within 
the cluster, but it is not hierarchical either, because the growers influence Asocaña’s 
decisions, sectoral regulations, and set conditions to the sugar mills for the purchase 
of their production. In this sense, the sub-sector works more with a Coleman network 
structure. There are diverse relationships between growers, between sugar mills, and 
between sugar mills and growers. Knowledge and technologies flow dynamically 
within the network. 
Thus, it is understandable that each industry has different dynamics that leads to 
different innovation pathways according to their specificities. As Malerba outlines: 
[I]nnovation and industry evolution are highly affected by the 
interaction of heterogeneous actors with different knowledge, 
competences and specialization, with relationships that may 
range from competitive to cooperative, from formal to 
informal, from market to non-market (Malerba, 2006, p. 15).  
We learned from the cases under study that in order to survive, firms and growers 
represented by the producers associations have to be flexible to adapt to market 
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changes. Flexibility in the knowledge generation base according to sectoral needs 
and the knowledge cumulativeness of the industry is fundamental to remain 
competitive. Particular historical evolution patterns and formal and informal 
institutions have a direct impact on the way governability and governance are built to 
set different combinations of collective and competitive relationships and new 
market orientations; and to build effective networks that facilitate interconnection 
between the knowledge generation and knowledge exploitation systems. 
6.4. Knowledge 
We found in our study two sub-sectors with similarities in the way knowledge is 
built and applied and one sector that has a different trajectory. The sources, domains, 
applications, accessibility and cumulativeness of knowledge (see section 2.3.3.1) 
play a central role in the sectoral and firm innovation processes and affects the way 
firms learn and build capabilities (Malerba & Mani, 2009a). This is also highlighted 
by Joseph: “The evolutionary literature has proposed that sectors and technologies 
differ greatly in terms of the knowledge base and learning processes related to 
innovation.” (Joseph, 2009, p. 186) 
We can see a comparison of the knowledge dimensions between the three production 





























































































based on foreign 
innovations. 
High feedback 
from the market 















































the growers and 







Table 6.2. Comparison of knowledge dimensions in the coffee, flower and sugarcane production 
chains 
Source. Information gathered by the author. 
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The existence of strong research centres has been crucial for effective models of 
knowledge generation and knowledge exploitation in the coffee and sugarcane sub-
sectors. The centrality of these research organisations has impacted the productivity 
levels and the degree of competitiveness at both national and international levels. 
Moreover, the centres have acted as a bridge organisation between the producers 
associations and the growers and firms themselves. The generation, transfer, 
appropriation and validation technology models followed by Cenicafé and Cenicaña 
have proven to be effective in terms of R&D and solutions delivered to the final 
recipients.  
The intermediation of the producers association for knowledge generation and 
knowledge exploitation systems has shaped the way each of the industries are 
structured and the kinds of networks formed between the actors. In words of Loasby:  
The organisation of industry is an organisation of knowledge, 
and the way in which knowledge is organised shapes the 
content of the additional knowledge that is produced. 
(Loasby, 1999, p. 136) 
Here, we can see differences in our case studies in how the intermediation between 
the two systems (knowledge generation and knowledge exploitation) is partially 
overcome by active private research centres that are in direct contact with the 
producers. Also, we have found that better regulatory frameworks (as the creation of 
production chains for the Agro-industrial sector) and public research entities, like 
Corpoica, that work as bridges between the knowledge generation and the knowledge 
exploitation systems have a positive impact on closing the gap between producers 
and R&D results. As it is outlined by Cook for the case of regional systems of 
innovation (RIS): 
A Regional Innovation System…consists of two sub-systems. 
The first is the ‘Knowledge Generation’ sub-system. The 
second is the ‘Knowledge Exploitation’ sub-system. Most 
regions, and many nations, have poor linkage between the 
two sub-systems. Where nations or regions have overcome 
this barrier, it is either through successful working of market 
mechanisms, set in an appropriate regulatory environment, 
classically in the USA. Or market failure is overcome by the 
establishment of state entities that directly or indirectly 
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straddle the “exploration” to “exploitation” divide. (Cooke, 
2004, p. 79) 
The coffee knowledge generation and exploitation model, highly intermediated by 
the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC), developed the required 
institutional structure so every component of the knowledge and technology cycle 
was covered by different organisations, as we illustrated in the K&T transfer, 
adoption, and validation model part of the coffee section (see figure 5.10). Cenicafé 
generates the knowledge, the extension service is the bridge between the growers and 
Cenicafé, and Fundación Manuel Mejía provides training to technicians and 
researchers and lately even to the coffee growers themselves. All these organisations 
are part of the FNC. The sugarcane industry has followed a similar pattern having a 
strong producers association, Asocaña, which created Cenicaña. The research centre 
develops R&D and has developed with Tecnicaña (the association of sugarcane 
technicians) programs for K&T transfer, adoption and validation. At the same time, 
the research centre provides training to the sugarcane technicians. The flower sub-
sector presents a more dispersed knowledge generation system that it is 
intermediated sometimes by Ceniflores for covering common problems found in the 
chain, but there is not a particular methodology or model to develop, transfer, adopt 
and validate K&T. The knowledge creation and exploitation systems are not highly 
integrated. The lack of integration can be seen in the composition of the networks 
with low density in relationships and weak linkages among firms. The relationship 
with the breeders is sustained at individual levels between firm and breeder. The 
socialisation of sectoral knowledge produced through Ceniflores is not fluent and 
does not reach all associates of Asocolflores. In the flowers case actors like 
Corpoica, the public research centre for agriculture, has a more active role in the 
knowledge generation subsystem than in the coffee and sugarcane cases. However, 
Corpoica’s influence has been rather limited. 
This integration of both creation and exploitation of knowledge in the coffee and 
sugarcane cases has proven to be successful and has maintained the viability of the 
industries in the hardest crisis. The importance of such proximity is recalled by 
Cowan et. al: 
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[F]or an economy to have a strong, innovative manufacturing 
sector, it is necessary also to have correspondingly strong 
applied and basic research activities situated in close 
proximity to the production operations themselves. (Cowan et 
al., 2000, p. 222) 
Analysing the boundaries in the knowledge space for codified and uncodified 
knowledge (Cowan et al., 2000), we can also see differences in the trajectory of the 
three sub-sectors. In the flower production chain there is circulation and use of tacit 
knowledge for all activities related with the managerial and logistics links of the 
chain. Managers bring their expertise from other sectors and adapt their skills to the 
flower industry. This has been the case since the industry was created and has been 
maintained over time. Colombian flower firms have tried to keep their know-how 
protected, encouraging low staff turnover and having strict confidentiality 
agreements. Experience comes with practice of particular skills and then internal 
firm capabilities are built. This knowledge has remained unarticulated and adapted 
from generic codified knowledge. Codified knowledge used by the actors comes in 
the form of artefacts (rootstocks) and technologies (cultivation techniques, fertilisers, 
irrigation equipment, greenhouse specificities). There is also codified knowledge that 
is transferred by the international breeders concerning cultivation requirements to 
guarantee the final expected outcome from the cutting. This codified knowledge is 
appropriated and adapted to the field characteristics and codified by the technical 
staff and national researchers in the form of internal technical procedures and 
academic papers. Around this codified knowledge there is unarticulated knowledge 
shared by the actors within the farms to have higher productivity levels determined 
by less use of resources and better protection against diseases. This know-how, in the 
flower sub-sector case is shared in the industry through staff turnover (even when it 
is tried to be kept low by the firms), since there is not a strong cooperation network 
between the firms.  
For the coffee and sugarcane cases, there is codified knowledge produced by the 
research centres that has been perfected over time through experimentation in field, 
and feedback cycles between technicians and researchers. The growers and firms (in 
the coffee case the firms are the cooperatives, roasters and traders; and in the 
sugarcane are the sugar mills) are an active part of the knowledge generation and 
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exploitation sub-systems. When technicians interact with the final users, the 
appropriation and validation phases generate new knowledge that can be used to 
improve existing solutions or to find new ways of dealing with common problems. 
This knowledge is partially codified by the technology transfer teams and by the 
research centres, but most of the knowledge keeps uncodified as part of the know-
how of the farmers and companies.  
We can see different degrees of dynamic complementarities in the three production 
chains in the innovation cycle. These are characterised by interdependencies and 
feedbacks between users and producers of knowledge and sectoral agents 
intermediating the flow of knowledge, as can be seen in table 6.2. However, 
knowledge transactions -or the way actors transfer, appropriate and validate 
knowledge within the sectors- (Cowan et al., 2000) have been highly expensive in 
terms of the production of codified knowledge. The knowledge and technologies 
used have been normalised in many of the cases, but the codebooks and repositories 
of codified information have been built internally responding to contextual 
particularities of production. This process has associated costs that in the coffee and 
the sugarcane sectors are absorbed by the research centres, and in the flower case is 
mostly paid by the firms themselves, with internal investment in R&D and hiring of 
international experts. Ceniflores has sponsored sectoral research projects to support 
the firms associated to Asocolflores but its influence and impact is still limited. 
Finally, a common problem found across the sub-sectors, is the weakness of the 
formal institutional setting for encouraging and facilitate Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) agreements between universities, research centres and laboratories both public 
and private, and firms and producers associations. Universities are in the process of 
exploring different mechanisms to provide services to the business sector and 
transferring research results for specific sectoral needs. In this case, there is not an 
effective bridge between the production of knowledge and the absorption and 
exploitation in commercial solutions. In the three production chains, actors 
interviewed from the producers associations, research centres and firms complained 
about the difficulty for having joint projects with all sort of research organisations 
within the country. For the three case studies, there are more joint-research projects 
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with international universities and international research centres than with national 
research actors. The reason is that it is easier and more effective to have these 
agreements with foreign organisations than with national ones. There is a systemic 
failure in the translation of knowledge into innovative products and services. This 
weakness has hindered and prevented effective knowledge exchange between the 
actors of the innovation networks. As explained by Santiago Echavarría, executive 
director of the Centre of Science and Technology of Antioquia: 
In practice the implementation of policies still favour the 
knowledge production block of the system, so the system is 
not complete. There is no knowledge flow and transfer, no 
learning processes. In innovation there is something that is 
called ‘valley of death’. Between research and innovation 
there is a whole issue of development. That development 
process is what is called ‘the valley of death’. The Colombian 
model is focused on strengthening the knowledge generation 
side, but not much has been done to convert ideas into 
technological solutions. The universities are not designed to 
complete the innovation cycle, there is not experience and 
mechanisms to facilitate the conversion of knowledge into 
market solutions.  (Santiago Echavarría, personal 
communication, March 16th, 2012) 
6.5. Coevolution 
The knowledge base of the sectors under study has hinged on their longevity. The 
early entry position of the coffee and sugarcane sectors impacted positively in the 
construction of a solid knowledge base incremented through cumulative processes of 
knowledge generation according to direct feedback from the growers and sectoral 
firms. The Colombian flower industry is still in a process of maturation and 
continues to be highly dependent on foreign knowledge production. From this stand 
point the industry has enhanced its knowledge base at the logistics level, but it has 
remained steady in the biological knowledge base for developing new flower 
varieties. In the three cases, the knowledge base has determined the type of networks 
developed. However, longevity itself is not a critical variable. Without an effective 
cooperation network of actors to encourage accumulation of knowledge, innovation 
does not happen. 
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Besides knowledge base, type of networks and longevity, the demand type has been a 
main factor in determining the sub-sectoral innovation pathways. As we explained 
before, coffee and flower production chains have a high dependency on international 
markets, which has shaped the products characteristics and design. Notwithstanding 
other factors influencing the sectors evolution, the result of having highly specialised 
customers has resulted in different innovation dynamics. Since Colombia has been a 
pioneer in offering Arabica coffee, it has created specific consumption preferences 
attached to the special characteristics of Colombian coffee. However, given the 
entrance of more competitors and more sophisticated requests from the final 
customers (flavour, origin, acidity, etc.), the sectoral actors had to improve their 
knowledge base to diversify the offer, which resulted in the production of higher 
coffee quality and value-added products. As a result, the export of specialty coffees 
has had a sustained growth (see figure 5.6). The Colombian Coffee Growers 
Federation has also ventured into the production and sale of freeze-dried coffee to 
cover the range of soluble coffees and has gone to the last link of the chain, having 
its own coffee shops, Juan Valdez, first in the domestic market and expanding 
afterwards to international markets in South, Central and North America, Korea, and 
Kuwait. In the flower case, the production is customer-driven, which means that 
firms adapt their supply to the market tendencies and demand. Therefore, Colombian 
flower production is highly focalised on the production of roses and carnations, since 
these present the higher demand. Specialization has come also in the form of finished 
bouquets. New capabilities in the production process have been added in terms of the 
composition of different flower varieties, diverse packaging combinations, and the 
design of final bouquets. This further step has also meant that firms have had to 
associate to be able to mix different varieties of flowers and transform their 
production line in order to offer a wider range of final products. However, the 
product R&D base (rootstocks) remains external to the national industry. The 
demand patterns in the sugarcane production chain are different than in the previous 
cases. Most of the demand is internal and there is a domestic market shared by 
fourteen sugar mills located in the same geographical region. The mills have strategic 
alliances with confectionery and spirits companies, sell sugar directly to final 
customers through wholesalers and retailers and from 2006 the cluster has expanded 
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its products portfolio to biofuels. There are five plants for ethanol production owned 
by five sugar mills. The ethanol production is totally absorbed by the domestic 
market, given the existence of national biofuels policies that warrants the purchase of 
internal production, before importing it from different countries. 
Political institutions have had an important influence on sectoral policies and their 
use for supporting the viability of the sub-sectors in the short and medium term. The 
coffee, flowers, and sugarcane subsectors have had special policy instruments to 
minimise market failures, information asymmetries and lack of competitiveness in 
international markets. The main policy instruments designed to support the sectors 
competitiveness can be seen in table 6.3: 
Production Chain Instrument Function 
COFFEE 
National Coffee Fund  National Budget special account. Gets funding from a non-fiscal tax paid by the 
growers and public subsidies. 
Price transfer Mechanism to transfer the final coffee price 
to the growers. 
Purchased warrant The FNC coffee cooperatives warrant the 
purchased of a certain volume of coffee at a 
certain price up to 6 months in advance.  
Preferential export taxes Lower national taxes to export coffee to 
international markets. 
FLOWERS 
The Andean Trade Promotion 
Drug Eradication Act 
(APTDEA) Free Trade with USA. 
Generalised System of 
Preferences Preferential tariffs with Europe. 
Russian Generalised System 
of Preferences 
Zero entrance tariff to the Russian 
Federation. 
Plan Vallejo Import of raw materials used in the production of export goods with total or 
partial import taxes exemption. 
Incentive for Rural 
Capitalisation (ICR) 
Special funds given to the firms for 
renovation of plantations, land 
improvements, biotechnology 
developments, among other items. 
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Sanitary Incentive Subside to promote appropriate sanitary 
conditions in plantations and integrated pest 
management for export products. 
Revenues protection for 
exporting products 
First called Incentive for the exchange 
hedging, is a subside to counterbalance 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
SUGAR CANE 
Andean Price Band System 
(APBS) Variable levy system with price floors and 
ceilings to buffer international price shocks. 
Stabilisation Fund for Sugar 
Prices (FEPA) 
Stabilisation fund that receives transfers 
generated when the given selling price 
exceeds the market reference price, and 
offsets when the price is lower than the 
reference price.  
Table 6.3. Policy instruments design to benefit the coffee, flowers and sugarcane sub-sectors 
Source. Data compiled by the author. 
The table above shows that the flower and coffee sub-sectors have had access to a 
broader set of instruments. A question remains behind the evolution and 
sustainability of the studied sub-sectors. Is the viability and permanence of these 
industries subject to protectionist policies coming from the central governments? The 
coffee sector has had a strong vertical integration to lower transaction costs and has 
been consistent with investments in R&D and K&T learning processes. This strategy 
has determined the type of sectoral networks formed, which at the same time have 
been shaped by the knowledge generation and exploitation dynamics of the sector. 
The flower chain had backward vertical integration in the first stage of development, 
characterised by a supply chain composed of specialised firms to intermediate the 
transport and distribution of the final product. In a second stage the firms underwent 
a process of forward integration with the final buyers, controlling the whole value 
chain from the production until the direct sale to the final customer. The sugarcane 
sector has maintained a consistent vertical backward and forward links between 
growers, sugar mills and final customers. The transaction costs have been reduced 
with the construction of internal capabilities so the sectoral research centre has 
absorbed the search and information costs, and the sector has achieved standard 
procedures to minimise the bargaining and enforcement costs. However, the coffee 
and flower chains have struggled to remain competitive and to generate enough 
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profit for the growers in the coffee case, and to the firms in the flowers case. The 
one-day successful production chains have gone through a re-structuration process 
that was delayed by the subsidy policies. Excessive protectionism could hinder the 
overall competitiveness of sectors, causing dynamic policy inconsistencies. 
However, state intervention to encourage the modernisation of sectors and a trade-off 
between market pressure and protection of small growers can help to build 
capabilities in the medium and long term. A balance between strategic protectionism 
and mechanisms to promote sectors’ modernisation needs to be built according to the 
assessment of the different policy mixes that have been tried already. 
6.6. Conclusion 
It is worth answering the question: what is co-evolving with what? In the cases under 
study we can conclude that the market size of each chain has co-evolved with the 
type of demand, mostly customer-driven for each case. The knowledge base and 
knowledge transactions have depended on the productive capabilities of the firms 
and the growers at each stage of development. The producers associations are a 
central piece in the system structure and functional dynamic, being the main engine 
to determine the industrial expansion and contraction strategies, and the development 
of the sub-sectoral research centres, as the main pieces for capability building. In the 
cases of coffee and sugarcane, given the predominance and importance of Cenicafé 
and Cenicaña, the networks have redundant ties between growers, the research 
centres, firms, and the producers associations. The coffee production chain has a 
stronger hierarchical structure that can be seen in the Federation being the strongest 
path between the growers and the subsequent coffee conversion processes. The 
flower sector does not have strong ties between the actors, represented by disperse 
SMEs and few large firms that have their own distribution channels and direct 
relationship with the final customers. In this case, the producer association, 
Asocolflores, has lost representativeness and power and the prevalent behaviour 
among the actors is of competition and lack of trust. This is the opposite case of the 
sugarcane chain, which is characterised by problem solving, communication and 
trust between the actors. Thus, the knowledge base and transactions have influenced 
the way the networks operate in each of the sub-sectors. 
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As Montobbio states: “Institutions and organizations can no longer be considered 
exogenous to the agents’ innovative activity but, rather, are often created to 
accommodate a specific trajectory of technological specialization. Innovative success 
in some countries and sectors can be the result not just of the appropriate institutional 
package but, rather, of the flexibility of the institutional environment to adapt to the 






This thesis developed a study of the evolution, application and results of science, 
technology and innovation (STI) policies in Colombia, along with a study of the 
dynamics of innovation at sectoral levels, as a particular case study of a developing 
economy within Latin America. The research took a specific direction towards the 
National System of Innovation (NSI) approach. From the constitution of Colciencias 
in 1968, S&T policy-makers were reflecting on research and production systems and 
their interactions; and adopting the Latin American Structuralism Approach 
(LACSA) as the basis for these reflections. This approach highlighted the necessity 
of building internal S&T capabilities for achieving economic growth, which focused 
on competitiveness at the firm level.  
There was also a clear understanding about the role of the universities, the business 
sector and the public agencies in the development of effective national strategies to 
boost the national economies. Ernesto Sábato, Latin American politician and 
academic, developed a model for encouraging links between public, private and 
academic sectors to improve the knowledge generation and exploitation systems 
called Triángulo de Sábato or Sabato’s triangle. He proposed this idea in 1968; much 
earlier than the diffusion of the triple helix (1990). However, the Triple Helix 
(Etzkowitz, 1993) and the NSI approach were adopted from the 1990s and have 
prevailed since then to build STI policies in Latin America.  
Having explored the development of the formal institutional framework of 
Colombia’s NSI, we realised that we needed to understand how innovation patterns 
actually take place; and that to do this, we needed to investigate deeper into sectoral 
cases. We initially chose agriculture as our case study. However, given the 
complexity of the Agro-industrial sector, we found the need to apply an even finer 
degree of granularity and to study the knowledge generation and exploitation 
dynamics in particular agriculture production chains or sub-sectors. We had to 
constrain the scope of the research when we found deep differences between the sub-
sectors, so we focused our attention on the comparison of three sub-sectoral cases. 
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This part of the research represents the second thematic pathway; a comparative 
study of innovation dynamics.  
In this chapter we bring together empirical, theoretical and practical findings to 
answer the research questions that started this doctoral journey. In the first section, 
we summarise the main aspects developed in the two thematic pathways to respond 
to the research questions. The second section presents the concrete theoretical 
contributions to knowledge derived from the research. A third section presents key 
contributions for practitioners and policy-makers that include comprehensive 
learning of policy building processes and considerations related to the actual 
operation of the so-called innovation systems. The final section presents issues and 
considerations for further research, limitations and lessons for the future. 
7.2. Empirical Results 
In this thesis, we followed two thematic pathways: STI policy development, 
implementation and outcomes in the Colombian context at the national level; and the 
study of particular innovation dynamics through the analysis of the coffee, flower 
and sugarcane subsectors within the Colombian Agro-industrial sector. We then 
presented an empirical analysis and discussion to answer the research questions that 
guided the study. In this section, we re-state these research questions and sum up the 
main findings. 
1. How has Colombia attempted to establish a national system of innovation? 
 
Colombia, as part of the Latin American and Caribbean Region, was not exempt 
from the regional economic and political structural changes, which began after the 
Great Depression in 1929, and continued through to the economic opening of the 
countries of the region from the end of the 1980s. Under the influence of 
transnational organisations such as the ECLAC, OAS and OECD, Colombia 
established Colciencias, a national institute for the promotion of science and 
technology, followed by the promulgation of national laws and instruments 
promoting the construction of S&T capabilities to encourage social and economic 
development. This model, perhaps unwittingly adopted a public science-push 
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approach, led to an emphasis on the weakness of university-industry linkages. The 
NSI was understood and applied as a modernisation recipe for developing 
economies; even though it was not developed as such by its originators. Embracing 
of this view generated an implied gap – a gap that did not exist before - and gave 
greater importance to universities as the main actors for generating suitable 
knowledge for the business sector. This was an oversimplification in the promotion 
and encouragement of innovation dynamics by coupling science and production 
systems. When adopted, it overwrote the Latin American School of Thought (LAST) 
that had a stronger focus on the industrial system and firms as the engine of 
development. With the changing paradigm, Latin American scholars started to shift 
to a particular reading about what a national system of innovation should be, which 
gave central attention to the promotion, advancement and exploitation of public 
sector research.  
Colciencias followed the aforementioned approach and adopted this narrower 
reading of the NSI model. Colombian policy-makers attempted to create a NSI on 
these lines, and did so using formal institutional measures based on OECD 
innovation indicators. It declared the existence of the Colombian NSI in the first law 
created for S&T. However, the implementation of the law was not exempt of 
shortcomings. After two decades, this designated NSI still faces many problems 
rooted in a deficient governability and governance of the system, lack of systemic 
relationships between major players of the system, scarce financial resources that are 
deficiently allocated given the absence of national consensus about the strategic areas 
to be developed, and a low valuation of science and technology as engines for 
development and innovation in the productive sector.  
While the Colombian NSI appeared to be perfectly defined on paper, the evidence 
shows that it has had a sluggish performance, characterised by lack of systemic 
relationships and a poor transformation, adaptation and validation of knowledge in 
the business sector. Findings suggest that the adoption of the NSI as a political 
device has failed. LAC countries are moving now towards the promotion of 
innovation strategies through the building of critical mass to trigger innovation and 
structural change-led economic development. This is coupled with emphasis on 
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macro structural conditions that can support the imperative paradigm of having an 
efficient national system of innovation, such as market size, exports structure, 
support to technology-base SMEs, among others (Dutrénit, 2011).  
The defining components of the Colombian NSI can be seen in figure 7.1. Although 
the blocks are present in the diagram, many of them are in process of construction or 
re-structuration, as it is the case of supportive infrastructure and the intermediaries. 
 
Figure 7.1 Colombian NSI structure 
Source. Made by the author 
While Figure 7.1. suggests a formal system of innovation, which is also stated in the 
national policy of science, technology and innovation, there are deficiencies in the 
three main blocks (public, productive and research/academic), and in the 
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infrastructure block which is expected to support the innovation dynamics. In reality, 
a ‘linear-plus’ model (Tait & Williams, 1999) is followed in the policy-making side, 
which adopts ever more elaborate policies and incentives that seek to get knowledge 
to flow from public sector research and be applied in industry; to get the innovation 
system to operate in a linear, science-push manner.  
There has been a strong focus from Colciencias on strengthening knowledge 
generation through the education and research subsystem. However, there is a weak 
knowledge exploitation side in the productive sector. In this sense, promoting 
industry-academic links has become central, along with setting up technology-based 
SMEs and spin-off companies. In promoting these activities within the NSI 
approach, there was an anticipated direct connection between players in the 
innovation arena. Nevertheless, putting financial resources into the research system 
has not directly translated into innovation. The idea of building ‘bridge institutions’ 
to reduce the transaction costs for firms has remained central to how knowledge 
flows should be, and how quickly they should happen. However, evidence has shown 
that it is the embodied knowledge that produces innovation (Cowan et al., 2000; M. 
Teubal & Andersen, 2000), not the production of basic research to be further applied 
to business solutions. Universities remain as central actors for training needed human 
resources that can bring their knowledge and expertise to the productive sector, but 
not necessarily as the main block to produce applied knowledge. This narrow NSI 
approach ignores knowledge flow complexities and the crucial role of embodied 
knowledge as main driver of innovation. It also ignores evidence which suggests that 
these flows usually happen slowly and indirectly (N. Clark & Chataway, 2009). 
This suggests that the functional structure of the NSI is ‘messy,’ especially in the 
delineation of the expected roles from the actors. Following this idealised model of 
innovation within a national system of innovation, Colombia has failed to achieve the 
goals for which the system was created. The scarcity of agencies performing the role 
of intermediaries or bridges between the research centres and universities and the 
productive sector has resulted in inventions failing to be exploited and 
commercialised as innovative solutions. In terms of the networks between blocks and 
actors of the system, there are meagre flows of knowledge and a dearth of learning 
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processes within firms and sectors. We therefore question the existence of a system, 
which is explored in the fourth chapter.  
We found that there are specialised networks between actors in the public, private 
and academic sectors that emerge through personal relationships, not because of the 
existence of an operational system. There is an idea of something called national 
system of innovation, but that is not tangible in practice. It is not clear who are the 
actors of that system (beyond the labels of public, private and academic actors), how 
actors benefit from each other, and what support instances are available. 
Colombia’s STI policies, solidly ensconced in the NSI approach, may have had 
positive outcomes in S&T capability building, increasing financial resources for STI, 
development of strategic sectors, and a higher social appropriation of science. There 
is an institutional framework that facilitates and enables action from firms, 
universities, public research centres, technological development centres, and other 
public agencies to generate and exploit knowledge. However, results appear distant 
from the goals set from the very first mission to encourage development through 
science, technology and education. Stronger intellectual property systems, banking 
and venture capital, agencies supporting innovation, standards and norms that make 
the Colombian firms more competitive in international markets are still in a 
consolidation process, although they exist in the national context. Firms have slowly 
increased their investment in R&D and S&T activities, however it is still low and in 
isolation with other actors in the innovation system. Training of human resources at 
the higher education level has been improved in terms of population coverage, 
quality standards and updated curriculums in tune with needs of the labour market, 
but this process remains slow and defocused from technology-intensive sectors 
needs.  
We conclude that Colombian policy-makers continue to design policy instruments 
that respond to a linear reading of innovation, which has generated a misperception 
of an uptake lag. We suggest a mismatch between the formal institutional 
frameworks and the practice. 
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2. What are the main innovation dynamics differences in the Colombian coffee, 
flower, and sugarcane sub-sectors? 
 
In directing our study to specific case studies to generate a deeper understanding of 
how innovation actually happens within the production system, we were surprised to 
encounter major differences in the capability-building strategies, technological 
evolution, knowledge networks, and the institutional setting at the sub-sectoral level. 
We chose a traditional and strategic national sector, agriculture, and three sub-sectors 
within it, which are recognised nationally and internationally as successful.  
We found that even at the sub-sectoral level, there are significant differences that 
determine the innovation pathways of specific industries. Dynamics between firms 
and non-firms organisations, formal and informal institutions, type of networks and 
demand, and the longevity of the production chains have determined their evolution, 
competitive advantage, and position in the marketplace. The research and technical 
assistance subsystems within the Agro-industrial system have contributed very little 
to the innovation patterns of the cases under study. The research and technical 
assistance sub-systems have had a limited impact in the R&D and S&T activities 
within the chains, especially for the coffee and sugarcane cases. For example, 
although Cenicafé, Cenicaña, and Ceniflores have received funding from MADR and 
Colciencias, these have not been their main funding sources. Technical assistance 
and transfer processes have been offered using internal mechanisms, as we explained 
in each of the sub-sectoral chapters. The extension service of the Coffee sector 
offered by the National Federation of Coffee Growers and the technology transfer, 
adaptation and validation groups led by Cenicaña have been effective to cover the 
sub-sectoral needs. These chains do not use the national technical assistance units.  
In the case of the flower chain, even when Ceniflores does not have an explicit 
model to provide knowledge and technology transfer and assistance, the firms do not 
use the Agro-industrial technical assistance mechanisms either. The structure of the 
technical assistance subsystem does not work with the same standards in every 
region, which makes it operative and useful in some regions and for some production 
chains, but not for the totality of actors. In three cases recognised as successful 
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within the Agro-industrial system, the technical assistance subsystem does not play a 
central role, nor has there been an intended learning process from successful 
experiences to provide technical assistance and generation and exploitation of 
knowledge, such as coffee and sugarcane, to share and strengthen the agriculture 
sector overall, much less to other national sectors. The sub-sectoral strengths have 
not risen to higher levels.  
Producers associations have been the main non-market organisations within the 
Colombian Agro-industrial System of Innovation, as was seen in the section 4.5. In 
the three sub-sectoral cases, the associations have been crucial for developing the 
sectors and have enhanced their competitiveness in local and global chains of 
production. In terms of representation within the Agro-industrial system, the 
associations have been an important link between producers, firms and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR), Corpoica, Colciencias, other 
support organisations and training agencies (Look at Figure 4.21. Actors of the Agro-
industrial System). They have also been the first step to constitute the production 
chains, since there can be just one chain by product.  
In this sense, the system has contributed formal institutional processes, standards, 
protocols and platforms for exporting Colombian agriculture products, but has failed 
to provide extensive support to growers and firms that do not have strong 
representation. Also, structural problems have affected the whole sector such as lack 
of legal clarity about the use and land tenure; lack of adequate infrastructure for 
competitiveness; high cost of agricultural inputs; fall in the price of agricultural 
commodities; and exchange rate appreciation against other countries of the region 
with better exchange rate controls and protections. 
Through our case studies, we found that there were significant differences in the 
structure of markets and the dynamics of competition between the case studies. This 
is clearly seen in sectors that have a great dependency on international markets. 
When customers have an important influence on the volume, type of product, quality 
and market tendencies, the industries shape their productive capabilities to respond to 
these requirements. On the other hand, the knowledge base and knowledge 
transactions determine the productive capabilities and the networks structure. This 
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knowledge base is built in a long and path-dependence learning process that 
determines the growers and firms know how.  
Finally, we found that the governance and governability of the production chains 
help or hinder the innovative capacity of all the chain actors. When there is a balance 
between management, control, execution, planning and consultation with all the 
actors in the chain, the knowledge generation and exploitation cycles flow easier and 
bring higher productivity to growers and firms upstream and downstream. Trust and 
power are two main elements that affect these dynamics. There are constant 
negotiations between actors to deal with uncertainty and complexity. However, 
powerful narratives close down policies and strategies according to particular 
interests and purposes. This can lead to a general lack of trust that affects network 
dynamics and therefore collective learning processes. 
3. How are top-down and bottom-up innovation dynamics within sectoral levels 
developed and enhanced? 
 
This question was answered implicitly through the empirical and discussion chapters; 
however, we will explicitly bring together the main considerations that have affected 
synergy processes between national and sectoral policies and the impact of both in 
actual sectoral innovation pathways. Opening up the analysis to integrate national 
and sectoral initiatives is one of the main empirical and theoretical contributions. By 
exploring the state support through a set of policy instruments, and the analysis of 
sectoral dynamics, we could advance in the understanding of national systemic 
failures and to integrate sectoral actors initiatives towards innovation at all stages of 
the production chains.   
We found disconnections in all the levels of analysis. At the macro level, there is not 
continuity and synergy between industrial, economic, educational and planning 
regulations and laws, which directly impacts in the STI policy programs and the 
resources to support them. At the meso level, the competitive and technological 
space ruled by standards, intellectual property rights, and non-firm support 
organisations is still under process of formation and the institutional setting is not 
always responding to specific sectoral needs and dynamics. At the micro level, there 
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is a weak business sector in terms of dynamic innovation capabilities. As it is 
referred in the latest report of the OECD about the Colombian NSI (OECD, 2013), 
most of the innovation activities are carried out within the firms with poor or non-
existent linkages with other actors of the system. When links exist, they are mostly 
with other firms within the sector, and the relationship with universities and research 
centres is limited to expand traditional activities of the firm, such as design and 
specific technological developments.  
Overall, our results suggest that the Colombian NSI lacks of a shared vision or 
purpose to follow in the short, medium and long time framework. There are different 
agendas at the sectoral, regional and national levels that have been built up in 
isolation according to particular purposes. Thus, it is not surprising that there are 
misconceptions among the actors about the role and purposes of the non-firm 
organisations, the difference between competitiveness and innovation, and the role of 
science and technology as sources of wealth. In terms of the instrumentalisation of 
policies, since the vision is unclear, the strategies and priorities are disconnected. 
Therefore, incentives supporting measures and mechanisms to trigger sectors and 
regions do not follow a systemic approach either. Dominant agendas from each 
changing government deepen narrow and highly incomplete approaches towards 
economic development strategies. This affects the STI policy mixes and the 
resources supporting the previous and new policy programs. Without financial 
resources, plans and projects cannot be executed.  
And finally, there is confusion between the innovation systems and the actors within 
them. The systems are not the agents, which have led to a generalised disinformation 
from actors about the availability of instruments to support the innovation processes 
and a tendency to believe that the only problem that the Colombian NSI has are the 
weak linkages between actors. This is what we mean when we say that there is not a 
NSI in the sense of a system, since there are poor connections - not only between the 
actors in the systems, but also between the main components or sub-systems. If there 
are not clear agendas to develop a national innovation strategy, there will be poorly 
aligned instruments that do not respond to a strategic vision. This is problematic and 
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spills over from the national level to the regional and sectoral levels. A graphical 
representation of these dimensions can be seen in figure 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. NSI levels and functional blocks 
Source. Made by the author based on (Katz, 2001) and (Santiago Echavarría, personal 
communication, March 16, 2012) 
The utility of the national policies and a national system of innovation, as an 
enabling framework to encourage and promote innovation networks between 
different national, regional, and sectoral domains, have not been completely fulfilled 
during the years. Table 4.7 (Investment in S&T as percentage of GDP proposed by 
several public documents) suggested a long inconsistency between formal policies 
and their implementation. This is exemplified by the fact that, even though from 
1994 the national goal was to increase the investment in S&T to 1% of GDP, in 2012 
the joint investment in R&D and S&T activities did not surpass 0.62% of GDP. This 
inconsistency and lack of coherence between policies has affected the connection of 
the macro, meso and micro levels. National strategies have not been successful 
enough to reach productive sectors; therefore, most sectoral industries have 
developed technical capabilities and innovation niches on their own, separately from 
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the national dynamics. The latter approaches are much closer to the earlier ECLAC 
approach followed by Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s to promote 
competitiveness from the firms, having a profound insight of the value chains and 
intervening specific links within them. The aim was to focus on changing production 
patterns at the firms level to enhance social equity (Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean ECLAC, 1990).  
Our findings suggest that a significant part of the success of the three sub-sectoral 
cases can be explained by the development of their own R&D centres and their own 
knowledge transfer, appropriation and validation dynamics. Corpoica, the Colombian 
Corporation for Agriculture Research, has not only been an unimportant source of 
support for the three production chains we studied, but also competes with them for 
financial resources from the public sector. The richness of the empirical cases under 
study showed that the weak and dysfunctional national system is not an indicator of 
failure at sectoral levels. Policy instruments gaps and lack of support to build 
technological and scientific capabilities have been overcome by sectoral actors 
through different governance patterns and the construction of R&D centres supported 
by producers associations.  
We found little evidence to support the proposition that national policies embedded 
in the so-called Colombian NSI had succeeded in overcoming the lack of innovation 
in the industrial system. The NSI, as a general framework, was thought to provide 
enabling conditions in which firms and sectors could build their own competitive 
advantages. The NSI approach emphasises the need to have an effective knowledge 
generation system coupled with the interaction of diverse actors that could use, adapt 
and exploit that knowledge to compete successfully in the marketplace. However, 
evidence suggests that the Colombian NSI has failed, given the lack of a key 
foundation in terms of a strong research system and industrial support infrastructure. 
Crucially, as our research has shown, it only has weak links and connections with the 
innovation structures and governance systems of the industrial sectors with their 
particular dynamics.  We can say that the construction of the system has been 
artificial and policies have been focused on parts of the system that are just under 
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construction. Therefore, we can understand why the system goals have not been 
achieved.  
The influence of good and bad practices cannot be seen in the inverse case. We only 
studied three sub-sectoral cases within the Agro-industrial sector. However, with the 
analysis of the data collected, we could not find bottom-up permeation from the 
sectoral to the national spheres. Although agriculture research centres cooperate 
between them, their successful knowledge generation, transfer, appropriation and 
validation practices have had a reduce influence in the innovation dynamics of other 
industries and have not contributed to learning policy processes at the national level. 
When we carried out the second specialised focus group - where national and 
sectoral actors participated and showed their advance towards innovation - many 
industrial, academic and public agents were surprised of the existence of validated 
models to promote innovation at the sectoral level. There are weak learning cycles 
integrating national and sectoral experiences and providing feedback to practices at 
both levels. 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that the State intervention, funding and legal framework 
to provide a suitable environment for promoting innovation has been a total failure. 
A long trajectory of political thought and action cannot be disregarded as completely 
obsolete or ineffective. We emphasised throughout this thesis that innovation is the 
result of the interaction of complex dynamics between social agents that have their 
own agendas and political interests, where decisions are taken under incomplete 
knowledge dimensions. If we accept that dynamism, uncertainty and complexity 
dominate today’s world (Leach et al., 2010), this cautions us against taking a 
simplistic and linear reading of messy, fuzzy and constantly changing contexts. 
Unfortunately, although the Colombian White Papers for STI policies emphasise the 
systemic character of innovation, the instrumentalisation strategies followed by 
policy-makers reflect a linear approach. Public funding for innovation has been 
always higher than the investment for S&T activities and R&D from the private 
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sector158, and the State has invested steadily in basic research for fundamental areas 
such as health, agriculture, oil and mining, ICT and biotechnology. In this sense, we 
recognise the role of the State in the establishment and strengthening of the 
knowledge generation side of the innovation system, but found profound deficiencies 
in the support and design of effective means and mechanisms for the knowledge 
exploitation system. Without doubt, the State has had an active role in shaping the 
scientific and technological trajectory that has led to innovation in different sectors. 
It has not been a mere entity to ‘fix market failures’ or to just ‘nudge’ the private 
sector to facilitate innovation, as happens in all countries (Mazzucato, 2013). The 
Colombian State has had an active role to promote innovation, but the expected 
outcomes have not been achieved yet and the efforts have been insufficient. 
 Therefore, the (top-down) national STI policies have been theory-driven in terms of 
the declaration of the existence of a National System of Innovation, and practice-
driven at the (bottom-up) sectoral level in order to respond to particular needs of 
firms and market interactions. The connection between them is limited and not 
efficient. However, it is clear from this study that sectoral innovation dynamics have 
been effective within the circumstances of their particular value chains, which have 
kept the sectors under study as viable in the national and international markets. We 
believe that sectoral studies need to be taken into account in the construction of 
national policies since they can give an account of real systemic innovation dynamics 
and learning cycles to produce contextualised knowledge. 
7.3. Contributions to Theory 
The conceptual and formal definition of the Colombian NSI follows the general 
guidelines of the NSI approach. However, intended development trajectories 
specified in the strategies and goals of the NSI have not been achieved. There are 
clear functional and structural failures. The OECD model for having national 
systems of innovation could not be applied as had been expected in most developing 
countries, certainly not in Colombia. In Latin America an alternative analytical 
                                                
158 The average of public investment 2002-2012 from public sources for S&T activities was 52.36%, 
and 54.73% for R&D, with a counterpart of 44.07% and 40.30% respectively from the business sector 
(Lucio et al., 2012).  
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approach to the study of innovation began from the micro level, looking at the firms, 
understanding the factors that make enterprises innovate. Afterwards, the tendency 
migrated to the integration of technical change and role of innovation in the 
economic growth of countries at the macro level. The Latin American economists 
and policy-makers focused their attention on the generation and propagation of 
technical progress to boost productivity, drawing attention to genuine and spurious 
competitiveness and the systemic nature of innovation (Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC, 2008). This line of thought was part of 
the Latin American Structuralism Approach (LACSA). After the period known as the 
‘lost decade’ for the LAC region, when import substitution-led industrialisation 
failed and the intended gradual economic openness to maximise the economy 
performance exhibited flaws in its structural change, the NSI approach emerged as a 
response to the dominant neoclassic macroeconomic measures where general 
equilibrium was assumed and the role of the State should be reduced to correcting 
market failures. In this vein, when the approach started to be popular within the 
political circles, mainly in Europe with the impulse given to it by the OECD, its 
diffusion as a political and social artefact began. In the 1990s, most of the LAC 
countries included the general guidelines of the NSI in their STI policy construction, 
leaving behind the emphasis put by LACSA in the generation of technical change 
from the industrial system, intervening at the sectoral level. 
We advocate for having an alternative Weltanschauung, or worldview, to understand 
the particularities of the south region in order to design contextualised STI policies 
beyond the reified NSI approach. Hybrids and borderlands need to be built in 
developing countries (Delvenne & Thoreau, 2012). Our study shows that the NSI 
approach - in its generic and narrow reading - does not consider particularities and 
complexities of developing economies and social problems, such as the sustained 
internal conflict and high levels of corruption, as is the case of Colombia.  
We only partially agree with Delvenne and Thoreau (Delvenne & Thoreau, 2012) on 
directing the attention to the construction of a world-system analysis to enrich the 
NSI approach. We support the initiative to look beyond the nation-state borders, in 
the understanding that global value chains - where the national and regional sectors 
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are involved - are predominant in a globalised world. We also believe that the 
division between northern and southern countries in terms of economic performance, 
industrialisation and urbanisation, among other criteria, has been encouraged by the 
NSI when calling for normative indicators that ultimately give a major relevance to 
the countries’ GDP growth. Nevertheless, we advocate strengthening local views and 
analysis of innovation within sectors and particularly to the firms’ level. If it is true, 
as we have shown with our case studies, that innovation is path-dependent and can 
get lock-in to certain actor’s practices, we encourage integrating further the NSI 
approach with regional and sectoral innovation systems without losing the broader 
global dynamics.  
The NSI approach has evolved over time with the inclusion of new economic 
realities, social movements, environmental pressures, and lately has begun to take 
account of national innovation dynamics in newly industrialised economies and in 
developing countries. However, flaws remain in its understanding and in its utility as 
a political device. It is important to turn our gaze back to the roots and ask; science 
and technology for what? As it is presented in the NSI approach, S&T lead to 
industrial innovation, which in turn brings wealth generation, that can be measured in 
GDP growth, so there can be social distribution of economic growth and innovative 
solutions to solve everyday problems; ultimately, in the case of developing 
economies, to contribute to overcoming social obstacles that cause social inequality 
and to change the unfavourable geopolitical situation of remaining on the periphery 
of the world economy.  
However, we argue that this is a linear view of progress and social welfare. We can 
see a reduction in complexity and a linear reasoning on the impact of effective STI 
policies. Although science, technology and innovation are thought of in a systemic 
way, where several actors and components interact to maximise technical progress, 
the intended results from this system evolution is perceived as another link in the 
development race. The pitfalls of neoclassical economics prevail when it comes to 
the social effects of innovation in countries.  
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Certainly, the NSI approach fails to provide strategies to contexts where initial basic 
conditions159 implicitly taken for granted are missed. This can be explained by its 
origin as an analytical device to explain the way innovation was impacting the 
economic progress of industrialised and developed economies and used afterwards as 
a political device to encourage particular strategies for countries from the North. 
Although the approach focuses on the encouragement of innovation and on technical 
progress and does not have to give account for every social and political problem, it 
lacks robustness to deal with countries from the south. We therefore encourage a 
deeper and explicit bottom-up study of innovation dynamics that takes context into 
account.  
The NSI became, for Latin American countries and for Colombia in particular, an 
omnipotent approach to understand and to design STI policy. As Sharif (Sharif, 
2006) noted, the approach acquired an air of inexorability and appeared to be the 
best, and only, theoretical and practical framework to promote successful innovation 
patterns in privileged industrial sectors. It seems that the region is locked-in to the 
NSI approach. Even when Latin American scholars have pointed out the deficiencies 
of the systems of innovation (SI) approach in dealing with the complexities and 
particular historical and economic trajectories of the countries of the region, the 
analysis and proposals keep standing within the SI base (Delvenne & Thoreau, 
2012). It seems that use of the same political language from the Northern countries is 
beneficial for the economic and political interests of the region, but at the same time 
continues the replication of dominance from one part of the hemisphere over the 
other.  
What is certain is that a narrow version of the NSI approach has been used in the 
LAC region, which was driven by the OAS and UNESCO first and then supported 
and maintained over time by the OECD. Standardized indicators only recognize the 
production of knowledge in terms of R&D, patents, scientific production, 
technology-base companies, and expenditure in science, technology and innovation. 
It is true that there must be measures for comparing the level of innovation of 
                                                
159 Transport infrastructure, effective labour system, quality and maturity of the research and 




countries and sectors, but these types of indicators are simplistic and do not add 
much in terms of understanding good practices, relationships between users and 
producers, and different types of learning, production and exploitation of knowledge.  
Ultimately, we highlight that since the NSI is an approach and not a theory, with this 
viewpoint supported by many of the main scholars developing the concept, it is 
important to bring more case studies to strengthen its theoretical corpus. By 
highlighting differences in regional contexts such as Latin America and 
particularities of developing economies with deep social and political problems such 
as Colombia, we are extending the scope of the approach.  
We face two complementary postures. On the one side are those who seek to replace 
the NSI lens with other perspectives that can bring together different realities and 
particularities of developing economies (which present very different historical and 
technological trajectories to those in the developed countries where NSI emerged) 
and that offer other analytical devices and intervention methods when it comes to 
STI policy building and supporting instruments to promote innovation. On the other 
hand, we see attempts that seek to retain the NSI approach as an analytical base but 
that attempt to revise, elaborate and strengthen it through more case studies in 
peripheral countries.  
The sectoral systems of innovation approach can be also extended to deal with more 
detailed cases where particular non-market institutions play a central role in the 
evolution of innovation patterns within the firms. In sectors such as agriculture, the 
basic units are not just ‘firms’ (and firms themselves differ enormously between 
SMEs, large firms and MNCs), but include more particularly the producers or 
growers (who may have very different organisational structures). When we have 
sectors that are immersed in and are highly dependent on international market 
interactions, the State is called upon to play an active role to protect the industries in 
their infancy and promote innovation through diverse incentives and instruments 
afterwards that help them to balance their internal catching-up processes with healthy 
marketplace pressure. The complexity of innovation in a globalised world requires 
expanding the scope of analysis and intervention to specific local dynamics and their 
connection with world trade systems.  
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Hence, keeping the analysis within a national boundary does not give account of 
sectoral innovation dynamics and their connections with the international 
marketplace. We found that a deeper understanding of the industries, the actors 
involved in the value chains and their historical, cultural and economic context, are 
crucial to give account of their evolution and to trigger their innovation pathways. 
Policy-makers are locked into national views of innovation that have a mismatch 
with sectoral realities; as a result, STI policies in Colombia have not penetrated 
industrial needs. Therein, national and sectoral policies are not in tune to promote 
higher business innovation to make firms more competitive both at national and 
international levels. 
In summary, we have sought to understand the effectiveness or failure of the 
innovation systems in their national context, and explore the distinctive relationships 
between industrial players. When looking at the industrial players, we found very 
distinctive dynamics within each sub-sector that were rooted in the geography, 
political history, social structure ownership, governability and governance, supply 
chains and the place of each production chain within the economy. This study has 
engaged with two dimensions. Initially we focused on the development and 
implementation of the NSI policy framework as the enabling artefact to promote or 
hinder innovation at national and sectoral levels. However, that was not enough. We 
therefore sought to analyse innovation dynamics within industrial sectors. To achieve 
this, we encountered the need to incorporate perspectives from sociology, 
ethnographic and historical research to supplement the vanilla generic NSI models. 
The NSI, as currently cast, does not have tools to engage with these dimensions, and 
that is why innovation studies need to be complemented with other research areas.  
7.4. Contributions to Practice 
Our study followed the premise that policy building is not a single process. Multiple 
narratives and policy framings are present during the processes of definition, 
implementation and assessment of policy outcomes. In this section, we present 
contributions for practitioners and policy makers in charge of design and 
implementation of STI policy mixes, although the recommendations can be 
generalised to any kind of policy processes.  
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In terms of political institutions, we found that there is a tension between the heavily 
formalised political and legal Colombian framework and its translation to practical 
policy mixes. There is a gap between policy definition and policy implementation. 
Even though there is a formal declaration of a National System of Innovation and a 
National Agro-industrial System of Innovation, in practice, policy initiatives follow a 
linear innovation model based on science push. Colombian policy-making shifted 
from neo-liberal policies focused on market mechanisms that were hoping to 
promote competitiveness to a systemic approach to innovation. This was in some 
respects rhetorical - in the sense of aligning with the dominant political narratives of 
transnational organizations as the OECD. The means and mechanisms proposed are 
not systemically developed and have not strengthened the fundamentals of the 
Colombian NSI as the education and industrial sub-systems. On the other hand, the 
governability structure is weak, given the lack of power decision of the councils, the 
low representativeness of members that end up attending the councils and an 
unbalanced participation of the tripartite forces with a strong academic sector, a 
disinterested business sector and a low strategic vision from the public sector. 
Instead, successful bottom-up innovation dynamics are emerging at the sectoral 
level.  
We found networks at the sectoral level supported by collaboration relationships 
between members of the production chains as a mean to optimise resources and 
social benefits. Governance trends are not exempt from mediations of power between 
dominant players, social systems are complex and at the same time adaptive. 
Nevertheless, bottom-up initiatives of distributed governance between main 
innovation players take place at the sub-sectoral and sectoral levels. Once again, we 
emphasise the importance of having a bottom-up approach towards innovation 
dynamics and the social, political and economic dynamics shaping it.  
We found that Colombian policy-makers are reactive rather than strategic. There is a 
lack of long-term vision - a product of the continuous changing of priorities of every 
government -. There is not a clear strategy and neither the means nor mechanisms to 
materialise national priorities of investment and development.  In short, there is a 
lack of consistency between state and government policies, national and sectoral 
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policies and industrial, education and STI policies. Without a level of synergy to 
achieve a consensus view of the country, efforts will keep responding to temporal 
problems and interests of powerful actors without continuity in time. Also, this 
identifies the tension between public agencies to encompass as many resources as 
they can, using the label of innovation. There is not clarity about what is the leading 
national agency in charge of innovation policy and the collaborative work with other 
agencies to achieve a common purpose. There is tension between ministries and 
regional agencies to co-ordinate innovation programs. 
 On the policy side, we find a tendency in Colombia to think that failures and 
weaknesses of policies are to be improved through more policies. This is a policy-
making fallacy. Since there is a “linear-plus” thinking towards policy building 
processes, formal definition of laws are made following a “rational” criteria to solve 
perceived and well-defined problems. However, when it comes to the 
implementation and assessment of intended outcomes of national and sectoral 
policies, policy-makers are reactive and take a long time to adapt to real scenarios 
and to learn from strengths and weaknesses of previous political programs. In most 
cases, policies are changed and shaped informally by the actual recipients. One clear 
example of this is the formal institutional upgrade of Colciencias through the years 
(see figure 7.3.). One of the main changes of the S&T law of 2009 is the higher 
administrative level of the agency, giving its status as an administrative department 
that has power as a ministry. However, in reality the Administrative Department not 
only does not have a higher budget, but its budget has been reduced and its action has 
been limited. This suggests an ongoing inconsistency between formal and informal 




Figure 7.3. Colciencias organisational status transition 
Source. Made by the author. 
It was recognised in CONPES 2739 of 1994 that:  
Although market opening and liberalization of the economy 
generates more pressure on innovation and technical change, 
this opening is not a sufficient factor in itself to ensure the 
development of an innovative and dynamic productive sector. 
The formulation of appropriate macroeconomic and sectoral 
policies plays a crucial role in the generation of effective 
demand that fosters a close relationship between science, 
education and development. (DNP, 1994, p. 20) 
The above statement stresses the importance of having coherence between national 
and sectoral policies and their impact on the kinds of relationships forged between 
the education, productive and economic systems. It is important, from the policy-
making side of the system, to offer policy mixes that incentivise the demand of 
knowledge and technological services from the business sector in order to support a 
higher level of competitiveness and dynamism in the marketplace. 
In terms of accessibility to resources, incentives and instruments, the linear-plus 
thinking is clear when most of the instruments160 are focused either on the research 
side or on the commercialisation side. There is little to support the systemic 
                                                
160 Categorised in instruments for: R&D projects, human resources training, tax incentives for 
research and innovation and other kinds of support (Look at figure 4.7.) 
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processes of production of knowledge, use, test, implementation, adaptation and 
validation of applied knowledge and technology. There is also a major problem about 
the coverage, diffusion and use of the available instruments.  
We found that enterprises have a low use and trust in public instruments and 
incentives. The main problems identified by businessmen, when asked about the low 
use of the available mechanisms to help their internal innovation processes, were: 
ignorance of the available instruments; lack of information about the requirements to 
apply to them; and the long and complicated process to apply to them, with the risk 
of not gaining the allocation of resources or incentives.  
We identify that innovation policies should not be thought of as substitutes for social 
and industrial policies. STI policies are complementary with other national policies; 
moreover, they rely on having certain minimum conditions covered in order to 
maximise the potential and impact of strategic national plans. Insufficient 
mobilisation of human capital, a stagnated business sector, high levels of business 
informality, and low investment in publicly funded research impacts negatively on 
STI policy programs. There should be alignment of forces and definition of particular 
strategic sectors to invest in and to promote so the already scarce resources can be 
allocated in the best possible way, maximising their impact.   
Finally, we identify that an excessive formalisation of political institutions, rather 
than bringing better policy programs, has led to the circumvention of laws by actors 
in the system. There is a proclivity to find ways to escape the rigid limits of laws, 
that ends up giving more power to actors that are already powerful and that can exert 
pressure on the policy system. This has also meant that informality prevails in 
practice, resulting in a non-transparent action space. This could be overcome through 
a more participatory policy-making process with the intervention of sectoral actors. 
There is a common complaint about the design of STI policies and instruments, 
where actors are only informed about changes in the legislation and programs, 
without any real participation in the policy design process. Such involvement could 
also help to rebuild trust in public institutions. Colombia, having a long-term 
violence problem and a high index of corruption, presents a particular setting where 
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the construction and implementation of STI policies is more challenging and 
complex than other contexts. These specificities need to be taken into account. 
So why is it that in Latin America, and specifically in Colombia, having diverse 
conceptual and empirical studies, it is so difficult to design and implement STI 
policies? Sagasti says: “It is possible to see a disconnection between the ideas and 
the science and technology political praxis” (Sagasti, 2010, p. 1). We think that 
Colombia has very particular social and political threats that make even more 
complex and uncertain the processes of policy construction. 
7.5. Limitations, extensions and lessons for the 
future 
We consider it important to reflect on the research choices made during this doctoral 
journey and their consequences for the new knowledge generated. We explained that 
when we started this research, we were drawn into the systems of innovation 
approach, since the formal institutionality to build STI policies in Latin America and 
Colombia used the NSI approach as a political artefact to shape the processes of 
policy development, implementation and outcomes assessment. However, we 
retained an analytical distance from our object of research. In part this was based on 
the generic principle of the system approach, which emphasises that this is just one 
way among many analytical means to understand reality, and that it is therefore 
important to make explicit the view of the analyst (consultant, policy-maker, 
academic, member of a non-market organisation) when understanding and defining 
the situation under analysis. We recognise that the system view is an idealisation of a 
desired outcome, but has shortcomings since it cannot completely explain the 
complexity and variable dynamics of the social systems. In other words, it does not 
represent a complete analytical model and it is not the only, nor always the best, way 
to promote innovation in the business sector. 
We believe that in order to integrate sectoral innovation dynamics and to analyse 
their connection with global value chains, more sectoral studies are needed. In 
interviews with relevant national actors, we found a common claim to have systemic 
instruments coupled with human and financial resources to invigorate the Colombian 
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business sector. It seems that the NSI approach - in the way that it has been used in 
the Colombian political arena - has failed to give account of the business dynamics 
and needs, as the core of any innovation system. Although policies can never be 
regarded as optimal (Foray, 2009), we question the suitability of the NSI approach 
towards the construction of STI policy mixes. A broader analysis of sectors recalled 
as strategic by different White Papers, could give a more solid base to reflect about 
structural and functional changes to support and promote innovation more 
effectively. A comprehensive view of industrial sectors, and sub-sectors within them, 
can bring a wider impact on the understanding of the trajectory and intended 
outcomes of the Colombian STI policies. It is also beneficial to open new debates 
about the conceptualisation and instrumentalisation of innovation strategies that can 
bring wider social impacts, privileging the social distribution of wealth and therefore 
welfare over the ultimate goal of economic growth at any cost. 
During our fieldwork, we gathered information about a new policy to fund science, 
technology and Innovation in Colombia. However, since the initiative is very new, 
we could not include its operation and outcomes in our research. In 2011, the 
national government decided to invest 10% of mining and petroleum royalties in 
projects for development of S&T capabilities in the regions. The distribution was 
formalized with the legislative act Number 5 of July 18th of 2011, which enacts that 
10% of total incomes produced by regional royalties are invested in a Science, 
Technology and Innovation Fund that has representation from public national and 
regional entities, universities and the business sector.  
However, the mechanisms to allocate those resources are not clear to the actors of the 
system. The resources have to be invested in the regions where the royalties come 
from, which not coincidentally are those with lower productivity rates and social 
equity, and present higher rates of violence and corruption. If well managed, these 
resources can generate higher regional development and competitiveness to the most 
economic and social depressed areas of the country, so there is need of research in 
this area. Nonetheless our analysis raises doubts about the design of policy programs 
following the same rationale and within the boundaries of the NSI approach.  
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In terms of further research, at a general level, more comparative research between 
sectors and regions across peripheral countries is also needed with a prevailing 
qualitative base. Innovation processes involve more than normative performing 
indicators. In order to understand complex and uncertain social dynamics that govern 
the political and economic space, researchers have to examine the actual interactions 
between actors at the core of the so-called innovation systems, individuals and firms 
that create the progress of sectors and countries. In order to strengthen the use of the 
systems of innovation approach as a boundary object used by different epistemic 
communities, we support the line of reasoning of the scholars working on this 
research area that promotes a flexible understanding and application of the approach 
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APPENDIX II: SPECIALISED FOCUS GROUP – 
FIRST PHASE 
Specialised Focus Group about the Evolution and 
Effectiveness of ST&I Public Policy in Colombia (Bogotá, 
December 6, 2011)  
 
Although I had problems with the workshop date (That day there was a national 
protest and all people arrived to the central downtown square, very near Universidad 
del Rosario were the workshop was, so arriving and leaving was very difficult that 
day), there was a good assistance. I had representation of the three sectors, academia, 
private and public.  
The agenda was:  


































Identification of the major barriers that diminish the effectiveness of 
policies for STI - Carousel 
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Carousel:/ 3/ flipcharts/ were/ positioned/ at/ stations/ around/ the/ room/ each/ headed/
with/one/different/but/related/question./There/was/the/same/number/of/groups/as/
questions./The/groups/rotated/around/the/stations/until/each/one/was/visited./Each/
successive/ group/had/a/different/ colour/marker/pen/ for/ recording/ their/ answer/ to/
the/questions./The/idea/was/that/each/successive/group/reflects/on,/elaborates/and/
adds/ to/ the/ answers/ of/ the/previous/ groups,/ so/ producing/ a/ fairly/ comprehensive/
view/in/a/short/period/of/time./
Question) 1:)Do) you) think) the) current) STI) policy) framework) is) sufficient,)
appropriate,)and)consistent)to)the)Colombian)context?  
The/answers/to/this/question/can/be/classified/into/four/categories.  
The/ first/ category/ relates/ to/ the/coherence' of' public' policies' on' ST&I' with' other'
political'systems. It/is/considered/that/there/is/no/real/link/between/S&T/policies/with/
economic,/ social,/ and/ industrial/ policies. There/was/ also/mentioned/ a/ governance/
problem/of/the/NSI./Although/there/are/laws,/decrees,/rules,/systems,/each/ministry/
and/ incoming/ government/ interpret/ policies/ according/ their/ convenience,/ which/
leads/to/interference/in/policy/implementation/and/longaterm/strategies. There/is/a/
serious/ problem/ with/ regard/ to/ the/ prevalence/ of/ shortaterm/ government/ S&T/
policies/ in/contrast/ to/state/vision,/which/ involves/ longaterm/planning./Participants/
argue/ that/ previous/ S&T/ Law/ (Law/ 29)/ was/ implemented/ successfully/ and/ that/ it/
produced/ good/ results/with/ regard/ to/ S&T/ capacity/ building./ It/ is/ argued/ that/ the/
content/ and/ structure/ of/ this/ law/ is/much/ better/ than/ the/ current/ S&T/ Law/ (Law/
1286/ of/ 2009),/ as/ the/ last/ did/ not/ cover/ previous/ law/ gaps,/ either/ is/ driving/ any/
advance/over/the/previous/law. 
As/ a/ second/ aspect/ of/ discussion,/ it/ was/ said/ that/ there/ is/ not/ enough/human'
resources/to/ sustain/ NSI/ bases. Looking/ at/ the/ data/ from/ the/ latest/ national/
manufacturing/ survey,/ it/ can/ be/ determined/ that/ staff/ education/ level/ in/ the/
industry/is/not/concentrated/in/the/higher/education/levels. This/is/also/reflected/in/




There/ was/ also/ discussion/ about/Francisco' José' de' Caldas' Fund/of/ Colciencias/ for/
training/ of/ human/ resources. Some/ participants/ argue/ that/ the/ background/ is/ not/
sufficiently/ flexible/ in/ allocating/ resources,/ and/ it/ is/ falling/ short/ in/ attracting/
resources/from/other/funding/sources/while/it/is/not/increasing/the/S&T/budget. 
Finally,/ there/ were/ several/ criticisms/ about/ the/ current/ST&I' funding. The/
government's/ strategy/ to/ increase/ funding/ for/S&T/ through/royalties/ is/ considered/
not/ suitable/ for/ development/ on/ S&T/ capabilities/ of/ earmarked/ funds. It/ is/
considered/ that/S&T/must/be/ funded/ through/ the/national/budget. Science/ should/
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be/clearly/ in/ the/public/ agenda/and/ should/not/be/dependent/on/particular/public/
and/private/actors.  
Question/ 2:/What/ are/ the/ main/ problems,/ barriers/ or/ challenges/ the/ NSSTI/ has/
today?  
A/recurring/problem/mentioned/by/the/groups,/ focuses/on/the/failures' for'defining'
and' implementing' public' policies. There/ is/ a/ lack/ of/ continuity/ and/ consistency/ in/
policy/definition. This/can/be/seen/in/the/inconsistencies/between/policies,/strategies/




its' dynamics. There/ is/ an/ absolute/ absence/ of/ research/ and/ reflection/ on/ the/
conceptual/body/of/S&T/policy./Therefore,/there/is/not/feedback/to/the/public/sector/
in/ its/ policyasetting/ exercise. Whilst/ the/ social/ imaginary/ of/ science/ remains/ as/ an/
isolated/aspect/from/social/life,/there/will/be/a/gap/between/policy/and/the/science/
practice. 
The/lack' of' financial' resources' for' investment' in' S&T/ affects/ the/ generation/ of/
innovation. One/ way/ to/ increase/ investment/ in/ S&T/ could/ be/ through/ greater/
investment/from/private/sector,/however,/businessmen/are/not/convinced/that/this/
investment/will/ result/ in/ economic/ benefits,/ or/ an/ important/ differential/ for/ their/
economic/activity./It/is suggested/by/some/groups/to/give/greater/tax/incentives/for/
R&D/ to/ overcome/ this/ problem. This/ would/ also/ help/ to/ mitigate/ investment/
risk. However,/it/was/disagreement/on/this/point,/since/the/incentives/exist/and/they/
have/ not/ been/ successful. It/ is/ suggested/ that/ the/ economic/ incentives/ should/ be/
accompanied/ by/ programs/ focused/ on/ the/ development/ of/ understanding/ and/
capacity/building/on/S&T/in/the/Colombian/companies,/being/them/small,/medium/or/
large. It/ is/ emphasized/ that/ the/ economic/ benefits/ and/ programs/ to/ promote/





unlinked,/ which/ is/ evident/ in/ the/ unequal/ participation/ of/ them/ in/ the/ national,/
departmental/ and/ national/ S&T/ councils. The/ issues/ related/ to/ the/ understanding/
and/use/of/S&T/for/innovation,/is/still/relegated/from/the/public/agenda. In/addition,/
there/ is/ an/ absence/ of/ pressure/ groups/ to/ keep/ alive/ the/ discussion/ about/ the/
importance/of/S&T/to/generate/development/in/the/country. 
The/ institutional/ framework/ for/ S&T/policy/does/not/help/ to/ create/ links/between/
actors. For/ example,/ efforts/ are/ replicated/between/ the/ strategies/of/ the/National/
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Competitiveness/System/and/ the/NSI,/and/sometimes/ initiatives/ from/each/system/
are/contradictory. 
It/is/clear/that/the/public/sector/should/undertake/joint/policy/making/exercises/with/
stakeholders,/ as/many/ of/ the/ policies/ developed/ in/ the/ last/ period/ are/ unfocused/
and/do/not/respond/to/recipients/and/implementers/needs. For/the/private/sector,/it/
is/evident/ the/ low/ level/of/ interest/ in/S&T/ issues/caused/by/ the/ lack/of/knowledge/
about/ how/ S&T/ can/ impact/ productivity,/ and/ a/ low/ level/ of/ confidence/ in/ the/
effectiveness/of/S&T/policies. The/academic/sector/argues/that/there/must/be/more/
and/ better/ reflection/ on/ the/ exercise/ of/ conceptualization/ and/ implementation/ of/
S&T/policies/and/re/strengthening/of/the/science/as/a/social/activity. 
NSSTI future visions. Talk about ideal scenarios – Metaplan 
 
Metaplan/is/a/twoastage/exercise./The/first/involves/individual/brainstorming/without/
judgement/or/ interaction,/ to/come/up/with/3/ responses/ to/a/set/of/questions./The/
second/stage/is/an/interactive/clustering/exercise/in/which/the/whole/group/making/
decisions/about/which/individual/contributions/sit/together/and/what/categories/are/









There/ is/ a/ strong/ and/ continuous/ work/ between/ universities/ and/ industry/ to/
strengthen/clusters. This/workflow/has/been/achieved/through/a/fluid,/participatory/
structure/between/government,/academia/and/the/productive/sector/in/public/policy/
making./ Policies/ are/ contextualized/ to/ the/ needs/ of/ individual/ sectors/ and/ the/
country's/ reality. This/ close/ relationship/ has/ been/ achieved/ through/ successful/
experiments/ on/ the/ participation/ of/ civil/ society/ groups/ about/ the/ definition/ of/
investment/priorities/for/ST&I/resources/at/regional/and/national/levels. 
The/ academic/ sector/ produces/ knowledge/ relevant/ and/ useful/ to/ the/ public/ and/
private/ sectors,/ resulting/ in/ successful/ cases/ of/ innovation./ This/ was/ achieved/ by/
stimulating/the/production/of/knowledge/aligned/with/the/interests/of/national/and/
sectoral/ development,/ through/ public/ policy. Thus,/ in/ 2019/ there/ is/ a/ smooth/
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coordination/ and/ articulation/ between/ policies,/ instruments/ and/ actors/ of/ the/
system,/at/local,/regional/and/national/levels. 
• Definition/and/implementation/of/policies 
Colombia/has/a/state/ST&I/policy/consistent/with/a/solid/ longaterm/vision. There/ is/
coordination/ and/ integration/ between/ sectors,/ organizations/ and/ government/
officials,/which/is/reflected/on/the/definition/and/implementation/of/ST&I/policies/for/
the/ short,/ medium/ and/ long/ term. Thus,/ there/ is/ clearly/ a/ dynamic/ consistency/
between/ public/ policies/ in/ the/ country. Finally,/ the/ National/ Competitiveness/
System/ and/ NSI/ are/ highly/ coordinated. All/ this/ has/ been/ possible/ thanks/ to/ the/
strong/ institutions/ specialized/ on/ the/ design/ of/ efficient/ instruments,/ on/ the/
execution/of/resources,/and/on/the/identification/of/key/actors/demands. 
• Sectors 
New/ sectors/ have/ emerged/ based/ on/ productive/ innovation. The/ emergence/ of/
these/sectors/has/been/supported/by/ST&I/sectoral/policies./These/policies/are/based/
on/ studies/ that/ identify/ country's/ competitive/ capacity/ at/ local,/ regional/ and/
international/ level./ This/ was/ made/ through/ monitoring/ and/ prospective/




The/ Observatory/ is/ structurally/ and/ financially/ consolidated/ for/ information/
management/useful/for/longaterm/planning/to/guide/the/direction/and/political/ST&I/
thought. This/ means/ the/ Observatory,/ in/ addition/ to/ produce/ S&T/ indicators,/
performs/ social/ studies/ about/ S&T/ in/ Colombia. Thus,/ the/ NSSTI/ is/ based/ on/ the/
knowledge/and/results/produced/by/the/centre. 
• Social/appropriation/of/science 
Public/ understanding/ of/ science/ and/ the/ appropriation/ of/ it/ as/ a/ social/ process/ is/
central/ to/ the/ strategies/of/NSSTI./ This/ is/ reflected/on/national,/ regional/ and/ local/




The/ investment/ budget/ in/ S&T/ exceeds/ the/ budget/ of/ war/ (armed/ forces). The/
country/has/evolved/to/have/in/2010/8%/of/GDP/spent/on/defense/and/1%/of/GDP/in/






The/ number/ of/ highly/ qualified/ human/ resources/ has/ increased. Colombia/ went/
from/being/in/sixth/place/in/Latin/America/to/be/in/second/place/in/terms/of/number/
of/ doctoral/ graduates. / These/ doctors,/ in/ addition/ to/ being/ concentrated/ in/ the/
universities/and/research/centres,/have/been/inserted/into/the/productive/sector/and/
leading/laboratories/of/R+D+i/in/the/private/sector. 
Articulation of the key players within the NSSTI. Knowledge flow 
between firms, universities and government - thinking hats 
 
Thinking hats: The underlying principle is that there are three ways of thinking about 
something (to which he attaches different colours): 
Critical judgement (black): logic applied to identifying flaws or barriers, seeking 
mismatch. 
Positive judgement (yellow): logic applied to identifying benefits, seeking harmony. 
Creativity (green): statements of provocation and investigation geared to coming up 
with new ideas, seeing where a thought goes.   
Participants began to consider three questions analyzed from these three different 
hats. They managed to answer the first two questions.  
Q1. Does the current relationship between the academic, private and public sectors 
allow generation of knowledge that results in innovation?  
Today, there is no coordination between sectors that results in knowledge 
generation. For example, nowadays there are not processes where the industrial 
sector expresses real needs to the academic sector with support of the public 
sector. Without an academic foundation, innovation clusters do not exist. But without 
a business sector that has the financial muscle, either. At the end, it can be said that 
there is not a fluid, long-range relationship among the three sectors. 
But if you look at specific sectors, there are different scenarios. The case of 
agriculture, for example, shows an effective integration between the three 
sectors. This does not mean that there is not competing interests. But some 
productive chains have set up their own private research centres (e.g. sugar, rice) 
contributing to generation of relevant knowledge. This is complemented by the 
 
 378 
central role Corpoica (Colombian Corporation of Agricultural Research. 
Decentralized public organization) has for developing basic science that is 
transferred to the private sector. Although this relationship is not established 
completely, the agricultural case has been an example of integration. Another case 
where it can be seen a good coordination between actors in the three sectors, is in the 
hospitals. Today, the relationship between the university and the hospital is 
essential. High-level hospitals know this relationship is fundamental. A successful 
case is that of San Vincente de Paul in Rionegro, Antioquia. In this case, the driver 
was Antioquia’s health cluster and there it can be seen a case of successful synergy 
between the private sector and academia. This is a successful example of strategic 
partnership between Proantioquia (Proantioquia is a non-profit, privately operated 
foundation, established in 1975 by a group of prominent entrepreneurs from 
Antioquia) and Universidad de Antioquia. 
Then it is necessary and important to perform studies of successful cases to integrate 
learned lessons for replication elsewhere in the country. This can be done by 
economic sector (agriculture, health) and also by region (Antioquia). Nevertheless, it 
must be clear that trying to generate a single model for capacity building for the 
whole country, all regions and all sectors, it is not viable. 
While the country does not consider case studies it will not learn. This must be done 
from social studies of science, which the country left. There is not a single call for 
promoting studies on science and technology policy. In the 70’s there was S&T 
thought, not now. Again, it is important to study the sectoral success stories. These 
innovative cases occur despite the state. The second issue imperative to study, refers 
to the behavior of Colombian business. The current mistake of Colciencias is to 
believe that private sector is driven primarily from chambers of commerce. The 
success story of Antioquia is Proantioquia, not its chamber of commerce. Among the 
successful cases of joint regional actors can be counted on Route innovation in 
Antioquia, ICESI, Lili Valley Foundation. In the case of Valle de Lili Foundation 
(Hospital organization), the Valle (department or state of Colombia) business 
community know that without science, there is not dialogue with the nation. It is a 
different business thinking, so it is important to promote again these kind of 
studies. In these studies, it should include and give priority to small industry. The 
only social topic that is driven from the public sector is that of peace, the rest is left 
out, which is a costly mistake for the country.  
Q2. Does the current NSSTI structure promote and encourage the formation of 
learning cycles to generate useful knowledge in the productive sector?  
The system is not systemic. Successful experiences happen because of members of 
civil society, but not because the structure of the system facilitates these 
processes. However, it is a mistake to put on the head or structure of the system, a 
responsibility that goes far beyond the system. Those who create learning cycles are 
the companies and their networks.  
However, it is important to boost from NSSTI different levels of science 
utility. Scientific activity has objectives that eventually may result in concrete 
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application, but not necessarily start with a particular purpose. If there is not clear 
that all sectors of scientific activity should be supported with the same intensity and 
financial support there will not be S&T that allows innovation. For example, when 
Colciencias decides that only supports social research topics on violence and 
disasters, is receding. There is a total misunderstanding of what S&T as a social 
investment mean for the generation of innovation and development. 
In this sense, the problem the country has is that always stays in form and not in 
substance. When talking about the system, we talk about a set of relationships, it is 
much more than just a formal issue. It is imperative to address the internal rules of 
the game, underlying articulations, dynamic consistencies or inconsistencies between 
public policies, beyond what is formally prescribed. Public policy is being captured 
by officials, maximizing the income of each institution. Then studies must go beyond 
the formal system. 
Another aspect that must be developed is monitoring and evaluation of policies for 
policy design and building. Further impact studies should be made. There must be 
clear roles between design, implementation and evaluation of policies. The 
assessment documents are repetitive, and are not being used for feedback. If there is 
not research on the dynamics of S&T, it is impossible to learn. However, although 
impact assessments are made and cost large amounts of money, the evaluated 
programs and policies change or disappear before results are presented. This makes 
no sense. 
With regard to the productive sector participation, Colciencias fails in its calls to the 
private sector, because its conditions and specifications are difficult to understand 
and follow for employers, especially for small and medium enterprises. This result in 
the participation of very large companies in the projects, which already know how to 
respond to the complicated requirements of Colciencias, but small companies feel 
overwhelmed before starting the process. 
It is also important to divide the functions of design, implementation and evaluation 
of S&T policies. Recently it has begun a restructuring process to divide science 
policy design and implementation in Colciencias. On the other hand, the policies 
concerning innovation will be centralized in Bancoldex. However, it remains unclear 
how it will be the division. 
